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Abstract
Hazards on accident sites are such that investigators must balance personal safety 
against the risks involved in collecting evidence intended to prevent future loss of life. 
Better knowledge of hazards and their mitigation could reconcile these conflicting 
objectives to a point at which risk might be no greater than in other workplaces. 
Nevertheless, the magnitude and nature of the hazards at any accident site cannot be 
determined in advance.
The perceptions of novice accident investigators of potential hazards are not greatly 
different from the realities encountered by experienced investigators, although the 
former tend to focus on general health and safety issues, while experienced investigators 
are more aware of hazards arising from aircraft systems and materials. Experienced 
investigators reported most of the hazards they encountered over six years as arising 
within a narrow range of hazard categories - yet they must be prepared to carry  out 
thorough investigations while protecting themselves against all hazards, including those 
encountered very infrequently.
Both generic and dynamic risk assessments are important in protecting investigators and 
the integrity  of evidence. The ongoing management of an investigation in the field 
involves a continuous and iterative cycle: identification of hazards, determination of 
exposure, assessment of risk, introduction of controls, review and assessment of 
remaining risk, and identification and management of residual hazard. Lives and 
evidence depend upon the quality of this process.
At present, great reliance is placed on personal protection equipment as a control on 
hazards. Observation of participants in training programmes has identified instances of 
poor selection and ineffective use of such equipment to the extent that it has provided 
no protection. 
The thesis points to required further directions in the training of investigators - an 
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USCG  US Coast Guard
US&R  Urban Search and Rescue 
UTC  Universal Co-ordinated Time      
VHF  Very High Frequency
VOR  VHF Omnidirectional and Range
WAAS  World Aircraft Accident Summary
WEL  Workplace Exposure Limits
WRVS  Women’s Royal Voluntary Service





On the night of 12th February  2009, a Colgan Air Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 aircraft 
crashed while on an instrument approach into Buffalo International Airport. The 
accident killed all 49 passengers and crew on board, and caused one fatality on the 
ground. The aircraft crashed into a house, and both the house and the aircraft were 
destroyed by the impact and resulting post-crash fire. Within 15 minutes of the accident, 
emergency responders from four fire departments and three police departments had 
arrived on the site (NTSB, 2009a). The post-impact fire was not extinguished until 1045 
hrs on the following day. It was later discovered that the accident impact had severed a 
gas pipe, which was fuelling the fire (NTSB, 2009b).
By the following morning, a team of twelve National Transportation Safety  Board 
(NTSB) investigators had been deployed to attend the site. Investigators and advisors 
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Transportation Safety  Board of 
Canada (TSB), Bombardier Aerospace and Pratt & Whitney Canada arrived on site from 
the 13th February to support the investigation (NTSB, 2009c). The wreckage trail was 
largely confined to a single property. The systems group of the investigation team 
remained on site until 18th February  2009 (NTSB, 2009d). Once the on site 
investigation had been completed, the wreckage of the aircraft was moved to secure 
storage, for further analysis (NTSB, 2009e).
When an aircraft accident such as this occurs, the country in which it has happened (the 
‘State of Occurrence’) has an obligation to investigate. This is documented by  the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a), which 
defines an investigation as “a process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention, 
which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, 
including the determination of causes, and, when appropriate, the making of safety 
recommendations” . The same document recommends that “when possible, the scene of 
the accident shall be visited, the wreckage examined and statements taken from 
witnesses”. At any accident site, the aim of the investigation team is to collect as much 
evidence as is necessary to identify causal factors objectively and accurately.
Although different types and sizes of accidents require different approaches to evidence 
collection, they all have two factors in common. First, there is immense pressure on 
investigators to proceed rapidly with their work. Time is of the essence: the evidence is 
perishable, and those affected by the accident - and the public as a whole - want to 
know what went wrong and how such an accident could be prevented in the future. The 
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pressure to deliver results is clearly apparent in the intense interest in the loss of an Air 
France A330 on 1st June 2009 in the South Atlantic Ocean: one of the world’s major 
airlines lost a current-model aircraft built by  one of the world’s largest aircraft 
manufacturers, in circumstances yet to be explained.
Second, investigators themselves are at risk on accident sites. Considerations of 
investigator safety are becoming increasingly important in the literature and among 
practitioners and accident investigation authorities. The need for investigators to 
consider their own safety  is an important emerging factor in air accident investigation. 
Several large accidents have demonstrated the myriad hazards that can face 
investigators on site, and even relatively small scale general aviation accidents may 
pose significant personal risk. This thesis considers the role of aircraft accident 
investigators, to examine how they might continue to solve complex problems without 
unacceptable risks to their health and welfare.
1.2 Motivation for the study
Within the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSW), specifies 
that “it shall be the duty  of every employer to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
the health, safety and welfare at work of all his employees”. Other countries have 
similar legislation. The application of the legislation to aircraft accident investigation is 
an area of uncertainty. 
Aircraft accidents and serious incidents, and all injuries to people sustained through 
such events, are investigated by the national investigation agencies: in the UK, this is 
the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the Department for Transport, under 
The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations, 1996. 
However, the health and safety of the AAIB investigators themselves is regulated 
formally by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). 
Although air accident investigators are not first responders to an accident in the same 
sense as the emergency services (fire, police and ambulance services), their objective is 
to arrive at  an accident site as quickly as possible in order to collect and preserve 
perishable evidence. The risks they face might not be as high as those whose job it  is to 
save lives, but the environment they enter is likely  to contain many of the same hazards. 
This is no ordinary  workplace. Managing the hazards without destroying evidence is a 
difficult task, and one for which much of the necessary guidance is inadequate or based 
largely on the personal experience of the investigator. Much of the available guidance 
material is based on the experiences of the authors, and not on measured research. 
The overall aim of this study is to assist in improving investigator safety, while at the 
same time maintaining the quality of the investigation process. Air accident 
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investigation makes an immense contribution to aviation safety, and the overzealous 
application of health and safety requirements must not be allowed to compromise the 
quality of the work of the accident investigator. To date, the HSE has not had reason to 
investigate the working practices of AAIB employees while on aircraft accident sites 
(HSE, 2010a), but it could potentially happen in the future.
1.3 Context of the research
1.3.1 An overview of aircraft accident investigation 
ICAO is very  clear about the purpose of air accident investigation: “the sole objective of 
the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and 
incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability” (ICAO, 
2001a).
Each country which is a signatory  to ICAO is required to have an independent national 
aircraft accident investigation agency  to investigate air accidents and incidents within its 
jurisdiction (ICAO, 2001a). The agency can be an aviation specific investigation 
authority, such as the AAIB (UK), the Air Accident Investigation Unit (AAIU, Ireland), 
Le Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA, France), and the Bundesstelle für 
Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU, Germany). Alternatively, it can be part  of an independent 
multi-modal investigation agency, such as the Australian Transport Safety  Bureau 
(ATSB), the NTSB (USA), and the Transportation Safety  Board of Canada (TSB). 
Countries within the European Union (EU) also have responsibilities for conducting 
independent no-blame investigations, as specified in EU Council Directive 94/56/EC. 
In those parts of the world where accident investigation is not yet the responsibility of 
dedicated accident investigation agencies, investigation is carried out as an ancillary 
task by the air safety regulator, or conducted on a case-by-case basis by a specially 
convened inquiry. 
1.3.2 Aircraft accident investigation in the United Kingdom
The AAIB has its roots back in the Royal Flying Corps in 1915, when Captain 
Cockburn was appointed to the position of Inspector of Accidents (AAIB, 2010a).
The investigative force of the AAIB currently consists of sixteen engineering inspectors, 
twelve operations inspectors, and five flight data recorder inspectors. The organisation 
receives 700-800 notifications of aircraft  accidents and incidents each year. This results 
in 300-400 investigations annually, of which 120-150 require field investigation (AAIB, 
2009a). 
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For a field investigation, the AAIB will deploy at least one engineering inspector and 
one operations inspector. Further engineering or operations inspectors, or a flight data 
recorder inspector, will be deployed as required. Investigation of the British Airways 
777 accident at  London Heathrow Airport (17th January 2008), required ten AAIB 
investigators on the site (AAIB, 2010b). When British Midland flight 92 crashed near 
Kegworth on 8th January 1989, eighteen days after Pan Am flight  103 crashed near 
Lockerbie, all AAIB investigators were either deployed on or between the two sites.
Non-fatal accidents involving sport aviation aircraft are normally  investigated by the 
relevant sports associations (AAIB, 2008a), such as the British Gliding Association 
(BGA) or the British Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association (BHPA). Minor 
incidents not requiring AAIB investigation might nevertheless be followed up by 
company investigators from the airline, the manufacturer, the airport or the insurer. 
1.3.3 On site investigations
For most accidents, the investigation starts at the accident site. Aircraft have crashed in 
a range of environments from Antarctica to the Sahara Desert, and from heavily 
populated areas to the depths of the oceans. Assuming that investigators can reach the 
site, they will be faced with a unique situation, and with a unique range of potential 
evidence to try to retrieve. As noted by former NTSB investigator, Greg Feith (in Faith, 
1996), “... no rehearsal, no amount of experience or careful preparation ... can ever 
prepare an investigator for what he finds on the site ... The actual arrival at an accident 
site is probably the most traumatic thing anyone could ever experience”.
The reaction of former AAIB Principal Inspector, Eddie Trimble is similarly  stark: 
“Confronted with a scene of absolute disaster, whether it be Lockerbie or Kegworth, the 
average reaction is ... where do you start?” (Faith, 1996). Prioritising actions on an 
accident site where evidence may disappear or change is but one of the challenges. 
Given the urgency of collecting and recording evidence, the avoidance of injury might 
not be given the priority it requires. 
Hazards abound at accident sites. They are defined in ICAO Circular 315: Hazards at 
Aircraft Accident Sites, in terms of five categories (ICAO, 2008a, p. v). 
1. “Environment - location (both geographic and topographic), fatigue (effects of 
travel and transportation), insects/wildlife, climate, security, and political 
situation;
2. Physical - fire, stored energy, explosives, structures;
3. Biological - pathogens associated with human remains or cargo consignments and 
state of local hygiene;
4. Materials - exposure to and contact with materials and substances at the site; and
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5. Psychological - stress and traumatic pressures imposed by  exposure to the aircraft 
accident, and interaction with those associated with the air carrier and related 
aviation activities”.
Concern about the effects that hazards on aircraft accident sites may have on site 
responders is not new. Site hazards have been referred to historically in a number of 
guidance documents, texts, and industry discussions (for example Culling, 1992; FAA, 
2010a-e; Ferry, 1988; ICAO, 1970; ICAO, 2000; NTSB, 2002; Wood and Sweginnis, 
2006). National aircraft accident investigation agencies have also published guidance on 
potential site hazards (for example AAIB, 2008a; AAIU, 2005; ATSB, 2006a). These 
documents have been prepared by subject matter experts (SMEs) who are all 
experienced aircraft accident investigators. However, they  generally do no more than 
list potential dangers on accident sites: they  offer only limited guidance on when the 
hazards might be expected, on how they might affect an investigator, and on how to 
protect against them. Additionally, they  do not adequately consider new and emerging 
hazards arising from changes in aircraft technology and aviation operations. 
Circular 315: Hazards at Aircraft Accident Sites (ICAO, 2008a) is significant in that it 
was the first  document to focus solely on hazards-related guidance for aircraft accident 
investigators. It was the product of a decade’s work by the Hazards at Accident Site 
Study Group (HASSG), a forum of subject matter experts from aircraft accident 
investigation agencies. Specifically, the document seeks to “... assist individuals to 
consider and apply effective occupational safety management practices both to their 
own activities, and to the activities of the teams that they work with, or for which they 
are responsible. The circular discusses the nature and variety of occupational hazards, 
and the management of risk associated with exposure to these hazards” (ICAO, 2008a).
The publication of Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) represents a milestone in shifting 
attitudes towards the threats present at accident sites. It was long overdue, and the fact 
that it has been published only recently might suggest that the accident investigation 
community has been slow to acknowledge a potential problem.
1.4 Objectives of the Research
1.4.1 Research questions
Although the the body  of literature on air accident investigation is extensive, there are 
gaps in our present knowledge about the potential hazards on aircraft accident sites. 
This thesis presents four studies which are designed to fill some of those gaps. The 
objective of the research is to increase the general awareness of accident site hazards 
among investigators, by answering the following questions:
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1. What hazards may arise for investigators collecting evidence on aircraft accident 
sites?
2. What site hazards do novice aircraft accident investigators perceive to be a risk?
3. What hazards are experienced accident investigators identifying on sites?
4. How do accident investigators identify and manage the hazards?
The results of each of these studies will assist in shaping recommendations to improve 
hazards-specific training for aircraft accident investigators.
1.4.2 Context
Each of the four questions is answered using an applied research methodology, the 
purpose of which is to produce “knowledge that is practical and has immediate 
application to pressing problems of concern” (‘Applied Research’, Sage Encyclopaedia 
of Qualitative Research, 2008). The outcomes of the research need to be practical if 
they are to be of benefit to aircraft accident investigators. 
In the broad scheme of accident investigation, the identification and management of 
hazards might seem incidental and of relatively minor importance, but if mismanaged it 
has the potential not only to cause injury  and illness to the workforce, but also to 
destroy evidence. That in turn can affect the outcome of the investigation, and hence 
future aviation safety. The pressing nature of the accident investigator’s work does not 
allow for the same time to be spent on the preparation of detailed written risk 
assessments as in other workplaces, nor do accident investigators have the option of 
removing certain hazards from the site without affecting the evidence. 
A variety of fieldwork measures have been applied in collecting data for the four 
studies, including surveys and observations. Fieldwork introduces variables into the 
analysis which cannot always be pre-determined, but can generally be accounted for 
through proper understanding. The fieldwork was complemented by  analysis of 
literature and historical data. 
The data are, in the main part, qualitative data, intended to provide “well grounded, rich 
descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts” (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). There is relatively limited capacity for accident investigators to 
define numerically the risk of a particular substance being on a particular site. What is 
most beneficial for them is to develop a generic knowledge base regarding potential 
hazards, and to understand the processes and tools available to mitigate the risks of 
those hazards that have been identified. It is for this reason that  qualitative research data 
collection and analysis methodologies have been applied.
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1.4.3 Structure of the thesis
Four studies have been used to answer the four research questions. Each study is a 
separate piece of research and is presented separately within the thesis, but each builds 
on the findings of the previous study. Figure 1.1 shows the structure of the thesis.
Study One (Chapter Three) reviews the hazards that investigators potentially might 
encounter when collecting evidence on an aircraft accident site. As discussed in Section 
1.2 and Section 2.6.5, ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) is the most up-to-date explanatory 
guidance on hazards at aircraft accident sites. However, it is only  an overview, and by 
no means an exhaustive reference manual. The purpose of Study One is to complement 
the abbreviated guidance provided by the Circular, to develop an enriched 
understanding of how hazards may affect those on aircraft accident sites. It does this by 
analysis of accident reports and other empirical data. 
Study Two (Chapter Four) identifies the hazards that novice investigators perceive as 
posing most risk on aircraft accident sites. By examining the awareness of particular 
hazards among novice accident investigators and their perception of the consequent 
risk, we can assess the level of general hazards identification skills possessed by 
investigators. From that  basis, improvements can be made in the content and design of 
training courses.
Study Three (Chapter Five) reviews the hazards that experienced aircraft accident 
investigators have encountered while collecting evidence, and the personal protective 
equipment they used on the site. This study complements Study Two, by  allowing for 
comparison to be made between hazards perceived and hazards actually identified. The 
purpose of this pair of studies is to understand whether the intrinsic knowledge of 
hazards will prepare an investigator for the actual hazards met on the job. 
Study Four (Chapter Six) observed accident investigators on both simulated and real 
accident sites, to identify the processes used to identify, assess and manage hazards. The 
purpose of this was to assess the impact of training on the hazard assessment and 
management process.
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis
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1.4.4 Scope of the research
The number of potential hazards on aircraft accident sites is almost limitless. For that 
reason, some restrictions have been placed on the boundaries of the research problem. 
First, as noted in Section 2.3.2.6, the research focus is on hazards of aircraft accident 
sites, and not on hazards posed by wreckage analysis off site. Second, it focuses only on 
hazards and processes which affect aircraft accident investigators and technical advisors 
during the evidence collection process, and not on other participants at  other stages of 
the response to an accident. Emergency responders and wreckage recovery 
organisations perform different functions, and may face different risks from those 
encountered in the accident investigation phase.
Finally, the research is limited to hazards potentially occurring on accident sites 
investigated by civilian accident investigation agencies. Accidents involving military 
aircraft may  create additional hazards: their investigation requires specialist military 
knowledge of systems and operations. However, the research does draw on some 
examples of hazards identified when civilian accident investigators have been involved 
with the investigation of military aircraft accidents.
1.4.5 Contribution to knowledge
Previous work on hazards at aircraft accident sites has been based on the site experience 
of investigators. These experiences have been the foundation on which guidance 
material has been developed for training purposes. This research is the first research to 
systematically  review the effects of hazards on evidence collection, to compare the 
perceptions of hazards by trainees investigators with the realities encountered by 
experienced investigators, and to compare the different approaches of trainee 
investigators and experienced investigators to the identification and assessment of 
hazards in the field.
The findings of this research, on the design of hazards specific training for aircraft 
accident site attendees, were presented at the 2010 International Society of Air Safety 
Investigators (ISASI) annual conference and are published in the associated proceedings 





2.1 Aircraft accident investigation
2.1.1 The purpose of investigating aircraft accidents
ICAO is very  clear about the function of aircraft accident investigation: “the sole 
objective of the investigation shall be the the prevention of other accidents and 
incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion blame or liability” (ICAO, 
2001a). All countries contracting to ICAO must provide a means of investigating 
accidents and serious incidents involving transport aircraft which occur “between the 
time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such 
persons have disembarked” (ICAO, 2001a).
The 190 States which have contracted to ICAO (ICAO, 2009a) must under the 
Convention of International Civil Aviation (ICAO, 2006a) maintain a high degree of 
uniformity in terms of the regulations developed for all aspects of aviation. This 
uniformity has been achieved by the agreement of contracting States to eighteen 
annexes to the Convention, each of which provides standards and recommended 
practices (SARPs) for different areas of aircraft operation. Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a) is 
the relevant document for aircraft accident and incident investigation. The annexes, and 
the included SARPs, are directive only, not legislative. It is the duty of each contracting 
State to mandate the SARPs through national legislation, or to formally  notify ICAO of 
any aspects of the SARPs which they do not propose to make mandatory (ICAO, 
2006a).
An investigation is “a process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention, which 
includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, 
including the determination of causes, and when appropriate, the making of safety 
recommendations” (ICAO, 2001a). 
Although the investigation of an aircraft accident “is a task that can be almost unlimited 
in scope” (ICAO, 2003a), there are elements common to all investigations: as noted by 
Wood and Sweginnis (2006), “All aircraft accidents are different, but the accident 
investigation process doesn’t change very  much”. With rare exceptions, investigations 
into aircraft accidents and serious incidents follow similar stages: notification and 
deployment, on site investigation, off site investigation, analysis, safety 
recommendations, and report writing. One representation of this sequence is shown in 
Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Overview of the investigation process for accidents and serious incidents
Source: Walker, 2008
Aircraft accident investigation agencies are usually notified of an accident by air traffic 
services or the aircraft operator (ICAO, 2000). This initial step  in the investigation 
process is highly regulated by ICAO. Once an accident investigation agency  in the State 
of Occurrence receives notification of an aircraft accident within their jurisdiction, it 
becomes responsible for notifying the State of Registry  of the aircraft, the State of the 
Operator, the State of Design, the State of Maintenance, and ICAO (if the aircraft 
involved has a maximum take off weight [MTOW] greater than 2250kg). These various 
notifications might necessarily be very basic: the type of aircraft, the number of 
passengers and crew, and the location of the accident (ICAO, 2001a). An aircraft 
accident investigator deployed to an accident site initially might have no more than this 
very sketchy information, and lack any details of injuries, cargo or the physical 
characteristics of the site. 
With the exception of accidents involving missing aircraft  or wreckage that is 
inaccessible, “the accident site is the primary area of investigation” (ICAO, 2003a). The 
investigation is inevitably  time-critical: any delay  in the arrival of investigators might 
well result in “the deterioration or disappearance of essential evidence due to theft, 
displacement, or improper handling of the wreckage, adverse weather, corrosion of the 
wreckage, obliteration of ground scars or contamination of witness accounts through 
discussion among themselves” (ICAO, 2000). Additionally, investigators will seek 
evidence off site: such as witness interviews, air traffic control tapes and radar plots, 




   
 
 
   





   
  
 
    
   
                                                       
   
 
1.5
situations and provide guaranteed success, and analysis activities ultimately rely on
the judgement of safety investigators.
Figure 1: Overview of safety investigation activities
Need for an enhanced analysis framework
Despite its importance, complexity, and reliance on investigators’ judgements,
analysis has been a neglected area in terms of standards, guidance and training of
investigators in most organisations that conduct safety investigations. Many 
investigators (from most safety investigation organisations) seem to conduct
analysis activities primarily using experience and intuition which is not based on, or
guided by, a structured process. It also appears that much of the analysis is typically 
conducted while the investigation report is being written. As a result, the writing 
process ca  become ineffici nt, supporting arguments for findings may be weak or
not clearly presented, and important factors can be missed.
The ATSB and its predecessor the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI)3 have
for many years been examining ways to improve investigation processes. In terms 
3 The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI) became part of the newly formed multi-modal
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) on 1 July 1999. 
- 6  -
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Once the site investigation is complete, the site is cleared and the accident investigators 
return to base to analyse the evidence. They  may recover the wreckage in whole or in 
part for further analysis. Some aircraft accident investigation agencies, such as the 
AAIB, recover wreckage on an almost routine basis whereas others, such as the ATSB, 
recover parts only  when necessary for further specific analysis, or when relating to a 
large scale accident. These differences are in part due to geography: being smaller, it is 
more feasible to transport wreckage by road in the UK than in Australia.
ICAO defines the analysis of evidence as “evaluation of evidence” (ICAO, 2003b).  In 
evaluating evidence, investigators might select from one of many formal analytical 
tools: these include fault tree analysis (FTA), Management Oversight  Risk Tree 
(MORT), Reason’s Model, root  cause analysis, Systematic Cause Analysis Technique 
(SCAT), Sequential Timed Events Plotting (STEP), Tripod-BETA and so on. Two 
aircraft accident investigation organisations, the ATSB and the TSB, have developed 
their own tools of analysis: the “ATSB investigation analysis model” (Walker and Bills, 
2008) and the “Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology” (ISIM) (Ayeko, 2002). 
Alternatively, or as well, accident investigators might rely on their own tried and tested 
skills and judgements as subject matter experts and experienced investigators.
Accident reports are required to be published in a format compliant with guidelines in 
Annex 13 (ICAO 2001a; further detail in ICAO, 2003b). This can be either a 
comprehensive final report  in formal standard format, or - in the case of smaller aircraft 
accidents - a published accident report form (ICAO, 2003b). In 2009, the AAIB 
published only six formal reports, but 290 shorter accident report forms. Where 
necessary, accident investigation agencies might also issue interim reports to provide 
information about the progress of an investigation.
Safety  recommendations are “actions which should prevent other accidents from similar 
causes or reduce the consequences of such accidents” (ICAO, 2003b). They can be 
issued at any time during an investigation, ahead of the final report (ICAO, 2001a): for 
instance, the AAIB issued nine safety recommendations during the investigation of the 
B777 accident at London Heathrow Airport on 17th January 2008 (AAIB, 2008b, 
2008c, 2009b). The final report contained nine more safety recommendations (AAIB, 
2010b). 
Safety  recommendations are advice rather than mandatory  requirements, and do not 
require obligatory implementation (Baxter, 1995). It is however the duty of the recipient 
to consider the recommendation, and formally to decide whether or not to implement it. 
This maintains the necessary separation between the role of the investigation authority 
and the role of the regulator: only the latter can make mandatory requirements.
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2.1.2 Regulation of aircraft accident investigation
ICAO Annex 13 (2001a) sets out the process for developing policies and procedures on 
aircraft accident investigation, and is the standard document to which each member 
State of ICAO is required to adhere.
Within the European Union (EU), implementation of ICAO Annex 13 is a legislative 
requirement under Council Directive 94/56, which established fundamental principles 
governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents. Compliance with 
this directive is mandatory for EU member states: under Article 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, the national legislation of each State must directly 
reflect the the Directive. Under UK legislation, the applicable instrument is The Civil 
Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1996. 
There is currently a proposal to revise Council Directive 94/56 and upgrade it from a 
directive to a regulation (European Commission, Mobility and Transport, 2009). 
Proposed changes include the renaming of accident investigation authorities as “Civil 
Aviation Safety Investigation Authorities”, and the establishment of a “European 
Network of Civil Aviation Safety  Investigation” comprised of the heads of the accident 
investigation agency in each EU member State (Department for Transport, 2010). This 
would not affect  the responsibility of the AAIB, under UK regulations, to investigate all 
accidents or serious incidents within or above the UK, or involving UK registered 
aircraft in countries with no investigative agency.
AAIB inspectors also work under The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Military Air 
Accidents at Civil Aerodromes) Regulations 2005. These regulations require the AAIB 
to investigate military aircraft accidents occurring during take-off or landing at civil 
aerodromes in the UK, or when the investigation of an accident involving a military 
aircraft is likely also to be of benefit to civil aviation. 
2.1.3 Aircraft accident investigation organisations
EU Council Directive 94/56 requires each Member State to ensure that investigations 
are conducted or supervised by  a permanent civil aviation body or entity, which is to be 
“functionally independent in particular of the national aviation authorities responsible 
for airworthiness, certification, flight operation, maintenance, licensing, air traffic 
control or airport operation and, in general, of any  other party whose interests could 
conflict with the task entrusted to the investigating body or entity”.
Although it  receives its budgetary  appropriation through the UK Department for 
Transport, the AAIB is statutorily a non-departmental public body  (NDPB) with 
responsibilities defined in legislation. The Chief Inspector of Air Accidents reports 
directly  at Cabinet level to the Secretary  of State for Transport, rather than to the 
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Permanent Secretary for the Department for Transport (AAIB, 2010c). The AAIB has 
no operational links with the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), and - as required by 
ICAO as well as the EU - is not compromised in its independence.
In Australia, the ATSB has a similar governance structure, in that is the part of the 
Australian Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local 
Government, but separate from the Australian CAA. In the United States, the NTSB is 
its own independent federal agency, separate from the US Department of Transport and 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Similarly in Canada, the TSB is 
independent from Transport Canada.
In each of these national jurisdictions, the objective is for aircraft  accident investigators 
to be scrupulously independent from other aviation agencies. They must be able to 
make safety recommendations directed at other relevant agencies, without fear or bias, 
and therefore fulfil their intended purpose of preventing future aircraft accidents and 
incidents.
2.1.4 Training and skills of aircraft accident investigators
There is no specific qualification or training pathway necessary to become an aircraft 
accident investigator. Braithwaite (2002) notes that “... there are few roles as specialised 
or as skilled as accident  investigation that do not carry a specific professional 
qualification or accreditation”. Accident investigators come from a variety of 
backgrounds, but generally  possess a high level of qualification and experience in their 
particular specialist fields, and normally complete some form of training.
The AAIB requires operations inspectors to hold an Air Transport Pilots Licence 
(ATPL), and to have command experience in either fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. 
Engineering inspectors must have an engineering degree or be a chartered engineer, and 
ideally  have experience as an aviation engineer. Additionally, the AAIB also looks for 
engineering inspectors to have some flying experience. Flight recorder inspectors must 
hold a degree in electronics, electrical engineering, or aeronautical engineering, or be a 
member of a chartered professional organisation with at least eight years of experience 
(AAIB, 2010c).
The ICAO training guidelines (2003a) recognise four stages of training for an aircraft 
accident investigator: initial training; on-the-job-training; a basic accident investigation 
course; and an advanced accident investigation course. It is also recommended that this 
be supplemented by specialist courses where required.
Initial training is intended to provide novice investigators with an understanding of local 
procedures. On-the-job training involves work-shadowing an experienced investigator, 
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either within their own organisation or in another accident investigation organisation 
(ICAO, 2003a).
The topic areas recommended for the basic accident investigation course are (ICAO, 
2003a):
• “the responsibilities of the States involved, as defined in Annex 13 - Aircraft Accident 
and Incident Investigation;
• the accident site considerations, such as security, hazards,  safety precautions, wreckage 
diagramming, collection of evidence and control of access;
• the investigators’ personal equipment and protective clothing;
• the examination and recording of the wreckage and witness marks;
• the range of apparatus available for recording evidence;
• witness interview techniques;
• the full range of in-flight recorders and ground-based recorders;
• the determination of the time and origin of any aircraft fires;
• crashworthiness and survival aspects;
• the properties and the modes of failure materials used in the aircraft structure;
• the design of aircraft systems and likely modes of failure;
• aerodynamics and aircraft performance;
• the examination of power plants;
• human performance;
• aviation medicine and pathology; and
• the methodology of report writing”.
The syllabus for the advanced course is designed to develop these topics further, and 
additionally covers a range of new topics (ICAO, 2003a): 
• “techniques used to investigate accident damaged systems that involve specialised 
technologies such as glass cockpit; fly-by-wire systems, GPS, and enhanced ground 
proximity warning systems (EGPWS);
• reconstruction of evidence recorded in damaged solid state recorders;
• the use of virtual video presentations in large structural reconstructions of wreckage; and
• the use of computer simulations and programmes for flight simulators to recreate aspects 
of the aircraft’s flight path which are of interest to the investigation”.
 
The advanced course also prepares the investigator to become an investigator-in-charge, 
and thus take responsibility for major investigations. Thus it includes:
• the provision of family assistance to those involved in an accident;
• relations with the media;
• an introduction to methods for cataloguing a large number of fragments of wreckage;
• management of a large accident site for security, safety and protection of the personnel;
• preparation of briefings and answers to formal questions for members of government;
• the methods of undertaking investigations that involve both civil and military aircraft; 
and
• liaison with law enforcement authorities in accidents involving unlawful interference”.
It is of course important that aircraft accident investigators should attend a range of 
courses regularly  throughout their careers. The ICAO training manual (ICAO, 2003a) 
suggests that these programmes should include courses on aircraft types that they are 
likely to encounter in investigations, courses on the investigation of helicopter 
accidents, and courses on the investigation of human factors in the occurrence of 
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accidents. The ICAO Circular 315: Hazards at Aircraft Accident Sites (ICAO, 2008a) 
additionally recognises the need for health and safety training of accident investigators.
Basic and advanced training courses are offered by training providers which are 
subsidiaries of accident investigation bodies, such as the NTSB Training Academy and 
ATSB training. They are also offered by  independent training providers such as 
Cranfield University, Southern California Safety Institute (SCSI), and the University of 
Southern California (USC).
Flaherty (2008) studied the requisite skills needed by  accident investigators employed 
by the UK Accident Investigation Branches (AIBs). Inspectors were asked to grade their 
self-perceived level of expertise in a variety of investigation skills, on a scale from 0 
(little or no knowledge) to 5 (expertise). A score of 4 indicates “extensive knowledge 
where currency is maintained and the knowledge is regularly  applied” (Flaherty, 2008). 
The median scores given by AAIB Inspectors for their general investigative skills are 
given in Figure 2.2. The median scores for aircraft specific investigation skills are 
shown in Figure 2.3.
AAIB inspectors rated their skills highly  in such key investigation areas as investigation 
management, evidence collection, data analysis, report writing, safety recommendation 
writing, and - of particular interest to this thesis - accident site health and safety. Areas 
where they do not rate their skills as highly - such as crash simulation, structures/
airframe, cabin equipment and air traffic control procedures - are areas in which 
specialist consultants are contracted in for assistance as technical advisors (see Section 
2.3.2.1.3). The results of this study could reflect the particular specialisations in 
engineering and operations in the AAIB and might not be replicated in other 
investigation agencies such as the NTSB, where investigators have different 




  a:  Investigation management
  b:  Resource management
  c:  Legislation
  d: Accident site health and safety
  e:  Wreckage plotting
  f:  Photography
  g:  Evidence collection
  h:  Documenting evidence
  i:  Interviewing
  j:  Data gathering
  k:  Data recovery/analysis
  l:  Accident reconstruction
  m:  Crash simulation
  n:  Human performance
  o:  Ergonomics
  p:  Media relations
  q:  Family liaison
  r:  Expert witness/of face
  s:  Industry co-ordination
  t:  Analysis methods
  u:  Report/technical writing
  v:  Recommendation writing
  w:  Technical presentation
  
Figure 2.2: AAIB Inspectors’ scoring of general investigative skills
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  Key:
  a:  Aerodynamic/stability/control
  b:  Structure/airframe
  c:  Propulsion
  d:  Flight control systems
  e:  Aircraft operating systems
  f:  Flight deck engineering
  g:  Avionics
  h:  Flight dynamics modelling/simulation
  i:  Cabin equipment
  j:  Group operations
  k:  Airline flight operations
  l:  Crew procedures
  m:  Training/simulation
  n:  Air traffic control procedures
  o:  Atmospheric effects
Figure 2.3: AAIB Inspectors’ scoring of aircraft design and operation knowledge
Source: Adapted from Flaherty, 2008.
As noted by  Clitsome (2007) in his discussion of the management of major 
investigations, “No investigation agency is staffed to the level where it has all the 
required in-house expertise and resources to respond to a major occurrence”. He 
recommends that investigation agencies develop  “safety partnerships” with 
organisations which might assist  in potential future aircraft accident investigations, 
informally or through formal memoranda of understanding. 
The basic and advanced ICAO training guidelines (ICAO, 2003a) both refer to accident 
hazards and safety precautions. AAIB inspectors rate their skills in accident site health 
and safety at a score of 4, indicating that they  believe they have extensive and current 
knowledge in this area and apply it  regularly. In part, the present research tests this 
belief. Section 2.6.6 takes up the issue of hazards specific training for aircraft accident 
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2.2 Aircraft operations and manufacture
2.2.1 Categories of aircraft operations
ICAO (2001b, pp. 1-3) defines three categories of aircraft operations, each of which can 
be conducted by fixed wing or rotary wing aircraft: 
1. Commercial air transport: “An aircraft operation involving the transport of 
passengers, cargo or mail for remuneration or hire”;
2. Aerial work: “An aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used for specialised 
services such as agriculture, construction, photography, surveying, observation 
and patrol, search and rescue, aerial advertisement, etc.”; and
3. General aviation: “An aircraft  operation other than a commercial air transport 
operation or an aerial work operation”.
Each operation type may be conducted with either a fixed wing or rotary  wing aircraft 
(traditional aeroplanes or helicopters). 
Other organisations define aircraft operations slightly  differently. For example, the 
ATSB (2009a) categorise operations into commercial air transport (including high 
capacity regular public transport  [RPT], low capacity RPT and charter flights); other 
commercial (including aerial work, flight training and business); and private/sports 
aviation. Within the USA, operations may be divided into categories such as on-demand 
air taxi, person, business, instruction, corporate, aerial application, aerial observation, 
other work, public use, ferry, or positioning flights (AOPA, 2009). 
In their guidance to accident responders, the AAIB (2010d, 2010e) divide operations 
into two categories: public transport aircraft and general aviation (GA) aircraft. This 
reflects the general level of response needed to an aircraft accident: in almost all cases, 
public transport aircraft  accidents will require a much larger response than a general 
aviation aircraft accident.
2.2.2 The occurrence of aircraft accidents
2.2.2.1 Overview
The national accident investigation agencies and national aviation regulators all publish 
information on aircraft accidents within their jurisdiction. There are also a number of 
international databases in which aircraft accidents can be reviewed. These include the 
FAA cabin safety  research technical group database (maintained by  RGW Cherry and 
Associates, current to 2009), the Warwick Air Accident database (current to 1997), the 
World Aircraft Accident Summary  (WAAS, maintained by ASCEND, current to 2009), 
the AOPA Air Safety  Foundation Accident database (current to 2009), and the aviation 
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safety  network database (Flight Safety Foundation, current to 2009). These databases 
provide a wealth of searchable information about aircraft accidents, using information 
gathered from published accident reports. However, they focus solely  on the outcomes 
of the investigations, and contain little information about the processes of investigation. 
Further, it is noted that  a significant factor in variation in the number of aircraft 
accidents reported by different accident investigation bodies is their use of different 
definitions of accidents. 
2.2.2.2 Commercial aircraft operations
In 2008, the most recent year for which complete data are available ICAO recorded 
twelve fatal aircraft accidents involving scheduled passenger flights on aircraft with an 
MTOW greater than 2,250kg (ICAO, 2009a). These twelve accidents killed 455 
passengers. Aircraft that have an MTOW greater than 2,250kg and may  operate 
commercially include Airbus and Boeing commercial airliners, regional jets and turbo-
props such as the Embraer 145/170/190 variants, the Shorts 360, the BAe ATP, and 
helicopters such as the Sikorsky S-76.
Amongst European registered aircraft of the same MTOW, there were 35 commercial 
aircraft accidents in 2008, including three fatal aircraft accidents that killed 160 
passengers and crew (EASA, 2009). For the same year, EASA recognised 54 fatal 
accidents world wide to aircraft in this weight category, including 28 passenger flights, 
fifteen cargo flights, five ferry/position flights, three air taxi flights, one emergency 
medical flight, one training flight, and one flight of unknown purpose (EASA, 2009). In 
the same aircraft category, commercial air transport in Australia in 2008 recorded 3,955 
incidents, 53 serious incidents, and 30 accidents leading to six fatalities (ATSB, 2009a).
There are various ways in which statistical trends in aircraft accidents may be 
expressed. Within the Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane 
Accidents 1959 - 2009 (Boeing, 2010), the historical accident rates for western-built 
commercially operated aircraft are presented in several ways, including by phase of 
flight (Figure 2.4), and by CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) Aviation 
Occurrence Categories (Figure 2.5). 
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LOC-I CFIT RE (Landing)
+ ARC
+ USOS
UNK SCF-NP MAC RI-VAP RE (Takeoff) OTHR F-NI WSTRW FUEL RAMP SCF-PP
Fatalities by CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) 
Aviation Occurrence Categories 





External fatalities [Total 244]
Onboard fatalities [Total 5001]









1 (8) 2 (2)
961 (0)
606 (21)
ARC Abnormal Runway Contact
CFIT Controlled Flight Into or Toward Terrain
F-NI Fire/Smoke (Non-Impact)
FUEL Fuel Related
LOC-I Loss of Control – In flight 
MAC Midair/Near Midair Collision
OTHR Other
RAMP Ground Handling
RE Runway Excursion (Takeoff or Landing)
RI-VAP Runway Incursion – Vehicle, Aircraft or Person
SCF-NP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Non-Powerplant)
SCF-PP System/Component Failure or Malfunction (Powerplant)
UNK Unknown or Undetermined
USOS Undershoot/Overshoot
WSTRW Windshear or Thunderstorm
No accidents were noted in the following principal categories:
ADRM Aerodrome
AMAN Abrupt Maneuver
ATM Air Traffic Management/Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
BIRD Bird





LALT Low Altitude Operations
LOC-G Loss of Control – Ground
RI-A Runway Incursion – Animal
SEC Security Related
TURB Turbulence Encounter





16 16 4 3 5 4 120 912 332
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2009 STATISTICAL SUMMARY, JULY 2010Figure 2.5: Fatalities by CICTT aviation occurrence categories, 20 0 - 2009
Source: Boeing, 2010
The importance of such different analyses for the present research is that the phase of 
flight, or the assigned aviation occurrence category, might  be useful in identifying the 
hazards likely to be present at an aircraft accident site. This is discussed in Chapter 
Three.
Fatal Accidents and Onboard Fatalities by Phase of Flight
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Percentages may not sum to 100% due to numerical rounding.
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Commercial aircraft  have traditionally been manufactured with an aluminium skin. 
However, as noted by Rakow and Pettinger (2007), composites which were “historically 
reserved for control surfaces and secondary  structures ... are now being employed for 
primary structures in major aircraft  programs”. Figure 2.6 shows the location of 
components built from composites on a Boeing 737; Figure 2.7 shows location and 
types of composites on an A380; and Figure 2.8 is a similar representation of 
composites on a Boeing 787 .
737.0.6
737-100/200/300/400/500 SERIES
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WING TO BODY 
FAIRING
October 31, 2009
Figure 2.6: Location of composites on Boeing 737-100 to -500 series aircraft
Source: Boeing, 2009b
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Figure 2.7: Location of composites on an Airbus 380
Source: Airbus, 2008
The composite materials CFRP, GFRP, and QFRP (Figure 2.7), comprise 22 per cent of 
the operating empty weight of an A380-800, with an additional 3 per cent GLARE 
(Janes’s 2010a). GLARE is a recent composite development made from alternating 
layers of aluminium and glass fibres. The A380-800 has a slightly  higher proportion of 
composites: its basic operating empty weight is 270,015kg (A380-841), of which 27 per 
cent by weight (72,905kg) is of composite material (Janes’s, 2010a). The aircraft has a 
Maximum Zero Fuel Weight (MZFW) of 361,000kg, and an MTOW of 560,000kg 
(Jane’s, 2010a).
 
                                            A380 
AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND 






Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP)
Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastic (GFRP)
Quartz Fiber Reinforced Plastic (QFRP)
Glass Reinforced Aluminum Laminate (GLARE)
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Figure 2.8: Location of composites on a Boeing 787 series aircraft
Source: Boeing, 2009b
By weight, the B787 (Figure 2.8) airframe is 50 per cent composite, 20 per cent 
aluminium, 15 per cent titanium and 10 per cent steel. The operating empty weight of 
the 787-8 (the standard commercial 787 model) is 108,860kg, with a MZFW of 
156,500kg, and a MTOW of 219,550kg (Jane’s, 2010b).
In 2007, the ATSB published data on the age of aircraft  operating in different  weight 
categories in Australia, based on 2005 statistics. Figure 2.9 presents the data by 
categories of size, and gives the percentages by  age in each category. The average age 
of the largest category (Category A) - multi-engine turboprop aircraft, such as the 
Bombardier Dash 8 and Fairchild Metroliner - was eighteen years. The average age of 
small multi-engine turbofan aircraft (Category  B), which includes the Cessna Citation 
and Embraer ERJ was sixteen years. The average age of medium multi-engine turbofan 
aircraft (Category  C), such as the A320, B717 and B737 was six years: more than 70 per 
cent of these aircraft were no more than five years old. The average age of large multi-











Category A: Multi-engine turboprop aircraft
Category B: Small multi-engine turbofan aircraft (MTOW < 50,000kg)
Category C: Medium multi-engine turbofan aircraft (50,001kg < MTOW < 100,000kg)
Category D: Large multi-engine turbofan aircraft (MTOW > 100,000kg)
Figure 2.9: Age bracket (years) of aircraft registered in Australia in 2005
Source: Adapted from ATSB, 2007
Air accident investigators can therefore be called upon to investigate accidents 
involving quite different generations of aircraft. More than 40 per cent of aircraft in 
Category A are 20-40 years old, but almost 80 per cent of Category C aircraft were built 
in the last ten years. Such information about the age distribution of aircraft, combined 
with knowledge of the materials from which they are constructed, is important in 
assisting investigators to anticipate hazards likely to be encountered on particular 
accident sites. Thus investigators are more likely  to encounter hazards arising from 
composite materials at the site of an accident involving a medium multi-engine turbofan 
aircraft, than at  a site involving a multi-engine turboprop aircraft, given the average 
greater age of the latter.
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2.2.2.3 Aerial work and general aviation operations
Figure 2.10 shows the different categories of aircraft operating as GA in the USA. By 
far the most common aircraft type operating GA is the piston engine, fixed wing 
aeroplane.
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Light Sport Aircraft 6,811
2.1   Active General Aviation and On-Demand FAR Part 135 Number of Aircraft by Primary Use by Aircraft Type (2008)


























Total All Aircraft 228,663 154,417 22,432 11,715 14,975 3,106 5,304 1,036 374 934 673 411 4,786 6,873 389 1,237
% Std. Error 1.6 2.3 1.9 0.9 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.2 0.7 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.6
Piston Total 163,013 118,929 18,854 1,874 12,055 1,389 2,943 499 0 642 70 222 3,131 2,261 64 80
% Std. Error 2.4 3.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 4.8 2.1 2.4 3.2 1.1 2.7 2.5 0.7 0.8 0.7
  One Engine 145,497 110,559 14,285 623 11,023 1,341 2,738 364 0 595 67 168 2,703 974 50 9
  Two Engine 17,515 8,370 4,568 1,251 1,032 49 205 135 0 47 3 55 428 1,287 14 71
Turboprop Total 8,906 1,354 1,562 2,158 125 1,163 538 166 0 45 3 47 117 1,393 40 196
% Std. Error 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
  One Engine Total 3,450 547 597 391 49 1,138 26 60 0 24 0 14 31 509 40 25
  Two Engine Total 5,456 807 966 1,767 76 25 512 106 0 21 3 33 86 884 0 172
Turbojet Total 11,042 1,030 835 7,070 43 8 11 12 0 22 3 10 165 1,724 0 106
% Std. Error 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Rotorcraft Total 9,876 1,614 420 342 1,405 465 1,652 327 368 81 108 127 458 1,427 252 832
% Std. Error 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.6
  Piston Total 3,498 1,322 245 27 1,037 180 288 33 0 11 76 3 216 50 10 0
  Turbine Total 6,378 291 175 315 368 285 1,364 294 368 70 32 124 242 1,377 241 832
  - One Engine Turbine 5,007 259 147 183 365 282 1,299 250 283 37 32 50 172 985 231 431
  - Two Engine Turbine 1,371 32 28 132 3 3 65 44 84 33 0 74 70 392 10 401
Gliders Total 1,914 1,594 1 8 269 0 0 0 0 8 14 0 20 0 0 0
Lighter-Than-Air Total 3,738 2,935 12 32 178 0 4 0 0 50 461 3 29 0 34 0
Experimental Total 23,364 20,814 698 222 435 77 138 33 4 83 9 2 759 68 0 22
  Amateur Built 19,767 18,290 476 75 346 5 75 0 2 22 2 2 472 0 0 0
  Exhibition 2,096 1,824 38 8 49 4 0 4 0 26 0 0 142 0 0 0
  Other 1,501 700 183 139 40 67 63 29 3 35 7 0 145 68 0 22
Light-Sport Total 3 6,811 6,147 50 8 465 4 18 0 2 4 6 0 107 0 0 0
1.  Excludes Air Medical Services conducted under FAR Part 135.
2.  Excludes Air Tour and Air Medical FAR Part 135.
3.  Estimated number of light-sport aircraft has increased significantly in 2007 due to mandatory regulatory process changes.    
The Use Categories are defined as part of the FAA General Aviation and Part 135 Activity survey. Starting in 2004, FAR Part 135 Air Taxi, Air Tours, Air Medical, and Commuter use categories were 
added and tabulated separately from other general use categories.  Beginning in 2004, commuter activity is excluded from all estimates.  2003 and prior, commuter activity was included in the Air 
Taxi use category. Table cells that are populated by a small number of aircraft may display relatively high standard errors for the corresponding estimates. Estimates in these types of categories also 
may vary noticeably from year to year and should be interpreted with caution. Columns may not add to totals due to rounding procedures.
In 2004, the FAA expanded the General Aviation Air Taxi Activity & Avionics Survey to include 100 percent of turbine and non-scheduled Part 135 airplanes.  Similarly, 100 percent of aircraft in Alaska 
were also surveyed. Furthermore, the FAA Registry sample was also adjusted. This change in survey methodogy resulted in improved accuracy in the GAATAA information.
Source: FAA









Figure 2.10: Active General Aviation aircraft in the USA, 2008
Source: GAMA, 2010
The situation is similar in the UK: the UK civil aircraft register (CAA, 2010) lists 
20,429 aircraft with an MTOW < 5,700kg registered on 1st  January  2010, with fixed 
wing aircraft being the dominant category (Figure 2.11). The UK statistics do not 
differentiate between piston-engined, turboprop and turbojet aircraft. 
Figure 2.11: Aircraft with an MTOW < 5,700kg on the UK Civil Register
Source: CAA, 2010.
Within the European Union, EASA maintains an accident data base under two 
categories: aircraft for general aviation and aerial work (MTOW > 2,250kg), and light 
















involving the first category of aircraft in 2008. Such aircraft include the Cessna 414, the 
Piper Chieftain, the Beech Baron and Eurocopter EC135. 
Table 2.1: Accidents to EU-registered aerial work and general aviation aircraft with MTOW > 
2,500kg
Aircraft type Operation type Total Number of 
Accidents
Number of Fatal 
Accidents
Aeroplane Aerial work 7 2
Aeroplane General Aviation 17 7
Helicopter Aerial work 5 1
Helicopter General Aviation 3 1
Source: Adapted from EASA, 2009
In the same year, the number of accidents in the second category  - light aircraft with an 
MTOW < 2,250kg - was higher (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2: Accidents to EU-Registered aerial work and general aviation aircraft with MTOW < 
2,500kg
Aircraft Category Total Number of 
Accidents
Fatal Accidents Fatalities on board
Aeroplanes 517 53 98
Balloon 25 1 1
Glider 178 16 16
Gyroplane 12 3 3
Helicopter 64 7 12
Microlight 261 45 70
Motorglider 41 10 11
Other 46 5 5
Unknown 1 0 0
Total 1145 140 216
Source: Adapted from EASA, 2009
Typical aircraft in this weight category include the Schleicher ASK21 (glider); the 
Pegasus Quantum Trike Ultralight (microlight); Cessna 152, Piper PA-28 Warrior and 
Piper Seminole (aeroplanes); and the Robinson 22, Bell 206 Jetranger and Eurocopter 
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AS350 Squirrel (helicopters). Some particular variants of aircraft such as the Piper 
Chieftain and the Beech Baron (listed above as having an MTOW > 2,250kg) may have 
an MTOW < 2,250kg, and therefore could be in either category.
Australian and overseas registered aircraft engaged in aerial work operations in 
Australia in 2008 were involved in 36 accidents including five fatal accidents, two 
serious incidents and 284 incidents. Flying training operations over the same period 
resulted in 21 accidents including three fatal accidents, three serious incidents and 264 
incidents. There was one accident and fourteen incidents in business aviation: and 62 
accidents (including thirteen fatal accidents), four serious incidents and 237 incidents in 
private/sports aviation operations (ATSB, 2009a).
EASA (2009) publishes information on aircraft accidents by accident category for 
aircraft with an MTOW < 2,500kg, which is shown in Figure 2.12. This analysis for 
general aviation is similar to that for fatalities by CICTT aviation occurrence categories 
(see Figure 2.5 above).
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  BIRD  Bird strike
  SEC  Security related
  RI-A  Runway incursion - animal
  RAMP  Ground handling
  ADRM  Aerodrome
  TURB  Turbulence encounter
  ATM  Air traffic management / Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
  ICE  Icing
  RI-VAP  Runway incursion - vehicle, aircraft or person
  WSTR  Windshear or thunderstorm
  F-NI  Fire / smoke (non-impact)
  USOS  Undershoot / overshoot
  RE  Runway excursion
  GCOL  Ground collision
  LOC-G  Loss of control - ground
  FUEL  Fuel related
  AMAN  Abrupt manoeuvre
  ARC  Abnormal runway contact
  SCF-NP  System / component failure or malfunction (non-powerplant)
  F-POST  Fire / smoke (post-impact)
  MAC  Airprox / TCAS alert / loss of separation / near midair collisions / 
    midair collisions
  SCF-PP  System / component failure or malfunction (powerplant)
  CFIT  Controlled flight into or toward terrain
  OTHR  Other
  UNK  Unknown or undetermined
  LALT  Low altitude operations
  LOC-I  Loss of control - inflight
Figure 2.12: EU Accidents by causal category, 2006-2007
Source: EASA, 2009
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A further method of analysis is used in the NALL Report (AOPA, 2009), which 
categorises GA accidents in the USA by primary occurrence in terms of type and phase 
(Figure 2.13). This gives a more generalised overview than that provided by Boeing 
(2010) for commercial aircraft operations (see Figure 2.4 above), but is similarly 
informative for investigators.
Figure 2.13: Categorisation of US GA accidents by primary occurrence type, 2008
Source: AOPA, 2009
In 2009 there were 1,474 GA accidents in the USA, of which 272 were fatal. There were 
20,456,000 flying hours recorded for GA in that year: the accident rate was thus 7.20 
accidents per 100,000 flying hours, or 1.33 fatal accidents per 100,000 flying hours 
(NTSB, 2010a).
Analyses of accidents by elements such as phase of flight and accident occurrence 
categories provide investigators with a frame of reference by which to assess the 
probability  of encountering particular hazards on an accident  site, such as hazards 
arising from the likely condition of the wreckage. For example, an aircraft that  crashes 
on take-off and initial climb, or as a result of controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), is 
almost certain to crash with a higher impact force - due to the high power settings - than 
an aircraft which crashes on landing. 
In general aviation, as in commercial aircraft operations, knowledge of the age of 
aircraft is important in assisting the investigator to assess the probability and nature of 
risks at the accident site. The ATSB ageing aircraft study (ATSB, 2007) found that the 
average age of single-engine fixed-wing GA aircraft in Australia in 2005 was 30 years. 
Over the period 1995-2005, the average age of this group of aircraft increased by seven 
years. Figure 2.14 shows the age range of this group of aircraft  in 1995, 2000 and 2005: 
despite growth of almost 1000 in the number of GA aircraft over the decade, the fleet 
continues to age.
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Figure 2.14: Age of single-engine, fixed-wing aircraft with an MTOW < 5,700kg in Australia
Source: ATSB, 2007
The study found the average age of single-engine piston helicopters in 2005 in Australia 
to be sixteen years, the average age of single-engine turboshaft  helicopters was 23 
years, and the average age of multi-engine turboshaft helicopters was fifteen years 
(ATSB, 2007). 
Similar statistics for the USA (GAMA, 2010) show that in 2009 the average age of 
single-engine piston aircraft was 42 years, single-engine turboprop aircraft sixteen 
years, and single-engine jet aircraft 44 years (most single-engine jet aircraft are ex-
military registered aircraft, which introduce some unique hazards for aircraft accident 
investigators). For multi-engine piston aircraft, the average age was 41 years, for multi-
engine turboprop aircraft 28 years, and for multi-engine jet aircraft seventeen years. The 
average age of all GA aircraft operating in the USA in 2009 was 39 years.
As with commercial aircraft (Section 2.2.2.2), composite materials have become more 
frequently incorporated into GA aircraft, such as the Diamond range and the Cirrus 
range of aircraft. An ATSB review of amateur-built and experimental aircraft (Stanton 
and Taylor, 2009) showed that 30.9 per cent of these aircraft registered in Australia in 
2008 had primary  structures made from composites (Figure 2.15). This is a higher 
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1995 2000 2005 
(N = 6645) (N = 7114) (N = 7591) 
Note: ‘N’ denotes the total number of aircraft in the category for the specified year 
The percentage of aircraft aged over 20 years, the typical design life for an aircraft, 
has increased from 50% to 80% over the 10-year period. The concern is that many 
aircraft in this category do not receive continuing airworthiness support from the 
manufacturer. Continuing airworthiness support and adequate maintenance are 
essential to ensure the flight safety of ageing aircraft (see Section 7). 
The percentage of aircraft aged 5 years or less as increased slightly over the 
period, from 5% in 1995 to 8% in 2005, while the percentage of aircraft aged over 
40 years has increased from 8% to 21%. 
A subcategory of the aircraft included in the single-engine piston fixed-wing 
airc aft category are the VH-registered amateur-built single- ngine piston fixed-
wing aircraft. From 1995 to 2005, there was a 250% increase in the number of 
aircraft in this subcategory. Amateur-built aircraft are contributing an increasing 
proportion of the single-engine piston aircraft category, accounting for 
approximately 10% of registrations by 2005. CASA data on aircraft registrations, 
grouped according to the year of manufacture, underscores the growing popularity 
of amateur-built single-engine aircraft. As of 31 December 2005, some 248 
amateur-built aircraft manufactured between 2001 a  2004 wer  registered in 
Australia. By c mparison, only 138 factory-built (or certified) aircraft 
manufactured during the same period entered the Australian aircraft register.   
Unlike factory-built aircraft, the average age of amateur-built aircraft is relatively 
low, reflecting the recent emergence of this type of aircraft as a popular alternative 
to traditional certified types. The average age of amateur-built aircraft remained at 
10 years throughout the period 1995-2005. 
– 20 – 
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Figure 2.15: Materials used in primary aircraft structure, amateur-built and experimental aircraft in 
Australia, 2008
Source: Stanton and Taylor, 2009
The average age of operating aircraft can provide some form of guidance to 
investigators on hazards from the composition of aircraft at accident sites they may be 
likely to attend. If a particular aircraft  type or operating category has a high average age, 
accident investigators are more likely to be encountering traditional metal airframes 
than composite structures.
2.3 The response to an aircraft accident
A major aircraft  incident or accident  triggers a number of events in response. The nature 
of this response is described by  the London Emergency  Services Liaison Panel (LESLP, 
2007) in terms of four stages: the initial emergency  response; the consolidation phase; 
the recovery phase; and the restoration of normality (Figure 2.16). 




Figure 24: Type of aircraft 
 













Figure 25: Type of aircraft structure 
 










2.3.1 Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:
the initial response;
the consolidation phase;
the recovery phase; and
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2.3.2 An investigation into the cause of the incident, together with the attendant hearings, may 
be superimp sed onto he whole structure.
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Investigation into causes of an accident or incident will start  as soon as possible after 
the event occurs, and continue well after the site is cleared away  and any disrupted 
systems returned to normal. The stages in the response are not necessarily  sequential: 
the emergency response, investigation, and site recovery  might all be occurring at the 
same time.
2.3.1 The emergency response
The initial response to an aircraft accident is the emergency response. The nature of this 
response will depend on many factors, including the size of the aircraft involved, the 
level of injuries sustained, and the location of the accident.
2.3.1.1 Emergency responders
The fundamental objective of the emergency response is clear: as noted by the 
Association of Chief Police Officers in the UK, “The primary aim of all emergency 
services is to save life” (ACPO, 2009).
The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (UK) identifies two categories of responders to 
emergencies: Category 1 responders (core responders) and Category 2 responders (co-
operating responders) (Table 2.3). Category  1 responders are notified immediately of 
the emergency, and are required to respond to it. Category 2 responders are on call to to 
provide support and assistance throughout the emergency  response and recovery stages 
of the event, as requested by core responders. This might include immediate attendance 
at the accident site.
Although not listed in the table, aircraft accident investigators are in the same position 
as Category 2 responders. Although they are notified of an aircraft accident at almost 
the same time as the emergency  services, they are not immediately  needed on site for 
the emergency response, but for the subsequent period of the investigation (Section 
2.3.2).
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Table 2.3: Category 1 and Category 2 responders to a UK Civil Contingency
Category 1 Responders Category 2 Responders
Emergency services
• Police forces
• British Transport Police
• Fire authorities
• Ambulance services
• Maritime and Coastguard Agency
Local authorities
• All principal local authorities (ie. 
metropolitan districts, shire counties, shire 
districts, shire unitaries)
• Port Health Authorities
Health Bodies
• Primary Care Trusts
• Acute Trusts
• Foundation Trusts
• Local Health Boards (in Wales)
• Any Welsh NHS Trust which provides 
public health services
• Health Protection Agency
Government agencies
• Environment Agency
• Scottish Environment Agency
Utilities
• Electricity distributors and transmitters
• Gas distributors
• Water and sewerage undertakers




• Train Operating Companies (passenger 
and freight)
• London Underground





• Strategic Health Authorities
Government agencies
• Health and Safety Executive
Source: Cabinet Office, 2010
The police are the key core responders. It is their responsibility to “... co-ordinate all the 
activities of those responding at or around the scene of a land-based 
emergency” (Cabinet Office, 2003). The police are also responsible for cordoning off 
the site, to facilitate the work of the other emergency services and protect the evidence 
on the accident scene (ACPO, 2009). 
The primary role of the fire service in a major emergency is “the rescue of people 
trapped by  fire, wreckage or debris” (Cabinet Office, 2003). Depending on the location 
of the aircraft accident, it  might be attended by the Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting 
Service (ARFF), which is also known as the Airport Fire Service (AFS), or Rescue and 
Fire Fighting Service (RFFS). This organisation is specialised in dealing with fire in 
disabled aircraft. Alternatively, if the accident is not at or near an airport, it  is likely to 
be attended by local fire authorities without such specialist expertise. 
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As noted by the FAA (2009): 
“Saving of aircraft occupants’  lives is the primary objective. All other considerations, such 
as preservation of wreckage,  must be secondary to rescue operations. Therefore, fire 
fighters in the performance of their primary mission of rescue through fire control or 
extinguishment should not be hampered or restrained by restrictions governing the 
preservation of evidence. However,  during the final stages of salvage and overhaul,  care 
should be taken to avoid unduly disturbing any evidence that may aid in determining the 
cause of the aircraft accident. Careful preservation of cockpit instruments, controls, areas of 
primary structural failure or damage, etc., in their original position is important. Any 
changes made in after-action documentation should be noted”. 
Cherry and Associates (2009) analysed data on responses to on-airport aircraft accidents 
over the period of 1967 to 2000. It was found that the time taken for ARFF units to 
respond to accidents was between zero and ~1200 seconds (20 minutes). The lower 
limit - immediate response - was achieved when given advanced warning of an 
imminent crash: two examples are the pre-impact notification of fires on board an 
L1011 at  Qatar in 1980 and a DC-9 in Cincinnati in 1983. The upper limit of greater 
than 20 minutes was the time taken to respond to the accident involving a Boeing 757 at 
Girona, Spain in 1999. On 50 per cent of occasions ARFF were in place to fight fires 
within four minutes, and on 90 per cent of occasions were there within twelve minutes. 
Once on site, ARFF established control of the fire within ten minutes for 50 per cent of 
accidents, and within 42 minutes for 90 per cent of the accidents.
The required levels of ARFF support on an aerodrome differ between countries, and 
within countries, according to the category and size of aircraft  operating into the airport. 
Airport categories within the UK are shown in Table 2.4. These categories are in line 
with ICAO guidelines (ICAO, 1990).
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Table 2.4: Aerodrome category for ARFF in the UK
Aerodrome 
Category
Aeroplane Overall Length Maximum 
Fuselage Width
Minimum 
number of foam 
producing 
vehicles
1 up to but not including 9m -
2 9m up to but not including 12m -
3 12m up to but not including 18m 3m 1
4 18m up to but not including 24m 4m 1
5 24m up to but not including 28m 4m 2
6 28m up to but not including 39m 5m 2
7 39m up to but not including 49m 5m 2
8 49m up to but not including 61m 7m 3
9 61m up to but not including 76m 7m 3
10 76m up to but not including 90m 8m 4
Source: Adapted from CAA, 2008
Categories 3-10 are the standard categories for airports taking commercial aircraft. For 
each of these, there are required volumes of water, foam and other extinguishing agents 
which must be carried on each fire fighting appliance (CAA, 2008). To maximise the 
chance of saving lives, it  is stipulated that ARFF response times should be within two 
minutes (120 seconds) to any point on the operational runway, and within three minutes 
(180 seconds) to any other part of the airport (CAA, 2008). 
No specific fire fighting appliance is required at Category 1 and 2 airports, except that 
there must be a vehicle ‘fit for purpose’ (which can include trailers). Two fire fighters 
must be available for emergencies at Category 1 airports and three firefighters must  be 
on station at Category 2 airports (CAA, 2008). The CAA (2008) also specifies 
requirements for ARFF at heliports, with guidelines similar to those for Category  1 and 
2 airports.
The ambulance services are also vital emergency  responders. Their role on an accident 
site is “... to sustain life through effective emergency treatment at  the scene, to 
determine the priority  for release of trapped casualties and decontamination in 
conjunction with the fire service, and to transport the injured in order of priority  to 
receiving hospitals” (Cabinet Office, 2003). 
If necessary, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) can be drawn into an emergency situation 
to assist in the search and rescue, or the guarding of cordons (Cabinet Office, 2003; 
ACPO, 2009). Further, in the event of a large commercial aircraft accident the British 
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Airways Emergency Procedures Information Centre (EPIC) can be brought into 
operation, to assist the emergency response. This centre is located at London Heathrow 
airport, and functions as the central airline co-ordination centre (Cabinet Office, 2003).
2.3.1.2 Management of an emergency response
Emergency response procedures are well defined, and have some common features 
whether they be for a natural disaster, technology disaster or transport accident, such as 
an aircraft accident. There is a considerable body of research and guidance on pre-
disaster planning (for example HSE, 1999; HM Government 2005; ACPO, 2009) and on 
the management of major disasters (see Section 2.5.3).
Organisations which respond to accidents must maintain a constant state of readiness. In 
the UK there is a requirement that they have an established emergency  response plan 
(Cabinet Office, 2003), compliant with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The exact 
manner of response will depend on the nature of the event, but the emergency response 
plan should cater for as many different scenarios as possible.
To manage the response to an accident, a three-level ‘Gold, Silver, Bronze’ command 
chain is now in general use within responding organisations in the UK. This structure - 
strategic, tactical and operational - is shown in Figure 2.17. The structure was adopted 
initially by the Metropolitan Police in the 1980s; soon after, it  was taken up  by the fire 
and ambulance services (Arbuthnot, 2008); and it is now common within the 
emergency response plans of other responding organisations. In the case of a large 
aircraft accident, this command structure will remain in place during the initial response 
and consolidation stages of the event. 
The strategic, tactical and operational levels are referred to as gold, silver and bronze 
levels respectively. “Gold, Silver, Bronze is a three-tier structure of command, each 
level of which performs mutually  exclusive roles at separate locations” (Pearce and 
Fortune, 1995).
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Figure 2.17: Civil Emergency Response command structure
Source: Cabinet Office, 2003
The strategic level, or gold command, is “invoked where an event or a situation could 
have a significant impact on resources, the wider community or the organisation’s 
reputation” (Arbuthnot, 2008). It provides support to the silver and bronze team 
members in the form of logistics, intelligence and administration (Pearce and Fortune, 
1995). In response to large events where designated gold commanders from multiple 
agencies work together, the group  may be referred to as a Strategic Co-ordinating Group 
(SCG).
The silver (tactical) team manages the response. Silver command’s role is to “determine 
priorities, allocate resources, plan and co-ordinate tasks to be undertaken, liaise with 
other agencies wherever necessary to co-ordinate efforts to achieve this, and also to give 
early consideration to the ‘consequence management’ and recovery phases of the 
incident” (Arbuthnot, 2008). The silver response team usually works close to the site, 
but not necessarily on it. 
The bronze (operational) workers are directly  present on the site, performing duties 
tasked to them by their individual organisations. This group  provides information to 
silver command, and in turn is given directions for the response. The CAA (2008) 
describes the role of bronze command level in the following terms:
“Bronze is the level at which the management of immediate ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken 
at the site(s) of the emergency. Personnel first on the scene will take immediate steps to 
assess the nature and extent of the problem. Bronze commanders will concentrate their 
effort on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility - for example, the police will 
concentrate on establishing cordons, maintaining security and managing traffic. In most 
instances the police will co-ordinate the operational response at the scene to ensure a 
coherent and integrated multi-agency response.”
Minor aircraft accidents or incidents might have no strategic or even tactical 
implications, and therefore not require all three levels of response. “Smaller incidents 
requiring the participation of a number of agencies would not be individually  labelled 
‘bronze’ unless the silver level was in place” (Arbuthnot, 2008).
3.5 The terms Bronze, Silver and Gold (for operational, tactical and
strategic respectively) are in common use in many organisations as
substitutes – e.g. ‘Bronze commanders’, ‘Gold Control’.  They provide less
clarity, however, for those unfamiliar with the topic. Interpretation of what
they mean does vary and further confusions can arise if they are equated too
closely with rank structures. The terms Operational, Tactical and Strategic
are therefore preferred in this publication as making clear the functions. 
3.6 At the start of any incident for which there has been no warning the
Operational level will be activated first. Either the escalation of the
incident or a greater awareness of the situation may require the
implementation of a Tactical level and, finally, a Strategic level should this
prove necessary.
3.7 In its planning, each agency will need to recognise these three
management levels and the functions they need to undertake. This will allow
the integration of management processes across agency boundaries. It is not
intended that the management levels necessarily predetermine the rank or
seniority of the individual discharging the functions. 
3.8 If any one agency activates its major inci ent plans (declares  major
incident) then others need to assess their potential involve ent and liaison
arrangements in line with agreed protocols.  It may or may not be necessary
for others to start to activate their own major incident plan. The authority to
declare a major incident for an organisation is vested in appropriate officers
of that organisation. A major incident for one is not necessarily a major
incident for others.
3.9 The operational level of management reflects the normal day-to-day
arrangements for responding to smaller scale emergencies. It is the level at
which the management of ‘hands-on’ work is undertaken at the incident
site(s) or associated areas. 
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The Combined Response: Command, control and Co-ordination
Framework of Command/Management
Strategic Establish strategic objectives and overall management
framework. Ensure long-term resourcin/expertise.
Tactical Determine priorities in obtaining and allocating
resources; plan and co-ordinate overall response.
Operational The ‘Doers’: manage front-line operations
Operational Level 
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2.3.1.3 Examples of emergency responses to aircraft accidents
It is important for aircraft accident investigators to be aware of the nature of the 
interaction that emergency responders have had with the wreckage, so that they can 
assess the impact the responders work might have had on the evidence.
On 19th July 1989, United Flight 232, a DC-10 crashed on landing at  Sioux City 
Airport, after an engine failure and complete hydraulic power loss. Almost 45 minutes 
passed between the aircraft having reported the power loss, and the aircraft crash. 
Emergency response agencies received 20-30 minutes advance notice of the aircraft 
landing. In that space of time, two designated casualty  receiving hospitals were alerted 
and prepared, and 29 ambulances were dispatched. Fire departments moved numerous 
units into pre-planned positions around the airport, and the police cleared the adjacent 
interstate road to provide a clear access route for emergency  responders. All 88 injured 
victims rescued from the aircraft were transported to hospital within 39 minutes of the 
accident (Charles and Settle, 1991). In this aircraft accident, emergency  responders had 
time to implement a pre-prepared response plan before the aircraft had crashed.
In comparison, at around 1530 hrs EST on 15th January 2009, a US Airways A320 
ditched in the Hudson River following multiple bird strikes resulting in loss of thrust. 
There were only three minutes between the bird strikes and the aircraft ditching 
(NTSB, 2009f), during which time it was uncertain where the aircraft was planning to 
land. Numerous organisations responded to the emergency: the New York Waterway 
(NY WW) Ferry Boats; the US Coast Guard (USCG); the New York Police Department 
(NYPD); the Fire Department of New York (FDNY); the New York and New Jersey 
Port Authority; the New York Office of Emergency Management (NY OEM); and the 
New Jersey Office of Emergency Management (NJ OEM) (NTSB, 2009g). There is no 
complete record of the number of emergency units that actually responded to the 
accident, but they  are known to have included seven passenger ferry boats (NTSB, 
2009h), five NYPD boats (NTSB, 2009g) and 47 FDNY units (NTSB, 2009i). The 
aircraft was towed and secured to a Battery Point wharf by 1714 hrs; NYPD divers 
searched the Hudson River for six days to locate the left engine, and recovered it two 
days later (NTSB, 2009h). In this accident there was absolutely no time to implement a 
response plan in advance.
Figures 2.18 and 2.19 show responders on the site of a Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 
crash on approach to Amsterdam Airport Schiphol on 25th February 2009. 
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Figures 2.18, 2.19: Responders to the 25th February 2009 Turkish Airlines B737-800 accident at 
Schiphol Airport
Source: BBC, 2009
The photographs show the devastation characteristic of major aircraft accidents. They 
are however not necessarily pictures of chaos. In circumstances such as this, it  is 
important that the site is under the direction of the police, that only authorised 
responders are present, and that all personnel are monitored. Even so, the photographs 
suggest that it might be difficult for investigators attending this accident to distinguish 
between damage caused by impact and damage resulting from the emergency response. 
It also appears to be a site at which it would be difficult to monitor and manage 
responders and participants. It is of paramount importance that a proper command 
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structure is in place during and after the emergency response, and that the health and 
safety of responders is directly managed.
2.3.1.4 Completion of site activities
Once rescue activities are completed, the responsibility of the police is to secure the site 
and to conduct any criminal investigation (Cabinet Office, 2003). In the case of 
transport accidents, the latter responsibility  is qualified by a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the AAIB, 
the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), and the Rail Accident Investigation 
Branch (RAIB) (CPS, 2008). The MOU asserts the potential primacy of considerations 
of public safety over criminal prosecution: “... the public interest requires that safety 
considerations are of paramount importance, the consequence of which may mean that 
the interests of an AIB investigation have to take precedence over the criminal 
investigation” (CPS, 2008). When the police are confident  that an aircraft accident has 
not occurred as a result of terrorism or criminal activity, control of the site is handed to 
the AAIB. The police play no further role in the field investigation except on request.
 
The situation is the same in the USA, unless there are exceptional circumstances - an 
example of which was the site of the crash of a Piper PA-28 aircraft into a building in 
Austin, Texas on 18th February 2010. The secured site was released by the police to the 
NTSB for accident investigation, during the course of which the NTSB decided that 
there were grounds for transferring control of the site to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (NTSB, 2010b).
2.3.2 The accident investigation
Whilst the purpose of the emergency response is to save lives, the purpose of the 
aircraft accident investigation is to determine the cause of the accident and to assist in 
preventing similar accidents in the future. 
From the point of assumption of control of the accident site, the accident investigation 
authority is in strategic and tactical (gold and silver) command of the investigation, and 
its Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) is its operational (bronze) commander. The IIC is 
responsible for managing the site, for authorising and managing access, for conducting 
the on site investigation, for securing the health and safety  not only of the investigators 
but also that of other personnel, and for continuing the investigation off site until the 
report and recommendations are finalised.
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2.3.2.1 Participants in the accident investigation
2.3.2.1.1 Overview
Many different agencies and bodies have a role at the accident site. It is the 
responsibility of the IIC to regulate their attendance, taking into account their various 
duties, entitlements and skills.
The Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 gives the Chief Commissioner 
of the ATSB the power to prevent anyone from entering an accident site unless:
“... the person entered the accident site, or remained on the accident site:
a. to ensure the safety of persons, animals or property; or
b. to remove deceased persons or animals from the accident site; or
c. to move a transport vehicle, or the wreckage of a transport vehicle, to a safe place; or
d. to protect the environment from significant damage or pollution.”
Thus emergency  responders, representatives of the coroner, recovery  agents, and 
environmental protection agencies are entitled to access to the accident site even after 
the accident investigation authority has assumed control.
In the UK, The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 
1996 have a related provision which in practice also permits access to personnel other 
than investigators:
 
a. The aircraft may be removed or interfered with so far as may be necessary for the 
purpose of - 
i.  extricating persons or animals;
ii.  removing any mail, valuables or dangerous goods carried by the aircraft;
iii. preventing destruction by fire or other cause;
iv.  preventing any danger or obstruction to the public, air navigation or other 
transport;
v. removing any other property from the aircraft under the supervision of an 
Inspector or with the agreement of an Inspector or of a constable;
b. if an aircraft is wrecked on water, the aircraft or any of its contents may be removed to 
such extent as may be necessary for bringing it or them to a place of safety”.
Specialist technical advisers from outside the investigation agency commonly attend 
accident sites at the request of the investigators, and the military  might well be called in 
when additional manpower assistance is required. The range of potential participants in 
activities at accident sites creates a diversity of demands on the investigation agency. 
2.3.2.1.2 ICAO recognised investigators
The aircraft accident investigation is conducted by the investigation agency for the State 
of Occurrence. The notified organisations in other countries - the State of Registry, the 
State of the Operator, the State of Design, and the State of Maintenance - are each 
entitled to send an accredited representative to participate in the investigation. The 
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representative may be accompanied by  a team of advisors to provide technical 
assistance (ICAO, 2001a). 
Under ICAO Annex 13 agreements, each authorised participant (investigators, 
accredited representatives, technical advisors), has the right to :
a. “visit the scene of the accident;
b. examine the wreckage;
c. obtain witness information and suggest areas of questioning;
d. have full access to all relevant evidence as soon as possible;
e. receive copies of all pertinent documents;
f. participate in read-outs of recorded media;
g. participate in off-scene investigative activities such as component examinations, 
technical briefings, tests and simulations;
h. participate in investigation progress meetings including deliberations related to analysis, 
findings, causes and safety recommendations, and
i. make submissions in respect of the various elements of the investigations”. (ICAO,
2001a)
In addition countries whose citizens have been killed or injured may request  to send one 
expert to participate in the accident investigation, with the right to:
a. “visit the scene of the accidents;
b. have access to the relevant factual information;
c. participate in the identification of the victims
d. assist in questioning surviving passengers who are citizens of the expert’s State; and
e. receive a copy of the Final Report”. (ICAO, 2001a) 
Although the national accident investigation authority is in control of the investigation, 
the attendance of specialist nationals from other countries brings management 
complexity, potentially mitigated by benefit.
The AAIB has three categories of investigator, each with different specialities: 
operations, engineering, and flight recorders (AAIB, 2010d). The number of 
investigators deployed will depend on the size of the accident. One Operations Inspector 
and one Engineering Inspector would normally  be deployed to the site of a small 
general aviation accident, their work being overseen by  a Principal Inspector as IIC, 
who would generally remain at base. For a larger aircraft accident, the IIC would be 
deployed on site with at least one Operations Inspector and an Engineering Inspector, 
supported by a Flight Recorder Inspector if required to recover the aircraft recorders. 
Additional operations or engineering inspectors would be added as necessary.
For investigation of major aircraft accidents, the NTSB adopts a group structure. 
Investigators, accredited representatives and technical advisers are divided into working 
groups: operations; structures; power-plants; systems; air traffic control; weather; 
human performance; survival factors; and data recorders (NTSB, 2004a). These teams 
are each headed by  an NTSB investigator, who reports directly to the IIC. The AAIB 
does not employ  a group structure routinely, but may divide investigators, accredited 
representatives and technical advisors into specialist groups as required (AAIB, 2008a): 
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for example, a group structure was adopted by the AAIB during the investigation of the 
Boeing 777 crash at Heathrow in 2008 (AAIB, 2010b).
In addition to personnel covered by  Annex 13 agreements (ICAO, 2001a), the lead 
investigation agency may invite specialists to assist with individual investigations. 
These may include airline employees, manufacturers of engines and other components 
and representatives from other government agencies, such as pathologists (AAIB, 
2008a). The number and mix of investigators and other specialists will depend upon the 
circumstances of the accident.
For example, the investigation into the 1988 B747-100 crash at Lockerbie involved 
twenty  AAIB investigators: an IIC, supported by a Principal Inspector (Engineering), an 
Assistant Principal Inspector (Engineering), thirteen Engineering Inspectors, and four 
Operations Inspectors. The wreckage of the aircraft created a 47m long crater and two 
major wreckage trails. The northern trail was concentrated over a 16km distance east of 
the crater, with some items extending up to 25km distance. The southern wreckage trail 
reached across Scotland and northern England to the North Sea, although the majority 
of the wreckage was concentrated in a 30km band east of the crater. In all, over 1200 
pieces of wreckage were collected (AAIB, 1990). Military personnel were drafted in to 
collect these pieces.
The loss of an Air France A330 on 1st June 2009 in the South Atlantic Ocean 
confronted aircraft  accident investigators with the problem of remoteness. The French 
air accident investigation authority, the Bureau d’Enquétes et d’Analyses (BEA) 
organised a team of investigators the same day  (BEA, 2009a), but the actual location of 
the aircraft wreckage was unknown: the initial search had a radius of 40nm and covered 
over 17000 km² (BEA, 2009b). Investigators had to travel to the search zone by  ship 
from either Praia (Cape Verde), Natal (Brazil) or Dakar (Senegal), which took between 
two and four days (BEA, 2009c). It was not until 6th June that wreckage from the 
aircraft was identified (BEA, 2009b). So far there have been three sea searches at the 
mid-ocean site: the team has included investigators, accredited representatives, technical 
advisors, and observers from France, Brazil, the United States of America, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, China, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Norway, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, South Africa and Switzerland 
(BEA, 2009d). 
2.3.2.1.3 Technical advisors
Flaherty (2008) identified the key skills needed by  aircraft accident investigators 
(Section 2.1.4). When an investigation requires additional specialist knowledge or 
skills, the accident investigation agency will contract in subject matter experts (SMEs) 
as technical advisors. The accredited representatives of organisations notified under the 
provisions of Annex 13 are also permitted to appoint technical advisors (ICAO, 2001a). 
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These advisors may participate only  in areas of the investigation in which they are 
specialised. 
Technical advisors may be representatives of the operator, the aircraft manufacturer, the 
engine manufacturer, or other aircraft component manufacturers (Wood and Sweginnis, 
2006). Material specialists may also be required to carry out analysis on failed parts of 
the aircraft  (NTSB, 2002): while their work will be predominantly  in a laboratory, they 
may need to attend the site to collect  evidence or to examine the evidence in situ. The 
transfer of parts of the wreckage for further examination, without loss of evidence, 
requires considerable skill.
Technical advisors generally  have some level of training or experience in accident 
investigation, and some manufacturers, such as Rolls Royce, have an accident 
investigation department. However some technical advisors may not have extensive site 
experience, and therefore may not be fully  aware of the hazards they are likely to 
encounter on the accident site. They therefore must be supervised, as set out in Annex 
13 guidelines (ICAO, 2001a).
The number of investigators, accredited representatives and technical advisors can be 
quite large. Following the Lockerbie accident in December 1989, the AAIB 
investigation team were supported by representatives from:
• “Air Line Pilots Association International
• Boeing Commercial Airplane Company
• British Airways
• British Army
• British Geological Survey
• Bureau d’Enquetes et  d’Analyses
• Canadian Aviation Safety Bureau
• Civil Aviation Authority
• Cranfield Institute of Technology
• Federal Aviation Administration
• Independent Union of Flight Attendants
• National Transportation Safety Board
• Pan American World Airways
• Police Service
• Royal Aerospace Establishment
• Royal Air Force
• Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment
• Royal Navy
• Royal Ordinance
• Royal Signals and Radar Establishment
• United Technologies International Operations (Pratt and Whitney)” 
(AAIB, 1990, Appendix A)
2.3.2.1.4 The military
If a UK military  aircraft  crashes away from a civil aerodrome, the emergency response 
and investigation (or board of inquiry) is launched by  the arm of the military involved 
(army, air force or navy). This is laid down in military Aircraft Post Crash Management 
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(APCM) procedures (Directorate of Aviation Regulation and Safety [DARS], 2008). 
Should a military  aircraft crash at a civil aerodrome, or there are particular 
circumstances which make the accident of interest  to civilian operations, then the AAIB 
will conduct the investigation, under The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Military Air 
Accidents at Civil Aerodromes) Regulations 2005. 
Military assistance may  also be provided following civil aircraft accidents. Under 
Military Aid to the Civil Community  (MACC) provisions, the military may provide 
manpower for specialised on site tasks during natural disasters and major incidents 
(Cabinet Office, 2003). Their assistance may be requested by  the AAIB (MOD DCDC, 
2007). 
Military personnel from the Royal Army, Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy 
provided assistance with wreckage collection following the Lockerbie accident (AAIB, 
1990). The initial sea search for the wreckage of the Air France A330 in the South 
Atlantic in June 2009 involved naval vessels from Brazil, France, USA and Spain 
(BEA, 2009e). Following the break-up of TWA 800 on 17th June 1996 off the coast of 
Long Island, New York, the US Navy  assisted with the debris search and mapping, and 
with the recovery of victims and wreckage (US Navy, 1998).
2.3.2.1.5 The coroner
In the UK, a coroner (or in Scotland a procurator fiscal) is required to inquire into all 
the circumstances of a sudden, violent  or unnatural death (AAIB, 2008a). Similar 
provisions apply in other national jurisdictions. A coroner will normally inspect the site 
of an air accident.
Aircraft accident investigators are not required to participate in the identification and 
removal of accident victims. Police officers trained in disaster victim identification 
(DVI), and acting under instructions from the coroner, will remove the deceased from 
the site (Cabinet Office, 2009), before or soon after the aircraft  accident investigators 
arrive. Where possible, any evidence around the deceased is collected by the police or 
accident investigators before it is disrupted. The DVI team have formalised 
management procedures covering removal techniques and methods of recording 
evidence, and any recorded evidence trail is shared with the AAIB (CPS, 2008).
ICAO Annex 13 (2001a) requires the state conducting the investigation into a fatal 
accident to “arrange for complete autopsy examination of fatally injured flight crew 
and, subject to the particular circumstances, of fatally injured passengers and cabin 
attendants, by a pathologist preferably experienced in accident investigation”. For this 
purpose, the AAIB generally uses an aviation pathologist  seconded from the RAF 
(AAIB, 2008a). Such examination is undertaken in conjunction with the coroner.
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2.3.2.1.6 The insurer
There is no legal requirement for access to the site to be provided to the aircraft  insurer. 
In the UK, site visits by insurance representatives are facilitated so long as they do not 
hamper evidence collection or conflict  with other conditions of access, under a protocol 
signed by the Association of British Insurers (ABI), The Chartered Institute of Loss 
Adjusters, aviation insurers’ representatives, AAIB, the Local Government Association, 
the Chief Fire Officers’ Association and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ABI, 
2007).
In the USA, Sarsfield, Stanley, Lebow, Ettedgui, and Henning (2000) have observed 
that “Insurance representatives arrive on the scene almost as soon as NTSB 
investigators, offering their assistance and co-operation, and at the same time obtaining 
almost immediate access to the crash site ... NTSB investigators readily admit that, 
despite NTSB regulations, they are ‘happy to have the insurers show up’. The insurers 
offset costs and provide necessary support  to the investigation, including heavy 
machinery, communications equipment, computers and accommodations” (Sarsfield et 
al., 2000, p.102). 
2.3.2.1.7 The media
An aircraft accident attracts media interest: a major accident will attract the attention of 
multiple national and international press agencies, which will often want access to the 
site. Guidance for the emergency services published by the investigation agencies 
includes information about dealing with the media (for example AAIB, 2008a; AAIU, 
2005; ATSB, 2006a). The press may be provided with information by the accident 
investigators, and given access to a safe and suitable filming location. In the UK, a press 
officer is normally  deployed by the Department for Transport to manage the press 
interest in major aircraft accidents (AAIB, 2008a).
2.3.2.1.8 Families and survivors
Families of those involved in an aircraft accident may wish to attend the accident site. 
This is recognised by ICAO in its family assistance plan (ICAO, 2001c), which gives 
the following guidance:
“Where access is practicable, a visit to the accident site by the families and the survivors, as 
part of the grieving process, is important and has become common practice. ... Experience 
has show that the family members of those killed in an accident prefer not to share the visit 
to the accident site with survivors. Also, it is advisable to arrange the visit for family 
members of passengers separately from that of the visit for family members of the crew.” 
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Similarly, the UK Home Office publication on The Needs of Faith Communities in 
Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines (2005), states that:
“There will usually be a requirement for some form of simple observance at the scene of 
the major incident, particularly if there is loss of life. This will usually take place some days 
after the date the incident occurred and once the identify of the deceased has been 
established. Where possible, and subject to both police advice and safety considerations, 
such a service may be held either close to the scene - within the inner cordon - or actually at 
the point where the death occurred or is believed to have occurred”
While care of the families and survivors is not the direct responsibility of the accident 
investigators, they may have to facilitate at least three site visits (families of deceased 
passengers, families of deceased crew, and survivors), and ensure their safety on site. 
2.3.2.1.9 Witnesses
Wood and Sweginnis (2006) identify three types of witness to aircraft accidents: 
participants involved in the accident; eyewitnesses who saw the event happen; and 
background witnesses who were not directly involved, but know something about the 
circumstances of the accident.
Accident investigators may  bring witnesses back to an accident site to interview them in 
situ, or interview them off site. This will depend on the nature of their evidence. If on 
site, their safety and supervision is the responsibility of the investigation team.
2.3.2.1.10 Volunteer organisations
Many volunteer organisations can be called to assist the emergency  services. Table 2.5 
is an example of available volunteer organisations in London.
Following a large aircraft accident, volunteer organisations might remain on at  the site 
to support the investigation. Volunteer organisations provide food, drink and rest 
facilities for investigators, from outside the accident site cordon. The US Navy thanked 
the American Red Cross for support during the TWA 800 investigation (US Navy, 
1998). Following the September 2005 crash of a Boeing 737 in Medan, Indonesia, the 
Salvation Army remained on site for the benefit of rescuers and families (Salvation 
Army, 2005). Numerous volunteer organisations supported the 3,000 strong team 
searching for wreckage from the Columbia Space Shuttle daily (CAIB, 2003).
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Table 2.5: Volunteer organisations supporting emergency services in London
Emergency Service Volunteer Organisation
London Fire Brigade Salvation Army
London Ambulance Service British Association of Immediate Care (BASICS)
British Red Cross Society
St John Ambulance
Salvation Army
Police Women’s Royal Voluntary Service (WRVS)
First Aid Nursing Yeomanry (FANY)
Source: LESLP, 2007
2.3.2.1.11 Environmental protection agencies
If the accident has damaged the environment or has the potential to do so, 
environmental protection agencies will have an important role to play at the accident 
site. Action could include measures such as preventing fuel from leaking into 
waterways. Particular attention is given to sites of special scientific interest (SSSI) 
which are of national importance and environmentally  very sensitive: in England there 
are 4,000 SSSIs, covering 7 per cent of the country (Natural England, 2010). Wreckage 
from a Boeing 747 Freighter that crashed on 22nd December 1999 in the Hatfield Forest 
SSSI after take off from London Stansted Airport  caused substantial environmental 
damage requiring long-term amelioration.
2.3.2.1.12 Examples of accident sites
Two examples illustrate the unique nature of accident sites and the complexity of the 
management tasks faced by accident investigators.
The Columbia space-shuttle accident on 1st February 2003 initiated “the largest debris 
search in history” (CAIB, 2003). The NTSB were brought in by the NASA Mishap 
Investigation Team (MIT) to provide guidance on the search for wreckage. The search 
continued until 25th April, and involved more than 3000 people per day in the ground 
search. There was concern among investigators about the risk to the public health and 
search personnel caused by human remains, and by hazardous material such as 
propellants. Over the search period, more than 30,000 people contributed 1.5 million 
man hours: 700,000 acres of ground were searched manually; and 84,000 pieces of 
wreckage were collected, weighing a total of 84,900 pounds. Even so, this was only 39 
per cent of the weight of the shuttle. Up to 30 items of wreckage were identified as ‘hot 
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items’, that is, items such as computers, film, camera, and recorders which contained 
important but  highly perishable evidence due to limits on battery  life (CAIB, 2003). 
Had this evidence been delayed in reaching specialist investigators, vital evidence may 
have been lost. 
In Canada, Clitsome (2007) reviewed the TSB response to the A340 runway  over-run 
and fire at the Lester B. Pearson International Airport, Toronto in August 2005. The 
TSB was notified of the accident by the airport ATC within five minutes of the accident. 
The TSB immediately called in all available investigators, from which a team of 
investigators with the most appropriate experience were selected to conduct the 
investigation. Within three hours of notification, the investigation team met to prepare 
their equipment and be briefed. The team was on the accident site within twelve hours, 
and comprised of “35 TSB investigators, supported by accredited representatives from 
the BEA and the NTSB, and 43 observers from the following entities: Transport 
Canada, the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States. NAV Canada, Air 
France, Airbus, General Electric, the UK AAIB, Goodrich Corporation, the Peel 
Regional Police, and the Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA)” (Clitsome, 2007). 
The field investigation continued for fourteen days. 
2.3.2.2  Notification and deployment
Under The Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 
1996, it is the official duty of the pilot, or the aerodrome authority if the accident occurs 
at an aerodrome, to report the accident to the AAIB. In the event, AAIB can be notified 
of an accident by one or several of a number of sources: the pilot, air traffic control, the 
police, the aircraft operator or eye witnesses (AAIB, 2008a). On receipt of notification, 
it is the duty  of the Chief Inspector to instigate a investigation. In practice, this is done 
by a Principal Inspector, acting as duty co-ordinator. 
It is the responsibility of the accident investigation agency then to notify any other 
investigative agency which might be entitled to send an accredited representative, and 
also ICAO if the aircraft has an MTOW > 2,500kg (ICAO, 2001a). Each organisation 
will then select an accredited representative and alert any proposed technical advisors. 
Annex 13 specifies that the initial notification ideally should include the following 
information:
a. “... for accidents the identifying abbreviation ACCID, for serious incidents INCID;
b. manufacturer, model, nationality and registration marks and serial number of the aircraft;
c. name of owner, operator and hirer, if any, of the aircraft;
d. name of the pilot-in-command, and nationality of crew and passengers;
e. date and time (local time or UTC) of the accident or serious incident;
f. last point of departure and point of intended landing of the aircraft;
g. position of the aircraft with reference to some easily defined geographical point and 
latitude and longitude;
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h. number of crew and passengers; aboard, killed and seriously injured; others, killed and 
seriously injured;
i. description of the accident or serious incident and the extent of damage to the aircraft so 
far as it is known;
j. an indication to what extent the investigation will be conducted or is proposed to be 
delegated by the State of Occurrence;
k. physical characteristics of the accident or serious incident area, as well as an indication 
of access difficulties or special requirements to reach the site;
l. identification of the originating authority and means to contact the investigator-in-charge 
and the aircraft accident investigation authority of the State of Occurrence at any time; 
and
m.presence and description of dangerous goods on board the aircraft”. (ICAO, 2001a)
It is inevitable that not all the above detail can be provided in the great majority of 
initial notifications. As noted by the NTSB, investigations commonly begin before all 
this information is known: “information about the nature of the accident is often 
incomplete and frequently  erroneous at the time of the launch” (NTSB, 2002a). Once 
the notification is received and the decision to investigate is taken, sufficient 
investigators with required skills (the ‘go team’) are selected to attend the accident site 
from amongst those investigators ‘on call’.
When a large aircraft accident occurs in the UK, the Chief Inspector acts as the gold 
commander; a Principal Inspector acts as silver command (and IIC); and there will be as 
many operations, engineering and data recorder investigators as are necessary (AAIB, 
2008a). For smaller aircraft accidents, such as general aviation accidents, a small field 
team of an operations inspector and an engineering inspector will be deployed. A 
Principal Inspector will act as IIC, but will not generally be deployed to the site. 
In the USA, the NTSB requires that: 
“... all personnel on call should arrange their personal affairs such that they are able to 
depart for the scene of an accident with minimum delay. Regardless of when they are 
notified about an accident, Go Team members should be able to arrive at the airport within 
approximately two hours of being notified”. (NTSB, 2002a)
This is not always practical. The time taken for aircraft accident investigators to arrive 
on a site will depend on many factors, including the time of the accident, the availability 
of flights or other travel arrangements to get to the site, the distance to travel, and the 
ease or difficulty of access to the site. Under Annex 9 (Facilitation) SARPs, ICAO 
member states are required to facilitate the arrival of accident investigation teams and 
equipment from overseas, without delay (ICAO, 2005a). 
2.3.2.3 Investigation equipment
The start  to any investigation should be expeditious: ICAO states that “Accident 
investigators should have their investigation field kits and essential personal items 
packed and ready so that they can proceed without delay to the accident site” (ICAO, 
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2000). However, as noted by Wood and Sweginnis (2006) “there is no standard 
investigation kit”. NTSB (2002a) similarly observe:
“Most Go Team members do not have a suitcase pre-packed because there’s no way of 
knowing whether the accident scene will be in Florida or Alaska, but they do have tools of 
their trade handy - carefully selected wrenches, screwdrivers and devices peculiar to their 
speciality”. 
On deployment, the only information the go team might have about an accident site is 
that given in the initial notification (Section 2.3.2.2). On that  limited basis, they must 
conduct a generic risk assessment: they must select suitable clothing, personal 
protective equipment, and investigative tools to take with them to the site. The amount 
of equipment they take will be limited by the size of their vehicle, the baggage 
allowances on any aircraft in which they travel, and their own physical limitations given 
potential difficulties of access to the site. It  is important that potential hazards at the site 
are identified as accurately  as might be possible beforehand, to ensure that investigators 
take precisely  the right equipment, and avoid taking inappropriate and inadequate 
equipment which might prevent them from collecting evidence and conducting a 
thorough investigation.
There are various sources of guidance on the selection of investigative tools (for 
example ICAO, 2000; Lewis and Burrell, 2004; Wood and Sweginnis, 2006). The 
equipment finally selected will depend on the personal preferences of the investigator. 
The only information the accident investigator will have to work with to ascertain what 
tools, equipment and clothing to take to a site will be the initial notification form.
2.3.2.4  On site activities
The on site work of an aircraft accident investigator is conducted in a high pressure, 
rapidly changing environment. Time is of the essence - the perishability of evidence, the 
demanding work environment, the commercial pressures and the often difficult access 
to sites mean that investigators may have only a short time to collect  the evidence 
needed for thorough investigation. Primary  on site evidence is in most investigations 
critical to discovery of the causal and contributory factors that led to the event.
2.3.2.4.1 Initial actions
On arrival at the site, investigators are likely to be briefed by the police or other 
emergency services before the site is handed over to the control of the IIC. Ideally, the 
site will be as undisturbed as possible at this stage. However as it is more than likely 
that emergency responders would have disturbed the wreckage while recovering 
passengers and crew from the aircraft, the investigators would seek precise details of 
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their activities, about what their actions were, where they rescued people from, and 
what, if anything, they moved.
The first action of investigators will be to make an initial assessment of the state of the 
wreckage and the site conditions they will be working in. They will also make certain 
that the site is as secure as possible, to ensure that all evidence is adequately  protected, 
whether it be parts of the aircraft or ground scars created along the wreckage trail 
(ICAO, 1970). Importantly, potential hazards - previously considered generically and 
off site during preparation for deployment - will be reassessed. This is known as the first 
dynamic risk assessment: depending on the size of the accident, the dynamic risk 
assessment will be carried out by  the IIC, the safety manager, or an engineering 
inspector. Generic and dynamic risk assessments are further discussed below (Section 
2.4.4). 
Further, the investigators must establish a field base from which to operate (NTSB, 
2002a; Wood and Sweginnis, 2006). It must provide facilities to make phone calls and 
access the internet, to meet and interview witnesses, and to store evidence. It should be 
as close as possible to the accident site, although this proximity will be determined by 
the local conditions.
Before the investigation can begin in full, the wreckage might need to be made safe. For 
example, in the accident report on the Boeing 777 accident at London Heathrow airport 
in January 2008, it is observed that:
Immediately following the accident, and to make the aircraft safe,  the AFS assisted by 
engineers from the operator accessed the aircraft. The aircraft battery was disconnected, and 
in the flight deck the Battery switch and the APU switch were moved from ON to OFF”. 
(AAIB, 2010b)
In this case, making the wreckage safe involved co-operation between the AFS and the 
AAIB. Non-airport fire services might not have known the location of the battery on a 
Boeing 777, and the necessary supplementary actions to make the aircraft safe. The 
AAIB inspectors were able to verify  the switch positions in the flight deck, and were 
protected by the AFS in the event of fire outbreak.
Once the likely hazards are identified and safety precautions have been taken, evidence 
collection begins. 
2.3.2.4.2 Evidence collection
Evidence is collected both on site and off site. The two sources complement each other, 
and both are needed to understand the causal factors of the accident. Evidence collected 
on site will be re-analysed throughout the investigation. 
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2.3.2.4.2.1 Evidence collected from accident sites
There is a wide variety of types of evidence: the actual evidence collected at a site will 
depend on the circumstances of the accident. In some situations, there will be a need for 
full analysis of the entire airframe and components: in other situations, only certain 
parts of the aircraft might provide relevant evidence. 
Sources such as Wood and Sweginnis (2006), Ellis (1984) and the ICAO Manual of 
Aircraft Accident Investigation (1970), provide guidance on the collection of evidence. 







• Pressurisation and air conditioning systems
• Ice and rain protection systems
• Instruments
• Radio navigation equipment
• Flight control systems




The NTSB collects evidence by dividing the investigation team into eleven groups: air 
traffic control; human performance; maintenance; operations; airplane performance; 
powerplants; structures; survival factors; systems; meteorology; and witnesses (NTSB, 
2002a). Each group focuses on its own particular aspect of evidence collection, and the 
evidence and findings are compiled after the on site phase.
In their review of NTSB investigation procedures, Sarsfield et al. (2000) observed that: 
“The need to modernise certain investigative practices and procedures is particularly 
acute. In some respects, the NTSB’s investigative techniques have not kept pace with 
changes in modern aircraft design, manufacturing, and operation, raising doubts about 
its ability to expeditiously and conclusively resolve complex accidents”. 
2.3.2.4.2.2 Perishable evidence
Perishable evidence may be lost  unless collected in a short space of time. It includes 
fuel samples; oil and hydraulic fluid samples; loose papers, maps and charts; evidence 
of icing; evidence of runway condition; switch positions and instrument readings; 
control surface and trip  tab positions; flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders; 
and ground scars (Wood and Sweginnis, 2006).
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Guidance documents for the emergency  services suggest ways in which evidence might 
be protected and recorded prior to the arrival of accident investigators: not  disturbing 
wreckage unnecessarily; mapping the location of any runway debris; securing the site; 
taking photographs; not  touching the data recorders; collecting the contact details of 
witnesses; using fire fighting foam only  where necessary; recording the locations where 
survivors were assisted; and leaving fatalities in place (AAIB, 2008a; AAIU, 2005). The 
purpose of this guidance is to keep the immediate post-accident site as untouched as 
possible until the investigators arrive. This allows them to begin investigation 
immediately, without spending unnecessary time considering whether particular 
characteristics of the wreckage were caused by the accident or by the emergency rescue.
The NYPD Harbour Unit that responded to the A320 ditching in the Hudson River in 
January 2009 found that evidence was rapidly being lost due to the flowing tide (NTSB, 
2009h). Rescue boats were directed to all floating debris, and the FDNY marine rescue 
boats tied a cable through the front doors of the aircraft  to prevent it from sinking 
(NTSB, 2009i). This is an extreme example of rapidly perishable evidence.
Given the perishability  of evidence, the accident investigation team will begin work as 
quickly as possible. Light items of wreckage may be blown about, as might documents 
and papers carried on the aircraft. Fuel and oils may  leak into the ground, ice may melt, 
switch positions move easily, and ground scars fade due to weather or trampling. The 
more information that can be recorded early on, the better the chance of success. 
Further, investigators must make early  decisions about their own health and safety while 
collecting the perishable evidence.
2.3.2.4.2.3 Methods of evidence collection
The TSB describes the general tasks that investigators conduct on sites as “secure and 
examine the occurrence site, examine the equipment, vehicle or wreckage, interview 
witnesses and company and government personnel, collect pertinent information, select 
and remove specific wreckage items for further examination, review documentation, 
and identify potentially unsafe acts and unsafe conditions” (TSB, 2005 p.5).
On site evidence is collected using a variety of techniques, such as photography, 
diagrams, wreckage distribution plots, and ‘bagging and tagging’ pieces for further 
analysis. Through experience, each investigator develops favoured techniques: these are 
important in deciding the equipment and materials to be carried in the ‘go 
bags’ (Section 2.3.2.3).
The manner in which evidence is collected will depend on the overall management of 
an accident. For example, if investigators determine that it is important for the purposes 
of thorough investigation that the wreckage of an aircraft  be reconstructed, either 
wholly or partially - as was the case with TWA 800, the Air France Concorde, and the 
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Lockerbie aircraft - the major objective will be recording and mapping the location of 
each part of wreckage, and preserving the wreckage for transport. This is a lengthy and 
costly task.
The Canadian TSB Manual of Investigation (1991) suggests the following factors 
should be considered before deciding to recover an aircraft back to an investigation 
base:
• “The likelihood of finding any significant evidence.
• The benefit to the investigation.
• The potential to further advance aviation safety.
• The possibility of organising an effective search.
• The feasibility of recovering the wreckage.
• The extent of public interest.
• The total cost of the search and retrieval process compared to the benefit to aviation safety.
• The likelihood of reliable cost-sharing between the owners,  operators, insurance companies, and 
the TSB”. 
(TSB, 1991)
Some basic rules have been applied when “bagging and tagging” evidence. For 
example, anti-static bags should be used for the collection of electrical equipment, to 
prevent static build up and to avoid potential damage to electrical components and 
hence stored memory (Pepper, 2005); and any evidence covered in body fluids should 
be bagged in marked biohazard bags, to prevent investigators handling the wreckage 
from subsequently being exposed to the hazards present. 
Evidence collection within or close to the wreckage potentially exposes investigators to 
many different health and safety hazards (see Chapter Three). 
2.3.2.4.2.4 Quality of evidence collection
The quality of the evidence is of vital importance. Braithwaite and Greaves (2009) note 
that: “Whilst the no-blame culture approach advocated by Annex 13 means that 
evidence does not necessarily need to be collected to the standards of proof required for 
a criminal prosecution, an investigator that is trying to analyse an accident or draw 
recommendations from that analysis will struggle to fulfil their role without high quality 
evidence”.
Personal protective requirements differ between aircraft accident investigators and 
crime scene investigators, due to the different needs for evidence standards and personal 
protection. On a crime scene, emphasis is placed on preventing contamination of the 
evidence. Pepper (2005) comments that, by a crime scene investigator wearing incorrect 
protective clothing, the evidence in a trial can be questioned. 
Aircraft accident investigators wear PPE to protect themselves. Since the investigation 
they  are conducting is non-punitive, they can focus on preventing the transfer of 
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evidence onto themselves, rather than preventing the transfer of themselves onto the 
evidence. There is further discussion of the different needs for PPE in Chapter Six. 
2.3.2.5 Completion of site activities
The length of time spent collecting evidence may be affected by the nature of the 
accident and its location.
The Boeing 777 aircraft that crashed at London Heathrow Airport in January 2008 was 
moved from the accident site to a secure on-airport  compound within three days: flight 
data recorders had been removed and all available in situ evidence had been gathered, 
recorded or photographed (BBC, 2008). The aircraft remained in the compound for 
follow-up investigation until April 2009 (Kaminski-Morrow, 2009): in contrast, 
investigations into general aviation accidents are often completed in one day, and the 
wreckage then released for immediate removal. 
Once all required evidence is collected, the site is returned to the owner, and the aircraft 
(if not needed for further analysis) is returned to the owner or insurer. 
2.3.2.6 Off site activities
Off site evidence collection and analysis can take place at the same time as on site 
investigation, and subsequently. The TSB lists the activities involved in post-field 
investigation as follows:
• examine all pertinent company, vehicle, government and other records;
• examine selected wreckage in the laboratory and test selected components and systems;
• read and analyse recorders and other data;
• create simulations and reconstruct events;
• review autopsy and toxicological reports;
• conduct further interviews;
• determine the sequence of events; and 
• identify safety deficiencies. 
(TSB, 2005)
2.3.2.6.1 Evidence collection
Evidence collected at the same time as the field investigation includes maintenance 
records, operational documents, crew logbooks, radar traces, air traffic control readings, 
and weather after-casts. Additional evidence may also be gathered from the wreckage 
removed and stored in a secure wreckage hangar. 
Athiniotis, Lombardo and Clark (2010a, 2010b) discussed the problems of recovering a 
helicopter wreckage from Indonesia to Australia. Australian quarantine regulations 
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required much of the evidence to be washed to remove potential pests and 
contaminants. The investigation team was particularly interested in split pins from the 
aircraft, which could have easily been lost in the cleaning process. A method had to be 
found to comply with the regulations without loss of evidence. Further, it was decided 
to sterilise evidence which would have been destroyed by washing, such as ash, by 
using gamma rays or ethylene oxide gas. Once the evidence was secured in this way, 
health and safety management principles had to be established, to ensure the on-going 
protection of the laboratory workers sieving through the wreckage for evidence 
(Athiniotis et al. 2010a). This process continued for several months while all the 
evidence was collected (Athiniotis et al., 2010b).
As in the field, recovered wreckage and off site evidence collection can pose health and 
safety  risks for investigators, but the hazards involved are outside the scope of this 
research. The particular hazards presented both on and off the site may be the same, but 
the available measures of posed risk, and the control mechanisms available, may  be 
different. An initial hazards specific training course, in line with ICAO Circular 315 
(2008a) guidance, would not instruct investigators and accident site responders in the 
control of hazards away from an accident site. 
2.3.2.6.2  Analysis
As noted in Section 2.1.1 analysis is the evaluation of evidence, and may proceed on the 
basis of a formal theoretical model or by using an investigator’s own skills and 
judgements.
Recent work in Australia has sought to add precision in assigning to different factors 
their relative importance in an accident occurrence. The ATSB analysis standards and 
framework (Walker and Bills, 2008) has been introduced following criticism of the 
ATSB’s apparent lack of scientific research methodology, one example of which was 
criticism by a coronial inquiry into the 2000 Whyalla Airlines crash (Walker and Bills, 
2008). 
This framework seeks to define terms used to describe the probability of various factors 
having contributed to an accident, by  giving each term a precise probability  range 
(Figure 2.20). 
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Figure 2.20: ATSB Analysis Framework probability definitions
Source: Walker and Bills, 2008.
These descriptors of probability  can then be related to a scale denoting standard of 
evidence, from low to high (Figure 2.21).
Figure 2.21: ATSB standard of proof requirements
Source: Walker and Bills, 2008. 
Both probability and standard of proof are of course subjective assessments: their 







   
 













of contributing safety factor. This level (more than 66 per cent likelihood or more
than a two in three chance) was chosen as being the critical threshold as it appeared
to represent an appropriate ‘standard of proof’ for safety investigations (see Section 
5.4.1).
Figure 5: Graphical representation of verbal probability expressions 
The ATSB analysis guidelines provide additional guidance for ATSB investigators 
regarding the use of the verbal prob bility expressions (as depicted in Table 1 and 
















   
   
  
  




   
  







   
 
   
   
 
  
    
 
    
 
 
investigation reports where it is needed to understand the circumstances of an
occurrence, and the ATSB proceeds more cautiously when evaluating evidence and
(where necessary) developing findings about such matters.
In some cases, the ATSB can anticipate that directly involved parties may express 
dissatisfaction with a contributing safety factor or other finding contained in an
ATSB report. When this occurs, it is inevitable that the ATSB will more closely 
examine the available evidence during its investigation and review processes prior
to releasing a draft report. In addition, if a party does express dissatisfaction with a
draft report’s finding, its views will be considered along with a review of the
available evidence. In these situations, the ATSB will more closely examine the
evidence available. Although it will not be intentionally applying a different 
standard of evidence, in some of these situations a closer examination may
occasionally identify areas where findings may not have been adequately supported 
or could have been better defined.
In summary, something akin to the Briginshaw scale is applied in a small 
proportion of cases where it is deemed necessary and as part of natural justice in
ATSB investigation analysis activities. However, there are several reasons for not 
incorporating a broader application of the scale into the ATSB investigation 
analysis framework, and these are discussed in Section 6.4.
Figure 17 provides a simplified representation of the relationship between
probability, standard of evidence and standard f proof in the ATSB analysis 
framework. Relative to the civil balance of probabilities standard (see Figure 15),
the main differences are the higher likelihood level and the relatively fixed nature
of the standard of evidence. The important distinction between the link-by-link 
approach and the relative-to-occurrence approach also needs to be considered when
making any comparisons between the two standards.
Figure 17: Simplified representation of the ATSB standard of proof
- 82  -
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of knowledge and skill. The ATSB analysis and standards framework does however 
mean that no piece of evidence is taken to indicate a possible causal factor in an 
accident, unless experienced SMEs regard it as a ‘likely’ factor (> 66 per cent 
probability), and are confident that their evidence is robust (> 66 per cent confidence in 
the strength of the evidence). 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2.4.2.4, the quality of evidence collected by aircraft 
accident investigators does not need to meet the same standards of proof as that of a 
police investigation. However, investigators need to understand how the evidence 
collected affects the level of analysis that can be conducted, and as a direct result the 
quality of the final report. If hazards encountered on a site affect the evidence collection 
process, then potentially the quality of analysis may be diminished.
2.3.2.6.3 Reporting and safety recommendations
Accident investigation organisations present the results of investigations in accordance 
with ICAO reporting requirements , which - amongst other things - require the accident 
investigation agency to identify  “any  condition, act or circumstance that was a causal 
factor in the accident” (ICAO, 2003b, p. IV-1-14). 
A full accident report must follow a specific reporting framework, as specified in ICAO 
Annex 13 (2001a) and the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation 
Part IV (2003b). This common framework allows reports on different accidents to be 
compared directly. As noted previously (Section 2.1.1) full reports are published for 
major accidents; abbreviated reports on accident report forms may be published for 
smaller accidents, particularly in general aviation.
Safety  recommendations made as a result of the investigation may relate to the causes 
and contributory factors of the accident, or to any safety deficiencies identified “which 
did not  contribute to the accident but which, nevertheless, are safety 
deficiencies” (ICAO, 2003b, p. IV-1-15). An example of the latter is the AAIB safety 
recommendation 2009-098 (AAIB, 2010b, p. 179): 
“It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation 
Safety Agency, review the qualification testing requirements applied by manufacturers to 
cabin fittings, to allow for dynamic flexing of fuselage and cabin structure”. 
This recommendation was made in response to damage to exit signs and business class 
seat-back video screens following the crash of the British Airways 777 at London 
Heathrow Airport in 2008. While these fittings did not cause the accident nor inhibit the 
evacuation, the damage to them indicates a safety deficiency. Accident investigators 
look not only  for evidence of the cause of an accident, but also for other evidence that 
might prevent other safety problems from occurring on similar aircraft.
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ICAO does not specifically require accident reports to describe the accident site, or to 
report on hazards or problems found on the site. However, the reports are generally 
written in such a way  that experienced investigators reading them will quickly 
appreciate the hazards that might have affected the progress of the investigation. The 
accident reports are therefore one means by which accident investigators communicate 
information about site hazards to other investigators.
2.3.3 Recovery and site clean-up
As noted in Section 2.3.2.5, when accident investigators have finished with the site, 
control of is returned to the land owners on completion. Any aircraft wreckage that has 
not been taken for further analysis is returned to the aircraft owner or insurer, and might 
be salvaged or repaired for re-entry into service. 
2.3.3.1 The purpose of clean-up
There might still be significant wreckage, damage or contamination at the time the land 
is due to be returned to the owner, and hence there is a need for restoration so far as is 
possible to the original condition. In Canada, three parties are responsible for the cost of 
recovering the wreckage and restoring the site: the aircraft owner or insurance company, 
who bear the major financial responsibility; the coroner, who is responsible for the cost 
of recovering any bodies from the site; and the TSB, which may be required to pay for 
any additional cost created by the particular nature of the investigation (although the 
owner and the insurer might also bear a portion of this cost) (TSB, 1991). The three 
parties are expected to work together to manage the recovery process. Similar 
regulations apply in other ICAO member states.
2.3.3.2 The process of clean-up
The participants in aircraft recovery depend on the intended destination of the 
wreckage. In the UK, the AAIB will usually call on the military for assistance. There 
are two military units which specialise in such work: the Joint Aircraft Recovery Team 
(fixed wing), based at St. Athan; and the Joint Aircraft  Recovery Team (rotary  wing), 
based at Gosport (MOD DCDC, 2007). Both are experienced in collecting wreckage 
without loss of evidence. 
Private recovery organisations are also used for wreckage collection: sometimes AAIB 
staff direct the recovery process themselves, using farm equipment and local labour. The 
level of support needed for recovery will depend on the size of the aircraft, the amount 
of damage and any need to protect the aircraft from further damage. 
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If the aircraft is going for salvage, further damage is not  a consideration, and the aircraft 
insurer will be responsible for calling in a salvage organisation. If the aircraft  is to be 
repaired, it will be recovered, with care, by  private recovery specialists or by the repair 
organisation itself. Guidance on the removal of damaged aircraft  is set out in the ICAO 
Airport Services Manual Part 5 - Removal of Disabled Aircraft (1996).
The cost  of the clean-up of the aircraft accident site is the responsibility of the aircraft 
owner, and is usually paid through the aircraft insurer. The work is generally carried out 
by commercial contractors. 
Some clean-up operations are major undertakings. For example, it was necessary to 
remove the entire layer of contaminated surface soil following the clean-up of aircraft 
wreckage and building rubble left when a Boeing 747 freighter crashed into a building 
in Amsterdam in 1992 (Uijt de Haag et al.,2000). Further, it is often necessary  for 
compensation to be paid to land owners for loss of crops, or damaged property.
Potentially significant hazards may arise during aircraft recovery and site clean-up, but 
these also fall outside the scope of this research. 
2.4 Health and safety
2.4.1 Occupational health and safety
In their text on work-related health and safety, Hughes and Ferrett (2007) define 
occupational health as: “The protection of the bodies and minds of people from illnesses 
resulting from the materials, processes or procedures used in the workplace”. They 
define safety  as “the protection of people from physical injury”. In relating the two, they 
note that “The borderline between health and safety is ill-defined and the two words are 
usually  used together to indicate concern for the physical and mental well-being of the 
individual at the place of work”. In fundamental terms, health and safety  is about 
protecting people.
The health and safety  of UK workers is overseen by the Health and Safety  Executive 
(HSE), which was created by the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. It is a non-
departmental public body, which functions as the independent watch-dog for work-
related health, safety  and illness. Most nations have a comparable organisation: for 
example WorkCover in Australia, and the Occupational Safety and Health Organisation 
(OSHA) in the USA.
All employers and employees in the UK are bound by the Health and Safety at Work Act 
1974, which has been supplemented by The Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999 and a number of additional regulations relating to specific types of 
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workplace. The HSE monitors observance of the applicable regulations within 
workplaces, and enforces compliance through inspections. These might result in the 
issuing of improvement or prohibition notices, in withdrawing or modifying operational 
licences, and in extreme cases the prosecution of companies or individuals (HSE, 
2009a).
The HSE commonly  refers to the ‘safety  culture’ within an organisation, which it 
defines as follows.
“The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to,  and the style and proficiency of,  an organisation’s health and safety 
management” (HSE, 1997)
The term ‘safety  culture’ is widely used in the same sense within the aviation industry. 
The safety  culture of an airline is an important consideration when investigating an 
aircraft accident.
The ICAO Safety Management Manual (first edition, 2006b) makes the point clearly. It 
notes that “although compliance with safety  regulations is fundamental to safety, 
contemporary  thinking is that much more is required. Organisations that simply  comply 
with the minimum standards set by the regulations are not in a good position to identify 
emerging safety  problems”. ICAO recognises that the safety culture of an organisation 
is influenced by:
• “management’s actions and priorities;
• policies and procedures;
• supervisory practices;
• safety planning and goals;
• actions in response to unsafe behaviours;
• employee training and motivation; and
• employee involvement or ‘buy-in’” 
(ICAO, 2006b).
This research considers the health and safety of accident investigators on accident sites. 
A critical part of that consideration is the safety  culture of investigative organisations. A 
strong safety culture within an organisation will be reflected in its capacity to maintain 
the health and secure the safety of its investigators, while satisfying the requirement for 
thorough investigation. An employer can, through the culture fostered by  the 
organisation, play a strong role in the perceptions that investigators have towards the 
identification and management of hazards on an accident site.
64
2.4.2 Hazards
Hazards have been variously defined.
 The HSE (1997) defines a hazard as anything with 
“... the potential to cause:
• harm including ill health and injury;
• damage to property, plant, products or the environment;
• production losses or increased liability”.
The FAA (2006a) defines a hazard as: “Any existing or potential condition that can lead 
to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or 
property; or damage to the environment. A hazard is a condition that is a prerequisite to 
an accident or incident”. 
ICAO defines a hazard as “Something that has the potential to cause adverse 
consequences in terms of harm and/or damage” (ICAO, 2008a p.1).
These and other definitions are in agreement that a hazard is something that  creates the 
likelihood of danger or harm to an individual. This research concerns the hazards on 
aircraft accident sites. The research topic revolves around the basic question: What is a 
danger to aircraft accident investigators working on accident sites? 
If the nature of a hazard is not understood, then the dangers posed to personnel on 
aircraft accident  sites (and other workplaces) can not be properly  controlled. Lee (2009) 
notes that “clear notions of hazards, consequences, and risks, as well as their logical 
relationships, are necessary for hazards to be correctly identified and effective controls 




The HSE definition of risk is the following: “A risk is the likelihood that a hazard will 
actually cause its adverse effects, together with a measure of the effect” (HSE, 2010b). 
Similarly, ICAO, along with many  other bodies, sees risk as the product of consequence 
and likelihood, and applies this definition in the Safety Management Manual (2006a, 
2009b). This definition of risk is usually expressed as Risk = Consequence x 
Likelihood.
There is an extensive body of publications on risk and its definitions (for example 
Duffey and Saull, 2008; Fischhoff, Watson and Hope, 1984; Hillson and Murray-
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Webster, 2005). In reviewing this literature, Aven (2010) identified three common 
definitions of risk:
1. “Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects.
2. Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences.
3. Risk is equal to the triplet (si, pi, ci) where si is the ith scenario, pi is the probability  of 
that scenario, and ci is the consequence of the ith scenario, i=1,2,..., N”
Aven (2010) expressed the common thread between the three definitions in terms of the 
equation :
Risk = (A, C, P)
where: “A represents the events (initiating events, scenarios); C the consequences of A; 
and P the associated probabilities”. 
Lee (2009) states that “clear notions of hazards, consequences, and risks, as well as their 
logical relationships, are necessary for hazards to be correctly identified and effective 
controls which are ‘in sync’ with the consequence to be effected. This is evidently 
lacking in many instances”. If the nature of the hazard is not understood, through 
knowing where it exists, and how it manifests itself, then the dangers posed to personnel 
on aircraft accident site (or any other workplace) can not be properly controlled.
2.4.3.2 The expression of risk
Risk may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively. The quantitative expression 
of risk is more common. Risk can be presented quantitatively in terms of indices such as 
the probability of injury to an individual, the recorded number of deaths per unit 
measure of activity, recorded data on loss of life expectancy, and data on frequency 
against consequence (Crossland et al., 1992). For example, in Section 2.2.2.3 the risk of 
a GA air accident in the USA in 2009 (Figure 2.13) was expressed in terms of the 
number of accidents (7.20) per 100,000 flight hours for different types of aircraft.
Various researchers have expressed in quantitative terms the risks of carrying dangerous 
goods by rail or road (for example, Purdy, 1993; Bubbico et al., 2004; Oggero et al.
2006). These studies have shown that the scale of the hazard caused by an accident  is 
mainly related to the nature of the area of impact, rather than the scale of the accident, 
which is generally limited by the size of the container holding the dangerous goods 
(Bubbico et al. 2004). 
The HSE cautions that there are a number of caveats and issues of which to be aware 
when reporting OHS risks in quantitative terms, or measuring health and safety 
performance following risk mitigation:
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• “Under-reporting - an emphasis on injury and ill-health rates as a measure, particularly 
when related to reward systems,  can lead to such events not being reported so as to 
‘maintain’ performance.
• Whether a particular event results in an injury is often a matter of chance, so it will not 
necessarily reflect whether or not a hazard is under control. An organisation can have a 
low injury rate because of luck or fewer people exposed, rather than good health and 
safety management.
• Injury rates often do not reflect the potential severity of an event, merely the 
consequence. For example, the same failing to adequately guard a machine could result 
in a cut finger or an amputation.
• People can stay off work for reasons which do not reflect the severity of the event.
• There is evidence to show that there is not necessarily a relationship between 
‘occupational’ injury statistics (eg slips, trips and falls) and control of major accident 
hazards (eg. loss of containment of flammable or toxic material).
• A low injury rate can lead to complacency.
• A low injury rate results in few data points being available.
• There must have been a failure, ie. injury or ill health, in order to get a data point.
• Injury statistics reflect outcomes not causes”.
(HSE, 2001)
There are some risks however that cannot be presented numerically as data, ratios and 
probabilities, and any attempt to do so can be meaningless. These include risks arising 
in unique situations which cannot be understood by drawing on prior probability data, 
because no such data exist. In such cases, “there is no alternative to making subjective 
assessments of the level of risk” (ICAO, 2008a). When a risk can not be objectively 
quantified, then the risk must be presented subjectively, “based purely on personal 
judgement, and normally defined as high, medium or low” (Hughes and Ferrett, 2007).
2.4.4 Risk Management
2.4.4.1 Overview 
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) recognises that the management of safety on an accident 
site is similar to safety  management in other areas of aviation operations. As with all 
safety  management systems, hazard identification and the management of safety risks 
are the core processes involved in the management of safety on air accident sites.
The health and safety laws governing the safety of accident investigators on accident 
sites differ between different countries. Accident investigation agencies must comply 
with national health and safety legislation. While the laws in each country are different, 
they  commonly require employers to conduct a risk assessment before employees begin 
work. 
Figure 2.22 demonstrates the risk assessment process, as set out in Circular 315 (ICAO, 
2008a).
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Figure 2.22: Risk assessment process
Source: ICAO, 2008a
This process is not specific to aircraft  accident sites: it is the same process in many 
other industries. What is important to consider in the light of the Circular is how this 
process specifically  applies to the aircraft accident site as a workplace. As in other 
industries, the ultimate purpose of a risk assessment is to reduce the risk to an 
acceptable level. 
Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.3.1) states that “Often, a balance must be 
struck between the requirements of the task and the need to make the performance of 
the task safe for investigation and response personnel. This balance may sometimes be 
difficult to achieve but should always be biased towards safety”. To strike and maintain 
this balance, accident investigators must maintain a level of situational awareness as the 
accident site changes around them. There are three stages to this: perception of the 
elements that change; comprehension of the current situation, and projection of the 
future status (Endsley, 1995). Figure 2.23 shows the decision making process accident 
investigators need to go through to establish and maintain their situational awareness on 
the site.





2.3.3 This process appears rather simple in concept and, indeed, the process may actually be easily introduced 
for those process-based industries that benefit from sufficient knowledge, time and planning capacity and that have firm 
control over their operations. However, organizations with responsive roles, such as accident investigation bureaux, 
rarely have the opportunity to apply these resources even if they have access to them and this constraint, together with 
the variable nature and scale of aircraft accidents, frequently makes the management of risk a more complex process 
than this schematic model suggests.  
 
2.3.4 Effective risk assessment first requires sound data to enable the identification of hazards. Chapter 3 
provides details of some known hazards commonly associated with aircraft accident investigation. Sources of 
information such as maintenance manuals and hazard databases should also be used by investigation authorities in this 
process. 
 
2.3.5 Identifying the groups of personnel who are likely to be exposed to hazards, the frequency of them being 
so, and the manner in which they will be exposed and, potentially, harmed is essential to properly determine exposure. 
 
2.3.6 To evaluate and subsequently manage the risks inherent in accident investigation, there needs to be some 
degree of measurement applied in asse sing the risks. For some activities, risks may be obj ctively measured, for 
example, in a situation in which exposure levels to chemicals are specified and exposure concentration is known. 
However, in other activities, including aircraft accident response, such measurements may not be possible, and there is 
no alternative to making subjective assessments of the level of risk. In any case, to make a reasonable assessment, 
response personnel need to determine specific information about the aircraft, its contents and the extent of damage. 
Equally important are environmental factors including weather, location and prevailing local conditions. A considered 
decision can then be made with respect to risk. If the task is considered too dangerous, it may be necessary to abandon 





















Figure 2.23: Model of situation awareness in dynamic decision making
Source: Endsley, 1995
This model in Figure 2.23 was originally developed to demonstrate the factors affecting 
situational awareness in occupations such as flying and air traffic control, but  can be 
similarly applied to the work of accident investigators. 
As the figure shows, situational awareness is affected by goals and objectives (such as 
the goal of collecting evidence before it  perishes), and by preconceptions and 
expectations. Knowledge and understanding of potential site hazards is vital to the 
formation of informed preconceptions and realistic expectations. If accident 
investigators do not have a sound knowledge of hazards, backed up by solid experience 
in managing them, then their initial analysis of the situation on arrival at the site could 
be faulty, and they would be unable accurately to predict further changes. 
The key  difference between risk assessment for accident investigators, and risk 
assessment in other industries, is that accident investigators have no way of conducting 
a complete risk assessment prior to beginning work on an accident site. Circular 315 
notes that “Unlike personnel involved in the more predictable domains within the 
aviation industry, investigators are required to respond to accident situations that are 
variable in nature, scale and environment” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.2.1). 
As the situation changes on an accident site, and the investigators’ awareness of the 
situation changes and develops in response (Figure 2.23), so investigators will apply the 
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five stages of the risk assessment process (Figure 2.22) repeatedly and cyclically  while 
on site. 
2.4.4.2 Identification of hazards
“Risk assessment is a common sense approach to identifying the hazards and risks 
associated with a work task or activity” (Perry, 2003 p.2). Under the UK Management 
of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (Regulation 3):
“Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of -
a. the risks to health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed whilst they are 
at work; and
b. the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out of or in 
connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking,
for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the 
requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him or under the relevant statutory 
provisions”.
Perry (2003) describes this regulation as meaning that a risk assessment is ‘suitable’ for 
the level and complexity of the job; and ‘sufficient’ in that it identifies as many of the 
known hazards and risks as possible based on the knowledge at the time of undertaking 
the risk assessment.
The initial accident notification will provide the accident investigator with some 
information on the aircraft  type, and ideally about the extent of the damage, the number 
of passengers and crew, basic information about the accident site, and any dangerous 
goods carried on board (ICAO, 2001a). From whatever information is provided, a 
generic risk assessment can be conducted, which will guide investigators on what 
investigative equipment, personal clothing, and PPE to take. 
A generic risk assessment is the only point at which any  quantitative assessment of 
hazards might be possible. In relation to the aircraft, it is likely some basic hazard 
parameters can be expressed in quantitative terms, such as the volume of fuel on board, 
oil and hydraulic fluid quantities, tyre pressures, and the weight of the cargo - although 
access to this information might be slow or difficult. Apart from this, further 
assessments of the level of risk will be almost entirely subjective.
On large accident sites, a safety officer may be appointed (NTSB, 2002a). It is the duty 
of either the safety officer or the IIC to conduct the initial risk assessment, which can 
only be done by inspection on the ground. Potential hazards are identified; the potential 
exposure of investigators is determined; the level of risk is assessed; control measure 
sare introduced to mitigate the risk; and the risk assessment is reviewed in the light of 
the controls (Figure 2.22).
The key requirement for the success of the risk assessment process is that the person 
conducting the risk assessment has sufficient knowledge and skills in identifying 
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hazards. Investigators build their skills in hazards identification and management 
through training and experience. It is imperative that investigator training should 
contain the most up-to-date information about the occurrence and dangers of potential 
hazards, and about their management and mitigation.
2.4.4.3 Determine exposure
Circular 315 contains very little information about the consequences that hazards may 
have on aircraft accident investigators. The only guidance it provides is that  “identifying 
the groups of personnel who are likely  to be exposed to hazards, the frequency of them 
being so, and the manner in which they  will be exposed and, potentially, harmed is 
essential to properly determine exposure” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.3.5). As stated 
previously  (Section 2.4.3.1), risk arises from both the likelihood and the consequence of 
exposure: where there is no likelihood of a particular substance or condition being 
present, or no harmful consequence from exposure to it, the substance or condition will 
pose no risk to an investigator. 
 
Hazards on accident sites may be hazards particular to the worksite, or general hazards 
that might affect all workers in any workplaces. As with accident sites in general, there 
are two types of hazards on aircraft accident sites:
1. Particular hazards that arise because of the difficulties of the site, and the nature of 
the aircraft involved. Their mitigation requires the direct and site-specific 
management of safety. 
2. Health and safety hazards that  are not specific to the sites of aircraft accidents, 
but which can affect workers in other workplaces, such as in muscoskeletal 
disorders and the risks of working at height. These hazards should be managed 
under occupational health and safety provisions. 
It is immaterial that some hazards fall into more than one of the five categories of 
hazards (environmental, physical, biological, material and psychological) set out in 
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a). The important  thing is that the presence of the hazard is 
identified by investigators at some point during the risk assessment process. 
The HSE (2010c) identifies four exposure routes through which hazards may  affect 
accident investigators: through inhalation, through ingestion, through absorption, and 
through injection (HSE, 2010c). The inhalation of dust, gas or mist can be directly 
injurious. Lippmann (2000) notes that the systemic uptake of chemicals from inhaled air 
depends on the physical and chemical properties of the inhaled material, and on the 
individual’s anatomy and pattern of respiration. Thus the risk posed by inhalation 
depends upon the nature of the inhaled material and the health of the individual 
investigator. Hazards can be ingested through the mouth, and enter the stomach; 
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chemical hazards can permeate through the skin and enter the bloodstream. 
Contamination through injection can occur when a sharp  item punctures the skin, 
causing the hazard to enter the body directly. The same hazards may  also affect an 
investigator by entry through open cuts and wounds.
Different types of hazard attack the body in different ways, as shown in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Methods of attack of hazards on humans
Type of Hazard Target Organ Reaction / Symptom
Toxic Kidney, liver, bone marrow Attacks and affects the 
functioning of the organ
Carcinogenic Lungs, liver, bladder Warts, ulcers, malignant 
growths
Corrosive Skin, lungs, stomach Destroys living tissue
Dermatitic Skin Inflammation of the skin 
(dermatitis)
Irritant Skin, eyes, lungs Inflammation, dermatitis, 
fibrosis of lungs
Flammable Skin, whole body Burns
Radioactive Skin, sensitive organs such as 
bone marrow, eyes, etc.
Leukaemia, cataracts, loss of 
fertility
Source: Ridley (2004)
Investigators need to understand the routes of entry  and the effects of exposure to 
different hazards, in order that  they can make better risk assessment decisions and 
protect themselves on accident sites.
In workplaces where quantitative assessments of risk are possible, material safety data 
sheets (MSDSs) and mandated workplace exposure limits (WELs) can be used to 
determine and regulate the level of exposure of workers, both over an eight hour 
working period (long term exposure) and a fifteen minute period (short term exposure). 
For example, each chemical has a specified short-term and long-term WEL (HSE, 
2007). On an aircraft  accident site, it is not possible to know exactly  how much of a 
chemical or other hazardous substance is present: accident investigators have no choice 
but to evaluate the risks of exposure qualitatively rather than quantitatively. 
Stolzer et al. (2008) describe the qualitative approach to hazards identification as 
“hazard identification through the analysis of data derived from operational 
observations”; and the quantitative approach as “hazard identification through process 
analysis”. There is not much capacity for the latter at aircraft accident sites. 
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2.4.4.4 Evaluate risk
A risk can be assessed accurately only  when it is properly  identified and its potential 
effects are understood. Some organisations attempt to assign values to the likelihood 
and the consequence of a hazard, so that the risk severity, and therefore acceptability, 
can be categorised against pre-determined levels. For example, Figures 2.24, 2.25, and 
2.26 are risk acceptability evaluation charts from the ICAO Safety Management Manual 
(2009b):
Meaning Value
Frequent Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently) 5
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently) 4
Remote Unlikely to occur, but possible (has occurred rarely) 3
Improbable Very unlikely to occur (not known to have occurred) 2
Extremely 
improbable
Almost inconceivable that the event will occur 1





Catastrophic • Equipment destroyed
• Multiple deaths
A
Hazardous • A large reduction in the safety margins, physical distress or a 
workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to perform 
their tasks accurately or completely
• Serious injury
• Major equipment damage
B
Major • A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the ability of 
the operators to cope with adverse operating conditions as a result of 
increase in workload, or as a result of conditions impairing their 
efficiency.
• Serious incident




• Use of emergency procedures
• Minor incident
D
Negligible • Little consequence E
















Frequent 5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E
Occasional 4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E
Remote 3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E
Improbable 2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E
Extremely 
Improbable 
1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E
Key:
Green  Acceptable risk
Orange Acceptable based in risk mitigation
Red Unacceptable under the existing circumstances
Figure 2.26: Risk assessment matrix
Source: ICAO, 2009b
Approaches such as those in Figures 2.24, 2.25 and 2.26 essentially seek to add a degree 
of precision to a set  of descriptors, and are useful to that extent. They remain a 
qualitative rather than quantitative framework. They  have been developed for 
application in an aviation-specific safety  management system, and can also be readily 
applied in aircraft  accident investigation. It is unlikely that there would be much benefit 
in recording risk in the manner shown in Figure 2.26 on an accident site where the 
situation is very dynamic, but such taxonomies provide a vocabulary of descriptors of 
degrees of likelihood and consequence which investigators might find useful. 
Glossop, Ioannides and Gould (2000) state “hazard analysis involves the identification 
of hazards at a facility  and evaluating possible scenarios leading to unwanted 
consequences. “The hazard analysis stage is a very important part of the risk 
management process, as no action can be made to avoid, or reduce, the effects of 
unidentified hazards. The hazard analysis stage also has the largest potential for error 
with little or no feedback of those errors”.
It is of interest  that on off-shore rigs and other relatively inaccessible facilities in the 
petroleum engineering industry, trials are in place to make health and safety assessments 
by remote means. Both video-conferencing and still photography  are in use, and the 
trials are being overseen by a panel of HSE inspectors (Simon et al. 2009). The panel 
provides expert  guidance to enable workers within the facilities to assess the hazards 
they  might encounter.. There might well be potential for this approach to be used on 
accident sites where there are likely to be hazards of particular concern, and expert 
health and safety assessment is required.
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2.4.4.5 Introduce controls
In the European Union there is now an agreed set of control measures to manage risk to 
the health and safety  of employees. They are mandated by regulation through EU 
Council Directive 89/391 EEC 1989 and The Management of Health and Safety at Work 
Regulations 1999. The measures are expressed as a hierarchy of controls to be used 
when managing identified risks. 
“The employer shall implement the measures referred to ... on the basis of the following 
general principles of prevention:
a. avoiding risks;
b. evaluating the risks which cannot be avoided;
c. combating the risks at source;
d. adapting the work to the individual, especially as regards the design of work places, the 
choice of work equipment and the choice of working at production methods, with a view, 
in particular, to alleviating monotonous work and work at a predetermined work-rate and 
to reducing their effect on health;
e. adapting to technical progress;
f. replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous;
g. developing a coherent overall prevention policy which covers technology, organisation 
of work, working conditions, social relationships and the influence of factors related to 
the working environment;
h. giving collective protective measures priority over individual protective measures;
i. giving appropriate instructions to the workers”.
This sequence of controls is neatly summarised by Ireland (2000) as “eliminate, 
substitute, contain, control, protect”.
Many of the same principles and sequence underpin the work by Ribak and Froom 
(1995) on occupational medicine. This sets out three categories of occupational health 
prevention: primary, secondary  and tertiary  prevention. Primary prevention methods 
involve avoiding exposure, and the selection of employees who are not susceptible to 
particular exposure. Secondary prevention methods prevent exposure from reaching 
above a certain level, for instance through biological monitoring. Tertiary prevention 
involves providing care to those who display early symptoms of exposure or injury. 
In the UK, accident investigation authorities (as employers) and air accident 
investigators (as employees) are subject to the EU regulations. Some of the control 
measures suggested in regulatory guidance are simply not possible on an aircraft 
accident site, such as complete avoidance of the hazard, or redesigning workplaces. For 
that reason, ICAO (2008a) has established for all member states a specialised hierarchy 
of controls for investigators on aircraft accident sites. This is set out in paragraph 2.3.9 
of Circular 315:
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“A wide range of control measures can be applied to help reduce risks, including:
a. stopping or delaying the task - where the risk is show to be excessive, this may be the 
only option until alternative methods of work are established;
b. removal/isolation of the hazards - components can be disconnected, made safe or 
removed from the site, hazardous materials can be neutralised or covered, dust and fibres 
can be suppressed with water or fluids, etc.;
c. limiting exposure - reduce the numbers of personnel within hazardous areas or limit the 
length of time or frequency of exposure;
d. modifying tasks or using alternative equipment or materials - this course of action can 
produce significant reductions in risk;
e. employing specific work procedures (eg. exposure control plans); and
f. using protective clothing/equipment.”
2.4.4.6 Review and revise risk assessment
Having reviewed and revised their risk assessment following the introduction of 
controls, investigators will identify any remaining or new hazards; determine the level 
of exposure to them; assess the remaining or residual risk; implement further controls; 
and again review and revise the assessment. They will continue to monitor and manage 
through this process of dynamic risk assessment. As with the initial, and probably off 
site generic risk assessment, these dynamic risk assessments will be essentially 
subjective, due to the impossibility of quantitatively measuring the hazards prior to 
commencing work. 
2.4.4.7 Risk ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ 
There are limits to how low any the risk can be reduced, and rarely on an accident site 
can it be eliminated.
The most common approach is to reduce risk to As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
(ALARP), which is the expression generally used in industry. The same meaning is 
intended by the alternative expression So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable, or SFAIRP, 
which is used in HSE health and safety regulations (HSE, 2010b).
Figure 2.27 shows three levels of risk, one of which is ALARP (or SFAIRP). This is the 
region within which risk can be reduced to a tolerable level by applying an acceptable 
level of effort and cost by way of mitigation. The risk which remains after mitigation is 
known as the residual risk, being risk which has been reduced but not eliminated. In the 
region of intolerable risk, the risk must  be avoided regardless of cost and effort. In the 
region of acceptable risk, the risk is so low that any further mitigation would be an 
unnecessary waste of resource.
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Figure 2.27: Risk management ALARP levels
Source: ICAO, 2009b
Where possible, the upper and lower boundaries of the ALARP zone should be based on 
a cost-benefit analysis as well as professional judgement (HSE, 2010b). However, many 
issues of occupational health and safety  in air accident investigation are not resolvable 
simply  by  cost-benefit analysis, where the cost is expressed simply in monetary terms. 
The balance to be struck is between taking ‘suitable and sufficient’ measures to reduce 
risk to the health and safety of an investigator to a tolerable level, in the hope that the 
investigator will be able to gather evidence to prevent future air accidents; or to reduce 
the risk to the investigator to a negligible level, at the cost of losing evidence which 
might have prevented future loss of life. 
2.4.5 The communication of risk
The risk management process would be ineffective if the identified hazards, selected 
control measures and residual risks were not communicated to all those whose work 
may be affected by them. The manner in which the information is communicated must 
take account of cultural and language differences, and the backgrounds of those 
participating in the work (Lee, 2009). Zainal, Farid and Yusoff (2009) suggest that the 
methods by which information about hazards is communicated may give rise to pre-
conceived notions and perceptions of the levels of hazard and risk, which could be 
counter-productive.
Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a, paragraph 8.9) urges Member States to “promote the 
establishment of safety information sharing networks among all users of the aviation 
system and facilitate the free exchange of information on actual and potential safety 
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is currently no formalised and systematic fail-safe method for sharing information 
between aircraft accident investigators about the hazards they have actually encountered 
on accident sites.
2.5 Health and safety management on aircraft accident sites
2.5.1 Overview
There is no substantial body  of literature and research on the management of health and 
safety  on aircraft accident sites. A preliminary  understanding of some of the issues 
likely to be involved can however be constructed from two sources: knowledge about 
the management of health and safety  issues in the normal operation of the aviation 
industry as a whole, and knowledge about the management of health and safety issues 
on disaster sites. 
2.5.2 Health and safety management of aircraft operations
Many of the health and safety issues relating to aircraft operations and maintenance are 
well understood. For many people, an aircraft  is their usual working environment, and 
thorough and complete risk assessments of the hazards they may encounter can be and 
have been conducted. 
Within the UK, the HSE and the CAA have signed an MOU (CAA, 2009) that 
underlines the responsibilities of each organisation in ensuring the health and safety of 
airport and airline workers. Under the MOU, the HSE is responsible for the 
occupational health and safety  of all workers on or around an aircraft while it is on the 
ground; the CAA is responsible for crew from the moment they board the aircraft  with 
the intention of flight, until when they disembark the aircraft (CAA, 2009). The latter is 
the same period in which national aircraft accident agencies would be responsible for 
conducting an investigation were an accident to occur (ICAO, 2001a). 
The CAA publication Occupational Health and Safety On-Board Aircraft - Guidance on 
Good Practice (CAA, 2007) provides guidance on occupational health and safety on 
board large commercial aircraft during normal flight operations. Some of the 
information - in particular that relating to slips, trips and falls, burns, and control of 
biohazards - is relevant in accident investigation. 
Pardo (1995) reviewed the hazards that airline and airport ground staff and maintenance 
workers may be exposed to during normal working conditions. Table 2.7 sets out some 
of these occupations, and the hazards identified.
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Similarly, Ribak, Malenky and Shain (1995) reviewed the hazards found in military 
aviation-related workplaces. The hazards they identified are: radiation hazards (lasers 
and ionising radiation from depleted uranium, and from lights and markings); 
biomechanical hazards (ejection seats, lifting and carrying, extreme weather and altitude 
exposure, chemical warfare); and hazards from chemical exposure (hydrazine, liquid 
oxygen, fuels, chemicals in personal equipment, photographic chemicals, chemicals in 
the canopy and radome, military aviation fire fighting, batteries, and ammunitions 
maintenance chemicals). They also drew attention to the hazards posed by pesticides in 
aerial pesticide application flying. These hazards are also potential hazards in aircraft 
accident investigation.
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repairer fitter, metal 
bonders





✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓




✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Airplane painter / 
coverer / painter of 
transportation 
equipment
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Electronics 
repairer, equipment 








✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Engine tester ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Oil filter inspector ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Upholsterer ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Source: Adapted from Pardo, 1995
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2.5.3 Health and safety management for emergency responders
In the UK, aircraft accident investigators operate within the framework of health and 
safety  regulations enforced by the HSE. These include The Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974; The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999; Reporting 
of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR); 
Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH); Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health Regulations 1999 (COSHH); The Personal Protective Equipment 
at Work Regulations 1992; and sundry  other regulations relating to specific hazards that 
the investigators might encounter.
As noted in Section 1.2, the HSE has not yet had cause to investigate the working 
practices of AAIB investigators on accident sites (HSE, 2010a), but this does not mean 
they  might not have reason to do so in the future. The AAIB has to monitor the health 
and safety of employees on accident sites, in investigation hangars, and in AAIB 
offices.
The health and safety of emergency  responders to natural disasters has been fairly 
thoroughly  explored. The research literature considers the nature of injuries to 
responders, the management of the response, and the potential improvement of crisis-
response practices. Among recent major disasters which have been the subject of such 
research are the Indian Ocean tsunami (for example Tolentino, 2007), Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005 (for example Ringel et al., 2007; Sullivent et a.l, 2006), and the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake (for example Piotrowski, 2010).
There were 997 injuries recorded among relief workers responding to Hurricane 
Katrina. Table 2.8 sets out the types of injuries sustained by  these workers; Table 2.9 
identifies the activities being undertaken when injury occurred (where recorded). 
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Table 2.8: Mechanism of non-fatal injuries to relief workers following Hurricane Katrina, 2005
Mechanism of Injury Number of Injuries (n) Percentage injuries of total (%)
Cut / pierce / stab 189 19.0
Fall 104 10.4
Struck by / against /crush 125 12.5
Bite / sting 129 12.9
Motor vehicle crash 35 3.5
Carbon monoxide poisoning 6 0.6
Other poisoning / toxic effect 20 2.0
Other 238 23.9
Unknown 151 15.1
Source: Sullivent et al. 2006.
Table 2.9: Activity being conducted by relief workers following Hurricane Katrina when injured
Activity when injured Number of Injuries (n) Percentage injuries of total 
(%)
Cleaning up 185 18.6
Repairing buildings etc. 107 10.7
Operating power tools 26 2.6
Attempting rescue / recovery 67 6.7
Evacuating 1 0.1
Swimming / wading 4 0.4
Operating power generator 4 0.4
Source: Sullivent et al., 2006.
With the exception of ‘repairing buildings’, all the activities set out in Table 2.9 
conceivably could be activities undertaken by aircraft accident investigators. Similarly, 
the types of specified injuries set out in Table 2.8 are known to have occurred in aircraft 
accident investigation. 
There has also been considerable research conducted on the hazards faced by 
responders to terrorism events, the most documented of which is the 11th September 
2001 attacks in the USA, and in particular on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New 
York.
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Following the collapse of the twin towers of the WTC, a recovery  effort took place to 
clear the site. This began immediately after the emergency life-saving response, and 
finished on 30th May  2002. OSHA identified over 9,000 hazards on the site, on the 
basis of more than 24,000 evaluations, including over 6,500 air and material samples. In 
terms of PPE, over 131,000 dust respirators, 11,000 hard hats, 13,000 pairs of safety 
glasses and goggles, and 21,000 pairs of gloves were used (OSHA, 2003).
Despite the use of PPE, a large number of injuries occurred. In the one month period 
following the attacks, 5,222 responders were treated for injury  or illness. These 
responders included firefighters, police, emergency medical services, urban search and 
rescue (US&R) and construction workers (Berrios-Torres et al. 2003). Figure 2.28 
shows the number of visits by rescue workers per day  to hospital emergency 
departments or to special Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) facilities set up 
near the site. It is noteworthy that more injuries and illnesses were recorded in the 
weeks following 11th September than in the immediate rescue period.
Figure 2.28: WTC rescue worker visits to medical facilities, 11th September - 11th October, 2001
Source: Berrios-Torres et al., 2003.
Table 2.10 gives data on illness and injury among rescue workers at the WTC in the 
month after the disaster. It shows the types and numbers of injuries and illnesses, and 
the rate of injury per hundred workers for construction workers and responders from the 
FDNY, NYPD and US&R (n=3,666). The final column shows the percentage of injuries 
and illnesses for all workers from all rescue organisations (n=5,222).
Results
Between September 11 and October 11, 2001, a total of
7673 records were collected. Sixty-eight percent
(n!5222) of visits were among rescue workers and 26%
(n!1999) among other personnel. Information on
worker category was missing for 6% (n!497). The
results presented here are limited to the 5222 rescue
worker visits.
General Information
Eighty-eight percent (n!4623) of rescue worker visits
were to DMAT facilities and 12% (n!599) were to the
four hospital EDs. Rescue workers were young (mean
age!39 years, range 18 to 78 years) and male (n!4649,
89%), and many were construction workers (n!2129,
41%) (Table 1). Most visits were illness or injury related
(78%), with 12% for other reasons such as requests for
medications or supplies (e.g., insulin, tetanus vaccina-
tion); personal protective equipment (e.g., respirators,
goggles); and follow-up care (e.g., suture removal,
dressing change).
The majority (87%) of rescue workers were treated
and released. One death was reported in a male fire-
fighter who was “dead on arrival” at the ED on Septem-
ber 11, 2001 (diagnosis or injury mechanism were not
recorded). Approximately 2% of visits resulted in trans-
port or admission to a hospital, most of which occurred
in the 48 hours immediat ly ollowing the att cks. Analysis
of t e DMAT triage classificat on yi lded simil r findings,
with the majority of visits (61%) classified as “not serious”
and "2% as “critical” or “s rious.” Figure 1 demon-
strates total daily rescue worker visits by facility.
Disaster medical assistance team (DMAT) facilities. In
Figure 1, the sudden increase in rescue worker visits to
DMAT beginning on September 17 appears to corre-
late with an increase in the number of DMAT facilities
fr m one (located four blocks north of the site) to
four.23 From September 18 to 24, there was a total of





















Male 1974 (92.7) 1156 (93.2) 1348 (84.1) 118 (64.5) 53 (79.1) 4649 (89.0)
Female 54 (2.5) 35 (2.8) 181 (11.3) 49 (26.8) 7 (10.5) 326 (6.2)
Unknown 101 (4.7) 50 (4.0) 73 (4.6) 16 (8.7) 7 (105) 247 (4.7)
Age (years)
Mean 40 39 37 37 40 39
Median 39 39 36 36 40 38
Range 19–78 18–74 20–70 20–62 20–56 18–78
Unknown 913 (42.9) 501 (40.4) 600 (37.5) 79 (43.2) 30 (48.0) 2123 (40.7)
Facility
DMAT 2071 (97.3) 1035 (83.4) 1307 (81.6) 152 (83.1) 58 (86.6) 4623 (88.5)
ED 58 (2.7) 206 (16.6) 295 (18.4) 31 (16.9) 9 (13.4) 599 (11.5)
Visit type
Injury or illness 1624 (76.3) 1001 (80.7) 1248 (77.9) 137 (74.9) 45 (67.2) 4055 (77.7)
Otherb 296 (14.0) 116 (9.3) 181 (11.3) 116 (9.4) 12 (17.9) 621 (11.9)
Unknown 209 (9.8) 124 (10.0) 173 (10.8) 29 (15.9) 10 (14.9) 545 (10.4)
Disposition
Treated and released 1855 (87.1) 1070 (86.2) 1405 (87.7) 152 (83.1) 52 (77.6) 4534 (86.8)
Transported 36 (1.7) 8 (0.6) 9 (5.6) 1 (0.6) 1 (1.5) 55 (1.1)
Admitted to a hospital 7 (0.3) 28 (2.3) 11 (0.7) 6 (3.3) — 52 (1.0)
Otherc 6 (0.3) 2 (0.2) 7 (0.4) 1 (0.6) — 16 (0.3)
Death — 1 (0.1) — — — 1 (0.0)
Unknown 225 (10.6) 132 (10.6) 170 (10.6) 23 (12.6) 14 (20.9) 564 (10.8)
aPercentages are rounded, and may not add up 100
bIncludes requests for medication, supplies, personal protective equipment, follow-up, and nonclassifiable visits.
cIncludes leaving against medical advice, refusing treatment, and “other”.
DMAT, Disaster Medical Assistance Team; ED, emergency department; EMS, emergency medical services; US&R, Urban Search and Rescue
Response System teams.
Figure 1. Daily rescue worker visits, by facility.
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Table 2.10: Rescue worker injury and illness categories and rates for workers at the WTC, 11th 
September - 11th October, 2001
Construction FDNY NYPD US&R All rescue 
workers
Total 
Category n Rate n Rate n Rate n Rate N / n Rate %
All injury and illness 
visits
1624 793.7 880 493.7 1117 300.3 45 24.4 3666 390.3
Musculoskeletal
     Sprain/strain 127 62.1 53 29.7 83 22.3 5 2.7 268 28.5 5.7
     Laceration 144 70.4 53 29.7 71 19.1 2 1.1 270 28.7 5.5
     Abrasion 34 16.6 21 11.8 33 8.9 - - 88 9.4 1.9
     Contusion 26 12.7 30 11.2 20 5.4 - - 66 7.0 1.4
     Fracture 9 4.4 9 5.0 9 2.4 - - 27 2.9 0.6
     Crush 9 4.4 1 0.6 5 1.3 - - 15 1.6 0.3
     Other musculoskeletala 94 45.9 42 23.6 47 12.6 3 1.6 186 19.8 4.0




120 58.7 64 35.9 76 20.4 8 4.3 268 28.5 5.5
     Cough 105 51.3 60 33.7 62 16.7 2 1.1 229 24.4 4.7
     Smoke/dust inhalation 9 4.4 54 30.3 59 15.9 - - 122 13.0 2.6
     Shortness of breath /       
wheezing
36 17.6 26 14.6 43 11.6 1 0.5 106 11.3 2.3
     Other respiratoryc 6 2.9 2 1.1 9 2.4 1 0.5 18 1.9 0.5




188 91.9 135 75.7 234 62.9 4 2.2 561 59.7 11.9
     Corneal abrasions 15 7.3 13 7.3 14 3.8 1 0.5 43 4.6 0.8
     Total eye 203 99.2 148 83.0 248 66.7 5 2.7 604 64.3 12.8
Skin
     Blister 159 77.7 28 15.7 30 8.1 4 2.2 221 23.5 5.0
     Irritation / rash 77 37.6 32 18.0 35 9.4 3 1.6 147 15.6 3.3
     Burn 72 35.2 17 9.5 20 5.4 - - 109 11.6 2.3
     Other skind 22 10.8 13 7.3 12 3.2 1 0.5 48 5.1 0.9
     Total skin 330 161.0 90 50.5 97 26.1 8 4.3 525 55.9 11.5
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Table 2.10: Rescue worker injury and illness categories and rates for workers at the WTC, 11th 
September - 11th October, 2001
Construction FDNY NYPD US&R All rescue 
workers
Total 
Category n Rate n Rate n Rate n Rate N / n Rate %
Neurological
    Headache 183 89.4 129 72.4 123 33.1 5 2.7 440 46.8 9.3
     Concussion 4 1.9 4 2.2 1 0.3 - - 9 1.0 0.2
     Other neurologicale 1 0.4 4 2.8 5 1.3 - - 11 1.2 0.2
     Total neurological 188 91.9 138 77.4 129 34.7 5 2.7 460 49.0 9.7
Gastrointestinal / 
genitourinary
Nausea / vomiting / 
diarrhoea
41 20 14 7.9 31 8.3 2 1.1 88 9.4 1.8
Other gastrointestinal / 
genitourinaryf
36 17.6 34 19.1 22 5.9 - - 92 9.8 1.9
Total gastrointestinal / 
genitourinary
77 37.6 48 26.9 53 14.2 2 1.1 180 19.2 3.7
Psychological stress 29 14.2 14 7.9 30 8.1 2 1.1 75 8.0 1.6
Cardiovascular
     Chest pain 11 5.3 15 8.4 14 3.8 - - 40 4.3 0.9
     Other cardiovascularg 11 5.3 2 1.1 6 1.6 - - 19 2.0 0.4
     Total cardiovascular 22 10.8 17 9.5 20 5.4 - - 59 6.3 1.3
Environmental
Heat exhaustion / 
dehydration
5 2.4 7 3.9 4 1.1 - - 16 1.7 0.3
     Other environmentalh 9 4.4 3 1.7 8 2.2 1 0.5 21 2.2 0.4
     Total environmental 14 6.8 10 5.6 12 3.2 1 0.5 37 3.9 0.8
Endocrine 6 2.9 1 0.6 - - - - 7 0.7 0.2
Other medicali 36 17.6 9 5.0 11 3.0 - - 56 6.0 1.2
a Musculoskeletal pain,  dislocations, foreign bodies, amputations, inflammatory processes, and trauma 
not specified.
b Symptoms of upper respiratory infection, congestion, sore throat, and influenza-like symptoms.
c Allergic rhinitis, peritonsillar abscess, nasal infection, and pneumothorax.
d Skin/wound infection, tinea pedis, cellulitis, nail disorder, edema, chapped lips, and cold sores.
e Dizziness, seizure, syncope, and relext sympathetic dystrophy.
f Renal injury, gastric ulcer, hernia, urinary symptoms, menses, haemorrhoids, heartburn, and abdominal 
pains.
g Hypertension       h Reduced temperature
i Hypoglycaemia, nose irritation, swollen glands, ear disorders, allergic reaction, fever, nose bleed, dental, 
infection (not specified), and fatigue
Source: Adapted from Berrios-Torres et al., 2003.
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Although the cause of the WTC disaster was deliberate terrorism, the disaster itself was 
the result of two aircraft crashing into buildings in a central city area of high population 
density. The range and scale of illnesses and injuries in the period of rescue and initial 
clean-up are unfortunately  a quite realistic indication of what conceivably  could occur 
again in a similar environment, whatever the cause of the aircraft accident. The data in 
Table 2.10 are therefore a very useful basis for understanding the potential health and 
safety  hazards in accident investigation following an aircraft accident in the centre of a 
major city.
In another study, Wallingford and Snyder (2001) sampled air and debris from the WTC 
site to identify hazards posed to rescue workers. Examining the composition of the 
rubble, they  determined that “exposure to this type of debris through the air or direct 
skin contact would result in irritation to the mucous membranes and the skin”. All the 
chemical hazards identified on the site potentially could occur at the site of an aircraft 
accident .
There is ongoing litigation - supported by a petition to the US Congress - about 
compensation and ongoing health care provisions for those responders to the WTC 
disaster who have developed illnesses attributable to their time on the site (Heinrich, 
2004; Maloney, 2010). Of particular concern are the respiratory symptoms that have 
become known as “World Trade Centre cough”. Research into the respiratory effects of 
dust inhaled at the WTC site is on-going (for example Herbstman et al., 2005; Samet, 
Geyh and Utell, 2007; Wu et al. 2010).
Following the London Underground bombings on 7th July 2005, a similar assessment of 
the hazards posed by airborne chemicals in the tube tunnels was made by Wilson, 
Murray and Kettle (2009). Negligible levels of hazardous materials were identified from 
the train carriages. Protection against airborne dust was achieved through the use of P3 
respiratory protection, and by placing time limits on work in restricted areas. The 
researchers noted that “One aspect of major incident response that  cannot be easily 
resolved, is the time required to deploy personnel to the scenes to initiate occupational 
hygiene or environmental monitoring” (Wilson, Murray and Kettle, 2009). 
Although aircraft accident investigators routinely will enter the wreckage of fuselage, it 
would be rare for them to be working for an extended period in an environment as 
confined as an underground tunnel. They nevertheless need to be aware of the dangers 
posed by airborne particulates in small spaces. It would be possible in some 
circumstances to monitor potential hazards during an investigation, but  even without 
monitoring there are good risk mitigation measures such as the use of PPE and limiting 
time-on site, which should be implemented.
The health and safety implications of responses to accidents in industries other than 
aviation have also been fairly widely  investigated. For example, Clements and James 
(2009) discuss the balance that must be achieved following an oil spill, between the 
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need to begin clean-up operations to prevent environmental (and reputational) damage, 
and the need to conduct a full safety assessment to protect those undertaking the clean-
up process. Generic risk assessments and skills in safe work practices are developed 
within the petrochemical industry, but - as in air accident investigation - local site 
variables “in terrain, oil type, weather conditions, infrastructure, security  and so 
on” (Clements and James, 2009) will require particular and possibly unique responses. 
As noted previously, there is no developed body of knowledge and research on health 
and safety issues in responding to aircraft accidents, similar to that for accidents in other 
industries or in responding to natural disasters and acts of terrorism. Air accident reports 
often demonstrate that initial responders have approached an emergency situation with 
very little information on what they might encounter. For example, the report on a 
Boeing 727 runway  overrun in Ottawa in 2000, states that “the emergency response 
services (ERS) vehicles approached the aircraft with no knowledge of the number of 
passengers, the amount of fuel on board, or whether any dangerous goods were on 
board. The tower controller did not have that information to pass on to the ERS 
personnel, potentially  delaying or slowing ERS operations and therefore jeopardising 
ERS and passenger safety” (TSB, 2001). Although potential hazards such as fuel and 
dangerous goods may be identified as generic factors to be taken into account in an 
emergency response, it  is impossible for any accurate risk assessment to be made 
without more detailed and precise information. Moreover, if emergency responders do 
not have such information when first responding to the accident, it is possible that they 
will still not have the information by the time they hand control of the site to the 
accident investigators.
2.6 Hazards on aircraft accident sites
2.6.1 Overview
Aircraft accident investigation is, by  its nature, a hazardous profession, with a 
requirement for accident investigators to enter sites where the dangers are largely 
unknown, with the task of collecting evidence and producing results in a short period of 
time. As noted by Wood (1998), “Aircraft accident investigation has always been 
hazardous to some degree, and aircraft accident investigators are routinely  exposed to 
more hazards than they might realise”.
The hazards and challenges for investigators are stark:
“When they reach an accident scene, which can be in just about any type of environment, 
they may be faced with dead or dying people, pathogens, toxic materials, and other physical 
hazards.  They may also have to deal with jurisdictional disputes, intense media scrutiny, 
and concerned family members. In the midst of all this, they must act as managers, 
technologists, and investigators in order to collect and assess evidence to support 
subsequent efforts to identify the cause of an accident”. (Sarsfield et al.,2000)
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Chapter Three reviews the effects of hazards on evidence collection, and considers each 
potential hazard at  an aircraft accident site, within the framework of ICAO Circular 315 
(2008a). The purpose of this section is to review the literature on hazards, including the 
guidance on hazards currently available to aircraft accident investigators and accident 
site responders.
2.6.2 Groups affected by hazards on aircraft accident sites
Section 2.3.2.1 reviewed the range of potential participants at an accident site, and 
described their various roles and functions; Section 2.5.3 set out the health and safety 
regulations within which aircraft accident investigators are required to work.
Once the AAIB has control of a site, it is responsible for the health and safety of all 
personnel present. Good site security is necessary  to prevent unauthorised persons from 
entering, to protect them from injury and to prevent damage to evidence. 
Not all parties on site will be equally exposed to hazards. Accident investigators, 
accredited representatives, technical advisors and representatives of the coroner will 
spend much time in the wreckage: they  will therefore be more exposed to attendant 
hazards than supplementary attendees such as insurance representatives and witnesses. 
The media, families and survivors will be kept well away from the immediate vicinity 
of the wreckage, until all evidence has been collected and the clean-up is well under 
way: they would be accompanied by AAIB personnel at all times. 
2.6.3 Examples of hazards at accident sites
The paucity of research on health and safety issues specifically related to air accident 
investigation means that there is little systematically documented evidence on the 
hazards of aircraft accident sites. The primary source of information is thus accident 
investigation reports, which might or might not report comprehensively on the hazards 
encountered in each separate investigation. 
It was not until the crash of an RAF Harrier in Denmark in 1990 that a hazard at an 
accident site became the subject of widespread discussion. This was because the 
investigation had to be delayed, due to the widespread scattering of man-made mineral 
fibres (MMMF) used to manufacture parts of the airframe (RAF, 1992). As described by 
Andrews (2008): 
“Within 24 hours of commencing work at the crash site some of the RAF recovery 
personnel suffered increasingly from painful skin irritations (traumatic dermatitis) and 
within 36 hours discomfort in breathing”.
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Day (2001) reported that accident site responders suffered from respiratory problems, 
sore throats, and eye and skin irritation, but that when full chemical protection suits 
with high level respirators were worn, the effects of exposure were reduced. The 
decontamination process required the removal of all the topsoil from the site (Bath, 
1992).
The health and safety concerns about the presence of composite materials during 
salvage of the Harrier led to the establishment of an Aircraft Crash Recovery  Procedures 
Working Group (MOD, 2006a). This work of this group resulted in the Aircraft Post 
Crash Management Aide-Memoire (DARS, 2008). 
Andrews (2008) refers to a subsequent  Harrier crash in Germany, where firefighters 
with no knowledge of composite hazards had little protection. RAF investigators arrived 
at the site shortly  after, fully prepared with protective clothing and respirators. This 
illustrates the need for better communication about hazards, both on site and proactively 
before an accident occurs (Section 2.4.5). 
On 2nd April 2005, a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Sea King helicopter crashed on 
Nias Island in Indonesia, while providing humanitarian assistance following a serious 
earthquake. Athiniotis, Lombardo and Clark wrote a series of papers (2009, 2010a, 
2010b) reviewing the accident investigation. They identified a series of issues that 
affected the investigation process, some of which were hazards present on the accident 
site.
The investigators had arrived at Nias Island 24 hours after being deployed, and in need 
of rest. Their trip  had required two flights by C130J, and transfer by Chinook, using 
‘Combat loading’ improvised seats due to the large amount of emergency aid also being 
delivered to the area. The roads around the island were badly damaged. On arrival, the 
team was provided with rooms in the local school as a base of operation, but had no 
access to food, water or electricity, due to the earthquake damage. Additionally, the 
entire region was still experiencing earth tremors, measuring up to 6.8 on the Richter 
scale (Athiniotis et al., 2009).
The investigation team had not been able to obtain any information about the aircraft 
accident other than that provided by  the initial notification (Athiniotis et al. 2009). They 
arrived at the site knowing little about the event.
The working conditions at the accident site were hot and humid, and there was a large 
amount of burnt carbon fibre. The investigators judged that the best course of action 
was to wear full personal protective equipment (PPE) while applying a floor wax 
solution to contain the fibre particles, which would then allow the level of breathing 
equipment to be reduced to P2 level. Even so, the investigators were restricted to 10 - 
40 minutes of effective working time per day, and took almost a week to acclimatise to 
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the environment. One member of the team was treated for heat stress (Athiniotis et al., 
2009).
Finally, the investigation team had communication problems due to the lack of mobile 
phone coverage, and the failure of their satellite phones after two days of exposure to 
high humidity. The team also struggled with the local language: the accident review 
highlights the need for a specialist linguist in such circumstances (Athiniotis et al., 
2009). While many of the hazards identified in the review of the accident site hazards 
were exacerbated by the earthquake and resulting local conditions, the problems caused 
by travel, lack of preparation, climate, and fibres potentially  can occur with other 
aircraft accidents (see Section 3.5).
2.6.4 Injuries to aircraft accident site attendees
As noted previously, the UK HSE has a responsibility to investigate the working 
practices of AAIB investigators, once a site-related illness or injury has been reported to 
it. No reports have ever been made. Nor, in Australia, has any illness or injury to an 
aircraft accident investigator been reported to Workcover by  the ATSB, or in the United 
States by the NTSB to OSHA.
Accidents that occur to UK military personnel on aircraft accident sites do not require 
reporting to the HSE. The Ministry  of Defence (MOD) have their own reporting system. 
However, injuries to civilian contractors to the military  must be reported to the HSE 
(DASA, 2010). There have not been any recorded civilian injuries on military aircraft 
accident sites.
Nevertheless, illnesses and injuries do occur. The AAIB itself is very concerned to 
protect its investigators, and requires any  health problems or injuries to be reported on 
the field investigation forms completed after each investigation. Accident reports can 
also indicate the occurrence of site-related illnesses and injuries, and there is substantial 
anecdotal evidence of the dangers of working on air accident sites.
This is acknowledged even at government level. The New Zealand Government has 
awarded the New Zealand Special Service Medal (Erebus) to those involved in 
Operation Overdue, the recovery  and investigation operation following the crash of Air 
New Zealand flight TE901 into Mount Erebus, Antarctica, on the 28th November 1979. 
The reason for the award is set out by the New Zealand Defence Force (2007) in the 
following terms:
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“The purpose of the New Zealand Special Service Medal (Erebus) is to recognise the 
extremely difficult and very unpleasant, hazardous, and extreme circumstances associated 
with Operation Overdue, being the New Zealand Police recovery and identification 
operation launched in the aftermath of the Erebus crash involving - 
a. the following physical risks:
i. the debris, wreckage debris, and contaminated wreckage trail from the Erebus 
crash at the Erebus crash site:
ii.  the extreme climatic conditions at the crash site:
iii. the hazardous physical location of, and conditions at, the crash site:
b. the following psychological risks:
i. body recovery:
ii.  victim identification:
iii. the scale of the tragedy of the Erebus crash:
iv. the fact that some of the victims of the Erebus crash were personally known to 
those providing services in the aftermath of the crash.”
Illness and injury have also been widely  reported in the literature. Following the in-
flight breakup and subsequent crash of an F-117A during an airshow in Syracuse, New 
York in 1997, 23 firefighters became ill from the smoke inhalation and were treated for 
suspected boron and radiation exposure. These were acute symptoms, but no long term 
health damage has been recognised. The site investigation took two weeks to complete, 
which involved the analysis and clean-up of very  damaged and burnt debris including 
radar absorbing material, splintered honeycomb, metal, hydraulic fluid and fuels 
(Walters and Sumwalt, 2000). 
Research conducted by Coarsey-Rader (1995) following the 1994 crash of a DC9 while 
on approach to Charlotte/Douglas International Airport in North Carolina showed that 
three of the thirteen investigators who attended the site had symptoms of Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD). Two of them had developed the same symptoms following 
attendance at previous accident sites, but the condition had been left undiagnosed. 
Additionally, another investigator from the group was diagnosed with major depression, 
and one with phobia. 
Slottje et al. (2007) researched the health-related quality of life (HRQoL) of emergency 
responders (firefighters and police officers). The researchers compared the HRQoL 
scores of responders who attended the 1992 site of the Boeing 747 freighter crash into 
an apartment building in Amsterdam, against the scores of colleagues who did not 
attend. The results indicated that in terms of physical health, the HRQoL scores of those 
who attended the accident site were lower than for those who did not attend the site. It 
was also found that, among the police officers, the HRQoL scores for mental health 
were lower for those who attended the site than the scores of other officers. 
Hodgkinson and Stewart (1991) outline some of the symptoms known to have been 
experienced by responders during rescue and recovery operations. These are divided 
into four categories: physical, cognitive, emotional, and behavioural (Table 2.11).
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Table 2.11: Symptoms experienced by responders during rescue and recovery
Category Symptom
Physical 1. Increased heart rate, respiration, blood pressure
2. Shortness of breath
3. Nausea, upset stomach, diarrhoea
4. Sweating or chills, hot/cold spells, clammy skin
5. Tremors of hands, lips, eyes
6. Muffled hearing
7. Headaches
8. Narrowed field of vision
9. Feelings of weakness, numbness, tingling or heaviness in arms or legs
10. Feeling uncoordinated
11. Soreness of muscles
12. Lower back pains
13. Feeling a ‘lump in the throat’
14. Chest pains
15. Faintness of dizziness
16. Exaggerated startle reflex
17. Fatigue
18. Appetite change
Cognitive 1. Memory problems
2. Difficulty in naming objects, eg. when asking to be given important 
equipment
3. Disorientation
4. Difficulty in comprehending, slowness of thinking
5. Mental confusion
6. Difficulty in making simple calculations eg. in relation to body counts
7. Difficulty in using logic, making judgements and decisions or problem 
solving
8. Loss of ability to conceptualise alternatives or prioritise tasks
9. Poor concentration, limited attention span
10. Loss of objectivity
Emotional 1. Feeling high, heroic, invulnerable
2. Euphoria, excessive gratitude for being alive
3. Anxiety (both anticipatory, en route and post-incident), fear
4. Strong identification with the victim, perhaps heightened by finding 
personal effects or photographs
5. Anger (with colleagues, officers, the media), blame
6. Irritability, restlessness, hyper-excitability
7. Sadness, grief, depression, moodiness
8. Recurrent dreams of the event or other traumatic dreams, sleep 
difficulties
9. Guilt feelings about not having done enough
10. Feelings of isolation, detachment, estrangement
11. Apathy, diminished interest
12. Denial of feelings, numbness
13. Excessive worry about the safety of others
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Table 2.11: Symptoms experienced by responders during rescue and recovery
Category Symptom
Behavioural 1. Difficulty in communicating, verbally or in writing
2. Hyperactivity
3. Decreased efficiency and effectiveness
4. Outbursts of anger, frequent arguments
5. Inability to rest or relax
6. Periods of crying
7. Increased use of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs
8. Social withdrawal, distancing
Source: Hodgkinson and Stewart, 1991
Accident investigators should be aware of these symptoms, and look out for them both 
in themselves and in other members of the investigative team. 
2.6.5 Industry guidance regarding aircraft accident site hazards
Despite no formal reporting of illness or injury to national health and safety  watch-dogs, 
accident investigation authorities clearly recognise and exercise their health and safety 
responsibilities, and seek to provide guidance and supervision for their investigators. 
As noted in Section 1.3.3, the most recent and now key document on accident site 
hazards is Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a), which was produced by the Hazards at Aircraft 
Accident Sites Study Group. This document identifies twenty different types of hazard 
potentially present on any aircraft accident site, grouped into five overarching 
categories: environmental, physical, biological, material and psychological. Chapter 
three examines each hazard and its impact, and the ways in which exposure to them can 
be managed.
Previous ICAO documents had gone some way in identifying and categorising hazards 
on accident sites. The original ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation (1970) 
listed hazards for accident investigators on site, and hazards to the investigation process. 
Table 2.12 gives some examples of the guidance provided by the document (ICAO, 
1970).
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Table 2.12: Action-specific hazards guidance in ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation 
(1970)
Actions on the Site Potential Hazards Suggested Mitigation 
Measures
Initial Walk Around Fire • Arrange for fire fighting 
appliances to remain on site
• Defuel the aircraft
• Limit use of radio or electrical 
equipment on the site
Dangerous cargo • Check freight manifest
Radio active material • Get qualified and equipped 
persons to remove from site
Wreckage removal from water Pressure vessels • Corrosion of metal creates 
potential ‘bombs’ - consider 
deflating tyres, and discharge 
contents of other pressure 
vessels
Checking windshield wipers 
and rain repellant
Chemicals from aerosol-type 
dispensers
• Bursting hazard, although 
substance is non-toxic
Source: Adapted from ICAO (1970).
Later ICAO hazards guidance provided a more general overview of potential hazards on 
the site, but without any  task-specific guidance. For example, Part I of the updated 
Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (ICAO, 2000), which replaced 
the ICAO (1970) manual, discussed hazards that arise in urban accident sites: from fire, 
dangerous cargo, wreckage hazards, biological hazards (which includes psychological 
stress), hazards of helicopter operations, and environmental and natural hazards. 
Wood and Sweginnis (2006) identify possible site hazards in the following terms:
• “Chemical hazards: fuel, hydraulic fluids, liquid oxygen, hydrazine.
• Pressure vessels: hydraulic accumulators, oleo struts, tires, fire extinguishers.
• Mechanical hazards: springs (ram air turbines, gear doors, drag chute mechanisms.
• Pyrotechnic hazards: ejection seats, munitions, survival equipment.
• Hygiene hazards: if there are human remains present in the wreckage, blood-borne 
pathogens present a serious risk to the investigator.
• Miscellaneous hazards: radioactivity (instruments, avionics,  flight control balance 
weights), fumes, dusts, and vapours resulting from composite materials or cargo”.
Although suggesting that  any known hazards should be “removed or neutralised” before 
the investigation proceeds, the authors provide no guidance in how this should be done. 
The ICAO Circular 298: Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident Investigators 
(2003a) was the most significant ICAO document prior to Circular 315 (2008a). It 
states:
“The safety of personnel at an aircraft accident site is of paramount importance and must be 
understood by participants of an investigation. An investigator is a valuable resource and it 
is important that he is protected and well equipped to do his work in the field with as little 
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risk as is practicable and with the optimum efficiency. Aircraft accidents frequently occur in 
adverse weather conditions in areas of inhospitable terrain such as mountainsides, swamps 
and deserts, or in adverse climatological conditions involving snow and ice or fierce heat. 
The need to take appropriate measures to protect those on the site against exposure to the 
elements,  to any hazardous cargo or dangerous materials released from the aircraft, and 
against injury or infection must be understood. There are medical risks and hazards from 
the aircraft wreckage itself and they must be explained to the investigators. Another subject 
that must be covered is how to deal with the psychological stress of investigators and other 
personnel with exposure at an accident site.  Disease is an ever-present risk and inoculations 
against such risks as hepatitis, malaria and tetanus are essential. The use of protective 
equipment against airborne and blood borne pathogens should be demonstrated. Utilities 
such as gas mains, electricity transmission lines and main transport routes require special 
consideration. Finally, a plan for aid and rescue in the event of an accident involving 
personnel at the site is required by many occupational health and safety organisations and is 
also dictated by common sense” (ICAO, 2003, p.8)
This paragraph is the basis on which ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) was developed. By 
building on the key items referred to above (hazards such as difficult terrain, adverse 
weather, hazardous cargo, dangerous materials, dangerous wreckage, and biological 
pathogens), Circular 315 provides a structured taxonomy of hazards, an operational 
safety  planning guide, a list of necessary PPE equipment list, and a detailed health and 
safety training programme. 
Table 2.13 compares the issues covered by several forms of guidance on site hazards for 
investigators, against the ICAO Circular 315 taxonomy of hazards. 
Table 2.13: Comparison of accident site hazards identified in guidance to aircraft accident 





































Topographical ✓ ✓ ✓
Fatigue
Insects/Wildlife ✓ ✓
Climate ✓ ✓ ✓
Security
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Table 2.13: Comparison of accident site hazards identified in guidance to aircraft accident 
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Bold: Five major categories of hazards as identified by ICAO (2008a)
Normal: Sub-categories of hazards as identified by ICAO (2008a)
Italics: Specific hazards identified in the sub-categories
It is noteworthy that biological hazards are the only hazards identified by all six sources 
of guidance. Radioactive materials (or more specifically depleted uranium) are referred 
to in five of the six references, reflecting concern over radioactive hazards such as those 
associated with the 1992 Amsterdam B747 Freighter crash .
In addition to ICAO guidance and other guidance referred to above, some accident 
investigation agencies provide their own guidance for emergency responders. Some 
examples are Aircraft Accidents: Guidance for Police, Emergency Services and Airfield 
Operators (AAIB, 2008a), Guidance for An Garda Siochana and the Emergency 
Services in the aftermath of an Aircraft Accident (AAIU, 2005) and the Civil and 
Military Aircraft Accident Procedures for Police Officers and Emergency Services 
Personnel (ATSB, 2006a). These are very  informative documents for emergency 
responders written from the perspective of investigation authorities, but their objective 
is not to identify all potential hazards for accident investigators, or to set out in detail 
the processes for managing those hazards. 
Some guidance has been prepared specifically for fire fighters (for example Anderson, 
Hawkins and Gill, 2008; HM  Fire Service Inspectorate, 1999). This type of guidance 
provides information for fire fighters with no specific knowledge about aircraft, and 
recommends certain rescue techniques. Guidance has also been prepared specifically  on 
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risk arising from dangerous goods - Emergency Response Guidance for Aircraft 
Incidents Involving Dangerous Goods (ICAO, 1999, updated annually).
Table 2.14 compares the way in which hazards are identified in guidance documents for 
emergency responders, against the hazards identified in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a). 



























Fire and flammable 
substances
✓











Oleo struts ✓ ✓




Pressurised gases ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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Local state of 
hygiene
Material hazards
Metals and oxides ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Composite 
materials






✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Depleted uranium
Cargo ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
General cargo ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Dangerous goods ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
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The differences between Circular 315 and the other guidance documents reflects the 
fact that the latter have been written for emergency responders, who attend aircraft 
accident sites for specific and time-limited purposes, and not as a matter of regular 
routine. They do not have the career-long exposure to a wide range of potential hazards 
which is characteristic of the role of an aircraft accident investigator. The question of 
whether the guidance given in Circular 315 is adequate for investigators is considered 
further below. 
The UK Police Service uses the mnemonic SAD CHALETS to conduct  a risk 
assessment prior to entering any event (Figure 2.29), and apply  this approach in 
emergency response to aircraft accidents:
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Survey (what can I readily see, hear, smell of feel?)
Assess (what do I think is happening and needs to be done?)
Disseminate and Declare (report back to  the control room accurately, concisely and clearly, 
and Declare a major incident, if appropriate)
C - Casualties
• Approximate number of all casualties and where they are located.
• What symptoms are present?
• What percentage of casualties  are deceased, seriously injured, have minor injuries or are 
trapped?
H - Hazards
• Present and potential hazards.
• Is there any cloud of gas, smoke or fire present?
• Any debris from any explosion? If so, how widely spread?
• Any other potential hazards?
• Any environmental hazards or potential pollution?
• If a transport accident, are there any Hazchem markings?
A - Access/Egress
• Best access routes for emergency vehicles and suitable provisional points.
• Is the initial access route safe?
• Are likely access and egress routes congested?
• What resources are likely to be needed to maintain clean access and egress routes?
• Is it necessary to remove parked vehicles?
• What egress routes are available, particularly for the removal of casualties?
• Is it necessary to set up ‘Priority’ (Red) routes to key locations (eg. acute hospitals)
L - Location
• The exact location of the incident, using grid references if possible.
• How large is the area affected?
• Does it contain residential properties, shops or offices?
• Are there any venues with large numbers of people nearby?
• Are the vulnerable persons involved or nearby?
E - Emergency Services and Evacuation
• Which emergency services are required?
• Is specialist equipment required, eg. the Fire and Rescue Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) 
teams?
• Are specialist support organisations required, eg. radiation monitoring, CBRN personnel?
• Is evacuation necessary or is shelter a more viable option?
• Will evacuation of people and/or animals be required, if so approximate numbers?
• Are there vulnerable groups of individuals?
• To where will they be evacuated?
• Is there an identified safe route to use?
• Where will they be taken and are facilities available to receive them?
T - Type
• Type of incident  with brief details of types  and numbers of vehicles, trains, or buildings 
involved.
• Are there any early indications if the incident may be an act of terrorism or crime?
S - Start a log / safety
• Consider health and safety, conduct dynamic risk assessments.
• Commence incident log (use pocket note book if necessary).
Figure 2.29: UK Police Service risk assessment mnemonic: SAD CHALETS
Source: ACPO, 2009.
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Additionally, the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Guidance on 
Emergency Procedures (2009) warns police that: 
“... as there are health and safety issues relating to aircraft, in particular military aircraft, 
police officers and staff should not engage directly in the rescue of survivors. This should 
be left to properly trained and equipped Fire and Rescue Service personnel.  In addition, 
aircraft can contain various hazardous materials, some of which may become airborne. 
Personnel should, therefore, place themselves upwind of the scene of an aircraft accident, 
with the cordon extended downwind of the scene to protect people”.
It is further suggested that the police consult with the fire and rescue service silver 
commander about potential hazards on the aircraft accident site (ACPO, 2009).
In January 2010, the UK Department for Communities and Local Government, advised 
by the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser for the UK, Sir Ken Knight, published its generic 
risk assessments for fire response to incidents involving air transport (Communities and 
Local Government, 2010a). These risk assessments are included in Appendix A. 
2.6.6 Hazards specific training for aircraft accident investigators
Training in the identification and management of hazards on aircraft accident sites can 
be provided as an integrated component of a complete accident investigator course, or 
as a stand-alone training course.
Accident site safety is one of the 25 areas that ICAO recommend be taught in any basic 
accident investigation course (ICAO, 2003a). The guidance states:
“The safety of personnel at an aircraft accident site is of paramount importance and must be 
understood by participants of an investigation. An investigator is a valuable resource and it 
is important that he is protected and well equipped to do his work in the field with as little 
risk as is practicable and with the optimum efficiency. Aircraft accidents frequently occur in 
adverse weather conditions in areas of inhospitable terrain sounds as mountainsides, 
swamps and deserts, or in adverse climatological conditions involving snow and ice or 
fierce heat. The need to take appropriate measures to protect those on the site against 
exposure to the elements, to any hazardous cargo or dangerous materials released from the 
aircraft, and against injury or infection must be understood. There are medical risks and 
hazards from the aircraft wreckage itself and they must be explained to the investigators. 
Another subject that must be covered is how to deal with psychological stress of 
investigators and other personnel with exposure at an accident site. Disease is an ever-
present risk and inoculations against such risks as hepatitis, malaria and tetanus are 
essential. The use of protective equipment against airborne and blood borne pathogens 
should be demonstrated.  Utilities such as gas mains, electricity transmission lines and main 
transport routes require special consideration. Finally, a plan for aid and rescue in the event 
of an accident involving personnel at site is required by many occupational health and 
safety organisations and is also dictated by common sense”.
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) identifies “... common training objectives and standards for 
aircraft accident investigators and support personnel that are recognised and accepted by 
Contracting States”.
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Salazar, DeJohn and Key, (1997) have drawn attention to the requirement within the 
USA that all employees be provided with training about  the hazards posed by blood-
borne pathogens. They note the difficulties of implementation in the workplaces of 
aircraft accident investigators: “an aircraft accident site does not compare in any way to 
the well-structured environment of a hospital or medical office; therefore, applying (this 
requirement) to a chaotic and usually isolated site presented a unique dilemma with no 
clear precedent to build on” (Salazar et al. 1997)
They  further note that, prior to the requirement, “the Federal government, including the 
military, had no comprehensive program in place that addressed and mitigated the 
potential for disease transmission at an aircraft accident site. Infection control was at 
best a piecemeal effort, usually undertaken by individuals based on their degree of 
knowledge or interest concerning the subject and personal experience in accident 
investigation” (Salazar et al. 1997). This statement is made specifically in relation to 
blood-borne pathogens, but  there is a risk that the management techniques used to 
identify other hazards are similarly haphazard.
2.7 Future trends in aircraft accident investigation
Learning about hazards through experience and consideration of past accidents prepares 
accident investigators for similar accidents. It does not provide the knowledge needed 
for investigation of accidents of the future. If investigators are to anticipate and respond 
to the requirements of the future, they need to understanding how the aviation industry, 
aircraft accident investigation, and health and safety regulations, interact with each 
other and will change and evolve over time. 
In 2000, researchers from the RAND Institute for Civil Justice conducted a review of 
the NTSB investigation practices and policies (Sarsfield et al., 2000). They noted that: 
“In some respects, the NTSB’s investigative techniques have not kept pace with changes in 
modern aircraft design, manufacturing, and operation, raising doubts about its ability to 
expeditiously and conclusively resolve complex accidents” 
Furthermore, they were very clear about the future:
“The nature of investigations and the future workload of the NTSB will be heavily 
influenced by the changing aviation environment, which is characterised by increasing 
technological complexity, growth in general and commercial aviation air traffic, and 
important changes in the composition of the air transport fleet. These factors have long 
challenged aviation accident investigators. Now, the pace of innovation is accelerating 
rapidly, and some of the developments will put unprecedented strain on the NTSB. Most 
important, the adequacy of the investigative methods the NTSB has traditionally used will 
be challenged. These practices have remained largely unchanged since the inception of the 
NTSB”. 
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As aircraft technology changes, and as aircraft operations also change, accident 
investigators will need to adapt the methods they use to investigate accidents, and to 
detect and document their causes.
Sarsfield et al. (2000) go on to raise a further important issue:
“[National Transportation] Safety Board investigators are well prepared for accidents in 
which the failure mode reveals itself through careful examination of the wreckage and 
analysis of debris - that is, those accidents in which a “permanent state failure” has 
occurred. Complex-system events, however, present greater challenges to traditional NTSB 
investigative practices. Here, failure states can be “reactive”, leaving no permanent record 
to discover in the wreckage”. 
The investigation which followed the crash of a Boeing 777 at  London Heathrow on 17 
January 2008 provides an example of a failure state leaving no permanent record in the 
wreckage. The investigation focussed on the possibility  of ice having developed in the 
fuel system. However the investigators found no ice during the investigation; the only 
physical evidence was small amounts of cavitation on the left and right high pressure 
fuel pumps (AAIB, 2010b). There was no evidence of a ‘permanent failure state’ to be 
found in the wreckage: the causal factor of the ice, and indeed the possibility of ice 
development in the Fuel / Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) rather than in any other area of 
the fuel system, could only be determined through tests away from the accident site. 
Wood and Sweginnis (2006) reached similar conclusions to Sarsfield et al. (2000) in 
their discussion of the investigation of loads, stresses and strains in aircraft. Importantly, 
they  note that “In any technical area, the knowledge of how to investigate failures 
always lags behind the development of the technology” (p. 335). They point out that 
there is a good understanding of metal fatigue in air accident investigation, but very 
limited knowledge about failure modes of composites in aircraft. 
The first major aircraft accident which relied on the investigation of composite damage 
to understand the reasons for the accident was that of American Airlines flight  587, an 
A300-600 which crashed in New York on 12th November 2001. The rudder and vertical 
stabiliser of the aircraft separated in-flight and were found one mile away from the rest 
of the wreckage (NTSB, 2004b). Airbus indicated that “the fin-box is made of the resin 
system Hexcel F913 carbon tape and fabric, and the rudder skins are made from F550 
carbon fabric in combination with EHG250 fibreglass fabric. The EHG250 fibreglass 
fabric was used to adhere the Nomex® honeycomb core to the CFRP skin, and was co-
cured with the skin (NTSB, 2002b). Different types of composites all possess different 
properties, and have different purposes.
The increasing use of composites in aircraft manufacture was discussed in Sections 
2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3. As aircraft design and construction evolves in the future, 
investigators will need a deeper technical understanding of the properties of composites 
and the reasons for their failure. At the same time, a new range of investigative 
techniques will need to be developed. 
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No investigator, anywhere, has yet been called on to attend a major civil aircraft 
accident site that contains a large amount of composite. The first major accident 
involving an A380 or B787 will be a massive learning curve for accident investigators, 
not only to collect the evidence needed from the site - which may be different  from the 
evidence needed for a traditionally  manufactured aircraft - but also in identifying the 
hazards on the site. Some of the skills needed will transfer from attending other large 
accident sites; and others will arise from experience in attending GA composite aircraft 
accidents; but without additional and specific training in the properties of composite 
materials this is unlikely to be adequate for the purpose of thorough investigation. 
Better investigation, and the safety of investigators, also requires the provision of full 
and timely information. In 1998, following the 1996 in-flight fire and emergency 
landing of a DC-10 at Newburgh, New York, the NTSB recommended that either the 
FAA or the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) should require all 
aircraft operators transporting hazardous material to provide 24 hour access to their 
cargo details, so that the information could be rapidly retrieved and provided to 
emergency responders (NTSB, 1998). In 1999, the FAA rejected this recommendation, 
deferring responsibility for action to the RSPA (NTSB, 1999). In 2003, the safety 
recommendation was closed without acceptable action, after new hazardous goods 
shipping regulations were implemented without the urgent response recommendations 
(NTSB, 2003).
It is interesting to note that the increased safety rate of aviation is leading to a decrease 
in the currency of accident investigator skills in responding to large aircraft accidents. 
With the exception of the B777 crash at London Heathrow in 2008, which remained 
largely intact, with no loss of life and only minimal injury (AAIB, 2010b), there has not 
been a large scale aircraft accident in the UK since the B747 Freighter crash near 
Stansted Airport in 1999. 
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2.8 Concluding note 
This chapter has reviewed the extensive body of literature which is the context in which 
the current the research on hazards awareness for aircraft accident investigators is 
placed. From this review, it is shown that while there is extensive available material on 
aircraft accident investigation policies and procedures, and on health and safety  best 
practices, and some measurement of injuries and illnesses to emergency responders, 
there is very little recorded evidence of actual hazards on aircraft accident sites, and on 
the mitigation measures used to overcome these hazards and continue with the evidence 
collection process.
As Jackson (2002) observed:
“The experiences of others in the field one wishes to research are invaluable. Whether such 
experiences are other empirical studies,  theoretical expressions,  or anecdotal accounts, they 
will contain useful guidance....It is important to plan for which outcome would be more 
useful to answer any research question: the frequency of an incident or the severity of an 
incident”.
The initial idea from this work sprang from fascinating anecdotal evidence about the 
hazards accident investigators have encountered on sites, and from the recent 
emergence of industry guidance on how such hazards might be managed. Together, they 




A Review of Hazards That May Affect Evidence Collection at 
Aircraft Accident Sites
3.1 Purpose of the study
The intention of ICAO Circular 315: Hazards at Aircraft Accident Sites (2008a), p.v) is:
“to assist individuals to consider and apply effective occupational safety management 
practices both to their own activities and to the activities of the teams that they work with, 
or for which they are responsible”
Information in the circular is provided for the benefit  of both emergency responders and 
aircraft accident investigators: although on the same accident  site, they undertake 
different tasks, and may be exposed to different hazards and hazard levels.
The Circular is not a comprehensive manual of knowledge about  hazards, from which 
accident site attendees might learn about hazards they will be exposed to on an accident 
site; rather, it is background information which, when combined with an understanding 
of the tasks to be completed on a site, and consolidated with an accident site health and 
safety  training programme, will assist site attendees to make good risk assessment and 
management choices.
It is stated in the circular that “given the relative infrequency of accidents, there are few 
opportunities for the scientific analysis of aircraft debris that is essential for accurate 
assessment of occupational health risks” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.2.1). Due to the 
number of variables involved - the items carried on an aircraft, the potential accident 
environments, and the crash impacts of an accident - it is simply  not possible to predict 
with accuracy  the hazards that might occur on any  future accident site. That said, there 
is a need for scientific assessment to be conducted to the best extent possible.
The purpose of this study is to consider both the evidence collection tasks that may be 
carried out on an accident site, and the different hazards that may be present on  the 
sites. This information will enable better understanding of where and when hazards may 
appear on sites, and encourage accident site attendees to consider how better to balance 
the evidence collection and personal protection tasks. 
This study  focuses on the hazards faced by accident investigators rather than emergency 
responders. The benefit  of the study lies in the development of extensive task-specific 
hazards information, which can be applied in further studies. The specific effect of each 
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hazard identified in Circular 315 is examined across a range of accident sites, as is the 
aggregate effect of a range of hazards at individual accident sites.
3.2 Context
3.2.1 Overview
This chapter reviews the effects that hazards encountered on an aircraft accident site can 
have on both accident investigators’ personal safety  and on their work tasks. There are 
two predominant documents used to guide this review: ICAO Circular 315 (2008a), and 
ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident Investigation (1970, 2000, 2003b and 2008b). These 
two documents are reviewed in Section 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 respectively. 
3.2.2 Background to ICAO Circular 315
Following the ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) Divisional Meeting 
in 1999, the Hazards at  Accident Sites Study Group  (HASSG) was created. This group 
was comprised of four SMEs in the field of accident site safety, overseen by a 
representative from ICAO. The HASSG was created to fulfil ICAO’s role of 
“establishing and maintaining an inventory of hazards peculiar to aircraft accident sites 
and in the promulgation of related guidance material to states” (ICAO, 2008a, p. v); it 
was tasked with developing (and maintaining) a list  of accident  site hazards and 
specifying necessary training requirements. Circular 315 (2008a), the outcome of this 
work, was published in 2008.
As discussed previously (Section 2.6.5), there are a number of other documents which 
consider factors at accident sites which could be hazardous to aircraft accident 
investigators and emergency responders. These include, but are not limited to, the ICAO 
Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident Investigators (2003a), the NTSB Accident 
Investigation Manual: Major Team Investigations (2002a), the AAIB Aircraft 
Accidents: Guidance for the Police, Emergency Services and Airfield Operators 
(2008a), and the ATSB Civil and Military Aircraft Accident Procedures for Police 
Officers and Emergency Services Personnel (2006a).
However, ICAO Circular 315 differs from this other guidance in four respects.
First, it recognises that “a balance must be struck between the requirements of the task 
and the need to make the performance of the task safe for investigation and response 
personnel” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.3.1). The work pressures of accident 
investigation are such that investigators need to begin their investigation activities as 
soon as possible after they arrive on site, to prevent the loss of perishable evidence. 
However, health and safety regulations (such as the UK Health and Safety at Work Act 
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1974, paragraph 2) would dictate that accident investigators should not enter an accident 
site until identified hazards are reasonably mitigated. These two pressures are at odds 
with each other. Many of the obvious health and safety  risk reduction measures that 
could be undertaken on a site, such as disinfection of surfaces and stabilisation of 
wreckage, would lead to the destruction of evidence. Therefore, the accident 
investigator must take responsibility for managing a balance between maintaining 
personal safety and completing the collection of evidence. Aircraft  accident 
investigators should not be cavalier with their own health and safety, but neither can 
they  be so concerned about the potential risks of hazards that they fail to complete their 
on site duties.







There are other ways in which hazards may be categorised (Section 2.6.5), but this 
particular taxonomy is useful in that it enables those with no background knowledge of 
potential hazards to gain an overall appreciation of possible dangers, and to develop  a 
basic framework to which further information about accident site hazards can be added. 
This framework can be used to build generic and dynamic risk assessments, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter Six.
Third, Circular 315 recognises the hazards arising from the changing nature of the 
materials from which modern aircraft are manufactured, and separates material hazards 
from general wreckage hazards. Previous ICAO guidance (ICAO, 2000) did not 
distinguish hazards posed by composite materials from wreckage hazards such as those 
caused by  tyres, propellers, batteries and jagged metal. By  separating material hazards 
from other wreckage hazards, investigators systematically working through the hazard 
categories are forced to consider specifically  the nature of the materials from which the 
aircraft is manufactured. Importantly, the materials category includes chemicals, which 
had never before been explicitly included in ICAO site safety guidance. 
Finally, the circular provides guidance on the minimum standards to be met by health 
and safety training for aircraft accident responders. With the exception of one paragraph 
in Circular 298: Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident Investigators (ICAO, 2003a), 
no health and safety training guidance has previously been published. This reflects the 
changing health and safety requirements being implemented by  ICAO member states, 
and fulfils one of the original aims given to the HASSG. 
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) is laid out in five chapters:
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Chapter 1 Terminology
Chapter 2 Managing occupational health risks in aircraft accident investigation
Chapter 3 Hazards
Chapter 4 Generic operational safety planning guide
Chapter 5 Health and safety training
Chapters 1 and 3 of the circular are discussed within this study, Chapters 2 and 4 of the 
circular are discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis, and the implication the results of 
studies in Chapters Four, Five and Six of this thesis have on health and safety  training 
(Chapter 5 of the circular) are discussed in Chapter Seven of this thesis. To ensure 
clarity, this thesis gives thesis chapter titles in words, and Circular 315 chapter titles in 
numerals.
3.2.3 Background to ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation
In 1994, following the 1992 ICAO Accident Investigation and Prevention (AIG) 
Divisional Meeting, the Accident Investigation Methodology Study Group (AIMSG) 
was created. The purpose of this working group was to update the ICAO Manual of 
Aircraft Accident Investigation (Doc 9620) which had not been extensively  updated 
since the 1970 edition. 
The AIMSG separated the original single volume manual into four volumes:
Part I  Organisation and planning
Part II   Procedures and checklists
Part III  Investigation
Part IV  Reporting
These four volumes are divided generally in the same way as the first four sections of 
the original 1970 document. The fifth section of the 1970 manual is now separated 
between the ICAO Safety Management Manual (ICAO, 2006b, 2009b) and the ICAO 
Accident Prevention Programme (2005b). The title of the guidance provided by the four 
volumes has been changed to the Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation. This reflects a change in approach in aviation safety: accidents, serious 
incidents and incidents are now investigated in the same way, the only difference 
between the events being the outcome (ICAO, 2001a). 
The four parts of the manual expand on Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a) to provide practical 
guidance on how to conduct an investigation in a manner required to fulfil the 
objectives set in Annex 13. Part I was published in 2000 (ICAO, 2000); part  IV in 2003 
(ICAO, 2003b); Part III was published as a draft in 2008 (ICAO, 2008b); and part II is 




As stated previously, the purpose of this study is to identify how the hazards set out in 
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) may pose a risk to accident investigators carrying out 
evidence collection tasks on aircraft accident sites.
The study is in two parts. The first part  (Section 3.4) identifies evidence collection 
methods that accident investigators need to complete on sites. The second part (Section 
3.5) is a detailed examination of the hazards identified in Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) 
and how and when they pose risk to an investigator. 
3.3.2 Evidence collection activities on aircraft accident sites
The on site activities of accident investigators were introduced in Section 2.3.2.4. There 
is no definitive list  of evidence collection methods to be employed by aircraft accident 
investigators on accident sites. Indeed, Flaherty  (2008, pp. 68-69) noted that accident 
investigators felt it  difficult to work with a “prescriptive methodology”; they preferred 
to use their own methodologies and the initial information gathered from the site to 
decide how to proceed with the investigation. However, a framework of evidence 
collection techniques is helpful in providing some structure and understanding in the 
review of hazards.
A content analysis methodology was applied to gather the required information. 
“Content analysis is a research methodology that utilises a set of procedures to make 
valid inferences from text” (Webster, 1985). 
This definition is expanded by Krippendorff (2004, p. 18): 
“Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from 
texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use”
Similarly Neuendorf (2002):
“Content analysis is a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages that relies on the 
scientific method (including attention to objectivity-intersubjectivity, a priori design, 
reliability, validity, generalisability,  replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited 
as to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are 
created or presented”
The methodology was applied twice to different data sources, and the results of the two 
analyses compiled into one table. 
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First, content analysis was applied in reviewing reports published in 2008-2010 on 
fifteen aircraft accidents which occurred in the years 2006-2009, to identify the sources 
of evidence used during the investigation. The reporting format set out in Annex 13 
(ICAO, 2001a) was used as a framework to enable comparison between the fifteen 
reports, to identify where evidence was collected both on and off the site. 
Reports selected for inclusion in the analysis were those on recent accidents (rather than 
serious incidents or incidents), and written in the formal Annex 13 format. Five reports 
were selected from each of the AAIB, ATSB and NTSB, to ensure that reported 
investigations used the most current methodologies. (A review of the fifteen most recent 
formal AAIB accident reports alone would have required analysis of reports back to 
2004, on accidents occurring from 2001.)
Second, content analysis was applied to the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and 
Incident Investigation, Part III - Investigation (2008b). Each section of the manual was 
systematically  reviewed to identify the methods recommended to gather evidence 
during each aspect of the accident investigation. The content analysis focused on the on 
site evidence collection techniques.
The two resulting data sets were then combined into a single table against the ICAO 
Annex 13 framework. The purpose was to identify the sources of evidence that accident 
investigators may be looking for both on and off an accident site, and to identify  the 
tasks needed to complete collection of the on site evidence. Development of the table 
provided a framework for analysis of hazards in the next stage of the research study.
3.3.3 Review of hazards
Each of the hazards identified in Chapter 3 of the ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) were 
reviewed to answer five questions:
1. What is the hazard?
2. Why is it hazardous to aircraft accident investigators?
3. Where does the hazard exist on an aircraft accident site?
4. How does the hazard interact  with an investigator’s work? (Answers to this 
question involve the use of the results of the previous work into evidence 
collection techniques used by aircraft accident investigators on site.)
5. What are the recommended practices for aircraft  accident investigators to use to 
protect themselves from exposure to the hazard?
The result of this exercise was to understand how each individual hazard can affect an 
investigator working on an accident site; how much of a risk is posed by individual 
hazards to aircraft accident investigators; and which particular hazards may  pose most 
risk, both in terms of prevalence on site and the effect on the investigator.
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The literature reviewed included journals, industry papers, and accident investigation 
guidance. This was supplemented by aircraft accident and incident reports and manuals 
of fire fighting guidance, to identify sites where particular hazards have arisen or where 
aircraft specific hazards may occur. 
3.4 Evidence collection activities on aircraft accident sites
3.4.1 Overview
The purpose of this study is to provide a structured guide to evidence collection 
techniques that aircraft accident investigators may use when on an accident site. The 
ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part III - Investigation 
(2008b, pp. III-1-1 - III-1-2) recommends four areas of investigation: accident 
particulars; meteorological; technical; and human factors. The same areas of 
investigation are classified differently by the NTSB (2004a): operations; structures; 
powerplants; systems; air traffic control; weather; human performance; and survival 
factors. 
3.4.2 Evidence sources used in recent aircraft accident investigation reports
3.4.2.1 Introduction
The reporting requirements of accident investigators are outlined in ICAO Annex 13 
(2001a) and the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part IV - 
Reporting (2003b), which were discussed previously in Section 2.3.2.6.3.
There are four sections in the standard report format: factual information; analysis, 
conclusions; and safety  recommendations (ICAO, 2001a). As all evidence used in the 
analysis and determination of causal factors must be introduced initially  as factual 
information, it is with the first section of the reports that this research is most 
concerned. 
Fifteen formal aircraft accident reports, written in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 
reporting guidelines, were reviewed to identify the type of evidence used in each section 
of the report.
The fifteen reports were comprised of five accident reports from each of the 
AAIB(2008d,e; 2009c,d; 2010f), ATSB (2010a-e) and the NTSB (2009j,k; 2010c,d,e), 
representing a range of general aviation, aerial work and commercial air transport 
operations, and including both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft (as defined in 
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Section 2.2.1). The full details of each report are listed in Appendix B: in summary, 
there were eleven fixed-wing aircraft and four rotary-wing aircraft, with twelve aircraft 
operating commercially, two conducting aerial work, and one private flight.
The skew towards fixed-wing aircraft reflects the larger number of fixed wing aircraft 
than rotary-wing aircraft currently in operation (see Figure 2.11, Section 2.2.2.3 for UK 
General Aviation example).
The skew towards commercial aircraft operations over general aviation or aerial work 
operations is explained by  the importance aircraft accident investigation agencies place 
on investigating accidents which pose the greatest safety risk. The ATSB (2010f) 
identifies the factors which influence the level of response provided to a safety 
occurrence as:
• “anticipated safety value of an investigation, including the likelihood of furthering the 
understanding of the scope and impact of any safety system failures
• likelihood of safety action arising from the investigation, particularly of national or 
global significance
• existence and extent of fatalities/serious injuries and/or structural damage to transport 
vehicles/other infrastructure
• obligations or recommendations under international conventions and/or codes
• nature and extent of public, interest, in particular the potential impact on public 
confidence in the safety of the transport system
• existence of supporting evidence or requirements to conduct a special investigation based 
on trends
• relevance to an identified and targeted safety program
• the extent of resources available and projected to be available in the event of conflicting 
priorities
• the risks associated with not investigating including consideration of whether, in the 
absence of an ATSB investigation,  a credible safety investigation by another party is 
likely
• timeliness of notification
• training benefit for ATSB investigators”.
The level of investigation response provided by the ATSB is guided by a hierarchy of 
aircraft operation types (ATSB, 2010f):
1. “Passenger transport - large aircraft
2. Passenger transport - small aircraft
i. Regular public transport and charter on small aircraft
ii. Humanitarian aerial work (for example, RFDS, SAR flights)
3. Commercial (that is, fare paying) recreation (for example, joy flights)
4. Aerial work with participating passengers (for example, news reporters,  geological 
surveys
5. Flying training
6. Other aerial work
i. Non-passenger carrying aerial work (for example, agriculture, cargo)
ii. Private transport/personal business
7. High risk personal recreation/sport aviation/experimental aircraft operations
It is for these reasons that most of the aircraft in the sample group are commercial air 
transport, fixed wing aircraft. Investigations into accidents involving smaller, privately 
operated aircraft will generally have a report prepared in a less formal structure, such as 
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in a bulletin. This is an acceptable practice under the Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a) and 
ICAO (2003b) guidance.
3.4.2.2 Report analysis
Each section of the fifteen selected aircraft accident reports was analysed to determine 
the sources or types of evidence used to provide the facts which the accident 
investigators employed to identify the causal factors of each occurrence. Within the first 
part of an Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a) report, which sets out the factual information, there 
are nineteen sub-sections. Each of these sections was reviewed for each accident report, 
and the types of evidence used were classified within the section. Appendix C is a full 
table of the evidence types identified in each report, both on site and off site. Table 3.1 
is a summary of the evidence types used in each report section: the left column lists the 
nineteen sub-sections against which the investigator must report, and the other two 
columns the sources of evidence on site and off site.
Table 3.1: Summary of On Site and Off Site Evidence Sources Identified in Fifteen Sample Accident 
Reports
Report Section On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
1. History of the Flight
“A brief narrative giving the 
following information:
* Flight number, type of 
operation, last point of 
departure, time of departure 
(local time or UTC), point of 
intended landing
* Flight preparation, description 
of the flight and events 
leading to the accident, 
including reconstruction of 
the significant portion of the 
flight path, if appropriate
* Location (latitude, longitude, 
elevation), time of the 
accident (local time or UTC), 
whether day or night”




* Non-volatile memory (NVM) 
including ACARS, EPGWS, 





* Review of aircraft manual 
from on board aircraft
* Witness statements
* Crew statements
* Emergency responder 
statements / logs




* Crew flight and duty time 
records




* Weight and balance 
calculations
* Fuel planning documents
* Radar traces
* Passenger statements
2. Injuries to Persons
Standard table for completion 
(ICAO, 2001a, Appendix 
paragraph 1.2)
* Site inspection * Information from emergency 
services and coroners office
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Table 3.1: Summary of On Site and Off Site Evidence Sources Identified in Fifteen Sample Accident 
Reports
Report Section On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
3. Damage to Aircraft
“Brief statement of the damage 
sustained by aircraft in the 
accident (destroyed, 
substantially damaged, slightly 
damaged, no damage)” (ICAO, 




“A brief description of damage 
sustained by objects other than 
the aircraft” (ICAO, 2001a, 
Appendix paragraph 1.4)
* Site inspection
5. Personnel Information 
a. “Pertinent information 
concerning each of the flight 
crew members include: age, 
validity of licences, ratings, 
mandatory checks, flying 
experience (total and on 
type) and relevant 
information on duty time
b. Brief statement of 
qualifications and experience 
of other crew members
c. Pertinent information 
regarding other personnel, 
such as air traffic services, 
maintenance, etc., when 
relevant” 







* Flight and duty time records
* ATC movement records
* Regulator records
* Medical examinations
* Statements from families
* Statements from colleagues
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Table 3.1: Summary of On Site and Off Site Evidence Sources Identified in Fifteen Sample Accident 
Reports
Report Section On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
6. Aircraft Information
a. “Brief statement on 
airworthiness and 
maintenance of the aircraft 
(indication of deficiencies 
known prior to and during 
the flight to be included, if 
having any bearing on the 
accident).
b. Brief statement on 
performance, if relevant, and 
whether the mass and centre 
of gravity were within the 
prescribed limits during the 
phase of operation related to 
the accident. (If not and if of 
any bearing on the accident 
give details).
c. Type of fuel used”. 
(ICAO, 2001a, Appendix 
paragraph 1.6)
* Summary of general aircraft 
information (including 
manufacturer, year of 
manufacture, powerplants 




* Weight and balance charts
* Information regarding aircraft 
structure
* Information regarding systems
* Information regarding engines
* Crew statements
* Witness statements (those 
who had flown the particular 
aircraft or aircraft type)
* Review of checklists
* Review of flight manual
* Review of operational 
guidance
* Review of performance 
calculation charts
7. Meteorological Information
a. “Brief statement on the 
meteorological conditions 
appropriate to the 
circumstances including both 
forecast and actual 
conditions, and the 
availability of meteorological 
information to the crew.
b. Natural light conditions at 
the time of the accident 
(sunlight, moonlight, twilight 
etc.)
(ICAO, 2001a, Appendix 
paragraph 1.7)





* Emergency responder reports
8. Aids to Navigation
“Pertinent information on 
navigation aids available, 
including landing aids such as 
ILS, MLS, NDB, PAR, VOR, 
visual ground aids, etc., and 
their effectiveness at the 
time” (ICAO, 2001a, Appendix 
paragraph 1.8)
* Equipment fitted in aircraft
* Handheld GPS
* Charts on aircraft





Table 3.1: Summary of On Site and Off Site Evidence Sources Identified in Fifteen Sample Accident 
Reports
Report Section On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
9. Communications
“Pertinent information on 
aeronautical mobile and fixed 
service communications and 
their effectiveness” (ICAO, 











associated with the aerodrome, 
its facilities and condition, or 
with the take-off or landing area 
if other than an 














“Location of the flight recorder 
installations in the aircraft, their 
condition on recovery and 
pertinent data available 








* Witness photographs and 
video
* Radar traces
* IHUMS data from operator
12. Wreckage and Impact 
Information
“General information on the site 
of the accident and the 
distribution pattern of the 
wreckage; detected material 
failures or component 
malfunctions. Details 
concerning the location and the 
state of the different pieces of 
the wreckage are not normally 
required unless it is necessary to 
indicate a break-up of the 
aircraft prior to impact. 
Diagrams, charts and 
photographs may be included in 
this section or attached in the 
Appendices” (ICAO, 2001a, 
Appendix paragraph 1.12)
* Site inspection
* Aircraft / wreckage inspection
* Plot of wreckage, debris and 
ground damage
* Systems inspections
* Records of part numbers
* Video footage
13. Medical and Pathological 
Information
“Brief description of the results 
of the investigation undertaken 
and pertinent data available 




* Search and rescue records
* Witness statements
* Passenger statements
* Breathalyzer tests on crew
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Table 3.1: Summary of On Site and Off Site Evidence Sources Identified in Fifteen Sample Accident 
Reports
Report Section On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
14. Fire
“If fire occurred, information on 
the nature of the occurrence, 
and of the fire fighting 
equipment used and its 
effectiveness” (ICAO, 2001a, 
Appendix paragraph 1.14)
* ARFFS laid foam
* Inspection for ground or in-
flight fire
* Damage to surrounds
* Thermal camera images
* Emergency fire responders
15. Survival Aspects
“Brief description of search, 
evacuation and rescue, location 
of crew and passengers in 
relation to injuries sustained, 
failure of structures such as seas 
and seat belt 




* Aircraft specific emergency 
card procedures
* Wreckage inspection
* Exit doors inspection
* Passenger statements
* Search and rescue statements
* Search and rescue log
* Crew statements
* Witness statements
* Search and rescue SOPs
* Witness video
* Training procedures
16. Tests and Research
“Brief statements regarding the 
results of tests and 

















* Sound spectrum study
* Passenger survey
17. Organisational and 
Management Operations
“Pertinent information 
concerning the organisations 
and their management involved 
in influencing the operation of 
the aircraft. The organisations 
include, for example, the 
operator; the air traffic services; 
airway, aerodrome and weather 
agencies; and the regulatory 
authority. The information could 
include, but not be limited to, 
organisational structure and 
functions, resources, economic 
status, management policies and 
practices, and regulatory 







* Air Operator Certificate
* Operator Safety Management 
System (SMS)
* Regulations
* Emergency response 
procedures
* Review of previous accidents
* Post accident actions
* Witness statements
* Crew statements




Table 3.1: Summary of On Site and Off Site Evidence Sources Identified in Fifteen Sample Accident 
Reports
Report Section On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
18. Additional Information
“Relevant information not 
already included” (ICAO, 




* Review of previous accidents
* Review of previous safety 
recommendations
* Review of regulations








* Review of safety studies
* Survivability testing
19. Useful of Effective 
Investigation Techniques
“When useful or effective 
investigation techniques have 
been used during the 
investigation, briefly indicate 
the reason for using these 
techniques and refer here to the 
main features as well as 
describing the appropriate sub-
headings” (ICAO, 2001, 
Appendix paragraph 1.19)
* Not used in sample reports * Not used in sample reports
Comment on some of the sub-sections listed in the table is useful.
History of the flight provides an overall picture of the accident site and the background 
to the accident. The sources of evidence, both on site and off site are numerous, and 
generally also used elsewhere in the report. 
The ‘standard table’ referred to in Injuries to Persons is shown in Figure 3.1.




Figure 3.1: Table for recording injuries to persons
Source: ICAO, 2001a, Appendix Paragraph 1.2
Of the fifteen accidents in this study, nine were fatal. The table is intended to identify 
physical injuries, but in one ATSB report (ATSB report  AO-2007-070, 2010a) it was 
noted that psychological trauma was apparent in some of the passengers following the 
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accident. Identification of the number of fatalities and level of injuries to crew and 
passengers may require collaboration with the emergency services and coroner’s office. 
Damage to Aircraft and Other Damage are answered through site inspection and aircraft 
inspection, to provide an overview of damage that  occurred during the accident 
sequence. Damage sustained to aircraft in the sample reports ranged from “repairable” 
to “destroyed”. In only two of the fifteen accidents was other damage reported: house 
and vehicle damage during impact (NTSB AAR10/01, 2010c), and damage to airport 
lighting and a perimeter fence following a runway overrun (NTSB AAR-10/02, 2010d).
Personnel Information is self explanatory and the evidence entirely off site.
All evidence relating to Aircraft Information was obtained off site. However, the 
evidence sought was guided by on site inspection of damaged components. For 
example, if an aircraft sustained damage to its landing gear, or particular instruments 
were found to be in a failed condition, off site evidence would be sought about the 
landing gear system or the instrumentation system. It  is therefore common for some 
form of site assessment to be required before the evidence needed for this sub-section of 
the report can be obtained.
The Meteorological Information in the sampled reports broke down into three distinct 
areas: forecasts, aftercasts and observations. Forecasts are the weather information that 
pilots have on take-off. Aftercast reports are issued by meteorological authorities on the 
basis of tracked weather patterns but in the absence of direct and real-time observations: 
one example within the sample reports is an aftercast made of the weather in remote 
Western Australia, where there were few other sources of actual weather information at 
the time of the accident (ATSB AO-2007-047, 2010c). Meteorological observations are 
conditions measured at a certain time, either automatically (such as by an automated 
surface observing system [ASOS]) or by a trained meteorological observer. 
Observations generally  exist for accidents that have occurred at an air traffic controlled 
airport. Reports from other pilots flying in the area, or witnesses on the ground, or 
emergency responders, may also be of assistance.
Although meteorological information is generally collected off site, data gathered on the 
site may  assist in confirmation of the weather conditions at the time of the accident. For 
example, in one of the reviewed reports, FDR data recovered from the aircraft measured 
the windspeed and direction during the aircraft landing (ATSB AO-2008-007, 2010d). 
In another report, the CVR transcript was used to confirm to investigators that the crew 
had the correct ATIS information for the time. 
Aids to Navigation, and Communications records are mostly  investigated away  from the 
accident site, by  using ATC recordings and tapes and independent checks on the 
functioning on navigation aids. However, an on site check of the serviceability of radios 
and navigation instruments fitted on the aircraft might be possible. 
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Much of the Aerodrome Information can be obtained through documents and records. 
However, if the accident occurs on take-off or landing at an airport, then the runway  and 
its surroundings may form part of the accident site to be investigated.
There was extensive reliance in the reports on information contained in the Flight 
Recorders (where fitted). The many different sources of data available on the aircraft 
include the flight data recorder (FDR), cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and the quick 
access recorder (QAR). Other data may be recorded as non-volatile memory (NVM) in 
the electronic memory  of systems such as FADEC/ECU, GCU and BPCU, EGPWS, 
EICAS, and handheld GPS units. 
Although the FDR and CVR are crash protected, they may be damaged through fire on 
impact, or from being exposed to the environment following an accident. In one of the 
sampled accidents (ATSB 2008-067, 2010e), some parts of the CVR and FDR data were 
lost following exposure to sea water. Investigators need to balance the special 
procedures required for recovery of data sources as well as the hazards they may 
encounter at the site, to ensure that the quality  of the data is maintained (see Section 
3.4.3)
Wreckage and Impact Information necessarily  involves site inspection. Such evidence 
depends on inspection of damage to the aircraft, and completion of a plot of the 
wreckage, debris and ground damage. Once an overall appreciation of the site is 
gathered, then further in-depth inspection of particular systems on the aircraft, such as 
instruments, electrical systems, propeller, powerplants, landing gear and hydraulics can 
be carried out. As with Aircraft Information, there is little off site evidence about  the 
wreckage and impact that can be gathered without the benefit of on site evidence. 
Components of the aircraft may be recovered back to a base where further analysis can 
be carried out, but without the guidance of a site investigation the investigation of failed 
systems will be difficult.
Medical and Pathological Information generally comes from post-mortem examinations 
or records of injury to crew and passengers.
The investigation of Fire again requires site examination, to determine whether fire 
occurred pre-impact or post-impact, and to identify  its origin. Components will 
generally  be recovered for laboratory analysis. Statements from emergency response 
personnel, witnesses and the crew and passengers are useful in identifying where to 
search the accident site.
The report  section on Survival Aspects calls for identification of factors which might 
have enhanced the chances of survival for crew and passengers. Some accidents in the 
sample were considered to be not survivable; for others an inspection of the wreckage 
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suggested evidence whether survival levels had been assisted or hampered. This also is 
enhanced by statements from crew, passengers, witnesses and emergency responders. 
The Tests and Research sub-section provides for reporting of the results of tests 
following the accident. Such tests depend upon the prior recovery of testable aircraft 
components, or suggestions from the on site inspection about which aircraft systems 
need further investigation. Items and tests reported on in this section may be linked to 
the section of Additional Information.
Organisational and Management Information allows for identification of any evidence 
of latent conditions which may have contributed to the accident. Most of this evidence 
must be collected off site, and includes potential factors such as weaknesses in the 
organisational structure of the operator, the quality  of the maintenance organisation, the 
capacity of the air traffic control authority, the safety management systems and safety 
culture of organisations involved, and the SOPs of the groups involved in the accident.
Use of Effective Investigation Techniques, which is the last of the nineteen sub-sections 
in the Annex 13 (ICAO, 2001a) report format, is only included in the report when need 
arises. There was no entry  in this sub-section in any of the fifteen sample reports. Only 
one recent AAIB accident report (Aircraft  Accident Report 1/2010, 2010b) included the 
results of a data mining exercise in this section. 
3.4.2.3 Discussion
The purpose of this section of the research has been to identify  the on site and off site 
sources of evidence that aircraft accident investigators commonly use when 
investigating an aircraft accident.
Through analysis of recent accident reports, it  has been identified that evidence must be 
collected from a variety of different sources, and very little of the report can be 
completed without both the on and off site components of an investigation.
Off site sources of evidence include statements from crew, passengers, witnesses, and 
SMEs, recorded aircraft  traces, operational guidance, and aircraft specific information. 
Analysis activities such as simulations, flight tests, and failure tests may also be 
conducted away from the accident site.
On site sources of evidence include wreckage plotting and examination of the different 
structures, systems and components which make up the aircraft. The on site activities 
identified through the reports are summarised in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: On Site Evidence Collection Tasks Identified from Sampled Accident Reports
On Site Evidence Activities
Site inspection Aircraft recovery
Aircraft inspection Location of accident
Recover FDR/CVR/NVM Cabin and cargo inspection
Engine inspection Fuel quantities on aircraft
Systems inspections Photography
Propeller inspections Crew materials/paperwork
Flight deck inspection Bird matter from site
Often components are not analysed on the site, but rather those with identified problems 
are recovered from the site to a laboratory or headquarters for further examination. Care 
must be taken by the investigators not to allow further damage to occur to components 
of interest before laboratory analysis can be conducted.
3.4.3 On Site Evidence Types and Collection Techniques Recommended in ICAO 
 Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part III - 
 Investigation (2008b)
3.4.3.1 Introduction
In the previous section, the evidence referred to in fifteen recent aircraft accidents was 
identified. The major forms of on site evidence collection identified were tabled in 
Table 3.2.
The next stage towards determining the hazards that  affect aircraft accident 
investigators during evidence collection is to identify the techniques used to collect the 
required evidence on site.
This was conducted through the application of content analysis on Part  III of the ICAO 
Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (2008b), ensuring that all 
evidence sources included in Table 3.2 were included. 
3.4.3.2 Review of on site evidence collection techniques
The full results of the content analysis, showing the evidence collection techniques used 
to collect on site evidence are included as Appendix C. 
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3.4.4 Discussion and conclusions
Section 3.4.2 showed that, in order to collect all the evidence required for completion of 
an investigation, both on site and off site evidence collection techniques are needed.
This results of this stage of the research (Section 3.4.3.2, Appendix D) indicate that the 
techniques required to collect evidence on site require investigators to conduct detailed 
inspections of different systems and components, which required close contact with 
many different materials and chemicals. It is during the completion of these tasks that 
the investigators may become exposed to accident site hazards. 
3.5 Review of Hazards
3.5.1 Overview
Within this section of the research, there are five questions to be answered about each 
hazard:
1. What is the hazard?
2. Why is this hazardous to aircraft accident investigators?
3. Where the hazards exist on an aircraft accident site?
4. How does the hazard interact with an investigators work?
5. What are the recommended practices for aircraft accident investigators to use to 
protect themselves from exposure to this hazard?
Where possible, an accident site example has been provided for each hazard, to 
highlight where these hazards have occurred in real world examples. This analysis 
considers the effects of each hazard as an individual concern on an accident site, rather 
than the hazards which affect an accident site as a whole.
3.5.2 Environmental Hazards
3.5.2.1 Overview
Environmental hazards are those arising from the location and site characteristics of the 
aircraft accident. ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) subdivides environmental hazards into 
“location (both geographic and topographic), fatigue (effects of travel and 
transportation), insects/wildlife, climate, security and political situation”. These hazards 
are unrelated to the type of aircraft or the nature of its cargo.
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3.5.2.2  Geographic and topographic location
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) takes the first of its five subdivisions and observes that:
“The accident location frequently poses a range of hazards to investigators due to the 
geographic and topographic location of the site. On land, the site may be located in remote 
or built-up areas, at altitude,  or in very difficult terrain; each of these may pose particular 
hazards.  Marine situations can pose their own problems depending on whether the accident 
site is in shallow or deep water. Recovery issues pose great risk where divers need to be 
deployed” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.2.1)
The analysis which follows is in the terms of this paragraph: the investigation of air 
accidents in remote areas of high altitude or difficult terrain; in built-up areas; and in 
marine situations.
Due to the global nature of aviation, aircraft accidents may occur anywhere. Accident 
investigators in the State of Occurrence might  travel only a relatively  short distance to 
an accident site (for example, AAIB accident investigators attending the Boeing 777 
crash at London Heathrow Airport on 17th January  2008) or might need to travel 
comparatively  long distances regularly  (for example, NTSB investigators attending 
major incidents across the USA). Accident investigators attending an accident site as an 
accredited representative or technical advisor can be called anywhere in the world.
The data show that most major accidents have occurred at or near airports, many of 
which are of course in quite remote locations. Figure 2.4 (in Section 2.2.2.2) gives the 
percentages of fatal commercial jet aircraft accidents that occurred in different phases of 
flight over the period 2000-2009 (Boeing, 2010). If the figures for those years are taken 
to be the norm, 55 per cent of accidents occur during take-off and initial climb or final 
approach and landing, and an additional 13 per cent occur on the ground at  the airport. 
Thus it  would appear from these statistics that in the majority of major accident 
investigations, aircraft accident investigators will be based either on or near an airport 
(however remote). The remaining 32 per cent of major aircraft accidents might  occur 
virtually anywhere. 
When being deployed to an accident site, there is potentially a large amount of 
investigative and personal equipment that an investigator may  want to take to the site. 
This might not be difficult on a local deployment, if investigators are able to drive from 
their base to the site. It  is more difficult if flying to a site, or if difficulty  of access to the 
site requires all equipment to be carried in physically. The geographic location of an 
accident might  affect not only the ease of access of investigators, but also the quantity 
of evidence they can collect and remove from the site.
The location of the accident site affects the response time to the accident, which in turn 
affects the level of perishable evidence that can be collected (Section 2.3.2.4.2.2). The 
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geographic location of the accident  site also affects other hazards, such as fatigue (due 
to travel distance), bad weather and poor security.
Particular issues with evidence collection arise if the aircraft wreckage is located in a 
protected site, for example one of the more than 4000 designated Sites of Special 
Scientific Interest (SSSI) in England (Natural England, 2010). Investigators have a 
responsibility to prevent  further damage to the surroundings within an SSSI, and their 
work may be supervised by environmental protection officers.
3.5.2.2.1 Remote areas, and areas of high altitude or difficult terrain
The remoteness and site characteristics of the landscape in which aircraft crash may 
create particular hazards. The topography will affect the ease of access to a site, the 
difficulty or otherwise of evidence collection, and the level at  which site security  can be 
managed. Review of past accidents in similar sites may assist investigators with their 
generic hazards assessment when these accidents occur.
Khatwa and Roelen (1996) found that around one quarter of the 156 accidents resulting 
from Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) during the period 1988-1994 occurred in 
sites of significant terrain, and 6 per cent occurred in areas of high terrain. The crash 
conditions were known for 135 aircraft: 97 per cent of them were destroyed, resulting in 
3177 fatalities and a mean fatality rate of 91 per cent per aircraft. These statistics 
suggest that  aircraft accident investigators responding to passenger aircraft involved in 
CFIT accidents in hilly  or mountainous terrain, should base their generic risk 
assessment on a very  damaged aircraft  with a high level of blood-borne pathogens on 
the site.
Khatwa and Helmreich (1998-1999) extended this study to review accidents in the 
period 1980-1998, and found that 67 per cent of the CFIT accidents in this period 
occurred in hilly or mountainous terrain. The aircraft in this sample can be assumed to 
have similar site specifics (substantially  damaged or destroyed aircraft, high level of 
fatalities) as the sample for 1988-1994. However, since requirements have now been 
introduced for Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems (EGPWS) on commercial 
aircraft, the CFIT accident rate has reduced to almost nil (Matthews, 2004). Figure 2.5 
(see Section 2.2.2.2) shows that  of the 89 fatal accidents that occurred amongst the 
western-built commercial jet aircraft  fleet in the period 1999-2008, only  sixteen were 
the result of CFIT, although this still resulted in 961 fatalities (Boeing, 2010). 
One CFIT accident was an Air Inter A320 which crashed into mountainside while on 
approach to Strasbourg Airport on 20th January 1992. The area was dense forest, which 
hampered entry to the site for both rescue workers and accident investigators (Figure 
3.2). 
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Figure 3.2: Air Inter A320 Accident Site, 1992
Source: BEA, 1993
Aircraft accidents which occur in remote areas will take longer for investigators to 
respond to, which is likely to result in disruptions to the site through time, lack of 
security, and loss of perishable evidence. 
The wreckage of an American Airlines Boeing 757 which crashed near Cali, Columbia 
in 1995 was located along the top of a mountain ridge at 9000ft  above mean sea level 
(AMSL). The impact site was on the east side of the ridge, and the majority of the 
wreckage on the west side of the ridge. There was approximately  500ft vertical height 
between the top of the ridge and the main wreckage point. Only four of the 163 people 
on board survived the accident. The accident site took eight hours to locate, when 
emergency responders arrived on site via helicopter (Aeronautica Civil of the Republic 
of Columbia, 1996).
The danger in investigating accidents in mountainous accident sites comes both from 
the physiological dangers of working at altitude, and the physical exertion required to 
access and investigate in areas with steep, unstable terrain.
“High-altitude illness (HAI) occurs when hypoxic stress outstrips acclimatisation. HAI 
can occur at  any  altitude above 2100m, but is particularly common above 
2750m” (WHO, 2009). When investigators travel to an accident site at high altitude, 
they  might not have time to acclimatise before beginning the investigation tasks. 
Indeed, aerobic exercise might exacerbate the problem: travellers are advised to avoid 
overexertion for at least 24 hours after reaching altitude (WHO, 2009). Potential 
methods of avoiding exertion include limiting working periods, or directing others, who 
are perhaps better acclimatised, to collect  perishable evidence and to photograph the 
site.
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Areas of difficult terrain are not all necessarily remote. The fire service was unable to 
extinguish the fire caused when a Piper Navajo crashed after take off from Oxford 
Airport (15th January 2010), as they could not get trucks across a field to the aircraft, 
nor did they have hoses of sufficient length to reach the site (BBC, 2010). If the fire had 
been extinguished earlier, less damage would have been caused to the fuselage. 
3.5.2.2.2  Built-up areas
The hazards of attending urban accident sites are not  directly  considered in Circular 315 
(ICAO, 2008a). It refers to other guidance documents, including ICAO Circular 298 
Training Guidelines for Aircraft Accident Investigators (ICAO, 2003a) and the NTSB 
Accident Investigation Manual: Major Team Investigations (NTSB, 2002a). 
Circular 298 (ICAO, 2003a) notes that “utilities such as gas mains, electricity 
transmission lines and main transport routes require special consideration. The crash of 
a Colgan Air Dash 8 (12th February 2009) ruptured a natural gas pipeline, causing a fire 
which took close to twelve hours to extinguish (NTSB, 2009b). Once the site was 
declared safe, the investigators had to search through burnt aircraft wreckage and house 
rubble to collect evidence (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Colgan Air Dash 8 Accident Site (February 2009)
Source: NTSB, 2009b
Built-up areas commonly surround or are near airports. On 17th July  2007, a TAM 
Airlines A320 overran the runway at Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, hitting a fuel 
service station and an air cargo service building (CENIPA, 2009). As well as dealing 
with the aircraft hazards, the accident  investigators faced additional hazards from fuel 
(from the service station) and rubble from the building, which was so extensively 
damaged that it had to be demolished. The El Al B747 freighter crash in Amsterdam on 
4th October 1992 also impacted with a building joining two eleven storey apartment 
buildings (Netherlands Aviation Safety Board, 1994). The hazards created by  aircraft 
 
  
Figure 1: Fire from the broken gas service pipeline 
 
 
Post Accident Events 
 
 On February 12, 2009 at 11:58 p.m., National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation 
(National Fuel), the operator of the natural gas distribution pipeline system serving the 
accident area, was notified that there was blowing and burning gas at 6038 Long Street, 
the impact site. On February 13, 2009 at 12:09 a.m. a National Fuel crew truck was 
dispatched to the scene. The crew arrived at 12:33 a.m., reported to the command center, 
and verified that the flow of gas had been shut off to 6032 and 6044 Long Street, the 
houses on either side of 6038 Long Street. The crew was unable to shut off the gas to 
6038 Long Street since the gas shut off valve was at the meter, which was directly in the 
fire are . 
 
 The National Fuel crew retreated from the accident site at the request of the 
Incident Commander at 1:30 a.m. after they had completed all of the work they could 
safely accomplish. After the crews pulled back, National Fuel developed a plan for a 
section shutdown that would have cut-off gas service to up to 50 homes, including the 
impacted residence. Since the outside temperature was approximately 32 degrees F, the 
shutdown would also have also required evacuation of 50 families from their homes in 
the early morning hours and the assumption of responsibility for the homes’ welfare. The 
 3/4 
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impacting with buildings include fire and hazards created by materials from which the 
buildings are constructed.
Aircraft accidents in urban areas may cause third-party fatalities, as was the case in both 
the TAM A320 and El-Al Crashes described above. Figure 2.5 (Section 2.2.2.2, Boeing 
2010) shows, by  CICTT aviation occurrence categories, the number of external (third 
party) fatalities for commercial jet  aircraft accidents 2000-2009. Of the fourteen 
categories of fatal accident, nine categories included third party fatalities on the ground 
(excluding mid-air collision). Third party fatalities add to the level of biological hazards 
on the accident site.
Site security at aircraft  accident sites in highly-populated urban areas can be more 
difficult than on other sites, due to the number of people present around the site. Nearby 
residents may  need to be moved. Figure 3.4 shows two images of the damage following 
the crash of a TAM  Fokker 100 aircraft into housing, following an engine failure on 
take-off from Congonhas Airport, San Paulo, Brazil on 31st October, 1996. The 
wreckage is unstable and the buildings damaged, yet there are many people present on 
the site.
Figure 3.4: Site photographs from TAM 402, 1996
Source: http://www.desatresaeros.net
Examples of aircraft that have crashed on take-off include the collision between a KLM 
Boeing 747-200 and a Pan-Am Boeing 747-100 at Los Rodeos Airport (now Tenerife 
North Airport) on 27th March 1977; a Singapore Airways Boeing 747-400 at Taiwan 
Airport (31st October 2000), and a Spanair MD-82 that crashed while taking off at 
Madrid Barajas Airport (20th August 2008).
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Recent accidents that have occurred during landing include an American Airlines 
MD-80 at Little Rock, Arkansas (1st June, 1999); a China Airlines MD-11 at Hong 
Kong International Airport (22nd August 1999); a Garuda Boeing 737-400 at 
Yogyakarta Airport, Indonesia (7th March 2007); the British Airways Boeing 777-200 at 
London Heathrow airport  (17th January 2008) (Figure 3.5); a Turkish Airlines Boeing 
737-800 at Schiphol Amsterdam International Airport (25th February 2009); and a 
FedEx MD-11 at Tokyo Narita Airport (23rd March 2009).
In most accidents on take-off and landing, the site to be investigated will be within or 
adjacent to the airport boundary. 
Figure 3.5: View of BA777 accident site at LHR, 17 January 2008
Source: AAIB, 2010b
Investigation within an airport boundary reduces the problem of site security, due to the 
already established airport fences. However, the site will still need to be secured against 
workers permitted to be within the airport boundaries. Investigators will need to be 
aware of dangers posed by aircraft operating in the vicinity, such as on taxiways or 
parallel runways. Additionally, if the location of the wreckage prevents aircraft from 
operating at the airport, or reduces the number that can operate, then the investigators 
will be under pressure from the airport operators to move the aircraft as soon as 
possible. 
Airports are in the normal course of events hazardous workplaces, on which the health 
and safety of the workforce needs to be managed. Some of the hazards are set out in 























































hazards arising from the wreckage. Investigations on airport sites do not however raise 
issues faced in more remote locations, such as transport to the site (unless the airport is 
closed by  the accident, and an alternate airport is needed), the availability of 
accommodation, and availability of facilities for interviews and communication. 
Table 3.3: Hazards of Working on Airports
Hazard Possible Sources
Manual handling Handling cargo and baggage, but also equipment such as 
vacuum cleaners and catering trolleys
Falls from heights Falls from aircraft holds, conveyor belt vehicles, catering 
vehicles and maintenance platforms
Moving vehicles Vehicles driving up to and away from the aircraft, vehicles 
passing close to the aircraft on their way to another stand, 
or crossing pedestrian routes
Fire and explosion Refuelling of aircraft
Hazardous substances Exposure to body fluids and sanitary waste, injuries from 
discarded hypodermic needles (needlestick injuries) during 
aircraft cleaning, skin exposure to aircraft fuels, fumes 
from aircraft and vehicle engines
Noise Aircraft auxiliary power units and engines, ground power 
units and vehicle engines
Electricity Ground power units and cables
Machinery Moving parts of machinery (eg. conveyor belts)
Slips and trips Badly stowed cables, spillages of fluids (eg. fuel, oil. 
hydraulic fluid)
Source: HSE, 2000
3.5.2.2.3  Marine situations
Where an investigation occurs in international waters, such as the crash of the A330 on 
1st June 2009 in the South Atlantic Ocean, the conduct of the investigation is the 
responsibility of the State of Registry (ICAO, 2001a), in that case, France. Annex 13 
(ICAO, 2001a, paragraph 5.3.1) provides that: “States nearest the scene of an accident 
in international waters shall provide assistance as they are able, and shall, likewise, 
respond to requests by the State of Registry”. In the A330 example, initial search and 
rescue capabilities were provided by navies from Brazil, France, USA and Spain (BEA, 
2009e). Accident investigators from France, accredited representatives, and technical 
advisors alike all had to travel to the aircraft  accident site, involving “...transits of the 
order of two to four days from ports such as Praia (Cape Verde), Natal (Brazil), or 
Dakar (Senegal)” (BEA, 2009c, p. 33).
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Four factors influence the success of sea recoveries: the depth; the meteorological 
conditions; the mobilisation times (distance in relation to naval bases); and the political 
context (BEA, 2004). Accident investigation involves locating the wreckage, and its 
recovery.
Emergency responders to the A320 landing on the Hudson River lashed cable through 
the front doors of the aircraft to prevent the fuselage from sinking. This allowed the 
aircraft to be towed to a dock and recovered from the water two days later (NTSB, 
2009g, 2009h, 2009i). 
In contrast, the search for wreckage from the A330 crash in the South Atlantic Ocean on 
1st June 2009 has taken over a year. In this period there have been three phases of sea 
search operations: Phase 1 (10th June to 10th July, 2009) which involved five navy 
vessels (including a submarine), an oceanographic specialist  boat, and two tug boats 
(BEA, 2010a); Phase 2 (27th July  to 17th August, 2009) during which the 
oceanographic boat continued sonar scans of the ocean floor in the expected region of 
the accident site; and Phase 3 (2nd April to 24th May, 2010) which involved an 
American ship equipped with a deep water sonar and a remotely operated vehicle 
(ROV), and a Norwegian ship equipped with six autonomous underwater vehicles 
(AUV) and one ROV. Over these three search periods, 6300 km2 was searched without 
the successful location of more than floating debris (BEA, 2010).
Accident investigators might spend an extended period of time at sea during the search 
period, or they might be able to return to a land base each night. Whatever the case, 
accident investigators must be prepared to spend a large amount of time on the water, in 
sometimes unfavourable weather conditions, without succumbing to the incapacitation 
of extreme sea sickness. Following the crash of TWA800, a Boeing 747-100 off the 
New York coast on 17th July, 1996, more than 225 navy divers and 150 civilian divers 
took part in 4,344 dives lasting 1,733 hours during the recovery period. There were also 
2,679 hours of ROV use while locating and recovering the wreckage (US Navy, 1998). 
Even once evidence is located on the ocean floor, there is the risk that it might be 
moved by ocean currents. The search and recovery of the wreckage of a Aerospatiale 
SA365N Dauphin helicopter which crashed into the North Sea on 27th December 2006 
was delayed by  inclement weather, and took 19 days to complete. The lower rear 
fuselage was found removed from the main debris site, and on the basis of further 
analysis, this separation was considered to have been caused by currents rather than 
through the accident sequence (AAIB, 2008e).
The Valujet DC-9 crash into the Florida Everglades on 11th May 1996 required divers 
to work amongst mud and sawgrass to recover aircraft components by hand. Debris was 
placed on a hovercraft and transported for decontamination, before being taken to a 
hangar for investigation (NTSB, 1997)
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3.5.2.3 Fatigue
“Extended journey times, circadian desynchronisation resulting from transmeridian travel, 
lengthy working hours and demanding working conditions can result in reduced 
performance as an outcome of fatigue. These are significant issues about which individuals 
should be aware and for which they should be prepared. Investigators should ensure they 
understand the physical and psychological demands of their work and when confronted 
with particularly demanding working conditions, seek medical advice at an early stage. It is 
recommended that investigators undergo a periodic medical examination to check their 
fitness for work at accident sites. Early provisions must be made for nourishment, rest and 
counselling of investigators,  both during and following their exposure to the accident 
site” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.2.2)
Within the field of aviation, and particularly with regard to flight crew and maintenance 
workers, the potential negative effects of fatigue on job performance are well 
established. Hobbs (2008, p. 22) suggests that fatigue may  “refer to physical weariness, 
emotional exhaustion, the degradation of skill that results from performing a mentally 
demanding task over an extended period, chronic fatigue related to weeks of work 
without an adequate rest, and finally, an unmet need for sleep”. Aircraft accident 
investigators working on an accident site may succumb to all these causes of fatigue.
An aircraft accident may close the airport to which the accident investigators need to 
travel, thus requiring other and possibly slower means of transportation to be found. 
This will not only  delay evidence collection, but might mean that the investigators are 
tired or jet lagged before they begin. 
The need to begin evidence collection quickly means that unwary investigators might 
push themselves to collect as much evidence in as short a time as possible, seemingly 
benefiting the progress of the investigation, but possibly at the cost of their own 
diminishing efficiency. Added to this are external pressures, such as those from the 
media or from airport operators to move the aircraft. These pressures, combined with 
the possible steadily-developing fatigue of the investigator, can lead to mistakes being 
made. Additionally, if an investigator becomes less vigilant in attention to site hazards 
due to fatigue, there is an increased risk of injury through exposure. 
3.5.2.4 Insects/Wildlife
“Some sites, particularly in remote areas, will introduce the prospect of exposure to or 
contact with wildlife. The many insects and larger animals that bite,  sting, inject or secrete 
can cause immediate or long-term health problems, some of which can be life 
threatening” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.2.3)
The insects and wildlife hazards posed on accident sites will differ between regions. 
Advice can be sought from foreign offices or health organisations about the insect or 
animal borne diseases prevalent in different countries: this information should be sought 
before an investigator travels to an accident site, so that inoculations or preventative 
medications, where available, are obtained. 
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“Rabies is the most important infectious health hazard from animal bites” (WHO, 
2009). Rabies is included in a group of diseases called zoonoses, which are transmitted 
through “animal bites or contact  with animals, contaminated body fluids or faeces, or 
consumption of foods of animal origin, particularly meat and milk products (WHO, 
2009a). Animals potentially transmitting these diseases may be drawn to the site: 
investigators will need to keep distant to protect themselves from bites or other contact, 
and ensure high levels of hygiene after handling wreckage which might have been 
contaminated.
Tropical, subtropical and desert regions are home to various poisonous snakes, 
scorpions and spiders (WHO, 2009). These find shelter amongst aircraft wreckage, 
particularly if it is providing shade, and can attack unwary investigators. Caution should 
be taken when moving wreckage, and protective equipment used. Local knowledge will 
be useful for investigators in becoming aware of poisonous animals potentially present 
on the site. 
Insects can carry a range of different diseases, which are transmitted through bites. 
Table 3.4 shows the vectors (carriers) and the diseases they  can transmit. Protection 
from insects can be provided by insect repellants or chemicals, or by protecting the skin 
through layers of clothing. Again, local information should be sought. 
Stellman (1998a) estimates that 22 per cent  of people may suffer allergic reactions to 
plants, ranging from skin irritations to respiratory problems. Vegetation can also be 
sharp; access to the Boeing 747 accident site at Guam in 1997 was hampered by the 
presence of sword grass (NTSB, 2000). 
The hazards from insects and wildlife might not only come from the environment. The 
MK Airlines 747 Freighter which crashed at Halifax, Nova Scotia on 14th October 2004 
was carrying eighteen cargo pallets of fresh seafood (TSB, 2006). Anecdotal stories 
suggest that the smell the seafood created on the site during investigation was 
nauseating.
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Table 3.4: Principal disease vectors and the diseases they transmit
Vectors Main diseases transmitted
Aquatic snails Schistosomiasis (biharziasis)
Blackflies River blindness (onchocerciasis)












Sandfly fever (Phlebotomus fever)
Ticks Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever
Lyme disease
Relapsing fever (borreliosis)
Rickettsial diseases including spotted fever and Q fever
Tick-borne encephalitis
Tularaemia
Triatomine bugs Chagas disease (American trypanosomiasis)
Tsetse flies Sleeping sickness (African trypanosomiasis)
Source: WHO, 2009
3.5.2.5 Climate
“Extremes of climate are likely to pose problems, especially to unprepared investigators, as 
can locations where changes in weather can occur suddenly. Even relatively small 
temperature changes can pose problems where wind and rain may also be involved and 
work is extended through a long day” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.2.4)
Working in the heat or the cold may reduce investigators’ capacities, and put them at 
personal risk. 
Table 3.5 is guidance for fire fighters on how to mitigate stresses from weather 
conditions (IAFF, 2003) which can similarly affect accident investigators.
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Table 3.5: Climate hazards to Fire Fighters





High heat / humidity 
(ambient)
Entire body Outdoor response 
activities involving 
moderate to high levels of 
work
Response efforts while 
wearing encapsulating 
clothing
Provide air conditioning 
in fire apparatus and 
vehicles in route to 
emergency scene
Provide increase staffing 
for controlling work/rest 
cycles
Provide appropriate fire 
fighter rehabilitation 
following response efforts
Use cooling devices in 
conjunction with PPE
Use ‘breathable’ PPE





Limit cold exposure times








Provide shelter, as 
possible
Use water-resistant PPE
High wind Entire body Outdoor response 
activities during 
inclement weather
Provide shelter, as 
possible
Use water-resistant PPE
Insufficient or bright light Eyes (vision) Outdoor work under 
bright conditions
Response activities wit 




Provide eyewear with 
shaded lenses
Source: Adapted from IAFF, 2003
Investigation in hot weather may induce heat related stresses, including heat rash, heat 
cramps, heat stroke, and heat exhaustion (IAFF, 2003). Investigators must ensure their 
water intake is sufficient to prevent dehydration. Additionally, irritation from dust may 
be intensified by the heat (WHO, 2009).
Exposure to cold weather may, depending on severity, reduce manual performance, 
muscular performance, aerobic performance, reaction time, tracking vigilance, and the 
ability  to perform cognitive tasks (Stellman, 1998b). Opportunity should be provided 
for investigators to acclimatise to the conditions before beginning work, and shelter 
should be provided (if possible) to allow breaks away from the site. 
The sun, and UVA and UVB rays may, whether in hot or cold weather, result in 
“sunburn and sunstroke, snow blindness, [and] solar urtica (sun-induced hives)” (WHO, 
2009). Wind may blow light pieces of debris away, leading to loss of evidence, and may 
cause windburn to investigators, causing personal harm.
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Precipitation may  affect working conditions by destroying perishable evidence by 
washing it  away or covering it (eg. with snow), inhibiting visibility (in fog and mist), 
making the site slippery, and making the wreckage unstable. News reports suggest that 
the site search following the crash of an A321 in Islamabad on 28th July 2010 were 
delayed by heavy rains (eg. Shah, 2010).
3.5.2.6 Security
“Criminal and terrorist threats are a feature of the social situation in many regions, even in 
seemingly safe cities. The advice and support of local contacts should be sought to 
determine security measures that should be adopted. Other political and social advice 
should be requested in order to not violate local traditions or regulations” (ICAO, 2008a, 
paragraph 3.2.5)
Security can pose a hazard to accident investigators in two ways: as a risk to themselves 
from trespassers on the accident site; and as a threat to the investigation, through theft 
or further damage of evidence. There is no set way of pre-determining how security 
might pose a hazard to an investigation: investigators must simply be alert  to potentially 
arising situations, and monitor as necessary. 
The occurrence of an aircraft accident inevitably  creates much local interest. It  is 
necessary  to ensure that the site is sufficiently guarded to prevent people from entering. 
Following the Boeing 757 crash at Cali (20th December 1995), many parts of the 
wreckage were reportedly stolen from the accident site (Bajak, 1996), despite the 
difficulty of access to the site. Anecdotal reports suggest that this also occurred on the 
TAM accident site in San Paulo, Brazil (31st October 1996): Figure 3.5 (Section 
3.5.2.2.2) shows the large number of people present  around the site. Stolen parts from 
the accident site might be important evidence which can not be recovered.
In his paper “Investigation Challenges in an Active War Zone”, Benzon (2006) 
discusses the NTSB response to a Boeing 737 crash in Afghanistan in February 2005. 
The associated hazards included attack from insurgents (investigators were flown to the 
site and supported by armed military personnel), and land-mines in the wreckage 
distribution area, which had to be located and disarmed. Along with these security 
hazards were a range of environment based hazards: travelling into Kabul from the 
USA, and using makeshift beds in army barracks along the way; and working on an 
accident site on a mountain ridge, with identified hazards including “the 11,000-foot 
altitude, the strenuous debarkation from the helicopter, and the snow”. Investigators had 
to leave the site each night and return to Kabul by helicopter, “because of the cold 
night-time temperatures, the possibility  of being weathered in, and the fact that  the 




The Circular 315 definition of physical hazards is simply:
“Physical - fire, stored energy, explosives, structures”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.1.2)
This includes the categories of fire and flammable substances, stored energy 
components, pressurised gases, military and ex-military aircraft, recent  safety 
equipment, pyrotechnics and explosives, and damaged and unstable structures. The 
predominant method of exposure to physical hazards is through puncture or damage of 
the skin surface, however secondary  exposure may also be caused through inhalation or 
ingestion of products of combustion or energy release, and through absorption into the 
skin.
3.5.3.2 Fire and flammable substances
“Fuel is likely to be one of the most common hazards encountered at a crash site. Fuel 
poses problems due to its flammability and its nature as a harmful substance. In practice,  it 
is the flammable aspect that most needs to be guarded against. There are, however, other 
health hazards presented by inhalation of fumes and prolonged skin contact that should also 
be considered. Where available, the advice of an experienced fire officer attending the site 
should be sought in guarding against fire hazards and in securing fuel tanks and containers 
of other flammable liquids such as hydraulic fluids. Fire may also be the result of aircraft 
batteries short circuiting; this may be caused by impact damage. Prolonged exposure to fire 
fighting agents can also cause skin and respiratory injuries.  These agents should be washed 
off skin and clothing as soon as possible”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.3.1)
A number of different types of fuel are used in the aviation industry, including AVGAS 
(used in most light piston engines), AVTUR/JET A1 (used in gas turbine engines) and 
MOGAS (used in some sport aviation aircraft). Other speciality fuels may be used in 
military aircraft, and will have their own specific properties and associated hazards. 
Investigators may come into contact with fuel if is leaking over a site, or when taking a 
fuel sample. ICAO (2008b) recommends at  least two litres of fuel be taken as samples, 
from a number of locations (if possible) for thorough testing. 
The Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Jet A1 lists potential health hazards as 
(Shell Australia, 2010a):
“Slightly irritating to respiratory system. Breathing of high vapour concentrations may 
cause central nervous system (CNS) depression resulting in dizziness, light-headedness, 
headache and nausea. Irritating to skin. Harmful: may cause lung damage if swallowed”
The MSDS (Shell Australia, 2010a) also identifies that the “liquid evaporates quickly 
and can lead to a flash fire or an explosion in a confined space”. Investigators should 
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ensure that they  collect fuel samples in clean aluminium or steel containers, and check 
the site for any areas where fuel may  be trapped. PPE recommended to be worn in a 
heavily Jet A1 soaked environment includes chemical resistant gloves, boots and apron, 
goggles, and a respirator (Shell, 2010a). 
The health hazards of exposure to AVGAS differ from those of Jet A1 (Shell Australia, 
2010b):
Harmful by inhalation. Vapours may cause drowsiness and dizziness. Slightly irritating to 
the respiratory system. Harmful in contact with skin. Irritating to skin. Moderately irritating 
to eyes.  Harmful if swallowed. Harmful: may cause lung damage if swallowed. Possibility 
of organ or organ system damage from prolonged exposure. Target organ(s): Blood-forming 
organs. Peripheral nervous system. May cause hereditable genetic damage. Possible risk of 
harm to the unborn child. Danger of cumulative effects. A component or components of this 
material may cause cancer. This product contains benzene which may cause leukaemia”.
Any part of the body having direct contact with fuel should be immediately washed 
with water. 
While fighting the fire created by an El Al Boeing 747-200 freighter hitting an 
apartment building in Amsterdam in 1992, firefighters sampled air quality to “determine 
dangerous concentrations of various gases like carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide and 
cyanide, to check for the presence of flammable substances above their lower 
flammability limit, and to check on dangerous radiation levels”. (Uijt de Haag et al., 
2000, p. 41).
Figure 3.6 shows the locations of flammable substances on a Boeing 747-400 aircraft. 
The use of fire fighting charts, such as Figure 3.6, assists accident investigators in 
identifying the locations of flammable materials.
Birch (1988, p.5) identified six ways in which post-crash fires generally occur:
1. “Wing separation due to impact, which is invariably accompanied by massive 
dynamic fuel spillage;
2. Fuel release from ruptured tank(s) or fuel line(s);
3. Fuel take eruption due to external radiant heating;
4. Ignition of cabin materials, usually as a result of fuel spillage;
5. Engine fires as a result of malfunction;
6. Undercarriage fires often associated with system failure, tyre or impact damage”.
Aircraft accident investigators do not generally have to deal with the post-crash fire of 
an aircraft, as they are rarely  on scene at this point. However, having an understanding 
of these fire breakout mechanisms helps when conducting the site safety  assessment  to 
ensure that each of the possible sources of fire break-out are made safe.
Following a fire fighter response to an aircraft, aqueous fire fighting foam (AFFF) may 
have been laid around the wreckage. A foam layer starves a fire of oxygen, minimising 
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the chance of re-ignition of a fire, but at the same time it can bury or destroy evidence. 
Investigators directly exposed to foam may  experience irritation of the eyes and skin . It 
is for this reason that the AAIB (2008a) requests that the laying of foam is kept to a 
minimum. 
Figure 3.6: Location of Flammable Materials on a Boeing 747-400
Source: Boeing, 2007.
3.5.3.3 Stored energy components
“Many aircraft structures and systems have the potential to cause injury to personnel. 
Electrical accumulators or capacitors and emergency power supplies can be hazardous due 
to their electrical potential and chemical content. Hydraulic accumulators, oleo struts, 
wheels and fire extinguishing bottles are examples of components that have potential stored 
energy”. (ICAO, 2008a. paragraph 3.3.2)
If a system with stored energy is damaged during an accident or incident, the energy 
may be inadvertently released. This can occur immediately on damage, or during the 
movement of wreckage or the inspection of systems. The proximity  of an investigator 
when investigating the system may mean exposure to injury as the potential energy is 
released. 
The pressure within the hydraulic system of an A380 is reportedly 340 bar (5000 psi) 
(Flight Global, June 2005). Boeing has reported that the pressure in the tyres on many 
747-400 & 400 COMBI SERIES
747.6.1
AIRPLANE RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING INFORMATION
747.6 (ChapName)-(SectName). 747-400 & 400 COMBI SERIES FLAMMABLE MATERIAL LOCATIONS
HYDRAULIC 
ACCUMULATORS 
IN RIGHT BODY 
WHEEL WELL
SIDE CARGO DOOR ON COMBI
HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR 4 
PLACES ON ENGINE 
STRUTS
ENGINE OIL TANK -










25092 GAL - 94983 L
2644 GAL - 10009 L
17164 GAL - 
64973 L











PASSENGER OXYGEN SYSTEM 
BOTTLES ON FWD CARGO 
COMPARTMENT WALL
IMMEDIATELY AFT OF DOOR
PORTABLE OXYGEN BOTTLES IN 2 
PLACES AFT SIDE EACH CLOSET 




BOTTLES AT OUTBD 
LEFT AND RIGHT 
ATT. STA.
PORTABLE OXYGEN
BOTTLES IN 8 PLACES 
UNDER OUTBOARD SEAT 
FORWARD OF DOOR IF 
PASSENGER AREA
OTHERWISE 6 PLACES
3300 GAL - 
12492 L
HORIZONTAL STABILIZER 
FUEL TANK AS INSTALLED, 
PASSENGER MODELS ONLY
2644 GAL - 
10009 L
8964 GAL - 
33932 L
25092 GAL - 
94983 L
8964 GAL - 33932 L
FUEL TANK
(AS INSTALLED)
-400   3210 GAL - 12151 L ACTIONS:
WHEELS ARE EQUIPPED WITH FUSIBLE PLUGS DESIGNED TO MELT AND DEFLATE THE TIRE 
WHEN THE TEMPERATURE IS EXCESSIVE.
HOT BRAKES
Normal Cooling (move aircraft to suitable location and allow to cool on their own).
Water Mist:  (can be deployed from turret or handline).
Fans (placement of fans may place firefighters very close to the hazard zone). 
WHEEL FIRE
Large amounts of water initially with turrets.                                                                                                                    
Transition to handline application to continue and maintain a cooling effect. 
WARNING: APPROACH LANDING GEAR TRUCK FROM FORWARD OR AFT WHEN FIGHTING 
A WHEELFIRE, AS WHEELS AND TIRES MAY EXPLODE.
October 31, 2007
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of their aircraft exceeds 200psi; they  have records of five separate occasions where 
maintenance personnel have been killed or lost limbs when tyres have exploded 
(Boeing, 1999).
The aircraft battery manufacturer Saft reports the effects of exposure to chemicals in a 
Ni-Cd aircraft battery as shown in Figure 3.7:
Issue status N°6 Date: 09/06/10 – MSDS_mainbatteries  1 
Material Safety Data Sheet




This document is applicable for all Saft Nickel-Cadmium (Ni-Cd) batteries and cells 
Trade name 




Saft America Inc. 
711 Gil Harbin Industrial Blvd. 
Valdosta, GA  31601- USA 
Phone: +1 (229)-247-2331 
Fax: +1 (229)-245-2890 
For Chemical Emergency 
Spill, Leak, Fire, Exposure or Accident 
Call CHEMTREC - Day or night 
Tel: +1 (800) 424 93000 
Saft Bordeaux 
111/113 boulevard Alfred Daney 
33074 BORDEAUX – France 
Phone: +33 (0)5 57 10 64 00 
Fax: +33 (0)5 57 10 65 70 
2. CHEMICAL COMPOSITION 
Ingredients CASH # EINECS# Quantity 






8% - 16% 






19% - 36% 
Electrolyte solution (18-30% 
Potassium hydroxide) 
1310-58-3 215-181-3 13% - 19% 
Cobalt (as Cobalt hydroxide) 21041-93-0 244-166-4 ~ 1% 
Copper 7440-50-8 231-159-6 9% - 11% 
Polyamide 11   11% - 13% 
Steel   22% - 34% 
3. HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
Ingredients Classification* 
Name Chemical CASH # EINECS# Symbol Risk phrase Safety phrase  




S2, S60, S61 








S2, S22, S36, 
S60; S61 















*Classification according to the Annex I of Directive 67/548/EEC 
Effects of Overexposure
Eye Effects Contact with electrolyte solution inside battery causes very rapid, severe damage.  Extremely 
corrosive to eye tissues.  May result in permanent blindness.   
Skin Effects Contact with electrolyte solution inside battery may cause serious burns to skin tissues.  Contact 
with nickel compounds may cause skin sensitization, resulting in chronic eczema or nickel itch.   
Ingestion Ingestion of electrolyte solution causes tissue damage to throat area and gastro/respiratory tract.  
Ingestion of cadmium and/or nickel compounds causes nausea and intestinal disorders.   
Inhalation Dust generated during activation procedures may cause varying degrees of irritation to the nasal 
mucous membranes and respiratory tract tissues varying from mild irritation of nasal mucous 
membranes to damage of lung tissues proper.  Inhalation of cadmium compounds may cause dry 
throat, cough, headache, vomiting, chest pain, and/or chills.  Excessive overexposure may result 
in pulmonary oedema, breathing difficulty, and prostration.  
Carcinogenicity NIOSH recommends that nickel and cadmium be treated as occupational carcinogens.   
Figure 3.7: Effects of Exposure to Chemicals in Ni-Cd Aircraft Battery
Source: Saft, 2010.
Investigators should visually  inspect batteries for leakage before moving them. Leaking 
batteries should only be touched when wearing very  high levels of chemical protective 
PPE. Care and protection should be used even when the battery  does not appear to be 
leaking.
3.5.3.4 Pressurised gases
“Some pressurised gases are carried onboard aircraft in containers of various design. The 
rapid discharge of these can pose a risk of physical injury or of asphyxiation if released on 
enclosed spaces. Some fire extinguishing agents can also be toxic. Pressurised oxygen can 
increase the risk of fire or explosion when released”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.3.3) 
The risks posed by pressurised gases are physical injury to investigators due to 
explosion of the pressure bottle, and to illness or asphyxiation following ingestion of the 
chemicals within the cylinders.
A Boeing 747-400 carries thirteen steel oxygen cylinders, each pressurised to 
12,755kPa/1,850psi (ATSB, 2009b). The damage that pressurised oxygen bottles can do 
to an aircraft in flight was demonstrated in October 2008 when a passenger emergency 
oxygen cylinder ruptured in a Qantas Boeing 747-400, and caused rapid decompression 
of the aircraft. The ATSB’s first interim report on the accident (ATSB, 2009b, p.v) 
states: 
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“It was evident that one passenger oxygen cylinder (number 4 from a bank of seven 
cylinders along the right side of the cargo hold) has sustained a sudden failure and forceful 
discharge of its pressurised contents, rupturing the fuselage and propelling the cylinder 
upward, puncturing the cabin floor and entering the cabin adjacent to the second main cabin 
door. The cylinder had impacted the door frame, door handle and overhead panelling, 
before presumably falling to the cabin floor and exiting the aircraft through the ruptured 
fuselage”
On the accident  site of an Air France A340 which overran the runway at Toronto 
International Airport in 2005, the top  of one oxygen bottle was blown 84m away from 
the wreckage in the post-crash fire (TSB, 2007). The bottle top landed across a creek, in 
an area which was not considered part of the accident  site although still within the 
airport boundary, and could have severely injured anyone who had been standing there. 
Protection against these hazards is similar to the protection required against  stored 
energy components: awareness of possible dangers, visual inspection before touching, 
and personal protective equipment where necessary.
3.5.3.5 Military and ex-military aircraft
“Current and former military aircraft are now commonly flying with civil registration. Civil 
aircraft crash investigators and emergency responders may, therefore, commonly come into 
close proximity with cockpit escape equipment and ejector seats, and, as a result, be subject 
to associated hazards”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.3.4)
The specific hazards highlighted by Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) in relation to military 
and ex-military  hazards are the dangers associated with cockpit escape equipment and 
ejector seats. In the civilian aircraft world, ejector seats are rarely installed. 
CAP 632: Operation of ‘Permit-to-fly’ Ex-military aircraft on the UK Register (CAA, 
2009) provides guidance to operators of most ex-military  aircraft or replicas thereof (ex-
military aircraft with MTWA > 2370kg, with a piston engine greater than 800hp, or with 
a turbine or turbojet aircraft). This document requires systems in the aircraft to be 
operated and maintained as they  would have been during military service - this may 
include having ejection seats and canopies fitted.
The Martin Baker Mk 16A seat, as fitted on the Typhoon, ejects at 600 KIAS (Martin 
Baker, 2010). If this went off unwittingly in the vicinity of an investigator, serious 
injury  at least is likely  to occur. Also included within the ejection seat structure are 
explosive cartridges for the parachute, actuators and oxygen bottles. These may also 
pose a hazard to investigators. Aircraft with ejection seats fitted should have this clearly 
marked on the aircraft.
Civilian investigators are responsible for the investigation of accidents involving 
military aircraft if they occur at civilian airfields. Investigators need to be aware of the 
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risk involved, and of the methods of preventing inadvertent ejection, or have access to 
specialist expertise. 
3.5.3.6 Recent safety equipment
“Other safety equipment is being introduced into civil aircraft,  for example, rocket-
deployed emergency parachute systems and airbag restraint systems are being installed 
across a range of aircraft. Often these systems are not clearly market and may not be 
marked at all. The armed and unfired rocket of an rocket-deployed recovery parachute 
system may pose a potential hazard to investigators and rescue personnel”.  (ICAO, 2008a, 
paragraph 3.3.5)
Recovery parachutes and airbag systems are becoming increasingly common in new 
general aviation aircraft.
BRS Aviation, a company that manufacture ballistic recovery systems, claims to have 
installed over 30,000 aircraft parachute systems (BRS Aviation, 2010). There are three 
categories of BRS offered: those for experimental aircraft; for sport aircraft; and for 
certified aircraft. Types of certified aircraft that may be fitted with BRS include the 
Cirrus SR20, SR22 and SRV aircraft, Cessna 172s and 182s, and the Cessna 182 
Katmai-260se STOL. The parachute system is not the same on each of these aircraft 
(BRS Aviation, 2010). 
BRS parachutes are not pre-charged, and if in normal operating conditions the system is 
purposely initiated, the parachute will not deploy. However in crash conditions, the 
system may  become unstable and unintentional deployment is possible. As with ejector 
seats, investigators should know the steps required to make the system safe before 
attending accident sites, or who to contact if they are unable to do so. The system must 
be made safe before entry into the aircraft or wreckage to begin investigation.
Seat-belt mounted airbags are being introduced into both the general aviation and 
commercial fleets. Cathay Pacific has fitted these seats-belt airbags to their A340 and 
Boeing 777 fleet (Amsafe, 2010). Figure 3.8 shows a deployed airbag in a general 
aviation aircraft. The manner in which airbags deploy in commercial aircraft are similar. 
If not deployed in the accident sequence, they  have the potential to deploy subsequently 
when the investigator is working within the cockpit  or cabin. Investigators should be 
aware of the direction the airbag could deploy, and steer clear of this area.
146
Figure 3.8: Seatbelt fitted airbag on general aviation aircraft
Source: Amsafe, 2010
3.5.3.7 Pyrotechnics and explosives
“Most commercial and many private aircraft carry custom-built explosive charges to initiate 
escape slides, parachutes, fire extinguishers,  cable cutters, flotation gear, deployable 
emergency location transmitters, etc. Whilst the activation of these charges may pose only a 
small direct risk to personnel, the unexpected initiation of the systems that they operate may 
present a more significant risk. Pyrotechnics are carried by an variety of aircraft, and 
therefore may discovered amongst the aircraft wreckage. They sometimes sustain impact 
damage, and, as a result, pose an increase risk of initiation. Weapons may also be carried by 
passengers or crew as cabin or stored baggage and should be carefully treated.  In the early 
stages of the crash investigation, perhaps at the reporting phase, co-ordination personnel 
should seek information passed to the Investigator-in-charge. These hazards also support 
the need for adequate police resources to restrict the pubic and media from access to the 
accident site for their own protection”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.3.6)
A wide range of pyrotechnic and explosive hazards are listed in this description. The 
equipment carried will depend on the aircraft types: for example, escape slides are fitted 
on large commercial aircraft and emergency flotation devices on helicopters, and 
parachutes are routinely worn by  glider pilots. While these are generally safe in their 
undamaged state, as are other stored energy  components, inadvertent explosion could 
pose a risk to the physical safety of investigators. 
As a safety  precaution, escape slides on all commercial aircraft are armed before take 
off. When deployed, the cartridge fills the slide with compressed carbon dioxide and 
nitrogen, mixed with air. The process reportedly  takes around six seconds (Huber, 
2007). Investigators working within these aircraft must determine whether these are still 
armed when entering the site. 
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Weapons may be carried on both civil and military  aircraft. Most civil aviation 
regulators have strict  guidelines on the ways in which weapons and munitions should be 
packed. As an example, the CAA (2004) permits firearms to be carried on board aircraft, 
so long as they are not loaded with ammunition, and are carried in an area inaccessible 
to passengers during flight, such as in stowed luggage. Up to five kilograms of 
ammunition may also be carried per passenger. 
3.5.3.8 Damaged and unstable structures
“Generally, the hazards posed by aircraft structures will be obvious and most will be readily 
identified. Situations sometimes arise, however,  when persons on site may be exposed to 
unexpected hazards, for example, if wreckage moves or gives way underfoot.  Modern 
materials,  including composite structures, may appear undamaged externally, but will have 
lost structural integrity due to impact and/or heat damage. They can also retain significant 
energy under the stress of impact, which, when released, may suddenly pose a significant 
hazard. Structural strength may also be reduced by corrosion,  for example, seawater may 
pose a risk to materials such as magnesium in a relatively short period of time”. (ICAO 
2008a, paragraph 3.3.7)
This category covers the general hazards encountered with aircraft wreckage and debris. 
Accident investigators may have to walk or climb over aircraft debris to collect 
evidence from areas of interest, but the wreckage might not be stable. Decisions will 
have to be made about whether to move the wreckage, find methods of stabilising the 
wreckage, or working around these conditions. This will be an ongoing process, with 
constant reassessments needed every time an investigator proceeds to a new part of the 
site. 
In order to access evidence such as large pieces of wreckage from large commercial 
aircraft, temporary work equipment might be required. The use of this equipment will 
need to be properly risk assessed, and supervised by experienced personnel. Andrews 
(2001) identifies types of mobile equipment to include “ladders, step ladders and 
trestles; general access scaffolds; suspended cradles and chairs; mast-elevated work 
platforms; power-operated work platforms; and abseiling equipment”. He states that  the 
accidents that occur most commonly  when using these types of equipment include slips, 
trips and falls; injuries from moving parts; injuries resulting from failure or collapse of 
the equipment; and injuries following contact with power-lines and other overhead 
services (Andrews, 2001). General health and safety lifting procedures should be 




“Biological - pathogens associated with human remains or cargo consignments and state of 
local hygiene”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.1.2).
Circular 315 divides biological hazards into one large category of general biological 
hazards, and a smaller sub-category  of hazards associated with the local state of 
hygiene.
3.5.4.2 General biological hazards
“Accident investigators are at risk of exposure to many biological hazards. Biological 
hazards may exist in the cockpit, cabin and cargo wreckage as well as on the ground where 
bodies and survivors have lain. Since it is not possible to readily identify contaminated 
blood and other bodily fluids, it is prudent to take precautions whenever working around 
and in wreckage, when handling wreckage and when performing off-site examinations and 
tests on wreckage parts”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.4.1)
“Precaution must be take to prevent viruses from entering mucous membranes (such as the 
eyes, nose and mouth) or non-intact skin such as open cuts or rashes. The accident site may 
be contaminated with liquid, semi-liquid and dried blood and other bodily fluids, 
fragmented bones, human or animal tissue and internal organs. In the dried stage, there is a 
risk that particles of these substances may become airborne and come into contact with the 
unprotected eyes, nose and mouth”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.4.2)
The risks posed by biohazards on accident sites are well researched and established. The 
requirement in the USA for all responders on accident sites to be trained in the 
management of hazards to 29 CFR 1910.1030 standards reflects this understanding of 
risk. 
Biological pathogens on the accident site may be in blood or other body fluids, or 
airborne. The predominant blood borne pathogens are hepatitis B, hepatitis C, and HIV 
(WHO, 2009). There is no accepted figure for how long these pathogens remain viable 
in the open environment, but the general anecdotal consensus is that HIV lasts no longer 
that a few minutes in dried blood in the outside atmosphere. The hepatitis viruses appear 
to last longer, up to around four days. 
With specific reference to HIV, Sherertz (1992) notes that clinical studies conducted by 
Resnick (1985) show that “common household bleach in 10% concentration in water 
and 70% alcohol each inactivated infectious viruses within 1 minute. Exposure of HIV 
to nonionic detergent also resulted in inactivation of virus within 1 minute”. 
Salazar, DeJohn and Key (1997, 1999) observed that  the instigation of nine site 
protocols on several large aircraft accident sites in the USA minimised the risks posed 
to investigators by blood borne pathogens. They were:
149
1. “Adequate immunisation against tetanus and a recent booster were made mandatory.
2. Hepatitis B immunisations were made readily available to personnel; most of the 
personnel entering the sites chose to be immunised against hepatitis B.
3. Use of contact lenses was forbidden due to increased risk for eye infection.
4. Persons with skin conditions that interrupted to integrity of the skin (eg. psoriasis, 
open sores, cuts, burns, skin lesions) were advised against entering the accident site.
5. Persons with eye or ear infections were advised against entering the site.
6. Any leakage of protective clothing was dealt with as soon as possible to prevent 
contamination.
7. If contaminated water, dirt, or mud entered the mouth,  eyes or ears, individuals 
affects were requested to leave the area immediately, and report to medical 
personnel for examination and irrigation of the affected area with clean water.
8. Briefings were given on blood-borne pathogen hazards, universal precautions,  and 
preventative measures.
9. At the ValuJet site, persons at greater risk for infection were not exposed to water 
and muck from the accident site; possible conditions included diabetes mellitus, 
those with concomitant infections or any other underlying condition likely to 
encourage infection due to lowered immunological defences”.
Salazar, DeJohn and Key suggest that post-crash fires may kill biohazards (1997). 
There are two ways that airborne diseases may be transferred: airborne transmissions 
and droplet transmission. “Airborne transmission occurs when droplet  nuclei 
(evaporated droplets) < 5 micron in size are disseminated in the air... Diseases spread by 
this mode include open / active pulmonary tuberculosis (TB), measles, chicken pox, 
pulmonary plague and haemorrhaging fever with pneumonia” (WHO, 2009, p.54). 
“Droplet transmission occurs when there is adequate contact  between the mucous 
membranes of the nose and mouth or conjunctavae of a susceptible person and large 
particle droplets (> 5 microns)... Diseases transmitted by  this route include pneumonias, 
pertussis, diptheria, SARS, mumps and meningitis” (WHO, 2009, p.55). Awareness of 
the potential airborne hazards around the accident site will assist in protecting against 
the risks posed. 
3.5.4.3 Local state of hygiene
“Low levels of hygiene can pose health risks. Even relatively minor complaints can become 
serious when personnel cannot access medical treatment. Care should be taken when eating 
and drinking in remote locations or where hygiene levels are of concern.  Guidance on 
essential hygiene should be sought from experts prior to undertaking foreign travel”. 
(ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.4.11)
Many important infectious diseases (such as cholera, cryptosporidioisis, giardiasis, 
hepatitis A and E, listeriosis and typhoid fever) are transmitted by contaminated food 
and water (WHO, 2009). 
Investigators should be aware of the local conditions, and adapt for them. Investigators 
travelling to sites should seek medical advice from international health agencies or local 




“Materials - exposure to and contact with materials and substances at the site”. (ICAO 
2008a, paragraph 3.1.2)
Material hazards on a site are in part determined by the materials and substances used 
by aircraft manufacturers to build and operate the aircraft. The materials carried in the 
payload of the aircraft might  also contribute to the presence of material hazards. 
Following an aircraft accident, investigators might  immediately obtain the aircraft 
manufacturer fire fighting charts, and the cargo manifest of the aircraft, to assist with 
their initial hazards identification process.
3.5.5.2 Metals and oxides
“Many of the metals and their respective oxides are hazardous to health when ingested into 
the body. However, all dusts and particles are considered hazardous when encountered in 
sufficient concentrations. It requires only relatively small quantities of some metals to pose 
risks to health and to have a significant effect on the body. These metals and oxides are 
accordingly classified as high risk. These substances may adversely react with chemicals, 
such as fire fighting agents, so any indication of chemical reaction should be treated with 
the greatest care and reported to the Investigator-in-charge”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 
3.5.4)
“The products of combustion of many materials are hazardous when inhaled, ingested or 
absorbed and exposure to them is restricted by national safety authorities. In practice, 
however, due to the type of damage created in an aircraft accident, it is almost impossible 
to separately identify and quantify safe limits of exposure to these substances during 
emergency response and accident investigation activities. Furthermore, accidents in 
industrial areas may introduce entirely new chemicals that may adversely react with each 
other or with the aircraft and prove more harmful to rescue or investigative personnel”. 
(ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.6).
Most of the aircraft currently in operation have been manufactured using aluminium 
alloys. The behaviours of these alloys in impacts and fires has been well researched and 
understood. 
Metals, and other materials in aircraft, start  to burn at different temperatures. Ashes may 
contain any variety of chemicals and oxides of metals, and inhalation of these products 
should be protected against using appropriate PPE.
151
3.5.5.3 Composite materials
“The use of fibre-based composites on aircraft is now extensive, with aircraft structures 
commonly consisting of more than 15 per cent be weight of these materials. A broad range 
of fibrous materials is used in the construction of composite materials, including carbon, 
glass, kevlar and boron, with these and others often combined to form a hybrid fibre. The 
resin matrix binding the fibre generally accounts for around 40 per cent of the 
manufactured composite material. These different fibres,  not surprisingly, behave 
differently when subjects to the forces and effects of aircraft accidents”. (ICAO, 2008a, 
paragraph 3.5.7)
“Reports indicate that when subjected to fire or impact alone, composite structures are 
likely to release around 1 per cent of their base material as free fibres. When subjected to 
both fire and impact damage, structures can release up to 10 - 12 per cent of material as free 
fibres”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.8)
“Particular concern has been raised about the potential hazard posed by damaged composite 
structures. Research into these hazards has been conducted at carious times following the 
early use of composites on aircraft, although it is acknowledged that more research on the 
health hazards posed is required. Research on carbon fibre indicates that this material 
exhibits minimal fibrogenic activity and little evidence of lung toxicity in tests. The studies 
show that carbon fibre is different from asbestos and mineral fibre, and less toxic that silica. 
As a result of recent unrelated research, some States have proposed that all synthetic 
mineral fibres under 6 microns (mean diameter) should be classified as irritates, and that 
some ceramic and mineral woods (types generally not used on aircraft) should be classified 
as carcinogenic (i.e. capable of causing cancer)”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.9)
“Other research suggests that exposure to the dusts of burnt composites may pose more of a 
problem that exposure to free fibres. What is clear at the present is that more research is 
required to be sure of the hazards and levels of risk posed by the range of materials”. 
(ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.10)
“There are other short term health effects resulting from exposure to the fibres and debris 
from impacted and combusted composites. Most notably, the fibres are highly irritant, 
particularly to the eyes, and also to the nose, throat and lungs. There is also still concern 
that partially burnt debris will cause contact hazards, such as dermatitis. Substances which 
are taken into the lungs with fibre and dust may also cause sensitisation (allergies),  which is 
a significant concern”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.11)
“As with other hazards, appropriate procedures to limit expose and reduce disturbance will 
prevent dusts and fibres from becoming airborne and minimise their hazardous nature when 
they do. Consideration may be given to entering the accident site from an up-wind direction 
so hazardous exposure is reduced as much as possible, and if encountered, provides a 
known exit direction with reduced risk of further exposure”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 
3.5.12)
The description provided about composite material hazards in ICAO Circular 315 
(2008a) is the most  comprehensive description in the Circular about any  of the 
identified hazards. This reflects the growing use of composites in the aviation industry, 
and the growing concern about the hazards these materials may  pose in crash 
conditions. 
The Boeing 787 contains more composite material than other commercial aircraft in 
operation. Fire fighting guidance provided by  Boeing (2009) states that “... from a 
toxicity  perspective, the composite structure during fire testing poses no greater hazards 
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than an aluminium fuselage aircraft. Also, note that the burn through time on the 
composite structure is significantly longer than with the aluminium fuselage which may 
inherently  provide greater safety to both the rescue fire responders and passengers in 
some scenarios”. This guidance is based on an intact fuselage, and the advice does not 
necessarily extend to aircraft that contain damaged composites.
Taylor (2008) describes the composites used in aircraft as including:
• “Carbon/epoxy (CFRP) - used as a primary structural and skin material;
• Kevlar/epoxy - mostly  used in military applications, in primary structures and amour 
plating;
• Glass fibre - used as a structural and skin material (on amateur-built and GA aircraft);
• Glass/phenolic (GRFP) - used in interior fittings, furnishings and structures;
• Boron/epoxy - used in composite repair patches, older composed structures”
Taylor (2008) also advises that the initial actions of investigators on sites should be to 
protect electrical equipment on site, as released fibres may be conductive, and hence 
destroy the equipment and any evidence contained within. 
In reference to the dangers posed by aircraft composites in fires, Day  (2001, p.3) notes 
that: 
“Highly toxic fumes are given off by the resins and bonding agents used in the manufacture 
of composite materials.  Many resins contain hydrogen, chlorine, nitrogen and oxygen. As a 
result Hydrogen Cyanide, Hydrogen Chloride and Nitrogen Dioxide are given off which are 
extremely toxic. Other poisonous products of combustion include Formaldehyde, 
Ammonia, Toluene and Carbon Monoxide and isocyanates from polyurethane based resins. 
Whilst it can be argued that the majority of these gases will be taken away in the smoke 
plume of the main fire, they may still be present in the post crash scenario where the pose a 
severe threat to firefighters”.
Investigators may also be affected by  these chemical by-products of composites in fires, 
especially if investigating in enclosed spaces. 
Day (2001) also recommends that: 
“The risk of composite material fibres and particles can be reduced in the following ways:
• The application of a fine water spray to the area
• The application of a water base suppressant. This will consolidate the top 3-4mm of the 
crash site debris.
• Application of a foam blanket. This does have the disadvantage of covering holes in 
aircraft floors and other obstructions.
• Small areas can be covered by polythene sheeting.
• Sections of composite materials may be separated from other debris and secured in 
polythene bags for future disposal
NB: Removal of crash debris would only be considered in the post crash scenario and 
having consulted the AAIB first”.
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3.5.5.4 Chemicals and other substances
“Aircraft contain many chemical compounds, some of which may be hazardous in their 
natural state and other which can become hazardous when exposed to heat and other 
substances. For example:
• Viton ® is a synthetic rubber-like material containing fluorine used for ‘O’ rings and 
gaskets in engines and hydraulic systems. If exposed to high temperatures and moisture, 
the material may degrade and produce a corrosive substance.
• Batteries contain chemicals such as lithium that reacts vigorously with water, and thionyl 
chloride that decomposes in air to form hydrochloric acid and sulphur dioxide.
• Hydraulic fluids may become hazardous in their normal state, perhaps being classed as 
irritants. Some also become acidic when exposed to temperatures above a certain 
threshold.
• Used mineral oils from engines are widely known to be carcinogenic and are identified in 
specific legislation in some States.
• Partially combusted fuels and lubricants are known to produce a range of hazardous 
substances.
• Asbestos, although not frequently used in aircraft construction, has been used in heat 
shielding materials on and around engines and in various gaskets”.
(ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.13)
There are many different chemicals on aircraft, contained within different systems and 
components of the aircraft structure. Aircraft manufacturers’ fire fighting charts will 
assist in identifying the location of these chemicals. 
Considering hydraulic fluids alone, ICAO (1970) states: “When heated, Skydrol (a 
Trade Name hydraulic fluid commonly used in present aircraft) gives off a white misty 
vapour which is acrid and choking. When burned, the residue is first dark coloured and 
viscous, then it changes to a dark charred material, then a white fluffy deposit appears 
after prolonged heat. When burned, it has a yellowish flame with white smoke. If 
Skydrol is heated and a piece of aluminium is placed in it, an acetylene-type odour is 
evident”. Investigators must be cautious when working in these situations. Solutia 
(2010), the manufacturer of Skydrol, advises that contact with the skin will cause the 
skin to dry out, causing dermatitis and secondary infections; they  recommend that 
gloves impervious to fluids, goggles, and a respirator should be worn when working in 
an area where Skydrol could be splashed.
Indeed, working in an area where chemicals are present, investigators may need to used 
high levels of PPE, including chemical protective suits, eye protection and powered 
respirators to prevent inhalation of, or contact with, the chemicals.
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3.5.5.5 Radioactive materials
“Radioactive materials are often used in small volumes in some aircraft components and 
are frequently carried as cargo in commercial operations, particularly substances for 
medical use. Generally, specific radioactivities of these are low, and half lives are short. 
However, higher activity material is regularly carried on-board aircraft. Restrictions on 
packaging these are, however, very strict, ensuring that in the majority of cases, packaged 
contents will remain effectively inert in the event of an accident.
• Several radioactive materials have been used in the construction of aircraft. These are 
mainly materials with a low specific radioactivity, and therefore pose a low risk in their 
normal state. However,  when reduced to dust after fire, they are likely to pose a hazard to 
health if ingested or inhaled. Depleted uranium has been used in ballast weights for 
control surfaces in a range of civil and military aircraft.  It was fitted in several hundred 
early versions of the Boeing 747, in Lockheed aircraft, and in stretched versions of the 
Hercules C130 aircraft. This materials has also been used to manufacture tip weights for 
helicopter main rotor blades.
• Radiologically, depleted uranium is not classes as a significant risk in its undamaged 
form. Where particulate is produced, however, e.g. by machining or fire damage, 
depleted uranium may be ingested, inhaled, or absorbed and, once in the body, the 
material poses a significant chemical hazard.
• Thorium. This material has been used extensively in components for aircraft engines, 
both piston and turbine, and is often alloyed with magnesium, although at relatively low 
concentrations. It has also been used in other components such as gearbox casings on 
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Its use has been reduced significantly in recent years, 
however, there are significant stocks of thoriated components available and these are, 
presumably, still to be used.
• Tritium. Beta lights are used extensively on some civil aircraft to indicate emergency 
exits and also in instrument lights on some military aircraft.  Typical beta lights each 
contain a total of about 20 curies of tritium gas. Exposure to the contents of a single 
broken beta light could result in a dose of up to 1/10th of the current acceptable annual 
limit.
• Other nuclides. Americium is used in some forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems, 
Krypton is used within oil level indication systems, and Strontium 90 can be found 
within ice detection systems and in helicopter rotor crack indicating systems”.
(ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.14)
Following the 1992 crash of a Boeing 747-200 freighter into an apartment building in 
Amsterdam, there was much concern from bystanders about their possible exposure to 
uranium as a result of the accident. Uijt de Haag et al. (2000) conducted an 
investigation into these claims, and determined that, despite 152kg of depleted uranium 
being missing from the site following the site clean-up, it  was highly  improbable that 
the health of any bystanders were affected by  inhalation, external irradiation or 
ingestion of depleted uranium.
Environmental protection agencies may need to respond to accident sites where 
radioactive materials are thought to be present.
155
3.5.5.6 Cargo
“There are immense difficulties associated with identifying and assessing risks posed by 
cargo. A huge variety of freight is carried by air, most of which is identified in some way, 
although a significant volume carries only a general description.  Dangerous Goods are 
usually well identified and documented, and information may be gathered (using dangerous 
goods manifests) at a very early stage to help determine the degree of hazard. While general 
cargo, by definition, is considered non-dangerous (in transport classification terms), in 
general health and safety terms, it is quite capable of posing significant hazards. It should 
be noted at cargo containing dangerous goods and general cargo many include the 
chemicals and substances mentioned above (NOTE: Paragraph 3.5.14). Neither mail, not 
private goods, both carried by air in large volumes,  carry any indication of contents on their 
packaging”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.15).
“When carrying out early site assessment work, it is essential to obtain full information 
about the complete load of cargo as soon as possible, Dangerous Goods manifests may 
usually be obtained quickly, but general cargo manifests should also be obtained and 
reviewed at a very early stage. A wide range of information is contained within the 
manifests/cargo documents, including descriptions of packaging, general description of 
cargo, and contact details of consignors/consignees, etc.”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.5.16)
Cargo on an aircraft may be categorised as either general cargo, or designated 
dangerous goods. 
Dangerous goods are defined as: “Articles or substances which are capable if posing a 
risk to health, safety, property or the environment and which are shown in the list of 
dangerous goods in the Technical Instructions or which are classified according to those 
Instructions”. The SARPs in Annex 18: The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air 
(ICAO, 2001d) provide guidance about what can be transported by  air, how it must be 
packed and labelled, and the responsibilities of the shipping and aircraft operator. 
A dangerous goods manifest is required to be left at the place of departure. This 
information can be requested by  investigators following an accident, but may take some 
time to receive. The TSB (2006) reported that, following the MK Airlines 747 Freighter 
crash at Halifax, Nova Scotia in 2004:
“Since all the dangerous goods carried on MK1602 had been loaded at the previous stop, 
Bradley International Airport, no one in Halifax had any information regarding the 
dangerous goods.  It was not until 10 hours after the accident that ARFF received a listing of 
the dangerous goods that had been loaded at Bradley. A lack of timely information 
concerning dangerous goods could have jeopardised the safety of the ARFF personnel and 
other responding personnel. In the case of a survivable aircraft accident, knowledge of the 
number of occupants could be critical to successful rescue efforts”. 
The NTSB has made numerous safety recommendations for manifests to be held at both 
the departure and intended arrival airports (including in 1990, 1998 and 2005), but these 
have not been accepted (TSB, 2006). 
No manifests exist to provide information about cargo that passengers are carrying with 
them, or the undeclared cargo on an aircraft. Aviation regulators publish guidelines 
about the goods that  can be carried on board aircraft. The CAA (2010) classifies goods 
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suitable for carriage in four categories: carry on baggage, checked baggage, on the 
person, or requiring operator approval. 
In March 2000, a Malaysia Airways A330-300 had to be written off following a spill of 
oxalyl chloride which was mis-declared as another non-toxic substance. The chemical 
corroded the aircraft, and caused five baggage loaders, who entered the aircraft hold, to 
become ill (FSF ASN Database, 2010). Investigators must be aware that the information 
they  are provided with on the dangerous goods manifest  might not be accurate and 
reliable.
In May 2004, spilt mercury was discovered in a Flybe BAe 146 aircraft at  Belfast City 
Airport. Three baggage handlers, two cargo handlers, and a fire fighter were 
hospitalised as a precautionary measure (BBC, 2004). In this instance no damage was 
done to the aircraft, but this mis-packed cargo is another cautionary  example of a cargo 
manifest not providing accurate information. 
3.5.6 Psychological hazards
“Accident investigations frequently require personnel to work in close proximity to disaster 
and trauma. This work involved dealing not just with the fatally or seriously injures, but 
with survivors,  relatives and colleagues of the victims. The intensity, scale, and (frequently) 
long duration of the task can present significant potential for adverse psychological impact 
on investigation teams. After past disasters, there have been reports of rescue workers 
suffering from Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), causing sleep disturbance, intrusive 
thoughts and flashbacks. There is little available evidence to confirm such symptoms 
amongst accident investigators, suggesting that the psychological impact poses less of a 
risk to investigators that once thought. However, this more satisfactory outcome may be 
due to the establishment of professionalism at both an individual and team level (including 
good work practices) and effective peer support”. (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.6.1)
The psychological hazards that affect an investigator are not necessarily recognisable on 
the site, and might not affect the evidence collection, but can have longer lasting 
repercussions after the event. Conversely, investigators might be affected immediately 
by horrific conditions at an accident site, and be distracted from the tasks they are 
intending to carry out. 
Following such an experience, responders may develop Critical Incident Stress (CIS). 
Leonhardt and Vogt (2006) define CIS as: “The psychological and physical changes 
which a person experiences after a critical incident. These reactions are normal 
reactions to an abnormal event”. A list of recognised symptoms of CIS are summarised 




• Difficulty in decision making
• Difficulty in identifying people known to the individual
• Disorientation in terms of time and place
• Change in readiness to react to situations
• Changed perception of surroundings
• Distrust
• Nightmares
• Disorientation in ability to concentrate and being alert
• Memory lapses, blanks
Emotional:
• Fear and insecurity
• Feelings of guilt
• Feelings of being overwhelmed/helplessness
• Anxiety
• Irritability/aggression
• Fits of anger
• Increased excitability
• Panic attacks
• Over exaggerated expressions of grief
• Suppression of feelings/elusive behaviour
• Lack of emotion or outbreaks of emotions
• Depression
Physical:
• Sudden dizziness/feelings of faintness
• Dizziness/numbness
• Sleeping disorder
• Faster pulse of higher blood pressure
• Breathing difficulties
• Dimness of vision
• Chills and fevers
• Teeth grinding
• Increased fluid intake
• Drowsiness
• Nausea and vomiting
• Muscle twitching/nervous twitching/paralysis









• Uncontrollable movements (for example ticks)




• Over exaggerated expressions of grief
• Suppression of feelings/elusive behaviour
• Lack of emotion or outbreaks of emotions
• Retreat, immobility, hyper mobility”
158
If CIS remains untreated, or intervention methods are poor and ineffective, then Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) may develop. Kersey  (2001) recommends that to 
reduce the risk of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), organisations should 
implement procedures such as “defusing sessions soon after the event where pent up 
feelings can be released; mentoring or “buddy” sessions with colleagues; professional 
counselling; or long-term psychiatric assistance”.
3.6 Discussion and conclusions
The purpose of this study  was to consider on site evidence collection tasks, and the 
hazards that investigators may encounter when collecting evidence on a site. This 
information might assist  investigators in considering the the evidence collection 
methods to be employed on sites, and how each task might  potentially be affected by 
the presence of different hazards. 
As noted in Section 2.4.4.1, Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) is specific in its guidance on 
where trade-offs between the job requirements and the safety of the investigator should 
be made. Where the frequently  difficult balance must be struck between the 
requirements of the task and the safety of the personnel, the decisions “should always be 
biased towards safety” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.3.1).
Every  accident site will pose different hazards or combinations of hazards. Given the 
diversity of aircraft operations and the variety of hazards that have been identified and 
considered, it is impossible to construct “across the board” generic risk assessments to 
provide investigators with comprehensive knowledge in advance of the hazards they are 
about to encounter on a site. As an investigator gains experience attending accident sites 
that have similarities in terms of aircraft type, accident type, or location, he will begin 
intuitively to develop  generic assessments  of the likely presence of particular hazards 
on particular sites. However, the individual investigator must remain open to the 
consideration that such an assessment might prove not to be correct, and that on site 
dynamic risk assessment will identify  different hazards from those which might have 
been expected. Prediction of likely  site hazards is a matter for the individual 
investigator entering a particular site. Investigators within an organisation, and across 
organisations, should be encouraged to report and discuss hazards they have 
encountered in different circumstances so that  others can learn from their experiences, 
and improve their own personal generic risk assessments. 
While a thorough understanding of all possible hazards is a necessary condition for 
success and safety as an investigator, it is not in itself a sufficient condition to ensure 
either. The key essential is the capacity  to assess the risks, and the degree of each risk, 
not just generically, but at the specific unique accident site, considering all other factors, 
and to decide on appropriate mitigation. This inevitably involves making decisions 
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about trade-offs between the requirements of the job and the degree of risk being faced 
in that particular location. 
It is therefore not sufficient to have a knowledge of the full range of hazards described 
in Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a). It is also essential to be able to apply the risk 
assessment process set out in the Circular, as discussed in Section 2.4.4.1 and shown in 
Figure 2.22. If the investigator is to gather all relevant evidence within a possibly 
limited time-span, and to remain safe, he must almost innately  follow the discipline of 
identifying the hazards, determining his degree of exposure to them, evaluating the risks 
arising from that exposure, introducing controls by way of mitigating the hazards, and 
reviewing the residual risks and revising the risk assessment in response. Situational 
awareness (Endsley, 1995; Figure 2.23) is critical, given the dynamic nature of an 
accident site. Training in routine use of the Circular 315 risk assessment methodology  - 
which it will commonly be necessary  to apply under difficult physical conditions and 
immense time pressures at an accident site - is perhaps more important than a 
comprehensive knowledge of all possible risks, including those encountered only 
infrequently. 
The culture of the investigation organisation must be such that when investigators 
encounter a hazard they  have not encountered before, and are uncertain about its nature 
and impact, they feel able to suspend the investigation  until this is determined. This 
may jeopardise the evidence collection process, but will allow the investigator to 
maintain personal safety. By advancing awareness of different hazards that may occur 
on sites, the chance of evidence being lost through through suspension of the 
investigation process will be diminished. 
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Chapter Four
Novice Accident Investigators’ Perception of Aircraft Accident 
Site Hazards
4.1 Purpose of the study
The objective of Chapter Four is to identify  the hazards that novice accident 
investigators perceive to pose most risk when they attend an aircraft accident site. In 
Chapter Five, the hazards identified by  experienced accident investigators on real 
accident sites will be reviewed, and a comparison made between the perceptions of the 
novices and the real experiences of the experts. This knowledge will assist in improving 
hazards specific training for aircraft accident investigators (Chapter Seven). 
Using the framework set out in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) as a guide, Chapter Three 
systematically  analysed the hazards that potentially occur on aircraft accident sites, the 
conditions under which they occur, and the consequences they may have on the personal 
safety  of an aircraft  accident investigator and on the integrity  of the evidence collection 
process. 
It is evident from Chapter Three and the literature reviewed in Section 2.6.5 that current 
industry guidance focuses on the risks to accident site responders through hazards such 
as fire, biological materials, composites, radioactive hazards, and dangerous goods. 
There is little mention of general health and safety concerns such as trip hazards and 
personal security. The hypothesis of the research in this chapter is that novice 
investigators will have a greater concern about general health and safety hazards, such 
as slips, trips and falls and biological hazards, than particular aircraft specific hazards 
such as pressurised vessels. Consideration is also given to whether the novice 
investigators’ perceptions of risk are likely to be realised on the actual sites.
4.2 Context
4.2.1 Overview
This research study draws on three aspects previously discussed: evidence collection 
tasks on an accident site (Section 2.3.2.4.2); hazards identification as a process of risk 
management (Section 2.4.4); and health and safety management on an accident site 
(Section 2.5).
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The identification and assessment of hazards on an accident site is an essentially 
subjective judgement. A full quantitative analysis of potential hazards before entry is 
simply  not possible. Aircraft accident  investigators make a thorough inspection of the 
site, and make professional judgements about risk on the basis of their knowledge and 
previous experience. Because of the variety and scale of hazards that may appear on 
different accident sites, this is the only effective and available way of conducting an 
assessment: a full quantitative analysis of potential hazards before entry to site is simply 
not possible.
Although accident investigators are trained in identifying potential site hazards, and are 
guided in doing so by  their knowledge of aircraft and aircraft operations, there will be 
differences in the assessments of risk made by different individuals. This is inevitable 
with subjective assessment. There is a theoretical basis for explaining these differences 
in perception, and in the behaviours which follow from the identification of risk.
4.2.2 Perception of hazards
“Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain 
events” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, pp. 1124). The way in which an investigator 
conducts a hazards assessment on an accident site is largely determined by that 
individual’s view of the risk posed by particular hazards. 
Fischoff, Watson and Hope (1984, p.124) consider the differences between objective 
assessment and subjective assessment of risk. They see the term ‘objective risk 
measurement’ as referring “to the product of scientific research, primarily  public health 
statistics, experimental studies, epidemiological surveys, and probabilistic risk 
assessments”. In contrast, ‘subjective risk measurement’ refers to “non-expert 
perceptions of that research, embellished by whatever other considerations seize the 
public mind”. They  further note that “this distinction is controversial in how it 
characterises both the public and the experts”. On an accident site there is little 
opportunity, especially in the initial hazards assessments, for objective measurements of 
on site risks; rather, an investigator will survey  the site to determine, subjectively, what 
he or she deems to be the major risks and the best mitigation measures. 
On large scale accident sites, risk assessment would normally  be carried out by a safety 
inspector (Section 2.4.4). This might be done in consultation with fire service 
responders and environmental protection agency representatives, who could be expected 
to have different perspectives on the nature and magnitude of the potential site risks, 
based on their own experiences and priorities. 
Work on risk perception (for example Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Fischhoff et al., 
1978; Pidgeon et al., 1992; Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1979; Slovic, 1987; 
Weyman and Kelly, 1999) suggests an inverse relationship between perceived risk and 
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perceived benefit when reviewing the outcome of a hazard. That is, the greater the 
perceived benefit, the lower the risk is perceived to be, and vice versa” (Alhakami and 
Slovic, 1994, p. 1085). If that is so, it suggests that if an investigator perceives the need 
to proceed immediately with the collection of rapidly perishable evidence, he will 
perceive the risk in doing so as lower than he might perceive it to be were the need not 
so urgent. In contrast, if an investigator perceives a particular hazard to pose a high risk 
to personal safety, he will take extra precautions for protection against  exposure to the 
hazard, whether the perception of the risk is valid or not.
Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) analysed the link between the perception of hazards and 
trust in expert judgement. They determined that an individual with little previous 
knowledge of a particular hazard,he was more likely to trust others about the risks posed 
by the hazard, than individuals with previous knowledge of the hazard. This conclusion 




A simple, one question survey  instrument was developed to conduct this research. 
Sampled investigators were asked:
Please identify five hazards that you believe you are at greatest risk from when 
attending an accident site.
Prior to distribution, the survey  was piloted with a number of responders, including 
expert and novice accident investigators and experts in research methods, to ensure that 
the language of the question was understood, and that the meaning of the question 
elicited valid responses for analysis. For many of the targeted responders, English was a 
second language, so the question had to be clear and concise, and the intended meaning 
quite explicit.
Each responder was provided with a sheet of A4 paper with the written question. Below 
the question, numbered spaces were provided for the five requested answers. 
The survey design was developed using a free listing technique, described by Bernard 
(2006, p.301) as “a deceptively simple, but powerful technique ... to get informants to 
list as many  items as they  can in a domain”. In this study, the domain of the research 
was explicitly hazards on aircraft accident sites.
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For practical reasons, the free listing methodology  was slightly modified. Rather than 
asking investigators to list  all possible hazards they  could identify, they were asked to 
provide a list  of their perceived five greatest hazards. This was for practical survey 
administration reasons, as the researcher had only ten minutes to introduce and 
distribute the survey to investigators prior to a hazards-specific training programme, and 
for the practicality of analysing the responses from the large number of participants.
This limitation is not considered to have had an effect on the results of the survey. The 
nature of the research question was to identify  the hazards that novice investigators 
perceive as posing most risk on an aircraft accident site, rather than identifying all 
hazards that pose any  risk on a site. Any potential problems created by  this enforced 
limitation were overcome by sampling a large number of responders. By using a large 
number of responders, a variety of hazards known by investigators from different 
backgrounds were identified, rather than using a smaller sample of investigators to 
identify a larger number of hazards.
4.3.2 Participants
The survey was administered to investigators attending a basic investigation course (as 
categorised by ICAO Circular 298 [2003a], Section 2.1.4). All responders were novice 
accident site attendees.
Participants were from a range of employment and cultural backgrounds, and included 
employees of national aircraft accident investigation agencies, military  accident 
investigators and recovery specialists, aircraft insurers, engine manufacturers, aviation 
regulators and aircraft operators.
The survey was distributed before any ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) or Circular 298 
(2003a) hazard-specific training was undertaken. This ensured that the novice 
perception of site risks was elicited, rather than perceptions informed by a training 
course. Individuals may have had previous training from within their own organisation. 
However, because this background training would have been given from a different 
perspective than aircraft accident site hazards, it was not considered to significantly 
affect the results of the survey. Each individual was still considered a novice in terms of 
the research, as they were only beginning careers in aircraft accident investigation. 
4.3.3 Ethical considerations
Prior to distribution of the survey, the researcher introduced the survey to each sample 
group. This introduction served to inform participants of the nature of the survey, and 
the overall research, and provided an opportunity  to confirm that participation in the 
survey was voluntary, anonymous, and confidential.
164
Participants had approximately  ten minutes to complete the survey. Although the survey 
was distributed by  the researcher, the responses were collected either by a third party 
person (not involved in the research), or from an anonymous drop-box. This assured 
participants of their anonymity. No person other than the researcher had access to the 
completed survey forms after collection. 
The content of the survey question was not considered to breach any ethical guidelines, 
as all participants were voluntarily  attending a course in which they knew they were to 
learn about all aspects of aircraft accident investigation, including site hazards.
4.3.4 Analysis methodology
Analysis was conducted using a card sort methodology, as described by Rugg and 
McGeorge (1997). The card sort methodology is a commonly applied methodology in 
psychology and social sciences. The sort was conducted against a template developed 
using the hazards taxonomy identified in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a), and as applied in 
Chapter Three (Section 3.5).
Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) was selected it is currently the most recent and 
comprehensive taxonomy of potential hazards (see Table 2.13, Section 2.6.5); it  is the 
most recent  international document on hazards, produced for accident investigators; and 
little benefit was seen in developing a new taxonomy simply for the purposes of this 
study. Further, use of this standard taxonomy allows for comparisons to be made against 
the results in this chapter and the study presented in Chapter Five.
Two raters (a psychologist, and the researcher) completed the card sort, by sorting all 
the cards into the pre-assigned categories. The purpose of using two raters was to 
improve reliability in the manner in which the cards were sorted. 
Each individual hazard identified by a participant in the survey was printed on an 
individual index card. Each card was numbered on the back, in a place where it would 
not influence the rater’s decision on how to sort the card. Each number, and the 
corresponding hazard it identified, was recorded in a master document for analysis 
purposes.
A verbal briefing accompanied a written instruction sheet detailing the instructions of 
the exercise. The raters were provided with a copy of Chapter 3 of ICAO Circular 315 
(2008a) which outlines each hazard category, and provided the framework for the 
analysis. The raters were asked to read the hazard identified on each card, and place in 
in the appropriate category. 
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The name of each hazard identified in Circular 315 (2008a), including the overarching 
groups (environmental hazards, physical hazards, biological hazards, and materials 







6. Fire and flammable substances
7. Stored energy components
8. Pressurised gases
9. Military and ex-military aircraft
10. Recent safety equipment
11. Pyrotechnics and explosives
12. Damaged and unstable structures
13. General biological hazards
14. Local state of hygiene
15. Metals and oxides
16. Composite materials




21. Environmental hazards (including categories 1-5)
22. Physical hazards including categories (6-12)
23. Biological hazards (including categories 13 and 14)
24. Material hazards (including categories 15-19)
The raters were asked to, where possible, assign each card to just one category  by 
placing the card in the appropriate envelope. Where this was not thought possible, raters 
were permitted to assign the card to two or more categories, up to a maximum of five 
categories. They did this by creating a “dummy card” (using spare index cards 
provided) with the name of the hazard, and its corresponding hazard written on the card.
Where the rater decided that the hazard could appropriately fit in more than five 
categories, they  were asked to identify the card as “too general” and place it in an 
envelope marked as such. 
Placing cards in more than one category was not considered detrimental to the research, 
as hazards do not have to fit into mutually exclusive categories. Indeed, if a hazard does 
fit into more than one category, this may provide more than one opportunity for an 
investigator to consider whether the hazard is present on a site, during the initial hazard 
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identification process. Additionally, the freedom to assign cards to multiple categories 
prevented cards from being falsely assigned to categories. This increased the reliability 
of the analysis.
If the raters believed a card did not fit  into any of the ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) 
hazards categories, then they were permitted to place this card in a separate envelope. 
They were then asked to suggest possible category names for this group of cards.
There was no time limit assigned to the rating exercise. On completion of the card sort 
exercise by each rater, the way in which the cards were sorted was recorded on a 
standard marking form, identifying the cards by number. 
When both raters completed the task, the card numbers that were placed in each 
category by each rater were compared. A comparison between the raters’ scores was 
used to measure inter-rater reliability. This was done through calculating the level of 
agreement between the raters on the particular cards assigned to that group.
For the purposes of analysis, only  the cards which both raters agreed as belonging in a 
category were included in the results. 
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Participants
The survey was administered to five course groups over the period of 2006-2010. A 
total of 121 survey responses were received (n=121), providing 604 identified hazards. 
Some participants listed up to seven hazards on the response form, and some listed only 
one. All responses were included in the analysis.
Table 4.1 provides details of the course groups surveyed, the response rates, and the 
average number of hazards identified per responder.
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1 34 25 73.5 124 4.96
2 31 30 96.8 149 4.97
3 25 21 84.0 105 5.00
4 28 26 92.9 130 5.00
5 21 19 90.5 96 5.05
Total 139 121 87.1 604 4.99
4.4.2 Card sort analysis
4.4.2.1 Overview
The card sort exercise took the raters between two and a half and four hours to 
complete. Following recording of each rater’s sort, the results were tabulated, and the 
categories assigned to each card sorted. These are listed in Appendix E. 
The agreement scores between raters on the cards in each categories ranged between 50 
per cent and 90 per cent.
Cards were included in a category when was agreement between the two raters that they 
should be assigned to that category. 422 cards were assigned to one category only, 51 
cards to two categories, six cards to three categories, and one card to four categories. It 
is these cards that are included in the analysis in Sections 4.4.2.2 to 4.4.2.6 below.
Both raters created an additional category to which to assign some cards. Twenty eight 
cards were considered by the raters to suggest hazards on site that did not fit into any  of 
the pre-assigned categories, in that they were either hazards that prevented evidence 
collection (for example disturbance to evidence, damage to evidence) or arose from 
poor accident site management (for example uncoordinated investigation activities, 
complacency, co-ordination and communications between site attendees). They also 
both created a category  for cards containing responses not relevant to the research. For 
the purpose of considering hazards identified by ICAO Circular 315 (2008a), these 28 
cards were amongst a total of 124 cards which were excluded from the analysis due to 
either no applicability to the research, or differences in coding between raters.
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Each hazard is discussed separately. The tables included are summaries of the cards in 
each category which had complete rater agreement about belonging in that category. 
The full list of cards identified in each category is in Appendix F.
4.4.2.2 Environmental hazards
4.4.2.2.1 General environmental hazards
There were only four cards which were sorted by both raters as belonging in the 
overarching “environment” hazard category (No. 21). These cards simply said 
“environment” or “environmental”, and therefore no further analysis was possible . 
4.4.2.2.2 Aircraft location
There were 58 cards assigned to the category of aircraft location. These are shown in 
Table 4.2, grouped by similarity of response.
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Terrain: geographical; difficult terrain path clearance; very steep slopey terrain; terrain - steep slopes, 
mountains, ravines; terrain hazard; physical (terrain); site terrain 7
14
Terrain and weather combined
Terrain and weather 1
Terrain and weather (site location and environment) 1
Local weather conditions and terrain 1
Availability of wreckage (terrain, climate etc) 1
Environment: cold, rough terrain, steep climbs, rolling rocks, snow ravines; hot and high, cold (military - 
desert, jungle, arctic); weather, terrain 3
7
Environment more broadly
Natural environment: of the crash site; steep slope, forest; terrain, weather, wildlife; terrain, weather, 
confined space; mountain, swamp 6
Environment of the crash: electric wires, other vehicles, weather; natural environment; smoke, fire, 
environment 2
8
Slips, trips and falls
Slips, trips and falls - various but specific descriptions 15
More general descriptions: uneven ground; underfoot conditions; ground conditions - uneven and 
cluttered; unsteady ground/surfaces 4
19
Overhead hazards and power




Organic (plant vegetation) 1
Site risks 1




ICAO Circular 315 (2008a, paragraph 3.2.1) classes accident location hazards as 
hazards “due to the geographic and topographic location of the site”. The responses 
given identify a range of different topographic site hazards, with the type of terrain or 
environment (mountains, slopes, difficult access to the site) a primary consideration. No 
responses identified hazards associated with marine-based investigations. Fifteen cards 
related to slips, trips and falls - a common health and safety  problem not only  associated 
with accident sites, but  with all work sites. Another four cards alluded to slips, trips and 
falls through mention of uneven underfoot conditions. 
Many the responses linked aircraft location hazards with climate hazards, or insect/
wildlife hazards that many environmental hazards are perceived to be closely related.
4.4.2.2.3 Fatigue
Only five hazards were assigned to the fatigue category (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Novice-identified hazards attributable to fatigue
Hazard Identified Number
Fatigue: accumulating tiredness and long hours 4
Fatigue (long hours / many time zones away) 1
Total 5
The ICAO Circular 315 (2008a, paragraph 3.2.2) describes fatigue as resulting from 
“extended journey times, circadian desyncronisation resulting from transmeridian 
travel, lengthy working hours and demanding working conditions”. The cards are 




Twelve cards were assigned to Insects/Wildlife hazards (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Novice-identified hazards attributable to insects/wildlife
Hazard Identified Number
Animal or Insects 9
Environment of the crash site 1
Weather / nature 1
Smoke / fire / environment 1
Total 12
 Of the nine cards grouped as ‘animals and insects’ most identified at least two different 
animal or insect hazards. Four cards referred to snakes, three to other reptiles, and two 
to wild animals generally. Four cards referred to insects. Only three of the nine cards 
specifically mentioned a method by which these animals or insects attack - all as bites. 
Only one card referred to a specific disease - in this case Weils disease (a zoonose 
carried by rats, as discussed in Section 3.5.2.4). The type of animal and insect hazards 
present on an accident sites will of course depend on the location and nature of that site. 
The three in Table 4.4 which are not grouped with other cards were also assigned to 
other categories.
4.4.2.2.5 Climate
Thirty cards were assigned to hazards attributed to climate (Table 4.5).
Weather, and its elements of temperature and precipitation in a range of forms, was 
referred to on 28 of the 30 cards assigned to this category, although only one card 
referred to wind as a hazard. As with aircraft location hazards (Section 3.4.2.2.2), the 
perception was one of a strong association between weather extremes and other 
environmental hazards. 
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Weather, various descriptions (temperature and precipitation, exposure, 
dehydration): inclement weather; snow, rain; rain, heat, cold; hot/cold/wind; hot/
cold/wet-exposure; dehydration and illness from exposure too the weather; hot and 




Weather and terrain, various descriptions: cold, rough terrain, steep climbs, rolling 
rocks, snow ravines; local weather conditions and terrain; availability of wreckage 
(terrain, climate etc)
6
Weather, and environment more generally: weather/nature; natural environment; 
natural environmental hazards - terrain, weather, wildlife etc; terrain, weather, 




Environment of the crash site 1




Five cards related to security hazards on accident sites (Table 4.6).




Hostile action (from enemy or terrorism) 3
Total 5
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The consequences of an insecure site could be both personal threat to the investigators, 
and loss of evidence - both of which were recognised in these cards.
4.4.2.3 Physical hazards
4.4.2.3.1 General physical hazards
The raters did not assign any  cards to the overarching category  of physical hazards (No. 
22). Most cards which referred to physical hazards fell within hazards-specific 
categories (Nos. 6-12)
4.4.2.3.2 Fire and flammable substances
Fire and flammable substances was the third largest category following the card sort. 
There were 75 cards assigned to this category (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7: Novice-identified hazards attributable to fire and flammable substances
Hazards Identified Number
Fire and products of fire
Fire 27
Fire/ash 1
Fire (if very early on)/hot surfaces 1
Fire explosion from fuel and electrical short circuits 1




Fire/explosion (e.g. rescue equipment) 1
Fire and heat 1
Fire/combustibles/fuel 1
Fire or re-ignition 1
Fire risk/fuel 1
Fire from kerosene 1
Burn 2
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Table 4.7: Novice-identified hazards attributable to fire and flammable substances
Hazards Identified Number





Fuel and other fluids (fire!) 1
Various fluids - fuel/hydraulic/extinguishants 1
Dangerous materials (fuel, hydraulic fluid etc) 1
Fuel pooling and fire 1
Fuel, hydraulic fluids, batteries on site 1
Fluids (fuel/hydraulic/oil) 7
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Airborne pathogens and burnt synthetics 1
11
Total 75
The responses fell into three related groups within the fire and flammable substances 
category: fire hazards; fuel hazards; and fume, smoke and vapour hazards. The majority 
(44 cards out of 75) were about the direct risk of fire and the resulting heat and fumes: a 
large risk when arriving on site early  on (as noted by one respondent), but  one which 
can be better managed after the emergency response. The initial risk assessment 
conducted by investigators should take into account the potential hazards of re-ignition 
or combustion, and take steps to prevent this from occurring. Only one response 
referred to the hazards posed by the physical product of fire, ash. The toxicity  of fumes 
at an accident site will depend on the nature of the cargo, the materials from which the 
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aircraft and its various components have been manufactured, and the ground cover at 
the accident site.
4.4.2.3.3 Stored energy components
Six cards were identified as belonging in this category (Table 4.8).
Table 4.8: Novice identified hazards attributable to stored energy components
Hazard Identified Number
Electrical 2
Fires explosion from fuel and electrical circuits 1
Equipment under pressure or mechanically pre-charged 1
Aircraft parts (tyres, hydraulics etc) 2
Total 6
The cards in this category covered the range of hazards arising from stored energy 
components (as discussed in Section 3.5.4.3). However the few novice investigators 
who perceived stored energy  components to be one of their five major hazards appeared 
to be more concerned with the electrical potential and explosive risks posed by these 
components, rather than with the risk arising from their potential chemical content risk, 
as described in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a).
4.4.2.3.4 Pressurised gases
Fourteen hazards were categorised as pressurised gases (Table 4.9). 
Responders identifying hazards in this category  labelled the hazards as either oxygen, 
gas or general pressure hazards. ICAO Circular 315 (2008a, paragraph 3.3.3) describes 
the risk posed to investigators from pressurised gases as arising from either “physical 
injury or asphyxiation”. Both of these outcomes were included in these cards. 
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Table 4.9: Novice-identified hazards attributable to pressurised gases
Hazards Identified Number
Gas
Gas supplies or cylinders 1




Explosion from pressurised containers 1
Pyrotechnics and pressurised bottles 1
Explosive materials/bottles 1
Compressed cylinders 1
Equipment under pressure or mechanically pre-charged 1




Liquid oxygen leaks 1
Explosion of oxygen bottles and cylinders 1
Detonation of gas or oxygen bottles 1
4
Total 14
4.4.2.3.5 Military and ex-military aircraft
There was no agreement between raters that any  cards belonged in this category, and 
very few cards that could potentially have been included. 
The category definition for hazards associated with military and ex-military aircraft in 
Circular 315 ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 3.3.4) refers specifically  only  to the cockpit 
escape equipment and ejector seats. There are other hazards associated with military  and 
ex-military aircraft, such as weapons carried and the systems on board, which can be 
categorised elsewhere in the taxonomy. 
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4.4.2.3.6 Recent safety equipment
There was only  one card that raters assigned this category: “On board explosives/rocket 
propellants”. The card was also assigned to the category off pyrotechnics and 
explosives. There was no perception of hazards associated with ballistic recovery 
systems or airbag systems amongst the responders to the survey - or at least they did not 
see them as a significant threat on accident sites.
4.4.2.3.7 Pyrotechnics and explosives
There were nineteen cards in this category (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10: Novice-identified hazards attributable to pyrotechnics and explosives





On board explosives / rocket propellants 1
Pyrotechnics 2
Total 19
Explosives are used in emergency equipment, including escape slides and fire 
extinguishers (which are also a stored energy hazard). Cards within this category also 
showed some awareness of the risk posed by weapons carried on board military aircraft 
and civil also aircraft (subject to packing requirements). 
4.4.2.3.8 Damaged and unstable wreckage
This was the largest category of perceived hazards, with 109 cards (Table 4.11).
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a, paragraph 3.3.7) states that “generally, the hazards posed by 
damaged aircraft structures will be obvious and most will be readily identified”. 
Certainly, these were the most obvious hazards for the novice investigators. More than 
half the cards saw sharp  debris resulting in cuts and wounds as the major hazard arising 
from damaged structures; there was also concern about falling objects, unstable 
footholds, slip and falls and other forms of direct personal injury. 
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Table 4.11: Novice-identified hazards attributable to damaged and unstable wreckage
Hazards Identified Number
Sharp debris
Sharp objects (glass/fuselage); sharp objects cuts; sharp matters; cuts from metal 
parts; sharps; sharp edges - broken airframe); torn metal; wound with a cutting part; 
shrapnel injury; sharp objects (metal/non-metals); sharp edges from wreckage; 




Mechanical (sharp edges, falling objects); object falls in case of large aircraft; loose 
debris - broken seats, loose baggage etc; loose surrounding aircraft structure; 
unstable parts of the wreckage; unsafe supports; unsecured objects e.g. derailed 
train; falling objects; moving parts; loose objects/unstable; loose wreckage falling 
onto rescuers/investigators; free fall of damaged spares; unstable equipment - topple 
hazard; physical risk through instability of wreckage
17
Slips, trips, falls
Tripping; trip hazards; slips and trips - hydraulic and other fluids; trip and fall; slips,  
trips, falls; slips, trips, cuts; trip hazards - uneven surfaces, wreckage 14
Personal injury from wreckage (without specifying sharps, instability or slips etc)
Personal injury from wreckage; wreckage itself; accident debris; injury while lifting 
or moving wreckage); injury from debris; physical hazards in accident area; 
structures/wreckage/fire/ smoke; crash generated debris; manual handling/wreckage
14
Chemicals and other hazardous materials
Chemical hazards (bio etc), mechanical hazards; sharp objects and biohazards; 
biohazards; hazardous materials on board the aircraft; hazardous materials from 
damage to structure
5
Injury from moving equipment
Rotating or reciprocating equipment; moving mechanics 2
Total 109
4.4.2.4 Biological hazards
4.4.2.4.1 Overview of biological hazards
The overarching category of biological hazards in Circular 315 (2008a) encompasses 
all biological hazards, with a sub-category pertaining to local state of hygiene. As 
responses were quite specific there were no hazards assigned to the overall category of 
biological hazards (No.23): 
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4.4.2.4.2 General biological hazards
Eighty four cards were assigned to the category of biological pathogens (Table 4.12). 
Table 4.12: Novice-identified hazards attributable to general biological hazards
Name of Hazard Number
General biological hazards
Biohazards 17
Biological substances and materials 8
Blood borne pathogens 23
Bloods 4
Body fluids and parts 12
Disease 4





Airborne particles / pathogens 2




Of the 84 cards, 77 referred to biohazards generally or focused on blood-borne 
pathogens and body fluids. Although descriptions varied and were imprecise - blood, 
blood borne pathogens, biological substances - it was clear that  there was a common 
perception of the link between body  fluids and infection. Hepatitis A to C and HIV were 
the only infections specifically mentioned.
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4.4.2.4.3 Local state of hygiene
Only one card - ‘local conditions/awareness’ - was sorted into this category. This card 
also appeared as a Security hazard.
4.4.2.5 Material hazards
4.4.2.5.1 General material hazards
Two responses were assigned to the general category of material hazards - ‘dangerous 
goods/materials from aircraft’ and ‘hazardous materials’.
4.4.2.5.2 Metals and oxides
The five responses categorised as metal and oxides hazards are summarised in Table 
4.13.
Table 4.13: Novice identified hazards attributable to metals and oxides
Name of Hazard Number
Ash / products of combustion 3
Toxic substances (gas, solid, liquid) 1
Other toxic aircraft materials 1
Total 5
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a, paragraph 3.5.4) notes that metals and oxides are dangerous 
when ingested. Three of the five responses in this category showed an understanding of 
how ash and other products of combustion can affect investigators, but as the responses 




Table 4.14 shows the hazards perceived to arise from composite materials.
Table 4.14: Novice identified hazards attributable to composite materials
Name of Hazard Number
Airborne fibres 6
Airborne pathogens / burnt synthetics / fuel smoke 2
Carbon fibre 9
Man Made Mineral Fibres (MMMF) 4
Materials (fluids, carbons, etc.) 1
Other toxic aircraft materials 1
Total 23
Of the 23 responses, nine refer to carbon fibres and four to MMMF. Carbon fibre is one 
of the most commonly known composites, particularly  in the aircraft manufacturing 
industry, but possible composites described in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) include 
“carbon, glass, kevlar and boron, with these and other often combined to form a hybrid 
fibre”.
4.4.2.5.4 Chemicals and other substances
The number of cards identifying hazards resulting from chemicals and other substances 
is shown in Table 4.15.
Of the 48 cards assigned to this category, 38 identify  chemicals in general as the hazard. 
A range of exposure methods is identified in the cards, including inhalation and through 
skin contact. Five of the cards refer directly to hydraulic fluid: one refers to the slip 
hazards produced by hydraulic fluids, the others imply  their chemical irritancy 
properties. Hydrazine, a chemical used in F16 aircraft, is the only specific chemical 
identified.
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Table 4.15: Novice identified hazards attributable to chemicals and other substances
Name of Hazard Number
Chemicals 29
Chemicals (combined with toxic goods, dangerous goods, solvents, radioactive 
materials, fuel) 9
Loose normally-contained materials eg. Hydrazine 1
Inhalation of Chemical gases/fumes 3
Other toxic aircraft material 1
Hydraulic fluid, lubricants 4
Slips and trips - hydraulic and other fluids 1
Total 48
4.4.2.5.5 Radioactive materials
Table 4.16 summarises the perceived hazards related to radioactive materials.
Table 4.16: Novice identified hazards attributable to radioactive materials
Name of Hazard Number
Radioactive materials 8
Radiation 3
Radiological (beta lights, etc.) 1
Nuclear contamination 1
Total 13
Twelve of the thirteen cards refer to radioactive materials in general. Only one card 
specifically identifies a source of radiation, in beta lights. This is one of the specific 




Table 4.17 gives the number of cards identifying cargo-related hazards.
Table 4.17: Novice identified hazards attributable to cargo
Name of Hazard Number




Dangerous goods are the predominant hazard identified in this category (12/15 cards), 
ICAO (2008a) refers to the health and safety hazards that general cargo may pose, but 
these have not been perceived as a risk by the novice investigators.
4.4.2.6 Psychological hazards
Seventeen cards were assigned to the category of psychological hazards (Table 4.18). 
Table 4.18: Novice identified hazards attributed to psychological hazards
Name of Hazard Number
Psychological trauma 7
Personal and psychological trauma from witnessing post accident events 3
Psychological - mental trauma / stress 1
Stress 4
The smell / stench of the accident site 1
Family, next of kin 1
Total 17
Psychological trauma suggests a hazard which might persist - or even initially  develop - 
well after the time spent on site. Some form of debriefing should take place to ensure 
that this trauma is managed. Stress may be a short term psychological hazard, brought 
on from the pressures of being on site, or may develop into a deeper psychological 
trauma. The stress of dealing with the family  of fatalities from the accident may 
increase the risk of stress and trauma. 
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4.5 Discussion
The tables in Section 4.4 summarise the perceived hazards described on cards on which 
there was agreement between raters, in terms of the Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) 
hazards category to which the card should be assigned. 
The excluded cards were spread across the range of categories, and could not 
significantly affect the rank order of categories were they  to be included. Some of the 
cards (58) were assigned to multiple categories, leading to a total of 546 cards being 
assigned. Six of these 546 cards were assigned to the overarching categories, which are 
not included in the rank order shown in Table 4.19.
The sample of novice investigators as a whole perceived the five greatest hazards they 
face on accident sites as arising from damaged and unstable wreckage; biological 
hazards; fire and flammable substances; accident location; and chemicals and other 
substances. These five categories accounted for 68 per cent of the total 546 cards 
categorised. The inter-rater agreement in classifying cards into these categories stood at 
85 per cent, indicating that the cards so assigned are a true representation of those 
groups.
The perceived five greatest  hazards are spread across four of the five overarching 
hazards groups in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a). The novice investigators therefore 
recognise the risk posed by environmental hazards, physical hazards, biological hazards 
and material hazards. The fifth hazard category, psychological hazards, is ranked only 
9th in terms of risk perceived by novice investigators, and is perceived to be one of their 
five greatest hazards by only three per cent of novice investigators (17/546 cards).
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Table 4.19: Rank order of hazards categories identified by novice accident investigators
Rank Order Category of Hazards Number of Cards
1 Damaged and unstable structures 109
2 Biological hazards 84
3 Fire and flammable substances 75
4 Accident location 58
5 Chemicals and other substances 48
6 Climate 30
7 Composite materials 23
8 Pyrotechnics and explosives 19
9 Psychological hazards 17
10 Cargo hazards 15
11 Pressurised gases 14
12/13 Insects/wildlife 13
12/13 Radioactive materials 13
14 Stored energy components 6
15/16/17 Fatigue 5
15/16/17 Security 5
15/16/17 Metals and oxides 5
18/19 Recent safety equipment 1
18/19 Local state of hygiene 1
20 Military and ex-military aircraft 0
Novice investigators did not perceive fatigue, security, metals and oxides, recent safety 
equipment and local state of hygiene to be significant hazards. No investigators 
perceived the hazards of military and ex-military escape equipment and ejector seats to 
be a high risk.
Of the 109 investigators who perceived damaged and unstable wreckage to be one of 
their five most  serious hazards, 57 perceived the danger to be laceration from sharp 
objects in the wreckage; 17 from unstable debris and falling objects; and 28 from slips, 
trips, falls and other forms of personal injury. The ranking of damaged and unstable 
wreckage hazards as the number one hazard would appear to be evidence in support of 
186
the hypothesis that novice investigators might  have a greater concern about general 
health and safety hazards than about aircraft specific hazards.
The effects of the second-ranked category, biological hazards were much less precisely 
described on the cards than the responses to the damaged and unstable wreckage 
category, which referred directly to mechanisms of injury. Rather, there were various 
descriptions of the hazards such as ‘blood borne pathogens’, ‘body fluids’ and ‘human 
remains’. There was no specific mention of the methods of exposure to these hazards. 
However, 77 of the 84 cards were in some way  related to infection or illness arising 
from exposure to blood or bodily  fluids. Again, this would appear to support the 
hypothesis of identification of general health and safety hazards over aircraft specific 
hazards, as does the ranking of fire and flammable substances as the third-ranked 
perceived hazard among novice investigators.
Accident location is a very  general definition for a category  which can encapsulate a 
wide and varied range of hazards, but to the novice investigators it signified difficult 
terrain and the natural environment as well as surrounding man-made hazards. Many  of 
the cards in this category were closely  linked with climate hazards. If the 30 cards 
identifying climate hazards (rank order six) are considered in terms of the broader 
environment of the site, the location of the site might be seen as a more significant 
hazard by novice investigators than the rank order suggests.
Responses assigned to the category of chemicals and other substances (48 cards; 9 per 
cent of responders) are undifferentiated by respondents as responses to biological 
hazards, suggesting that novice investigators are aware of the broad risks but not the 
precise mechanisms by which the hazards are presented.
4.6 Conclusions
All the novice investigators surveyed for this study  had obviously made a deliberate 
career choice to become accident investigators, and to undergo a course of training to 
that end. They therefore had an apparent interest in and commitment to this field. At the 
time of the survey, they had undertaken the syllabus for the basic accident investigation 
course (ICAO, 2003a), as set out  in Section 2.1.4. This is a very wide overview of the 
field of accident investigation including, amongst other things, the responsibilities of the 
various jurisdictions involved in investigation, accident site considerations, the available 
range of personal equipment and protective clothing, the likely sources of evidence, the 
design of aircraft systems and likely modes of failure, aerodynamics and aircraft 
performance, and report  writing. However, the basic investigation course does not 
include attendance or training at an accident site.
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The hypothesis to be tested by the research was that novice investigators will have 
greater concern about general health and safety hazards - such as slips, trips and falls 
and biological hazards - than particular aircraft specific hazards such as pressurised 
vessels. This hypothesis would appear to be proven: the top five ranked categories all 
identify general safety hazards. Categories which include aircraft-specific hazards 
(including stored-energy components, pressurised gases, recent safety  equipment, 
composite materials, metals and oxides, and military and ex-military aircraft) were 
ranked much further down the scale.
The implication of this finding is that the basic investigation course - as presently 
structured by ICAO - does not give a balanced understanding of the realities likely to be 
encountered on an accident site. This is partly understandable given that there is no real 
substitute for experience. Nevertheless, it is clear that  the basic course would be 
enriched by a greater focus on case studies and on accident reports prepared by 
experienced accident investigators. Case studies of major and complex aircraft accident 
investigations carried out by highly skilled investigators from the national investigation 
authorities - such as Lockerbie (AIB, 1990), Heathrow (AAIB, 2009c), and Buffalo 
(NTSB, 2009a-e) - would give trainee investigators a less theoretical and much more 
realistic understanding of the situations they are likely  to encounter. Similarly, as 
discussed in Section 4.2.2, there are real benefits in including simulated accident sites in 
investigator training. 
The methodology employed for this study allowed the trainee investigators to have open 
scope to name hazards they  felt posed a personal risk on sites. While this made the 
sorting of cards into the hazard categories assigned by ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) 
difficult, leading to the repetition of some cards in multiple categories, it ensured that  all 
ideas that the novice investigators had about potential site hazards could be included in 
the scope of the research.
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Chapter Five
An Assessment of the Occurrence of Hazards on Aircraft 
Accident Sites
5.1 Purpose of the study
Chapter Five analysed the hazards that novice aircraft accident investigators perceive to 
be the greatest risks on accident sites. The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the 
hazards identified on accident sites by experienced aircraft accident investigators.
The methodology  used - the analysis of historical data on health and safety forms 
completed by  investigators from a national aircraft accident investigation agency - also 
enabled review of the process of site investigation, providing an overview of the tasks 
completed and the PPE used by investigators. 
5.2 Context
The health and safety regulations of several countries which require employers to 
maintain records of the working environments of their employees, have been considered 
above. The difficulties associated with pro-active risk assessments and quantitative risk 
assessments have also been discussed. The only accurate way in which employers of 
aircraft accident investigators can monitor the exposure of their employees to hazards 
on accident sites is through retrospective review following accident site attendance. 
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Overview
This study is based on analysis of health and safety forms which are completed 
routinely by investigators employed by a national aircraft investigation agency, 
following an investigation. The sample of forms collected were for attendances at the 




The researcher had no influence over the design of the form. Two different forms were 
used over the period of analysis, the first from February  2003 to the end of 2006, the 
other from January 2007 onwards.
Both versions of the form asked for general information about the accident, including 
aircraft type, registration, and location; and site safety information, including details of 
the activities undertaken, the safety hazards identified, and the PPE used. The later 
version of the form included additional questions about the deployment and aircraft 
recovery process. 
5.3.3 Ethical considerations
The health and safety forms are completed by aircraft accident investigators as part  of 
their standard investigation tasks. Permission to use the forms for this research was 
granted by the investigation agency. 
As part of the data analysis, all identifying information was removed from the forms. 
No person, other than the researcher, had access to the forms. 
5.3.4 Analysis methods
Information from the health and safety forms was entered into a database. The standard 
database format called for all the information included on the newer version of the 
health and safety form. When information from the earlier version of the health and 
safety  form was entered, sections not included in the original form were left  blank. The 
differences in the forms were taken into consideration during analysis. There was no 
information collected on the first version of the form which was not included on the 
second version of the form. 
The information in the database was recorded in .csv format. This is a common data 
storage format which allowed portability of information between programmes. 
Once the information from the forms was entered into the database, some additional 
fields were created to assist with analysis. These included whether the form was 
completed by an investigator specialising in either operational, engineering, or flight 
data recorders investigation; whether the aircraft was operating as a commercial flight, a 
general aviation flight, or a sport aviation flight; and whether the aircraft was of fixed 
wing or rotary wing design. 
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The analysis then considered the range of different events attended, the deployment 
process, and the aircraft recovery  process. The information regarding the event was 
predominantly categorical; the information regarding the deployment and aircraft 
recovery process was predominantly  nominal. A simple count was used to look at this 
information. 
The tasks completed on site were analysed by  content analysis, as applied in review of 
site tasks in Section 3.4.3. These tasks were considered in relation to the specialisation 
of the investigator completing the form.
The hazards on site were analyses using a template analysis methodology (King, 1998). 
The coding scheme applied for analysis was based on the categories of hazards 
identified in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a), as discussed in Chapter Three, and applied in 
the research in Chapter Four. Additionally, the responses given to the perception survey 
used in Chapter Five were used as additional probes to ensure that the responses on the 
health and safety forms were categorised in the same way as the novice risk perception 
study.
Content analysis was again applied in considering the PPE used by  investigators. The 
PPE used on each site was then compared to the hazards identified on the site, to 
identify the minimum levels of protective equipment used for different hazards. 
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Overview
In this study, 392 field investigation health and safety forms were reviewed. These 
covered 208 events, occurring between February 2003 and July  2009. The majority of 
forms were from late 2005 onwards: there were 180 forms (96 occurrences) on the 
original version of the form, and 212 forms (112 occurrences) on the newer report 
format. Between one and eight forms were received per event.
Forms are required to be submitted by  each investigator who attends a site, although 
there were more site attendances during the specified period than the number of forms 
received by the researcher. This sample is not seen to cause a problem for the analysis. 
Of the forms received and analysed, it is unknown whether each of the events were 
accidents, serious incidents, or incident.
Table 5.1 gives the number of forms analysed for each different type of investigator or 
responder (engineering, operations, FDM, health and safety and engineering support 
[HS&E], other) in the sample, and the number of events that these forms covered. 
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Table 5.1: Number of health and safety forms analysed by investigator type
Type of Investigator Number of Forms 
Analysed
Number of Sites Analysed
Engineering 149 142
Operations 186 177





Table 5.2 shows the operation type and category  of aircraft involved in the events to 
which investigators were deployed. 
Table 5.2: Number of health and safety forms analysed by operation and aircraft category
Category of Operation Number of Forms Completed Number of Sites Inspected
Commercial (fixed wing) 186 101
Commercial (rotary wing) 25 9
General Aviation (fixed wing) 100 54
General Aviation (rotary wing) 22 10
Sport Aviation / Balloons 64 35
Total 397 209
Note: One accident site attended by five investigators was a mid-air collision between a commercial fixed 
wing aircraft and a sport aviation aircraft. This means there are (397-5=392) forms and (209-1=208) 
accident sites in total.
Four of the aircraft accidents involved military aircraft. These are included by the 
investigation organisation under the commercial (fixed wing) category. 
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5.4.2.2 Method of travel on deployment
The later version of the form sought information about deployment, including the time 
of deployment, the time on the task, and the method of travel. In most responses the 
time of deployment and time on task were given only approximately or not at all, but 
the method of travel is clear: of the 212 investigators who completed the later version of 
the form, 141 had deployed to the site by vehicle, including their own vehicles and 
agency vehicles.
Of the 141 investigators who deployed by  vehicle, the average time from base to 
deployment was about 5 hours 30 minutes. This included 24 deployments for which 
notification was received late at night, and the investigators arrived on site the following 
morning. Removing these 24 deployments from the calculation, the average time to 
deploy to a site by road was 3 hours 15 minutes.
The majority of investigators reported no problem with the deployment, or had no 
comment. In one circumstance the investigator was provided with incorrect details of 
the aircraft location; one chose to deploy using a company  four-wheel-drive vehicle, 
due to the initial but incorrect notification that the site was on a “remote, high elevation 
field”. Six investigators commented on the heavy traffic encountered, and four on 
conditions during the drive (either darkness, fog or rain). One investigator specifically 
noted that they  “arrived fatigued on site with many hours of work ahead”, while another 
commented that the deployment was “a long drive at the end of the day”. 
A total of 61 investigators deployed to the site by air. Approximate times between 
deployment and arrival were given for 47 of these deployments: the average was almost 
13 hours. Of these deployments, eleven were to international sites, of which there were 
eight; eleven were to offshore sites (two sites); the remainder were to locations which 
were too remote or too distant to access by road.
Comments from investigators who deployed by air focussed on the limited amounts of 
equipment that could be carried on board aircraft, or problems about airport congestion 
and delayed flights.
Ten investigators did not provide details of their time or method of deployment. In four 
of these cases, deployment was not necessary  because the work of investigation was 
undertaken while remaining at  base. Nevertheless, completion of a health and safety 
form remained a requirement.
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5.4.2.3 Organisation of the site investigation
In the 212 completed later versions of the form, only eight investigators reported 
problems in responding to the accident occurrence (by  answering “yes” to response 
issues). Three of these commented on the timeliness of deployment (one early, one late, 
and one questioning whether deployment was even necessary). One investigator 
reported problems with security and gaining entry  to the site, and one reported that 
access to the site was difficult. One investigator, responding to an accident involving an 
ex-military aircraft, noted that assistance was required to make the aircraft safe. Two 
investigators did not provide further details. 
A total of 18 investigators answered “yes” when asked whether there were issues with 
police: difficulties included ‘over-enthusiasm’ of police on site, and difficulties in 
getting the police to secure the site. One investigator reported that three shotguns were 
found on the site.
Four investigators reported problems with accommodation. Two were related to the 
quality of the hotel, one to difficulty in finding accommodation, and one that the hotel 
was closed  on arrival. One investigator suggested that hotels should be booked for the 
night following the site investigation, not just the one before it, because investigators 
are commonly too tired to travel home. 
Aircraft were recovered back to base from sites on which 133 of the investigators had 
worked. In 52 of these cases, the investigator played a major role in recovering the 
wreckage. A total of 34 aircraft were recovered with military assistance, and 42 required 
other organisations to assist in wreckage recovery. The recovery  organisations included 
private recovery contractors, sea salvage organisations, and local fire and police 
services.
5.4.3 Activities on site
As expected, different tasks were carried out by engineering investigators and 
operations investigators in response to accidents. 
Table 5.3 shows the tasks that engineering specialist investigators report  as having 
undertaken, in the 149 forms they submitted. The tasks most commonly identified are 
listed along the top line.
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Table 5.3: Tasks identified by engineering investigators during site activity
Activities Identified by Engineering Investigators
Recovery of aircraft Examination of aircraft Examination of wreckage
Site examination Site survey Plotting of wreckage / witness 
marks
Examine components Runway inspection Interviews
Functional tests on aircraft Collect floating debris Examine wreckage in hangar
Record damage on aircraft Recover bodies Examine documents
Observations on procedures Investigate 3rd party damage Recover data recorders
Assist other investigators Search for missing parts Fuel sampling
Wreckage sift Writing field notes Police liaison
Review flight data Co-ordinate security Co-ordinate recovery of bodies
Make the aircraft safe Meeting with relatives Brief coroner
Take chemical samples from 
toilets
Photography Investigate burst tyres
 
Phrases such as “standard field investigation”, “straightforward deployment” and 
“standard GA deployment” were also used in some of the forms.
Table 5.4 gives the investigation activities identified by  186 operations inspectors, with 
the most commonly identified tasks along the top line.
Table 5.4: Tasks identified by operations investigators during deployment
Activities Identified by Operations Inspectors
Interviews Attend site Liaise with emergency 
responders
Inspect aircraft Examine wreckage Gather documents
Recover wreckage Visit airfield (if different to 
accident site)
Collect ATC tapes / radar traces 
etc.
Family liaison Meetings with operator etc. Visit ATC - interviews/review 
procedures
Inspect runway Collect wreckage Office based work
Initial scene preservation Data recorder recovery Helicopter flights to survey 
scene
Recover bodies Fuel sampling
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As in the forms completed by engineering inspectors, some of the operations inspectors 
used phrases like “normal on site and post site” and “normal field investigation”.
FDM investigators deployed to sites recover recorders directly  from the aircraft, or from 
maintenance organisations or operators who may have already  recovered them. There 
are only  two instances in the sample of forms (out of 37) of FDM investigators having 
to search through wreckage to recover the recorders.
Health and safety support staff provide support for the investigators by conducting risk 
assessments, and facilitating the recovery of wreckage.
5.4.4 Hazards identified by experienced accident investigators
5.4.4.1 Overview
The separate lists of hazards identified by operations, engineering and FDM 
investigators, and by HS&E responders, are included as Appendix G. Table 5.5 shows 
the number of hazards identified by the different categories of investigators.
Table 5.5: Number of hazards identified by investigators on accident sites
Investigator 
Type
Number of Sites 
Attended
Number of Sites 
with no Hazards 
Identified
Number of Sites 
with Hazards
Total Number of 
Hazards 
Identified
Engineering 149 46 103 207
Operations 186 114 72 115
FDM 37 29 8 10
HS&E 15 1 14 32
The differences in the number of hazards reflect the difference in the tasks completed by 
investigators on sites: engineering investigators are much more involved in the 
wreckage sift, whereas operations and FDM investigators may not need to be involved 
in the site search to the same depth. 
These hazards were then combined and categorised using the definitions in ICAO 
Circular 315 (2008a), and compared to the hazards attributed to each category  in 




The hazards identified by accident investigators as arising from the aircraft location are 
shown in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Hazards identified by experienced accident investigators as attributable to aircraft location
Hazard Number
Airside / hanger operations / noise from other aircraft 30
Slope of earth / steep terrain / difficult access due to slope 12
Wet and slippery ground / icy ground / slippery seaweed on ground 6
Trip hazards 4
Hazards working on a ship / offshore 6
Working on high platforms 3
Field surface / uneven terrain 5
Working in and around unstable buildings 5
Marsh / waterlogged or swampy ground / mud 11
Wreckage in trees / broken branches in trees 9
Access to site / aircraft 5
Total 96
Airside hazards account for a third of the hazards identified in this category. This is not 
a location hazard specifically mentioned in the definition provided by ICAO Circular 
315 (2008a), but it  is clearly a significant hazard during investigation of accidents and 
incidents at an operating airfield. 
5.4.4.2.2 Fatigue
Four investigators identified fatigue as a hazard they had encountered during the 
investigation. 
5.4.4.2.3 Insects/wildlife
Seven investigators identified hazards categorised as insects/wildlife. Of these seven, 
four were insect hazards (specifically mosquitos and horse flies). One investigator had 
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to deal with livestock (both dead and alive) on the site. Two investigators identified 
hazards arising from the vegetation on the site: one had to investigate on a site covered 
with gorse bushes, and extremely sharp  bush; the other developed hay fever while on 
site. 
5.4.4.2.4 Climate
Table 5.7 summarises the climate related hazards which were identified by 
investigators.
Table 5.7: Hazards identified by experienced accident investigators as attributable to climate
Hazard Number
Cold weather / freezing windchill 10
Dehydration 1
Hot weather 3




While cold weather was the predominant hazard, a number of other hazards arising 
from extremes of temperature and precipitation were recorded.
5.4.4.2.5 Security
Four security related hazards were recorded: one being poor access control on the site; 
one with protecting third parties while they were on the site; and two (the same site, but 
identified by different investigators) where stones were thrown at them by bystanders 
while they were conducting the investigation. 
5.4.4.3 Physical hazards
5.4.4.3.1 Fire and flammable substances
There were 28 hazards attributed to this category, 26 were associated with fuel and the 
remainder with oil. 
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5.4.4.3.2 Stored energy components
Table 5.8 summarises the hazards identified as relating to stored energy component 
hazards.




High voltage power supply 1
Exploding nose wheel 1
Power to systems 1
Total 6
Five of these six hazards referred to potential electrical inputs when the investigator is 
working on the site.
5.4.4.3.3 Pressurised gases
Two investigators identified hazards posed by pressurised cylinders on sites attended. 
5.4.4.3.4 Military and ex-military aircraft
Four investigators identified armed ejection seats or escape systems on sites to which 
they deployed . 
5.4.4.3.5 Recent safety equipment
No hazards related to recent safety equipment were identified in this sample of health 
and safety forms. 
5.4.4.3.6 Pyrotechnics and explosives
On three separate accident sites, investigators identified either ammunition, flares, or a 
fire extinguisher posing a hazard during the investigation.
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5.4.4.3.7 Damaged and unstable structures
Table 5.9 gives details of hazards related to damaged and unstable structures.
Table 5.9: Hazards identified by experienced accident investigators as attributable to damaged and 
unstable structures
Hazard Number
Sharp wreckage / debris / sharps / sharp metal 30
Unstable wreckage 3




By far the most common hazard encountered in this category was sharp wreckage. The 
broken perspex and the medical kit  can also be considered in that context. Unstable 
wreckage may  hamper access to evidence, and the cabin environment might also be 
unstable or difficult to access.
5.4.4.4 Biological hazards
5.4.4.4.1 General biological hazards
Of the 77 hazards attributed to this category, 73 related directly to biohazards, 
pathogens, blood, or human remains, and one other investigator identified 
‘decontamination’ as a hazard. Three investigators reported animal manure on the site.
5.4.4.4.2 Local state of hygiene




5.4.4.5.1 Metals and oxides
Seven investigation forms identified metals and oxides hazards: four identified fire 
residue/ash/dust; and three identified the hazards from more intact but still fire damaged 
materials.
5.4.4.5.2 Composite materials
Table 5.10 summarises the composite-related hazards identified by investigators.
Table 5.10: Hazards identified by experienced accident investigators as attributable to composite 
materials
Hazard Number
Damaged composites / carbon fibre / glass reinforced plastic / carbon fibre shards 14
Burnt composites / burnt carbon fibre 10
Composite dust / Carbon fibre dust 3
Asbestos 2
Total 29
Fourteen of these hazards arise from impact damaged composites, and ten from fire 
damaged composites. The three composite dust hazards could come from either impact 
damage or, more likely, fire damage. Asbestos was located in a building into which an 
aircraft crashed. 
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5.4.4.5.3 Chemicals and other substances
Ten hazards were identified on the sample group of sites (Table 5.11).
Table 5.11: Hazards identified by experienced accident investigators as attributable to chemicals and 
other substances
Hazard Count
Fire extinguisher powder 3
Hydraulic fluid / Skydrol 4
Chemical weed killer 2
Chemicals 1
Total 10
Only one investigator identified ‘chemicals’ as a general hazard, the others were more 
specific about the particular chemical encountered.
5.4.4.5.4 Radioactive materials
Two investigators identified radioactive material hazards. The first one was radioactive 
dust, following an accident involving an ex-military  aircraft; the second a damaged 
forward looking infrared (FLIR) system on a current military aircraft. 
5.4.4.5.5 Cargo
Two cases of cargo hazards were identified, both from dangerous goods on board the 
aircraft. 
5.4.4.6 Psychological hazards
One investigator developed stress following interviews with relatives of the deceased in 
an accident. 
5.4.4.7 Hazards due to working conditions
Some of the hazards identified by investigators do not fit  into the ICAO Circular 315 
(2008a) taxonomy of hazards. These are identified in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.12: Hazards identified by investigators as associated with working conditions
Hazard Number
Driving conditions to site 6
Lifting heavy wreckage 4
Working at night 4
Working with cranes / lifting equipment 2
Lack of food/water supply 1
Carrying kit 1
Total 18
Working at night, the driving conditions to the site, and lack of food and water can lead 
to early  onset of fatigue and dehydration. This will reduce the performance of 
investigators and possibly be detrimental to the investigation. Driving in itself may  be a 
danger if investigators are distracted by incoming information about the accident to 
which they  they are responding. Lifting heavy wreckage and carrying kit can lead to 
muscoskeletal injuries.
Working with cranes and lifting equipment may  be necessary  when stabilising 
wreckage, or when recovering wreckage for further investigation. Investigators may 
need to consult the crane operator for safety advice. 
The investigators also identified the hazards that arose from powering up an aircraft and 
operating flight controls. Investigators must  ensure that the area is clear of other 
workers before these tasks are undertaken.
5.4.5 Personal protective equipment used on accident sites
The personal protective equipment accident investigators identified as wearing on 
accident sites in listed in Table 5.13.
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Table 5.13: PPE used by investigators on accident sites
PPE ENG OPS FDM HS&E Total
Footwear
Safety Boots/Shoes 28 25 2 3 58
Walking Boots 2 1 - - 3
Wellington Boots 5 8 - - 13
Overshoes (booties) - 1 - - 1
Clothing
Cold weather clothing 16 3 1 1 21
Wet/foul weather clothing 10 9 1 6 26
Waterproof clothing 6 6 1 - 13
Ski clothing - 2 - - 2
High visibility vest/jacket 23 9 4 - 36
Protective Coveralls
Coveralls 28 5 1 2 36
Hearing Protection
Ear defenders 7 1 - 1 9
Eye Protection
Safety Glasses 7 1 1 - 9
Safety Goggles 3 1 1 - 5
Visor - - - 1 1
Respiratory Protection
Disposable mask 15 4 - 1 20
Half face mask 1 - - 1 2
Gloves
Gloves (unspecified) 43 39 2 6 90
Nitrile gloves 11 14 - 6 31
Heavy duty/leather wreckage gloves 12 1 - 6 19
Warm gloves 1 - - - 1
Waterproof gloves - 1 - - 1
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Table 5.13: PPE used by investigators on accident sites
PPE ENG OPS FDM HS&E Total
Head Protection
Hard Hat 8 5 4 3 20
Hat 4 1 - 5
Other PPE
Safety harness 2 - - - 2
Life jacket - 1 1 - 2
Immersion suit - 1 - - 1
Other 
Sunscreen 3 1 - - 4
Insect repellent 1 - - - 1
Antiseptic / Disinfectant / Sterilisation 
sprays and wipes
4 1 - - 5
Torch - 1 - - 1
Trolley - - 1 - 1
This list shows that a wide range of PPE was used by investigators responding to 
accidents. All the major types of PPE are included. In addition items shown in the table, 
a number of investigators reported wearing ‘standard PPE’ or ‘full protective clothing’. 
Upon questioning some of the sampled investigators, this term was taken to mean, at  a 
minimum, coveralls, nitrile gloves, wreckage gloves and a respirator.
Wearing PPE comes with the job of investigation. A question arises from the above 
table about whether all types of PPE have been reported whenever they have been used. 
For example, it would seem certain that more than 58 investigators wore safety shoes on 
sites, as safety  shoes or boots are a standard part of an investigator’s kit. It might well 




5.5.1 Review of investigator deployment
Amongst the sample group, the method of deployment depended on the distance to the 
site. The average time taken to get to a site by  car was 3 hours 15 minutes, the average 
time taken to get to a site by  air was almost 13 hours. Delay in arriving at a site creates 
the potential for loss of evidence.
Both methods of deployment had drawbacks: investigators deploying by car complained 
of traffic, which potentially  leads to fatigue and lack of focus when they arrive on site; 
investigators deploying by air complained of airport congestion and delay, and limits on 
baggage allowances. If investigators are unable to carry all necessary equipment with 
them, they  might be unable to collect all the evidence required, or might have 
inadequate PPE for protection. 
 
After arrival, some investigators experienced difficulties in gaining access to the site, or 
in liaising with other organisations on the site. Because aircraft accidents are so rare, 
other organisations appear not to be aware of the protocols and legal rights of an 
accident investigation agency, and of how they might best assist the investigation. 
5.5.2 Activities on the investigation site
The activities that investigators carry  out on an accident site vary  according to purpose: 
engineering investigators get involved in the wreckage, possibly  inspecting and 
collecting every piece of debris for evidence about the causes of the accident; while 
operations inspectors, following initial site inspections and wreckage collection, might 
investigate in detail a smaller part  of the aircraft or wreckage, such as the cockpit, 
before conducting interviews and gathering other sources of evidence. 
5.5.3 Hazards identified on accident sites
Evidence collection and hazards management are integrally  linked task, and vary 
according to the specialisation of the investigator. Regardless of the specialisation, all 
investigators need to strike a balance between “the requirements of the task and the 
need to make the performance of the task safe” (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 2.3.1).
The rank order of hazards identified by experienced accident investigators in the data 
provided by the health and safety forms is shown in Table 5.14.
The top five hazard categories were aircraft location, biological hazards, damaged and 
unstable structures, composite materials, and fire and flammable substances. These 
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hazards represent four of the five overarching categories of hazards in Circular 315 
(ICAO, 2008a), psychological hazards being the only one not included.
Table 5.14: Rank order of hazard categories identified by experienced accident investigators
Rank Order  Category of Hazards Number of Reports
1 Aircraft location 96
2 Biological hazards 77
3 Damaged and unstable structures 39
4 Composite materials 29
5 Fire and flammable substances 28
6 Climate 22
7 Chemicals and other substances 10
8/9 Insects/wildlife 7
8/9 Metals and oxides 7
10 Stored energy components 6
11/12/13 Fatigue 4
11/12/13 Security 4
11/12/13 Military and ex-military aircraft 4
14 Pyrotechnics and explosives 3
15/16/17 Pressurised gases 2
15/16/17 Radioactive hazards 2
15/16/17 Cargo 2
18 Psychological hazards 1
19/20 Recent safety equipment 0
19/20 Local state of hygiene 0
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5.6 Conclusion
Examination of the 392 health and safety reports covering 208 accidents and incidents 
over more than six years has allowed a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
realities faced by accident investigators in the field. This reveals a great range and 
diversity of  experiences and situations in the life of an accident investigator.
The number and range of tasks undertaken are numerous: 33 different activities were 
reported by  engineering investigators (Table 4.1), and twenty were reported by 
operations inspectors. For the former, recovery  of the aircraft and examination of the 
wreckage are the most common activities; for the latter, the most frequent activities are 
interviews, site attendance and liaison with other responders. 
The 208 sites were attended by  387 investigators in various specialisations (Table 5.5). 
They  identified a total of 364 hazards. Engineering investigators reported hazards at  the 
great majority  of sites they attended (hazards at 103 of 149 sites); far fewer sites with 
hazards were encountered  by operations engineers (72 of 186 sites) and FDM engineers 
(8 of 37 sites). This reflects the different sorts of activities undertaken by each 
specialisation, with the greatest exposure to hazards being faced by engineering 
investigators. In contrast, HS&E investigators identified hazards at 14 of the 15 sites 
they  attended, which is explained by the fact that HS&E expertise is normally called in 
when other inspectors have encountered potential hazards about which they require 
specialist advice.
The most frequently reported hazards arising from aircraft location were airside hazards 
(30 of 96 reported hazards), although on-site terrain hazards relating to steepness, 
slipperiness, trip  hazards and uneven ground and swampy ground amount to 38 of 96 
reported hazards (Table 5.6). Cold weather was more commonly a source of hazards 
than hot weather (Table 5.7), although this was an expected consequence of the nature 
of the climate in the jurisdiction of the national investigation agency  to which the 
investigators belonged. Sharp wreckage was a common hazard (Table 5.9);  damaged 
and burnt composite materials (Table 5.10) were almost three times as frequently 
encountered as chemical hazards (Table 5.11).
It is clear that over a working lifetime an investigator will encounter a very wide range 
of hazards, but some of them will be met very infrequently. As four of the five major 
categories of hazards - arising from the location of the aircraft, biological hazards, 
damaged and unstable structures, and fire and flammable substances - will be 
encountered almost routinely, investigators must have high level skills in identifying 
and managing these hazards while at the same time collecting the necessary evidence 
and maintaining its integrity. 
Investigators also need to have the knowledge and skill necessary  to identify  and 
manage the less-frequently encountered hazards, even though they might come across 
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hazards such as those arising from cargo, pyrotechnics, lack of security and recent 
safety  equipment on only  a handful of occasions during a career. It is inevitable that 
such knowledge and skill must largely  be acquired at second hand - through updated 
briefings on the identification and  mitigation of such hazards - rather than be honed to a 
high level of practical experience in the field. This means that there needs to be ongoing 
specialised research into the detection and management of infrequently encountered 
hazards, and the prompt and regular dissemination of this information to all 
investigators, through publication and in-service training. Preferably, the latter should 
include training for experienced accident investigators on simulated accident sites 
involving the presence of infrequently  encountered hazards. There also needs to be a 
capacity for investigators to call upon personnel engaged in such specialist research, in 
the event of uncertainty about the existence of a particular hazard at an accident site, or 
about how to deal with it.
The results of this study can not be directly compared to the results of the previous 
study (Chapter Four), as one study  compares perception of risk and the other actual 
hazards, without consideration of the level of risk however, it is interesting to compare 
the relative rankings of the hazards (Table 4.19 and Table 5.14).
Although given in a different order, four of the five hazards that novice investigators 
perceive as most risk on site (aircraft location, damaged and unstable structures, 
biological hazards, and fire and flammable substances) are the ones experienced 
investigators identify most commonly on a site. 
Novice accident investigators included risks from chemicals and other substances 
within their five perceived highest risk hazards, where the experienced investigators 
identified it only seventh most commonly found on sites. Hazards associated with 
composite materials were reported by the experienced investigators as the fourth most 
common hazard, but only seventh by the novice accident investigators.
The risk arising from cargo is identified by novices as quite high, but identified by 
experienced investigators infrequently. Conversely, novice investigators did not identify 
any risk associated with military and ex-military aircraft, whereas experienced 
investigators identified this in equal eleventh ranking out of twenty hazards categories. 
The hazards posed by  metals and oxides are listed by  experienced investigators as the 
eight most common hazard, while novice investigators responses rank these hazards as 
fifteenth most hazardous. Potential hazards arising from recent  safety equipment and 
local state of hygiene are not recognised as greatly significant by either novice or 
experienced accident investigators, despite recent safety equipment being one of the 




Observations of the Identification and Assessment of Hazards, 
and the Selection and Use of Personal Protective Equipment 
by Accident Investigators on Simulated and Real Accident 
Sites
6.1 Purpose of the study
This study answers question four of the research questions: How do accident 
investigators identify and manage the hazards?
This study looks at the processes investigators use in the field to identify hazards, and at 
the methods employed to protect themselves against  the effects of those hazards. The 
research was conducted by observing investigators on simulated accident sites during 
both initial and advanced investigator training, and on a real accident site. 
6.2 Context
6.2.1 Overview
This study  builds upon the research set out in the previous chapters, and brings together 
the work on the training of aircraft accident investigators, generic and dynamic risk 
assessment, the potential hazards which may occur on accident sites, and on site 
evidence collection methods (Chapter Three).
6.2.2 Training investigators on simulated accident sites
The benefits of using simulated accidents for training in accident investigation have 
been demonstrated and are widely recognised (for example, Braithwaite and Greaves, 
2009; Siewert and Stephens, 2007; Woodcock et al., 2005). As noted by  Braithwaite and 
Greaves (2009):
“Simulation is not the same as instruction – the aim is not to walk investigators through an 
accident site tutorial (though such tutorials are a useful introduction). Instead, simulation 
requires full participation by the investigators under training and observation and feedback 
from experienced instructors”.
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Simulating an accident site gives investigators an opportunity  to practice the theories 
and techniques they have been taught during formal training, in a ‘safe’ environment 
where their mistakes will not lead to a loss of vital evidence. More importantly for this 
research, a simulation allows investigators to practice the skills needed to identify  and 
mitigate site hazards while collecting evidence, in a training environment.
Simulated accident sites are virtual crash scenes created in the field in great detail by 
subject matter experts (SMEs): they  are laid out so that  they resemble ‘real’ accident 
sites as closely  as possible. Accident investigators working on these sites in a training 
exercise are required to operate under time pressures to collect  evidence both on and off 
the site. However, the simulated environment allows close monitoring of the way in 
which the investigators conduct themselves, so that they  can learn from later analysis of 
any deficiencies in their behaviour, which on a real accident site could result in loss of 
evidence, or direct personal harm.
6.2.3 Personal protective equipment
6.2.3.1 Types of personal protective equipment
The personal protective equipment used by investigators on aircraft accident sites was 
reviewed in Section 5.4.5. This chapter considers the findings of Chapter Four in in the 
light of this further study and the available guidance on PPE.
General health and safety guidelines suggest that  PPE be used only as a final risk 
mitigation measure (Section 2.4.4.5). However, in achieving the necessary balance 
between evidence collection and personal safety, investigators may often need to turn to 
PPE before other risk mitigation measures.
The PPE recommended by Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a, p.19) for an investigators ‘go-
kit’ is shown in Table 6.1. In addition, Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a, p.20) notes that 
investigators working in marine environments may require: “life vest; suitable footwear 
for deck operations; hard hat or, if permitted, peaked waterproof hat; pair of neoprene 
gloves; sun protective screen; and motion sickness medication if recommended”.
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Table 6.1: Suggested PPE and equipment for Accident Investigators (ICAO, 2008a)
Half-face respirator complete with spare set of broad range of chemical/dust cartridges 
(the set should be effective for organic vapour, acid gas and P100). If space permits, a 
full-face piece respirator complete with spare set of cartridges should be included
Several disposable dust/mist HEPA/P3 masks
Two or more disposable coveralls
Several pairs of disposable nitrile gloves
Several pairs of disposable heavy duty gloves
One pair of Kevlar cut-resistant gloves with lined palm and fingers
Protective footwear with sole and toe protection
Hard hat
Eye protection: either safety glasses or safety goggles
Hearing protection: either ear muffs or ear plugs
Hand and equipment wipes
High visibility vest
Chemical or duct tape





Insect protective solutions and medication, if recommended
Extra batteries and power supply adaptors for electronic equipment
The PPE that investigators choose to wear on an accident site will depend not only on 
the nature of the site, but also on the specific tasks to be carried out. 
In the literature on aircraft accident investigation, there are various recommendations on 
PPE in addition to those given in Circular 315. These are compared in Appendix H. 
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6.2.3.2 Standards of personal protective equipment
When PPE is the most appropriate risk mitigation measure, it is important to ensure that 
the equipment is of the appropriate standard, and is fitted properly. It is also important 
that the guidelines for use are followed. Each type of PPE has been tested to sustain a 
certain level of use, beyond which the equipment will fail to function as designed, and 
will not provide protection for the investigator. Each individual pack of different PPE 
should contain an information leaflet with the limits of use on it. PPE selected should be 
comfortable for the wearer, and compatible with other selected PPE.
Head Protection
Hard hats should provide protection to meet standards EN397 (Europe)/ ANSI 
Z89.1-1986 (USA). The hard hats should be marked as either class A or B.
A hard hat should be selected provide a gap of between 1 and 1 ¼ inches (2.54cm to 
3.18cm) between the top of the head and the top of the cap. This provides the optimal 
level of impact absorbency if required.
All hard hats should have a chinstrap point, to ensure the hat stays on the head when 
manoeuvring around wreckage. In some industries and some working environments, 
such as on the railways, the wearing of a hard hat is compulsory. In other situations, it 
may  be the choice of the investigator. Accessories such as face visors, ear defenders, 
radios, torches and cameras may be attached to the hard hat.
If a hard hat is is judged not to be necessary, the investigator may instead choose to 
wear a ‘bump cap’ – a baseball style plastic cap, that provides some protection for the 
wearer against impact, but not the same level as a hard hat. The bump cap uses padding 
rather than a suspension system and space to provide protection. The advantage of 
bump caps is that they are lighter and less bulky. They provide sun or rain protection as 
well as as head impact protection.
Hard hats should be cleaned with hot water and a standard disinfectant solution such as 
Virkon, with all detergent rinsed off at the end of the cleaning process. Hats should be 
inspected regularly for their condition, and disposed of as soon as they show any  signs 
of damage, such as cuts, cracking, loss of gloss colour and flaking, when they will no 
longer provide sufficient protection. Bump caps may not be able to be cleaned to a 
sufficient level if they are covered with cotton.
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Eye Protection
Safety  goggles should meet at least standard EN166.1 – B.3.4.9. This means that they 
are goggles with the highest level of lens (166.1), that withstand being hit  by high speed 
particles at medium level impact (B), are resistant to liquid droplets (3), coarse dust 
particles (4) and molten metals and hot solids (9). Face shields are available that  meet, 
and exceed these standards, although a full face shield can be cumbersome to wear for 
extended periods.
Safety  goggles should fit over glasses, and have a malleable seal that forms around the 
arm of the glasses. Prescription safety goggles are available, although costly. Goggles 
must be properly  cleaned after each use, or contaminants could be introduced into the 
eyes.
Safety  goggles come with the option of having vents or no vents on the top of the 
goggle. Vents are designed to prevent the goggles from steaming up inside, but it must 
be ensured that the vents are indirect, otherwise dusts and other particles may  get into 
the goggles, thus defeating their purpose. 
Most safety goggles comes with an anti-fog coating, but it wears off with use. Many 
ways of reducing this problem have been found, including wetting the goggles before 
use, or lightly smearing the inside of the goggle with dish washing liquid.
Safety  glasses provide less protection against hazards than safety goggles, but are 
lighter and less burdening to wear.
Safety  goggles and safety glasses are considered disposable PPE. Unless they have 
prescription lenses, they are generally  fairly  cheap, and can be disposed of with other 
PPE after a few uses. It is possible to wash the goggles in a disinfectant solution if 
necessary, but this will greatly affect the anti-fog lens. Any safety goggles that show 
signs of damage should immediately be replaced.
Hearing Protection
For protecting hearing, investigators have the choice of either ear defenders or ear 
plugs. Both types of hearing protection must meet standard EN 352.
Ear defenders can be mounted on a hard hat, or used as a stand alone pair. The 
equipment must be compatible: stand alone ear defenders cannot be used with a hard 
hat. Advanced ear defenders may  have an active noise cancelling system, or may be 
attached to radio input. This is important on a large site, where communication is 
required. Ear defenders should be cleaned with a disinfectant wipe when necessary.
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Ear plugs can be either disposable or reusable. In a hazardous accident investigation 
situation, the disposable option is generally  recommended. Some pairs of ear plugs are 
available with a cord, band, or plastic grips to hold when handling the plugs. The 
benefit is that the investigator does not then need to handle the part of the ear plug being 
placed into the ear, thus preventing dust from being forced into the ear canal.
Respiratory Protection
A variety of different types of respiratory protection is available to accident 
investigators. The differences between them should be considered carefully to ensure 
appropriate selection for the hazards being encountered.
Paper dust masks (EN 149) provide a basic level of protection for investigators. These 
masks are available in a variety of filtration levels (FFP1 (lowest) to FFP3 (highest), 
with or without an inbuilt valve and filter. These are disposable masks, and should be 
replaced often, as the integrity of the mask is reduced by  increase in moisture. 
Additionally, touching the mask will reduce its effectiveness.
Care should be taken to fit the mask properly to the face, by adjusting the metal bar 
across the nose, and adjusting the elastic around the face as required. These types of 
mask are not suitable for investigators with facial hair that affects the closeness of fit of 
the mask to the face.
Half-face masks (EN 140) and full-face masks (EN 136) can have different filters fitted, 
to suit the working environment. These filters simply click on to the basic face mask 
unit. Each individual should have both half- and full-face masks, and these should be fit 
tested, to ensure that no air can leak in or out  of the mask through poor seals. The mask 
can be washed in disinfectant solution. The filters which attach are disposable PPE, and 
each comes with a recommended maximum time of usefulness, which is marked on the 
filter packaging.
In high dust situations, requiring a longer working time, investigators may wear a fan 
assisted, fully enclosed helmet (EN 146). To use this equipment requires training. 
However the potential filtration levels are higher; with experience, investigators may 
find the helmet more comfortable than a full face mask.
The highest level of respiratory  protection available is through the use of a forced air 
breathing apparatus. This provides either fresh air (EN 138) or compressed air (EN 
14594).
216
Body Protection (including skin)
Disposable ‘paper’ overalls (required standard EN 340) provide some protection for 
investigators against dusts and fibres. They  offer limited protection against  fluids. These 
suits do not breathe, and add extra warmth for the investigator.
Fluid resistant overalls (EN 368) provide protection greater protection against fluids. 
These suits can be washed down and disinfected if necessary, although for greater 
precaution they should be disposed of if a lot of pathogens have been encountered.
Whatever type of suit is selected for use, it is important that the size chosen takes 
account of the types of clothing that may  be worn underneath. An investigator may find 
that they need a different sized suit, depending on whether they have their summer or 
winter layers of clothing on.
If coveralls are not required for the investigation activities, then the investigators may 
need to use sun screen or insect repellent on areas of bare skin.
Hand and Arm Protection
Gloves protect against either chemical hazards or mechanical hazards. An appropriate 
size glove should be selected by each investigator, to maintain maximum dexterity for 
evidence collection.
The simplest glove for use is the pathogen resistant glove (EN 374, EN 388 and EN 455 
requirements). This is the standard nitrile glove, that provides barrier resistance to 
biological hazards, light fluids and dusts. These gloves offer no protection against 
sharps, and will tear easily, in which case they must be replaced immediately. Fuels and 
oils will be protected against for a short time, but gloves should be replaced as soon as 
is practicable after contact. Nitrile gloves have increasingly replaced latex gloves, due 
to common latex irritations. These gloves are for single use only.
A leather palmed glove (EN 388 – followed by  a number between 0 and 4, from lowest 
to highest levels of protection) provides protection against mechanical hazards, such as 
sharps. However, as they are not impervious to fluids, nitrile gloves will still be required 
to be worn underneath. These gloves are again disposable. 
Heavy duty chemical resistant gloves (EN 388, EN 374 and EN 420) will provide 
protection against chemicals. However, these gloves should be replaced regularly  as 
they  may absorb the chemicals which could seep through the material onto the skin. 
Nitrile gloves should be worn underneath these gloves.
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The highest  level of protection is provided by a knitted Kevlar glove, which gives both 
mechanical and chemical resistance. They are expensive, and will need to be replaced if 
they absorb a high level of chemicals.
In performing some tasks, investigators might need a glove with a longer length sleeve, 
that stretches to the elbow or higher. This will ensure that no fluids get around the end 
of the glove. 
Foot and Leg Protection
Boots should meet the equivalent standards of:
• EN 345 (Europe)
• ANSI Standard Z41-1991 (USA)
• CSA Standard CAN/CSA-Z199-M92 (Canada)
The boots selected should be waterproof, with a reinforced, impact  resistant toe (steel or 
composite cap). The boot should have a non-slip, puncture resistant sole, running along 
the length of the boot, that protects the wearer from injuries if standing on sharp 
wreckage. They should provide ankle support to the investigator, for walking over 
rough terrain. There should be no direct route of entry for hazards to penetrate the boot, 
including through the eyes. In addition to these requirements, consideration should be 
given to comfort, as the investigator may be required to wear the boots for many  long 
days on end.
In particularly wet, dusty, or fibrous environments, wellington boots (rubber boots, 
gumboots) may be a better option. These boots can be more easily cleaned than other 
work boots, due to the simple design. Selected wellington boots should meet the same 
standards as other work boots, with a reinforced sole and toe cap. However, working a 
full day in wellington boots may be more strenuous than wearing working boots, 
increasing the fatigue.
After finishing work on a site, footwear should be thoroughly  cleaned, using a 
disinfectant, such as Virkon. Ideally, this should be done in a dedicated cleaning area, 
not used for other purposes. Depending on the working environment, dusts and fibres 
may become embedded in the laces, which will need to be replaced if they cannot be 
cleaned by standard disinfectant techniques.
In addition to footwear, investigators may find use for knee pads and/or shin guards on 
the site. Knee pads are useful when the investigation task requires much kneeling, such 
as collecting evidence. Shin guards may be useful when moving pieces of wreckage, to 




This research was based on observations of the actions of trainee/novice investigators 
during the on site investigation phase of a simulated accident investigation. Some of the 
trainees were attending the basic accident investigation course at Cranfield University, 
and others the advanced course. The observations were focussed specifically  on the 
hazard identification and assessment process conducted by trainee investigators when 
first entering the site; on the ways in which they managed the hazards encountered 
during specific evidence collection tasks; and on the selection and use of PPE.
An investigation on the site of a real accident was also observed, with the same focus on 
the identification and assessment of hazards, the management of those hazards during 
evidence collection, and the selection and use of PPE. The objective was to determine 
whether the observations on simulated sites approximated reality in the field. 
6.3.2 Simulated accident scenarios
Investigations were observed at three sites: one simulated incident site and two 
simulated accident sites. 
Each simulation was developed by SMEs The sources of evidence and the necessary 
methodologies for evidence collection were representative of the range of sources and 
methodologies in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. 
The observations were made in 2008 and 2009. The investigation of the incident 
simulation was undertaken by attendees at  a basic investigation course; the two aircraft 
accident simulations were developed for investigators on advanced aircraft accident 
investigation courses. 
6.3.3 Observations
Observation of the actions of investigators on accident sites enables analysis of the 
practical application in the field of published guidance on risk assessment and 
management, such as that in Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a, Chapters 2,4). The various 
stages in the identification, assessment and mitigation of hazards can be identified, and 
the selection and correct use of appropriate PPE can be evaluated. The adequacy of the 
theoretical advice given in the guidance can be tested in the field; the understanding and 
skill of the trainee in applying that  advice is also demonstrated, so that further training 
needs can be identified.
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At each of accident simulations, the researcher acted as a ‘participating observer’, a role 
which Bernard (2006) describes as “outsiders who participate in some aspects of life 
around them and record what  they can”. Trainee investigators were told that the 
observer was a member of the staff assisting with the day, and would be on the site in a 
supervisory capacity. The researcher did not participate in the investigation, but her 
presence on the site was accepted as normal by the trainees. 
The simulations were each on different days, so all of them could be observed by the 
one researcher. SMEs were also present on the site. They were aware of the researcher’s 
research objectives, and provided guidance at stages during the investigation when 
particular events were occurring. However, only the researcher recorded the actions and 
events, thus minimising the potential effect of observational biases such as selective 
attention and selective coding (Robson, 2002).
In preparation for this work, the researcher had attended a number of similar previously 
simulated accidents, in order to determine the best  positions from which to make the 
observations at various stages in the investigation, and to review some of the location 
hazards involved in the simulation. This ensured that, during the observation process, 
the focus could remain on recording the actions of the investigators.
Three elements of each investigation were observed and recorded at  each simulation: 
the site hazards, which included both the hazards identified by the trainee investigators 
and the hazards identified by the SMEs; the conduct of the hazard assessment process 
by the investigators; and their selection and use of PPE. 
The observations were recorded as notes or field jottings (Bernard, 2006): given the 
pace at which it was necessary  for some parts of the investigation to proceed, it was 
impractical for long descriptive field notes to made at the time. Field notes were 
supplemented by photographs taken to record site hazards, the evidence available for 
use by investigators, and the actions taken by investigators on site. Immediately  after 
the investigation concluded, full notes were prepared from the field jottings and 
photographs.
6.3.4 Participants
6.3.4.1 Participants in the observations
The participants were assigned to investigation teams, comprised of a balance of 
backgrounds and experience. This ensured that each team had an equal opportunity of 
succeeding in the simulation task. 
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Investigators on each simulation site were provided with a tent or sheltered environment 
large enough for entire team. In the tent was a wide selection of PPE, covering all 
possible needs. 
6.3.4.2 Ethical considerations
Participation in the simulated investigation was an expected part of attendance at one of 
the investigator training courses. The simulations were designed primarily as a learning 
tool for the trainee investigators, rather than for the purpose of this research. 
Before participating in the site simulation, all investigators had - at  a minimum - 
completed training in hazards awareness and site safety, and had been on another 
simulated accident site during a site appreciation tutorial. Many of the investigators on 
the advanced investigation courses had more extensive site experience. 
A safety  briefing was provided to each investigation team before site entry. This briefing 
alerted investigators to the fact that the health and safety  hazards they faced on the site 
were real, but that all the equipment necessary to protect themselves from any hazard 
was provided. The briefing also introduced the investigators to the SMEs present on the 
site (including the researcher), who would be monitoring both their progress with the 
investigation and their safety. Each of the SMEs had a whistle which, if blown, would 
signal that investigators were to cease whatever task they were doing immediately, 
because of a safety problem. Such a situation did not arise during any of the observed 
simulations.
6.3.5 Analysis of observations
The recorded notes for all groups across each accident site, and for all groups across all 
accident sites, were compared across the range of observed investigations. Investigator 
actions and any  SME opinions on those actions were considered. The theoretical 
guidance on the identification and assessment of hazards, on the management of those 
hazards during evidence collection and on the selection and use of PPE, was considered 




This section reviews each of the accident sites separately. The aircraft incident site 
(investigated by  attendees of the basic investigation course) is discussed first, followed 
by the two simulated aircraft accident investigations. Observations of the work of 
accident investigators on the real accident site is discussed subsequently. 
The review is presented as a narrative covering the nature of the simulation, the hazards 
present on site, the hazards assessment process, and the PPE worn during site tasks.
6.4.2 Simulation 1: Aircraft incident on take-off
The first simulation was an investigation of a runway  over-run following an aborted 
take-off in a Jetstream 200 aircraft. The simulation scenario was akin to an incident 
investigation rather than an accident investigation. The investigation however was 
complicated by the ground handlers having dropped one of the cargo boxes from the 
conveyor and it breaking open, to reveal batteries being carried as undeclared cargo. 
This simulation was conducted in November on a cold day  (< 5ºC) beginning with fog, 
followed by intermittent rain throughout the day. The exercise was conducted at 
Cranfield University, on a runway no longer in use (for the purpose of this exercise, it 
was considered an operational runway). The rest of the airfield was operational. Figure 
6.1 shows the aircraft under investigation.
In terms of site hazards, this investigation was the most benign of the simulations. With 
the exception of the weather, which made being on the site for more than a couple of 
hours quite uncomfortable, the only real concerns on the site were three batteries, which 
on inspection were undamaged, and therefore not a high risk; and access to the aircraft, 
which required the investigators to climb up a baggage conveyor (Figure 6.2). There 
were no injuries in the event.
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Figure 6.1: Simulation 1: Jetstream 200 aborted take-off and runway over-run
Figure 6.2: Simulation 1: Damaged cargo box and conveyor providing access to the aircraft
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At this site, the process of investigation was observed for one group. Initially, they were 
very hesitant in entering the site: they did not approach the aircraft until 45 minutes 
after the initial safety briefing and a briefing from the fire services. Instead, they briefed 
as an entire group  on the possible hazards they could identify from a distance of around 
20m from the aircraft. They then began a very  wide walk around the site, before sending 
in two investigators in high level PPE to assess the site closely. The PPE selected for the 
two investigators included paper coveralls, eye and respiratory  protection (one with a 
full face mask, the other with safety goggles and a disposable dust mask).
The site survey recognised that:
• The thermal plugs of the tyres had melted, removing the risk of tyre explosion. No 
action was necessary. 
• The batteries had been stood upright (by the fire services), and were not  leaking. They 
were therefore not posing any immediate threat to the investigators. The investigators 
elected, after photographing and documenting the evidence, to move the batteries onto 
a drop sheet away from the aircraft.
• Access to the inside of the aircraft should be limited to only two investigators, 
working together, to prevent too many people from climbing on the baggage loader. 
This group  did not  initially consider the issue of site security. They believed the 
perimeter fence of the airport would prevent intruders from accessing the site, but this 
proved not to be the case. Each of the simulations had a number of ‘witnesses’ written 
into the scenario, who could provide background information to the investigators. The 
aircraft was visible from the airport gate, and a number of these witnesses entered the 
accident site to speak to the investigators. One ‘reporter’ was able to walk up  to the 
aircraft before being stopped by any of the investigators. Following these intrusions, a 
cordon was established around the aircraft, the airport gate was secured, and a single 
path of entry in and out of the site was established. Lack of site security  may lead to a 
loss of evidence, or may delay the investigation process when people not involved in the 
investigation enter the site. 
Investigators entered the site wearing appropriate footwear for the site, and clothing to 
protect themselves from the weather. Other than the standard airport requirement to 
wear high visibility vests, no comprehensive PPE requirements were set by the team. 
All team members opted to wear nitrile gloves, and some covered these with heavy duty 
gloves. The investigators who documented the contents of the broken cargo crate, and 
moved the batteries, wore the same high level PPE as during the site safety assessment. 
Although mismatched, the SMEs on the site deemed their PPE selection to be 
appropriate, if not a little too high for the task of moving the batteries (considering they 
had assessed the batteries as not a high risk hazard).
Towards the end of the investigation, some of the investigators became lax with their 
use of PPE, including one investigator who worked with coveralls undone (Figure 6.3). 
Although there were no major site hazards in this simulation, it was noted that 
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investigators did not change gloves at any stage during the investigation process, or 
during the different tasks such as taking photographs, making notes and moving the 
cargo.
Figure 6.3: Investigator with coveralls not zipped up
6.4.3 Simulation 2: Mid-air accident
6.4.3.1 Overview of the site investigation
This simulation created a mid-air collision between a Cessna 152 and a Aerospatiale 
Socata TB10 aircraft in the circuit at Cranfield Airport. The two aircraft  crashed 
separately, creating two sites to be investigated. Three groups each undertook an 
investigation.
The first site, the Cessna 152 (Figure 6.4) was on open grass on the airport. The pilot of 
the aircraft was fatally injured in the accident. During the crash sequence, the aircraft 
cart-wheeled along the ground, before stopping in an upright position facing backwards 
along the direction of flight. The wreckage trail was approximately  100m long. The 
aircraft was severely damaged in the accident sequence, and access into the aircraft  was 
limited. 
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Figure 6.4: Simulation 2: C152 accident site
The second site, containing the TB10 (Figure 6.5) was in a small clearing within a 
forested area inside the airport boundary. This aircraft flew through trees before coming 
to rest  in the clearing. One occupant suffered fatal injuries, the other was able to escape. 
A post-impact fire occurred, causing substantial damage to the airframe. There was also 
substantial damage to the surrounding vegetation, with parts of the aircraft  lodged in the 
trees overhead. The ground around the aircraft was muddy.
A third site, located below the estimated position of the mid-air collision, contained 
some pieces of wreckage from both aircraft. This was located approximately 500m from 
the C152 wreckage, and 240m from the TB10 wreckage. This site was in open grass 
near the airport VOR. 
The investigation took place in mid-June, with the weather ranging between 15ºC and 
20ºC. There was rain overnight before the investigation began, but no rain during the 
site investigation (although rain threatened). There was a slight wind of up to 10kts, 
which was not sufficient to disturb any of the larger wreckage from the C152 site. The 
TB10 site was protected from any wind disturbance by the surrounding vegetation. 
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Figure 6.5: Simulation 2: TB10 accident site
The hazards of the C152 site were mainly restricted to damaged wreckage (sharps, 
broken perspex etc.). The hazards on the TB10 site were more numerous, and therefore 
the investigation of this site became the focus of the observations. Three groups were 
observed at work on the TB10 site. 
6.4.3.2 Simulation 2: Group 1
The first group  summarised their activities for completion on the TB10 site as: the 
search for physical evidence, moving of structures and components, and sample 
collection. Their initial site survey  involved a long look around the site, including the 
forest area. They wore no PPE during this initial assessment. The hazards they 
identified were:
• fire damage (dust/fibres) - the hazard these posed was reduced as they had been 
dampened down by the overnight rain;
• biohazards around the cabin area;
• sharp objects from the wreckage;
• the weather, and the physical environment around the aircraft;
• aircraft debris in the trees;
• a strong smell of fuel on the site.
In dealing with these hazards, the team decided that all investigators on the site would 
wear, as a minimum, gloves (both heavy duty  rigger gloves and nitrile gloves) and 
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sturdy footwear. In addition disposable masks were to be worn when working close to 
the wreckage. 
Despite a whole team briefing on PPE requirements, members of the group adopted a 
casual attitude towards the use of PPE, particularly gloves. Heavy duty gloves were 
rarely worn: most of the investigators put a single pair of nitrile gloves on at the 
beginning, and did not change them during the investigative process. Two of the 
investigators in the group were observed to move sharp wreckage wearing only nitrile 
gloves, despite having heavy duty gloves. 
6.4.3.3 Simulation 2: Group 2
Group 2 had a designated site safety surveyor complete a full assessment of the site 
before anyone else entered. The hazards they identified in the area included:
• fire damage;
• man made mineral fibres;
• biohazards in the cockpit area;
• wreckage in the trees overhead;
• stinging nettles and brambles;
• fire fighting foam on the ground around the aircraft.
These hazards were managed through the use of PPE: a standard was created requiring 
all team members to wear coveralls, face mask, nitrile gloves and heavy duty gloves 
while on the site. Investigators working near, or retrieving wreckage from, the trees 
were required to wear hard hats. 
In response to the potential stinging nettle hazard, all investigators were required to 
wear long trousers and a long sleeve shirt underneath their coveralls. This was intended 
to provide an extra level of protection against the vegetation. Some investigators found 
this too warm, and took shortcuts with the PPE such as pushing up their sleeves.
The biohazard danger was overcome not only with the use of PPE to protect those who 
were in the contaminated area, but also by limiting the number of investigators who 
entered the site. The number of investigators potentially exposed to the hazard was kept 
at a minimum.
Group 2 was the only group on this site to recognise the potential for fire fighting foam 
to create a slip hazard. The team considered the possibility of hazard caused by the use 
of mobile phones near fuel, and restricted the use of phones to a distance away  from the 
site. They were also one of the few teams amongst all groups observed on all sites to 
implement a clean/dirty  line on the site, from the clean side of which used PPE would 
be removed and bagged in standard bags or biohazard disposal bags. 
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6.4.3.4 Simulation 2: Group 3
The third group sent two investigators to conduct a survey of the site wearing coveralls, 
safety  boots, heavy duty gloves and disposable masks. They did not wear eye 
protection. Major hazards identified included:
• debris at the tops of the trees;
• fuel tanks of the aircraft burnt out;
• possible fibres from the aircraft structure.
Following the site inspection, it was decided that only wet weather gear was required, 
unless working in the direct vicinity of the aircraft. The same PPE as worn for the site 
briefing was worn when working within the aircraft cockpit. The group also specified 
heavy duty gloves when working around the engine, due to the potential for sharps.
The use of masks by  this group was fairly  haphazard, with masks being worn on top of 
the head when they became overbearing, or when not required. While removal of an 
object causing discomfort may be an instinctive reaction, the masks should have been 
disposed of when not required, rather than being reused after being placed on the 
forehead or hair. Such reuse allows contamination by dust, which the mask is designed 
to prevent: when the investigator places the mask back over the nose and mouth, the 
dust is directly  inhaled. It was observed that following the initial site safety briefing for 
this group, there was no further discussion about PPE, or PPE briefings for other 
investigators who went onto the site. 
6.4.4 Simulation 3: Aircraft accident on landing
6.4.4.1 Overview of the site investigation
This simulation was a crash of a Piper Saratoga whilst conducting an instrument 
approach into Cranfield Airport (Figure 6.6). The aircraft cart-wheeled on impact with 
the ground and came to rest inverted. The pilot (the sole occupant) died in the accident 
sequence. 
The accident site was in the open fields parallel to, but spaced away from, the active 
runway. The site was located some distance away from any airport gates or fences. 
Being inverted, the wreckage itself was quite unstable; the wings were detached, but 
almost resting on the fuselage (Figure 6.7). The space inside the aircraft had been 
compromised during the impact sequence (Figure 6.8).
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Figure 6.6: Simulation 3: Piper Saratoga accident on landing
The simulation took place in June, on overcast days with temperatures of 10- 15ºC. The 
early mornings were foggy, and there was light intermittent rain during the 
investigation. Wind speed built to 10-15kts throughout the day. 
Two groups were observed working on the site, on two days.
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Figure 6.7: Simulation 3: instability of the wreckage
Figure 6.8: Simulation 3: inside the Saratoga cockpit
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6.4.4.2 Simulation 3: Group 1
Group 1 conducted a ten-minute walk-around of the site as a whole group, discussing 
the hazards they identified as they proceeded. They then proceeded to gather equipment, 
both to protect themselves and to collect evidence. The group appeared hesitant about 
how to start the investigation: they did not begin until 30 minutes after being briefed by 
the fire service. 
The first hazard they were concerned with was the aircraft battery. Before any further 
investigation, they took tools to find the battery and ensure it was disconnected. They 
also immediately appointed a security  guard to man the closest access gate, to prevent 
intruders from entering the site and also so they  would know when witnesses or others 
came to speak to them. The security guard was to record all people entering the site. 
For the purpose of the investigation, the team of seven split into three groups of two 
(with the IIC floating between the groups) to cover different parts of the site. One group 
initially walked around the site and back along the flight-path; one group surveyed the 
wreckage trail; and the third group went inside the inner cordon (set up by the fire 
fighters) around the aircraft wreckage, to investigate within the wreckage itself. 
Initially, no PPE other than nitrile gloves and high visibility  vests were worn. The team 
working on the wreckage trail were simply  measuring, photographing and recording the 
wreckage trail and ground markings, without yet touching any of the evidence. The 
team working within the inner cordon chose not  to touch the wreckage, and 
photographed the wreckage without entering it. They carried heavy  duty  gloves with 
them for later use in moving small pieces of wreckage from the outside of the aircraft. 
One investigator entered the cockpit  area to take photographs with no PPE other than 
nitrile gloves.
On the second day, the team began to move wreckage and bag evidence. They worked 
in a larger group, all wearing nitrile gloves under heavy  duty wreckage gloves, at a 
minimum. Those who entered or worked near the cabin area, wore coveralls, nitrile 
gloves, goggles and a disposable respirator. The group worked as a team to to ensure 
they  were all using appropriate PPE before entering the aircraft, but  there was no 
discussion about the stability of the wreckage or whether it was safe to enter. 
The group did not consider what to do with the PPE when it had been used, and kept 
their disposal bags in their work/rest tent, which meant that they  wore contaminated 
clothing into the area where they ate and drank. 
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6.4.4.3 Simulation 3: Group 2
The second group  on the site began their investigation with the IIC being briefed by the 
responding fire crew, while the rest of the team wandered along the path parallel to the 
wreckage (although some distance away), towards the VOR and back along the aircraft 
direction of flight. When the group returned and were briefed by the IIC, they then 
conducted another walk-around and site assessment. No PPE was worn by any member 
of the group during this process.
The group appeared distracted while walking around the aircraft itself, and began 
individually photographing the wreckage from within the cordon. At this stage, the body 
(a fire services dummy) was still in the aircraft. One investigator put on nitrile gloves at 
this point. 
The team slowly decided that investigators entering the aircraft should wear coveralls, 
goggles, nitrile gloves, and a dust respirator. They dressed individually  in this PPE at 
the rest tent, and walked to the site - a distance of approximately 500m. They  took a 
disposal bag with them to the site so they could remove contaminated equipment once 
used. A fuel sample was collected in an appropriate container, by an investigator 
wearing nitrile gloves.
On the second day, the PPE was carried to the site before being put on. Team members 
helped each other with putting on the coveralls, but not the other equipment needed. 
Before entering the site, they reviewed the fire services briefing they received the 
previous day, and reviewed the hazards. They  then began work on the site, initially in a 
large group, and then breaking down into separate tasks. 
One investigator had problems with the arms and legs of the coveralls riding up and 
exposing skin, particularly  his arms. When questioned, he said he was unaware that 
different sizes of coveralls were available. This problem was eventually  overcome by 
taping the legs of the coveralls to the investigator’s boots, and the arms of the suit to his 
gloves. 
Apart from this case, all other PPE was initially fitted appropriately, with the exception 
of disposable respirators. Many of the investigators failed to open the respirator fully, 
and to position the elastic bands securely, which meant that they were not protected by 
the filter. Over time however, shortcuts around other items of PPE were found as it  got 
uncomfortable or seemed to impede the task being completed: goggles were placed on 
the head, and respirators were placed on the head or hung around the neck. 
Unlike Group 1, this group did recognise the potential instability of the wreckage on 
this site, and ensured that the fuselage was stabilised by  an investigator on either side 
before any other member of their team crawled into the cabin space. The investigator 
inside the aircraft wore a hard hat as additional protection.
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6.4.5 General aviation aircraft accident: Christen Eagle II, Seething 
 Airfield, Norfolk UK, 2008
On 29th October 2008, a Christen Eagle II aircraft, registration G-EGUL (Figure 6.9) 
crashed after impact with a crop spraying vehicle while on landing at Seething Airfield, 
Norfolk, UK. The impact killed one occupant immediately; the other occupant  later died 
in hospital.
Figure 6.9: Christen Eagle II, G-EGUL (Note: picture in previous colours)
Source: CAA (2010c)
The aircraft  accident was investigated by the AAIB. The researcher was invited to 
attend the site as an observer, due to the unusual hazards presented by impact with a 
crop sprayer.
The Christen Eagle is an aerobatic biplane with a steel tube fuselage, wooden spars and 
ribs, covered with an alloy  skin from firewall to rear seat, and polyester fabric skin 
elsewhere (Jane’s, 1987-1988). The aircraft can be purchased as a kit, or in a fully 
assembled state. This particular aircraft (G-EGUL) was built in 1980.
The purpose of G-EGUL’s flight was to take photographs to accompany a story  on the 
aircraft in a general aviation enthusiasts magazine. The flight plan was to complete 
some general airwork before conducting some circuits around the airfield, so that a 
ground based photographer could take some photographs of the aircraft  on approach. 
On the second approach to the airfield, the aircraft collided with a crop  spraying vehicle 
which was tending a field in the undershoot area of the runway (AAIB, 2009e). Figure 
6.10 shows the site layout.
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Figure 6.10: Site diagram for Christen Eagle II, G-EGUL crash, 2008
Source: AAIB, 2009e
Two investigators arrived on the site after dark on the evening of the accident. The site 
was protected by  the police overnight, and the investigation resumed around 0800 hours 
on 30th October. The site investigation was complete and the aircraft recovered onto a 
truck by 1700 hours.
The accident occurred at the far extreme of an airfield. The gate to the airfield was 
guarded by police, and the adjoining farm and row of trees along the roadside provided 
some natural security  on the site. The investigators did not need to cordon off the 
aircraft beyond what had been done by the responding emergency services.
The weather for the investigation was cold but dry. Cold weather clothing, including 
coat, hat  and scarf, were needed as a minimum. The fuselage of the aircraft came to rest 
on the edge of the tarmac surface of the airport, but with the exception of a thin strip  of 
grass (the ‘fallow buffer strip’ in Figure 6.10), the rest of the wreckage site was a very 
muddy, freshly  ploughed field. Walking across the field was laborious, and the rapid 
accretion of mud on the bottom of boots made them very heavy. This mud had to be 
removed each time an investigator returned to the tarmac.
The nose of the aircraft shattered the fibreglass tank of the crop sprayer (Figure 6.11) 
before crashing, and being engulfed in a post-impact fire. The main fuselage of the 
aircraft was extensively damaged (Figure 6.12), and parts of the wreckage (from both 
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considerable damage.  He found its driver apparently 
uninjured, but in such a state of shock that he was unable 
to extricate him from the ab.  The farm hand then went 
to the airc aft, where a fire had star ed but, as flying club 
members were starting to arrive with fire extinguishers, 
he returned to the cab to attend his colleague.  The club 
members suppressed the fire and gave first aid to the 
severely injured crew.  The emergency services were 
alerted and an Air Ambulance helicopter arrived at 
1414 hrs.  The rear seat occupant was declared dead at 
the scene.  The front seat occupant, the aircraft owner, 
was taken to hospital in a critical condition, but died in 
hospital 24 days later as a result of his injuries.
Airfield information  
Seething Airfield occupies part of a former wartime 
USAAF airfield; it is about 9 nm from Norwich and 
is owned and operated by a private flying group.  The 
airfield is licensed by the CAA for operations at 
weekends, primarily to allow flying training to take place; 
at other times it operates as an unlicensed airfield1.  An 
air/ground radio station operates during licensed hours; 
at other times the radio may be manned, depending on 
circumstances and availability of operators.  The airfield 
wa  equipp d with Rescue and Fire Fighting (RFF) 
Footnote
1  Civil Aviation Publication (CAP) 168 deals with the licensing of 
aerodromes in the United Kingdom.
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the aircraft and the sprayer) were scattered around the site, on both sides of the crop 
spraying vehicle. 
Figure 6.11: Damage to the crop spraying vehicle 
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Figure 6.12: View of G-EGUL wreckage, looking from the crop spraying vehicle in the direction of flight
The debris had absorbed the yellow colour of the chemical being used in the crop  spray 
(Figure 6.13). There was also yellow liquid pooling beneath the crop spraying vehicle. 
It took approximately  3 hours for a farm worker to be located who could provide the 
investigators with the MSDS for the chemical being used. The chemical was a herbicide 
(containing pendimethalin and flufenacet), which has only a low toxicological effect in 
humans. However, it may still be an irritant to skin: a PPE requirement for coveralls, 
two pairs of nitrile gloves, and heavy duty gloves (on top of cold weather clothing and 
safety boots) was decided upon. 
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Figure 6.13: Yellow discolouration to the wing from the herbicide
There was a large amount of blood around the aircraft. This was covered by placing a 
tarpaulin over the affected area, although it caused some difficulty  when removing 
objects from within the aircraft. The remains of the fuselage were supported by mobile 
supports straps left  in place by the ambulance services, and this provided the required 
additional stability. As is standard practice, the medical supplies used by the ambulance 
responders and the fire extinguishers used by the airport fire crew were left on the 
scene. 
During the investigation, it was discovered that some fuel remained within the fuel tank. 
During the post-crash fire, the metal of the tank had melted; there were some deposits of 
metal within the fuel, but it  had not all combusted (Figure 6.14). Disposable masks were 
used in addition to other PPE when moving the remains of the tank away from the rest 
of the wreckage. 
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Figure 6.14: Fuel and tank deposits remaining in tank
For recovery of the wreckage, all debris pieces had to be retrieved. Collecting and 
bagging all visible pieces of wreckage carrying them across the muddy field to a central 
location was a physically  exerting task, despite the relatively small distance involved. 
The aircraft was recovered onto a truck, along with the bags of debris, and the burnt 
aircraft ashes were scraped up and bagged for further investigation at the AAIB. 
The report into the accident was published in September 2009 (AAIB, 2009e).
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6.5 Discussion
6.5.1 Comparison between simulated and real accident sites
The real accident site and the simulated sites, particularly the two accident sites, were 
comparable sites for the purposes of this research. The scale of the accidents, the size of 
the sites, the wreckage distribution, the hazards present, and the external pressures clear 
the site, were all similar. The most apparent difference was that the wreckage trail of the 
real site was much smaller than in the simulated sites - a matter which has no bearing on 
the research or on the method of investigation.
The two accident simulations were created using aircraft  which had been involved in 
real accidents. From the wreckage, realistic scenarios were developed, which would 
explain the existing damage to the wreckage, using expert knowledge and experience in 
accident investigation. 
One difference between the real accident site and the simulated sites was the number of 
investigators present at the investigations. On the real accident site, one investigator 
conducted most of the wreckage survey. A second investigator was present, but had 
other investigative tasks to complete. Because of health and safety concerns raised by 
the initially unknown chemical covering the site, a health and safety advisor was also 
called. These three AAIB investigators comprised the complete investigation team. On 
the simulated sites, there were up to seven investigators in a team, because the essential 
purpose was investigator training. 
6.5.2 Hazard assessment and mitigation
In each of the observed investigations, the site assessment was conducted by  means of 
an initial walk-around and visual inspection of the site. This assessment was a 
subjective appraisal of potential hazards, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.
The number of investigators involved in the hazards assessment varied between groups, 
from one to seven (the entire group). At the upper limit, the entire group evidently 
wanted the experience of conducting the site assessment: the lower limit might be 
explained by curiosity to enter the site rather than participate in a preliminary group 
assessment. It is of interest that the advanced course investigators in Simulations 2 and 
3, many of whom have previous investigation experience, carried out the hazards 
assessments in larger groups. 
Some of the groups were initially  hesitant about entering the site. Potentially, the 
recency of their prior hazards-specific training might have affected the way in which 
trainee investigators conducted the site safety  survey and identified site hazards. The 
team on Simulation 1 had completed their hazards training only a week before the 
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simulation, which might account for their taking 45 minutes to enter the site. However, 
other groups who had completed their hazards training longer ago seemed equally as 
hesitant. Alternative explanations might be wariness about encountering the hazards, or 
less than proactive leadership by the IIC. The training guidelines in Circular 315 
(ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 5.5.1) suggest that recurrent  health and safety  training should 
occur every 24-36 months: compliance with this would ensure that all investigators are 
equally aware of the hazards, both the well-known hazards and those which are newly 
emerging.
There was also variation in the use of PPE during the initial assessment. One group 
(Simulation 1) conducted the assessment in full PPE with high level breathing 
protection from a full face mask; another group wore no PPE whatsoever for the 
assessment. In Simulation 3, the problem of balancing personal safety  and evidence 
collection was demonstrated by  Group 2, who became distracted while conducting the 
site survey and began photographing the aircraft wreckage. As noted in Section 3.2.2, 
alerting investigators to the importance of this balance is one of the primary  objectives 
of ICAO Circular 315 (2008a). It was the opinion of SMEs on the simulated sites that a 
group of two investigators - in safety  boots, coveralls, nitrile gloves with heavy duty 
gloves over the top, goggles, and disposable respiratory protection - would be a 
sufficient deployment and level of PPE for the initial assessment, provided they did not 
enter any enclosed cabins or spaces during the assessment.
The observations indicated that the communication of hazards between investigators 
within groups was poor. The site assessment process carried out at the beginning of each 
investigation was rarely  discussed again. Only  Group 2 in Simulation 3 reassessed the 
site hazards on the second day of site investigation: this group  had struggled with 
managing the site survey and the use of PPE the day before, and probably  understood 
the need to make improvements. No other group overtly communicated or discussed 
any hazards amongst themselves after the initial assessment, even when team members 
arrived who had not been present for the initial assessment.
The behaviours and actions of the groups observed in this research can be analysed in 
terms of the five step risk management process set out in ICAO Circular 315 (2008a, 
paragraph 2.3.2). Except in the case of the real accident and accident investigation, the 
identification of hazards, the determination of exposure and the assessment of risk were 
carried out casually; the introduced controls relied on the use of PPE rather than any 
other risk mitigation measure, and indeed introduced further risk (through incorrect use 
of PPE, and potential contamination from used PPE); and there was no deliberate 
review and revision of risk assessments, to renew and maintain the cyclical five step 
process. Only one group (Group 2 in Simulation 2) specifically restricted the number of 
people conducting a task in order to limit exposure to an identified hazard. The group in 
Simulation 1 was the only  group to remove a hazard to a remote location after 
photographing and recording the evidence in situ - which was precisely the technique 
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used by  investigators on the real accident site following identification of the hazardous 
fuel tank. 
6.5.3 Hazards on the accident site
The hazards on each of the simulated sites ranged from limited and minor to abundant 
and serious. The simulated incident presented hazards in the form of access to the 
aircraft, and stored chemical and potential energy in the batteries. The simulated fatal 
accidents presented possible biohazards, unstable wreckage, fuel, and debris in trees. 
The potential for a slippery  surface due to the fire-fighting foam was (correctly) 
considered by one group. All groups recognised the potential of sharp  wreckage. The 
real accident site had wreckage completely covered in a mild irritant chemical. 
Chapter Four suggested that novice accident investigators were aware of the majority  of 
hazards suggested by ICAO Circular 315 (2008a); indeed, in this study  they managed to 
identify most  of the hazards on the different simulated accident sites. The simulations 
all involved traditional GA aircraft. It would be of real benefit  in identifying future 
training needs, to simulate an accident involving a more advanced GA aircraft such as a 
Cirrus SR22, with a composite fuselage and ballistic recovery  system. Such a 
simulation would introduce a range of hazards of which novice investigators are 
unaware, but for which they need to be prepared.
6.5.4 Selection and use of personal protective equipment
Reliance on PPE was the most common way in which investigators on the simulated 
sites chose to protect themselves. They  had a broad understanding of the PPE needed to 
protect against different hazards, but did not fully  understand the limitations of the PPE 
and its correct use. 
At no point did any  of the observed trainee investigators change their PPE when 
changing task, or when the effectiveness of the equipment was compromised (such as 
coveralls after kneeling in mud in Simulation 2). On the real accident site, the 
investigators went through a number of changes in PPE throughout the day. 
There were deficiencies also in the way  in which the PPE was worn. Full protection is 
achieved only when PPE is worn correctly, despite any discomfort. Wearing coveralls of 
an incorrect size, failing to zip them up and to fasten the hood (which prevents them 
from coming unzipped), wearing respirators incorrectly, and placing goggles and masks 
on the head and then back again over the eyes, are common practices which increase 
risk rather than reduce it. Clearly, there are messages here for investigator training.
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6.6 Conclusion
The research has a number of implications for the training of accident investigators.
First, there is a need for trainee investigators to be taught to think and work as a team. 
This means training in leadership and direction, training in the strategic allocation of 
roles and tasks according to purpose, and training in the exercise of those roles as an 
accountable member of the team. The aimlessness, loss of time and lack of co-
ordination demonstrated by  some of the groups of trainees suggests that training in 
teamwork and team management should be an essential component of investigator 
training. Although each individual might have a very good understanding of the 
identification and management of hazards, and of the techniques for the collection of 
evidence, an investigation could be ineffective and wasteful without explicit  direction 
and co-ordination. 
Second, greater attention needs to be given to teaching about the importance of effective 
and timely communication between members of the investigation team, at all points 
during the investigation process. It might well be that the communication problems 
among trainee investigators was due to the fact  that they did not know each other very 
well, or that - being all at a similar stage of learning - there was no clear authority 
gradient based on seniority or experience. However, this could also well be the situation 
in a real investigation: although the investigators from a single national investigation 
agency would know each other and their respective roles in the organisation, there are 
many participants in a major investigation, including ICAO recognised investigators, 
technical advisers and other responders (Section 2.3.2.1). These people, who will 
certainly not know all each other and might come from very different  cultural 
backgrounds, must nevertheless have the skills to accept and work within a co-ordinated 
structure, and to communicate effectively.
Third, greater emphasis perhaps needs to be given early  in the training programme to 
the management and mitigation of risk by means other than the use of PPE: such as 
limiting the number of investigators potentially exposed to a hazard, and rotating them; 
implementing a clean/dirty line; properly disposing of potentially  contaminated 
material; and recognising unstable structures and dealing with them. Although the 
experienced investigators at the real accident site used PPE and did so appropriately, 
they  first set out to manage the accident site to make it as safe as possible for the 
collection of evidence: they  sought the MSDS for the chemical, and then decided on the 
PPE; they covered the blood with a tarpaulin to prevent slippage; they stabilised the 
fuselage by  using mobile support straps; and they removed the remains of the fuel tank 
away from the wreckage. They  used no more and no less PPE than was necessary, and 
they used it properly.
Fourth, and consistent with the above, training in the correct selection, use and disposal 
of PPE must remain a core objective of training programmes. The purpose and 
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limitations of the various items of PPE must be fully  understood, and PPE must be 
selected so that it is really fit for purpose. Not all safety gloves are the same, nor will all 
of them provide similar protection against a range of hazards. An investigator must 
choose PPE that is appropriate for each investigation task, and dispose of the used 
equipment appropriately.
Finally, more emphasis must be placed on basing the core syllabus for all training for 
accident investigators soundly and centrally on the practical application in the field of 
the risk assessment process (Figure 2.22) set  out in Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a). The 
five stage iterative process - identify hazards, determine exposure, assess risk, introduce 
controls, review and revise risk assessment - is the foundation on which both the 
mitigation of risk and the maximisation of evidence is built.
244
Chapter Seven
Conclusion: The Implications of the Research on Hazards 
Specific Training for Aircraft Accident Investigators
7.1 Overview
The research has explored areas of accident site hazards, investigator awareness of 
hazards, hazards assessment and management, and the use of personal protective 
equipment. Four distinct  but related studies have been used to answer four research 
questions:
1. What hazards may arise for investigators collecting evidence on aircraft accident 
 sites?
2. What site hazards do novice aircraft accident investigators perceive to be a risk?
3. What hazards are experienced accident investigators identifying on sites?
4. How do accident investigators identify and manage the hazards?
The findings and conclusions of each study have been set out at the end of each of 
Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six. 
This concluding chapter draws together the implications of each study for the design of 
hazards specific training for aircraft accident investigators. These implications are 
advanced not  as a criticism of existing training programmes, but as a reaffirmation of 
good practice where it exists, and as advice where it does not. This chapter also 
considers the limitations of the research, and proposes some future directions for further 
work. 
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) is the first document to specify  training aims for aircraft 
accident investigators and emergency responders to accident sites. 
The training aims are (ICAO, 2008a, paragraph 5.2.1):
• “detailing the potential variable nature and scale of occupational health hazards 
experienced at aircraft accident sites;
• outlining any applicable State occupational health and safety legislation and its 
applicability to accident investigation activities undertaken by the State’s aircraft accident 
investigators;
• providing an understanding of the occupational health risk management,  risk assessment, 
and risk control processes associated with aircraft accident investigation operations;
• provide an understanding of the hazards and means of prevention of exposure to blood-
borne pathogens that meets the requirements of the State training standards;
• provide an awareness of the selection and use of personal protective equipment to meet 
the risks posed in aircraft accident investigation tasks; and 
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• provide an awareness of the effects and symptoms of psychological hazards associated 
with aircraft accident response activities”.
Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) recommends that training be conducted by “trainers who 
are knowledgeable and experienced in their subject as it applies to accident site 
operations”. There needs to be awareness of a potential risk of bias towards teaching 
about particular hazards: training should give a balanced view of all potential current, 
and emerging site hazards. 
7.2 Implications of Study One: What hazards may arise for 
 investigators collecting evidence on aircraft accident sites?
The study reviewed the nature of evidence collection activities by examining -  against 
the nineteen subsections of ICAO Annex 13: Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation (ICAO, 2001a) - the sources of on site and off site evidence reported in 
fifteen selected aircraft accident reports. 
It then reviewed the techniques used for on site collection of evidence, by content 
analysis of the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, Part III 
Investigation (ICAO, 2008b). Consideration of the detailed range of techniques set out 
in this document against the on site evidence collection activities which were necessary 
to prepare reports on the fifteen specific accidents, revealed the extent to which it is 
necessary  for investigators to conduct detailed inspections of different systems and 
components, which requires close contact with many different materials and chemicals. 
It is during this process that the investigators are exposed to accident site hazards.
On that basis, each potential hazard was then reviewed, using the framework given in 
ICAO Circular 315: Hazards at Aircraft Accident Sites (ICAO, 2008a), to answer five 
questions: about the precise nature of the hazard; about the specific danger it poses for 
investigators; about the conditions under which the hazard will exist; about the way in 
which the hazard will affect the work of the investigator; and about how investigators 
might manage the risk and protect themselves from exposure.
The study has three clear implications for the training of accident investigators.
First, in using ICAO Circular 315 as a basis for training programmes, emphasis should 
be placed at least as much on processes for the management of risk, as on the nature and 
taxonomy of the hazards themselves. Whatever the specific nature of the site hazards, 
and whatever the nature of the conditions in which an investigation must be carried out, 
the investigator must have the mental discipline to follow systematically and routinely 
the iterative risk assessment process set out in Circular 315: identify the hazards; 
determine the degree of exposure to them; assess the risk; introduce mitigation; and 
review and revise the risk assessment. Ongoing situational awareness at an accident site 
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where different elements are in a state of dynamic change is the key to both personal 
protection and the effective collection of evidence.
Second, although the work of accident investigation inevitably raises the question of 
trade-offs between the requirements of the investigation and the health and safety  of the 
investigator, the decision “should always be biased towards safety” (ICAO, 2008a). 
That basic tenet should be the foundation of any hazards-specific training programme.
Third, the ultimate objective of training programmes - and of future research on the 
detection and management of hazards - should be to ensure that for an accident 
investigator at  an accident site, the personal risk is no greater that for any other worker 
in any  other workplace. The systems and components from which aircraft are 
manufactured are widely used and managed in other walks of life with absolute safety. 
Except in the most extreme cases, the range of environments in which aircraft crash are 
environments in which people have adapted to live and work healthy and productive 
lives. 
If aircraft accident investigators have the mental discipline to manage hazards at an 
accident site on the basis of the Circular 315 risk assessment process, a thorough 
understanding of hazards of all types, the skills to identify them, and knowledge of the 
mitigation measures needed for protection, there would seem to be no reason why a 
particular risk on an aircraft accident site should pose any more risk to the workers than 
in other workplaces. While an accident site is a unique workplace, it is a workplace 
comprised of the same hazards as occur in many other workplaces.
The significant difference between aircraft accident sites and most other workplaces is 
that it is not possible at an accident site to undertake a generic workplace risk 
assessment in advance of the event. Hence the assessment of risk is the task of the 
investigator, and must be  done in real time. 
7.3 Implications of Study Two: What site hazards do novice aircraft 
 accident investigators perceive to be a risk?
The study  was a survey of novice aircraft accident investigators. These investigators 
may have prior hazards identification and risk management training, but not in an 
aircraft accident investigation context. None of the participants surveyed were 
experienced aircraft accident investigators. 
The surveyed novice accident investigators identified damaged and unstable structures; 
biological hazards; fire and flammable substances; accident location; and chemicals and 
other substances as the five hazards they perceived to pose most risk on aircraft  accident 
sites. 
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The group showed little knowledge regarding the hazards posed by stored energy 
components; fatigue; security; metals and oxides; recent safety equipment; local state of 
hygiene and ex-military aircraft. Of the 604 hazards identified during the survey  of 
novices, each of these categories was identified fewer than ten times. 
The indication from these results is that novice aircraft accident  investigators are well 
aware of general health and safety hazards, as would affect a person in any workplace, 
but they  are not  as aware of the aircraft-specific hazards that may occur on an accident 
site. 
One theory behind perception of hazards (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000; Section 4.2.2) 
suggests that  individuals are more accepting of guidance about the risk posed by 
hazards if they do not have previous knowledge of the hazard. Almost every person 
training to become an aircraft accident investigator has an aviation related background, 
and as such, will carry with them some knowledge about hazards posed by aircraft. Use 
of a survey instrument to identify preconceptions will allow training course designers to 
understand the backgrounds of the participants on a course, and the biases they  may 
have towards identifying the risks of particular hazards - thus  allowing  hazards 
specific training courses to be tailored to get the most relevant information to new 
investigators in a limited time frame.
7.4 Implications of Study Three: What hazards are experienced 
 accident investigators identifying on sites?
This study analysed the health and safety reports submitted by investigators employed 
by a national air accident investigation authority over the period February  2003 - July 
2009. There were 392 reports covering 208 accidents and incidents, which allowed 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the realities faced by accident investigators in 
the field.
The study  showed that within the sample, almost all the hazards identified in the 
Circular 315 (ICAO, 2008a) taxonomy were identified. Some of these hazards will be 
encountered only infrequently, some will be found more commonly, possibly on almost 
every  site. The implication of these results is that investigators should have knowledge 
about the broad range of hazards to ensure that any  exposure to the hazard will be met 
with appropriate and timely mitigation measures. Investigators need to have the 
knowledge and skill necessary to identify and manage all hazards, including those they 
come across only rarely. 
By alerting novice and inexperienced accident site investigators to the results of this 
study, individual investigators can begin to tailor their personal generic risk assessments 
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to suit the types of accidents they may be involved in investigating, and the tasks they 
will be completing on a site. Learning from others’ experiences will assist  new 
investigators in managing the hazards assessment process.
This study did not consider the consequences of each of the hazards identified, merely 
their presence on a site. Some of the hazards frequently identified, such as noise from 
other aircraft and cold weather, may prove to be a low risk to an investigator, while less 
frequently identified hazards, such as an exploding nose-wheel and chemicals, might 
create a much higher personal risk for an investigator. Further research could be 
conducted into a measure of the possible risks posed by different hazards in different 
accident scenarios.
There appears to be little sharing of information about hazards encountered on accident 
sites between investigators, and especially not between investigators from different 
organisations. Accessibility to more of the data used in this study will assist not only 
new accident investigators in training courses, but experienced investigators alike. 
By considering the findings of Study two and Study Three - the hazards that novice 
accident investigators perceive as a risk on an accident site, and the hazards that 
experienced investigators actually encounter - we can better identify the needs of 
training programmes and design them accordingly. The novice accident investigators 
identified damaged and unstable structures; biological hazards; fire and flammable 
substances; accident location; and chemicals and other substances as the five hazards 
they  perceived to pose most risk on aircraft accident sites. The experienced aircraft 
accidents identified aircraft location; biological hazards; damaged and unstable 
structures; composite materials; and fire and flammable substances as the five most 
common hazards occurring on accident sites.
Although given in a different order, four of the five hazards that investigators perceive 
as most risk on a site, are the ones experienced investigators identify most commonly. It 
would appear that novice investigators place high consideration on the risks posed by 
general health and safety  hazards potentially present in other environments. Where there 
is a difference between the risk perceived by novice investigators and identified by 
experienced investigators, it  is regarding aircraft specific hazards, for example metals 
and oxides and composite materials. Novice investigators did not identify any risk 
associated with military and ex-military aircraft, whereas experienced investigators 
identified this in equal eleventh ranking out  of the twenty hazards. The hazards included 
as recent safety equipment or local state of hygiene are not recognised as greatly 
significant by either novice or experienced investigators. Within each of the categories, 
the hazards identified by  novice investigators were quite general, where the hazards 
identified by experienced investigators were quite specific.  It is suggested that training 
be tailored to cover the details  of specific hazards within each of the categories,  to 
provide better awareness of the range of hazards that may be encountered. 
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7.5 Implications of Study Four: How do accident investigators 
 identify and manage the hazards?
This study was based on observation of the actions and behaviours of trainee 
investigators at simulated accident sites, and AAIB investigators at the site of a genuine 
fatal accident. There are four implications for training programmes.
First, investigators need to be trained to think and work as members of a team. The 
mental discipline of the risk assessment process, and a knowledge and understanding of 
the identification and management of hazards, are both necessary requirements for a 
successful investigator, but they  are not sufficient requirements: an investigator must be 
able - as the situation requires - to lead a team, to be a member of a team, to accept 
accountability for specific functions within the team, and to subordinate individual 
preferences to the objectives of the team.
Second, effective and timely communication is the key  to effective teamwork, and 
should be a central element of investigator training.
Third, greater emphasis need to be given early  in training programmes to the 
management of risk by means other than PPE. In the simulations there was a strong 
reliance on PPE to protect investigators from hazards while they collected evidence. For 
the PPE to work effectively, the investigators must understand the reasons they are 
using the PPE to protect against certain hazards, and the correct methods for its use. 
This was not evident through the observations. There are alternative strategies for the 
mitigation of risk on the accident site which are far more effective than the donning  of 
inappropriate protective clothing, as demonstrated at the real accident site by AAIB 
investigators. 
Fourth, training in the correct selection, use and disposal of PPE must remain a core 
objective of training programmes. Fitness for purpose is the key.
7.6 Limitations of the research
The boundaries of the current research are clear. As the number of potential hazards on 
aircraft accident sites is almost limitless, restrictions were placed on the dimensions of 
the research problem.
First, the research focus is on hazards of aircraft accident sites, and not on hazards 
posed by wreckage analysis off site. 
Second, it focuses only on hazards and processes which affect  aircraft accident 
investigators and technical advisors during the evidence collection process, and not on 
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other participants at other stages of the response to an accident. Emergency responders 
and wreckage recovery organisations perform different functions, and may face 
different risks from those encountered in the accident investigation phase.
Third, the research is limited to hazards potentially  occurring on accident sites 
investigated by civilian accident investigation agencies. Accidents involving military 
aircraft may  create additional hazards: their investigation requires specialist military 
knowledge of systems and operations. The research does however draw on examples of 
hazards identified when civilian accident  investigators have been involved with the 
investigation of military aircraft accidents.
Within this thesis, discussion of ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) compliant training course 
design has focussed on the design of general courses suitable for investigators who will 
investigate a wide range of accidents. When a course is to be designed for a specific 
group of investigators who will investigate only  a specific type of accident or incident 
(such as general aviation only), the discussion of hazards should be focussed more 
specifically. 
7.7 Conclusions of the research
Four questions were asked in the beginning of the research:
1. What hazards may arise for investigators collecting evidence on aircraft accident 
sites? 
2. What site hazards do novice aircraft accident investigators perceive to be a risk?
3. What hazards are experienced accident investigators identifying on sites?
4. How do accident investigators identify and manage the hazards?
The four studies have answered these questions.
1. The risks posed to accident investigators are broad in range and variable in 
nature, with consequences ranging from minor to extreme. However, with a developed 
awareness of the hazards - what they are called, how they become apparent, where they 
are located, how they affect an investigator, and how to protect against them - the risks 
can be made  no greater than in other workplaces. Experienced aircraft accident 
investigators referred to ‘usual hazards’ and ‘usual PPE’, indicating a level of accepted 
risk as part of the job.
2. Novice aircraft accident investigators perceive damaged and unstable structures; 
biological hazards; fire and flammable substances; accident location; and chemicals and 
other substances as the five hazards which pose most risk on aircraft accident sites. This 
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reflects an understanding of many general health and safety hazards, but of few aircraft 
specific hazards.
3. Experienced aircraft accidents identified aircraft location; biological hazards; 
damaged and unstable structures; composite materials; and fire and flammable 
substances as the five most common hazards occurring on accident sites. It is significant 
that experienced accident investigators list composite hazards as one of the top five 
hazards: composites are becoming more common in aircraft manufacture, but it  is still 
an emerging technology  with emerging hazards of which investigators are becoming 
increasingly  aware. These results also suggest that composite hazards are not yet a 
hazard accepted by experienced investigators as ‘standard’. 
The commonality  between the other four hazards listed by novice and experienced 
investigators suggest that novice investigators are right to be wary of the general health 
and safety hazards which are commonplace on accident sites.
4. Identification of hazards on accident sites relies on subjective visual assessment. 
In order to achieve this, the investigators assessing the site must have a rich awareness 
of all potential site hazards. However, results of observations on training investigators 
showed a high reliance on personal protective equipment for protection against hazards, 
rather than on any other mitigation measures. Other methods for hazards management 
should be explored before PPE use. 
Without  this developed hazards awareness, aircraft  accident investigators will be 
affected by the hazards, not be able to collect evidence, and not advance aviation safety 
through accident investigation. 
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7.8 Future Research
This piece of research focused directly  on the hazards encountered by  aircraft accident 
investigators investigating civil aircraft accidents on accident sites. There are a number 
of possible extensions for this work.
1. Consideration as to whether training is the best method of increasing aircraft 
 accident investigator awareness of accident site hazards. This is the method 
 suggested by ICAO Circular 315 (2008a), and currently adopted throughout the 
 world, but not the only possibility. 
2. A review of the hazards to accident investigators collecting evidence after 
 recovery of the aircraft from the site. The environmental hazards and biological 
 hazards will be limited, but the time spent handling the equipment will increase, 
 potentially increasing exposure to physical and material hazards. 
3. A subsequent review of hazards on aircraft accident sites encountered by other 
 responders to the site, including emergency responders and aircraft  recovery 
 personnel. While all groups have different tasks on the accident site, many may 
 overlap, and a combination of techniques to mitigate the hazards may benefit all 
 parties.
4. A review of the hazards of investigating military aircraft, from the perspective of 
 a civilian investigator. Civilian investigators may be required to investigate 
 military accidents, and while they might do this in conjunction with investigators 
 with specialist military knowledge, sometimes this might not be the case. In this 
 event, they will be investigating a site with no hazards awareness.
5. Extension of the review into considering hazards on the accident sites of other 
 transport modes. Investigators across different transportation modes may 
 encounter many of the same hazards, but manage them differently. A comparison 
 of the hazards awareness and risk management techniques used may  assist in 
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Appendix A
Fire Fighter Generic Risk Assessment for Response to Aircraft 
Accident
Source: Adapted from Communities and Local Government (2010). 
This is a document published in conjunction with the Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser for 
the UK, providing general risk assessment guidelines for fire fighters responding to an 
aircraft accident or incident. 
Note: ‘7.2d familiarisation visit’ is a preparatory visit to a site, in line with 7.2d of the 
UK Fire and Rescue Services Act, 2004.
Ref 
No.
Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures
1 • All tasks on 
crash site




















• Training and supervision
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
hazardous materials
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft construction
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE to include respiratory 
protection and chemical 
protection where necessary
• Facility for decontamination 
or disposal of PPE and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• 7.2d familiarisation visits
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures
2 • All tasks on 
crash site
























• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft construction and 
associated hazards
•Safety Officers
•Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors.




























• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft construction and 
associated hazards
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors
































• Training and supervision
• Adequate and suitable PPE
• Safety Officers
• Communications systems
• Fire fighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures






















• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection 
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control. 
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors




















• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Exclusion zones to the rear 
of jet engines
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
•Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors























• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Exclusion zones forward of 
engine intakes
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures














• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft fuel and associated 
hazards
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors


























• Training and supervision
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Communication systems
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control.
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft construction and 
associated hazards
• 7.2d familiarisation visits
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures





















• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
ballistic recovery systems
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors























• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Controlled use of radio
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As log as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft systems and 
associated hazards
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 
command centres 
• On scene advisors
• 7.2d familiarisation visits
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures


































• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Controlled use of radio
• Time distance shielding
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control.
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft systems and 
associated hazards
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 
command centres
• On scene military advisers
• 7.2d familiarisation visits
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors






• Fire Service 
operations















• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
helicopter construction and 
associated hazards
• Safety Officers
• 7.2d familiarisation visits
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures






























• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
helicopter construction and 
associated hazards
• Safety Officers
• 7.2d familiarisation visits
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors



































• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Provision of risk critical 
information in relation to 
aircraft manifests
• Provision of risk critical 
information from chemical 
databases
• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors
• Safety Officers
• Liaison with military 





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures

























• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Facility for decontamination 
or disposal of PPE and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Safety Officers








































• Training and supervision
• Safe approach
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Manual handing training
• Adequate and appropriate 
PPE
• Adequate and appropriate 
respiratory protection
• Firefighting procedures and 
equipment
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonably 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Safety Officers













hiding any of 
above
• Potential 










• Adequate lighting where 
necessary
• Secure site reasonable 
practical to do so, establish 
cordons





Activity Hazard Risk Persons at 
risk
Control Measures




















• Training and supervision
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 




• Liaison with military 
command centres and on 
scene advisors
20 • Attending 
aircraft 
accidents



















• Training and supervision
• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 




• Limited exposure of 
personnel wherever possible. 
As low as reasonable 
practicable by strict cordon 
control
• Liaison with military 





Reports used in Evidence Analysis
Air Accident Investigation Branch
1. Aircraft Accident Report No: 5/2008 (EW/C2006/06/04) Report on the accident to 
Boeing 7370300, registration OO-TND at  Nottingham East Midlands Airport on 
15 June 2006 (AAIB, 2008d).
2. Aircraft Accident Report No: 7/2008 (EW/C2006/12/03) Report on the accident to 
Aerospatiale SA365N, registration G-BLUN, near the North Morecambe gas 
platform, Morecambe Bay on 27 December 2006 (AAIB, 2008e).
3. Aircraft Accident Report No: 2/2009 (EW/2007/02/07) Report on the accident to 
Boeing 777-222, registration N786UA at London Heathrow Airport on 26 
February 2007 (AAIB, 2009c).
4. Aircraft Accident Report No: 6/2009 (EW/C2007/09/08) Report on the accident to 
Hawker Hurricane Mk XII (IIb), G-HURR, 1 nm north-west of Shoreham Airport, 
West Sussex on 15 September 2007 (AAIB, 2009d).
5. Aircraft Accident Report No: 2/2010 (EW/C2007/02/08) Report on the accident to 
beech 200C Super King Air, VQ-TIU at 1 nm south-east of North Caicos Airport, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, British West Indies on 6 February 2007 (AAIB, 2010f).
Australian Transport Safety Bureau
1. AO-2007-070 - Leading edge device failure - Norfolk Island - 29 December 
 2007 - VH-OBN, Boeing 737-229. Publication Date: 8 February 2010 (ATSB, 
 2010a).
2. AO-2009-018 - Midair collision - 15km SE Springvale Station, WA - 5 May 
 2009 - VH-PHT, Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta II and VH-HCB, 
 Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta II. Publication Date: 17 February 2010 
 (ATSB, 2010b).
3. AO-2007-047 - Aircraft loss of control - 255km SW of Warburton, Western 
 Australia - 17 October 2007 - VH-WXC, Cessna Aircraft Company 210M. 
 Publication Date: 22 April 2010 (ATSB, 2010c).
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4. AO-2008-007 - Hand landing - Darwin Airport, Northern Territory - 7 February 
 2008 - VH-NXE, Boeing Company 717-200. Publication Date: 14 May  2010 
 (ATSB, 2010d)
5. AO-2008-067 - Total power loss - Talbot  Bay, Western Australia - 25 September 
 2008 - VH-NSH, Bell Helicopter Co. 407. Publication Date: 28 June 2010 
 (ATSB, 2010e)
National Transportation Safety Board
1. AAR-09/06 (PB2009-910406) - Loss of Control and Crash - Marlin Air - Cessna 
 Citation 550, N550BP - Milwaukee, Wisconsin - June 4, 2007 - Adopted: 
 October 14, 2009 (NTSB, 2009j).
2. AAR-09/07 (PB2009-901407) - Crash During Approach to Landing of Maryland 
 State Police - Aerospatiale S365N1, N92MD - District Heights, Maryland - 
 September 27. 2008 - Adopted: October 27, 2009 (NTSB, 2009k).
3. AAR-10/01 (PB2010-910401) - Loss of Control on Approach - Colgan Air, Inc. - 
 Operating as Continental Connection Flight 3407 - Bombardier DHC-8-400, 
 N200WQ - Clarence Centre, New York - February 12, 2009 - Adopted: February 
 2, 2010 (NTSB, 2010c). 
4. AAR-10/02 (PB2010-910402) - Runway Overrun During Rejected Takeoff - 
 Global Exec Aviation - Bombardier Learjet  60, N999LJ - Columbia, South 
 Carolina - September 19, 2008 - Adopted April 6, 2010 (NTSB, 2010d).
5. AAR-10/03 (PB2010-910403) - Loss of Thrust in Both Engines After 
 Encountering a Flock of Birds and Subsequent Ditching on the Hudson River - 
 US Airways Flight 1549 - Weehawken, New Jersey - January  15, 2009 - 
 Adopted: May 4, 2010 (NTSB, 2010e).
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Appendix C
Evidence Sources Used In Recent Aircraft Accident 
Investigation Reports
Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
1.1 History of the 
flight












AAIB2 * FDR data
* CVR data
* GPS data
* Helicopter landing deck 
information
* Oil rig information
* Crew duty times
* Flight plan 
* Weight and balance
* SOPs
* Witness statements
* Emergency responder 
statements





AAIB4 * Witness statements






ATSB2 * Witness statements
ATSB3 * Witness statements
* Flight plan
* ATC recordings
ATSB4 * FDR data * ATC recordings
* Crew statements
ATSB5 * Witness statements






Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
NTSB2 * Radar track
* ATC recordings






NTSB4 * Site inspection
* CVR data
*ATC statements
NTSB5 * CVR data * Emergency response log
* Crew statements
1.2 Injuries to 
Persons
AAIB1 * 2 crew, minor/none
AAIB2 * 2 crew fatal
* 4 passengers fatal
AAIB3 * 20 crew minor/none
* 185 passengers minor/none
AAIB4 * 1 crew fatal
AAIB5 * 1 crew fatal
* 4 passengers serious
* 1 passenger minor
ATSB1 * No physical injuries
* Psychological injuries 
identified through passenger 
statements after accident
ATSB2 * 2 crew fatal
ATSB3 * 1 crew fatal
ATSB4 * None reported
ATSB5 * 1 crew minor/none
* 6 passengers minor/none
NTSB1 * 2 crew fatal
* 4 passengers fatal
NTSB2 * 3 crew fatal
* 1 passenger fatal
* 1 passenger serious
NTSB3 * 4 crew fatal
* 45 passengers fatal
* 1 ground fatal
NTSB4 * 2 crew fatal
* 2 passenger fatal
* 2 passengers serious
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NTSB5 * 1 crew serious
* 1 passenger serious
* 95 passengers minor
* 4 crew none
* 51 passengers none
1.3 Damage to 
aircraft
AAIB1 * Site inspection
* Aircraft inspection
AAIB2 * Aircraft destroyed
* Recovered from marine 
environment
AAIB3 * Aircraft inspection
AAIB4 * Site inspection
* Aircraft destroyed through 
impact and fire
AAIB5 * Site inspection - aircraft in 
shallow marine environment
* Aircraft destroyed
ATSB1 * Site inspection
ATSB2 * Site inspection
* Aircraft seriously damaged
ATSB3 * Site inspection
* Aircraft seriously damaged
ATSB4 * Inspection of damaged aircraft
ATSB5 * Aircraft recovered from 
marine environment
NTSB1 * Aircraft recovered from 
marine environment
NTSB2 * Site inspection
* Extensive structural damage
NTSB3 * Site inspection
* Aircraft destroyed
NTSB4 * Site inspection
* Aircraft destroyed
NTSB5 * Aircraft recovered from 
marine environment
* Aircraft substantially damaged
1.4 Other damage AAIB1 * No other damage
AAIB2 * No other damage
AAIB3 * No other damage
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1.4 Other damage
AAIB4 * No other damage
AAIB5 * No other damage
ATSB1 * No statement
ATSB2 * No statement
ATSB3 * No statement
ATSB4 * No statement
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * No other damage
NTSB2 * No other damage
NTSB3 * Site inspection
* House and vehicle damage 
from impact and fire
NTSB4 * Site inspection
* Damage to aerodrome lighting, 
fence and a road
NTSB5 * No other damage
1.5 Personnel 
Information




AAIB2 * Logbook information
* Licence information
* Job role records
* Background history of crew
* Safety training records
AAIB3 * Logbook information
* Licence information
* Rest periods
AAIB4 * Logbook information
* Licence information
* Employment information
* ATC aircraft movement 
records
* Formal training records
* Witness statements
* Display authorisation records
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ATSB1 * Employment record
* Licence information
* Logbook information
ATSB2 * Licence information
* Logbook information
* Flight and duty times
ATSB3 * Licence information
* Logbook information
* Operator records
* Flight and duty times
ATSB4 * Licence information
* Logbook information
* Training records
ATSB5 * Licence information
* Logbook information
* Training records










* Flight and duty times
* Medical examination
NTSB3 * Licence information
* Logbook information





NTSB4 * Employment records
* Licence information
* Logbook information




Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
NTSB5 * Employment records
* Licence information
* Logbook information





AAIB1 * General aircraft information





AAIB2 * General aircraft information
* Systems information
* Maintenance records
AAIB3 * General aircraft information
* Maintenance records
* Systems information
AAIB4 * General aircraft information
* Maintenance/restoration 
records
* Weight and balance 
calculations
* Registration details
AAIB5 * General aircraft information
* Weight and balance 
information
* Pilot’s operating handbook
* Airplane flight manual
* Performance calculations
* Checklists
ATSB1 * General aircraft information
* Maintenance records
ATSB2 * General aircraft information
* Maintenance records




ATSB4 * General aircraft information
* Aircraft damage inspection in 
laboratory
298
Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
ATSB5 * General aircraft information





NTSB1 * General aircraft information






NTSB2 * General aircraft information
* Instrument information
* Maintenance records
* Weight and balance 
information
* Witness statements
NTSB3 * General aircraft information
* Weight and balance 
information
* Performance data







NTSB4 * General aircraft information
* Engine information
* Aircraft logbook information
* Maintenance records
* Systems information
NTSB5 * General aircraft information








Report Section Sample 
Report




AAIB1 * Meteorological forecasts
* Meteorological observations






AAIB3 * Meteorological observations
AAIB4 * Meteorological observations
AAIB5 * Meteorological observations
ATSB1 * Meteorological forecast
* Meteorological observations
ATSB2 * Meteorological observations
* Sun position
ATSB3 * Meteorological aftercast
ATSB4 * FDR data * Meteorological observations
* Crew statements
ATSB5 * Witness observations
NTSB1 * Meteorological forecasts
* Meteorological observations
NTSB2 * Meteorological observations










NTSB4 * CVR data * Meteorological observations
NTSB5 * Meteorological observations
* Tidal records
1.8 Aids to 
Navigation
AAIB1 * Charts on aircraft * Maintenance records
* Service inspection
AAIB2 * GPS data
* On board radar data
* Review of available aids
AAIB3 * Not applicable
AAIB4 * Not applicable
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AAIB5 * Not applicable
ATSB1 * No statement
ATSB2 * Equipment fitted
* Handheld GPS data
ATSB3 * Equipment serviceability 
check
ATSB4 * No statement
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * No problems reported
NTSB2 * Equipment serviceability 
check
NTSB3 * Witness statements
* Equipment serviceability 
check
NTSB4 * No problems reported
NTSB5 * No problems reported
1.9 
Communications
AAIB1 * Site inspection * ATC recordings
* ATC statements
AAIB2 * On board communications 
recordings
* ATC recordings
AAIB3 * CVR recordings * Crew statements
* Witness statements
AAIB4 * Not applicable
AAIB5 * No ATC transmissions
ATSB1 * Crew statements




ATSB3 * ATC recordings
* SARWATCH timings
* Operator statements
ATSB4 * No statement
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * No problems reported
NTSB2 * No problems reported
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NTSB3 * No problems reported
NTSB4 * No problems reported




AAIB1 * Location of accident site * Maintenance records
* Runway specifics
* Airport facilities information
AAIB2 * Regulations for use
* Landing area inspection 
records
AAIB3 * Not applicable
AAIB4 * Aerodrome location
* Runway specifics
AAIB5 * Runway specifics
* Runway facilities
* Aerodrome procedures
ATSB1 * Runway specifics
* Terrain information
* Approach procedure
ATSB2 * No statement 
ATSB3 * No statement
ATSB4 * Runway specifics
* Aerodrome facilities
* Approach procedure
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * Aerodrome location
* Runway specifics











Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
























* Data simulation (using 
unmeasured variables with 
known parameters)
Note: Sea water corroded some 
of the CVFDR tape
AAIB3 * FDR data
* CVR data
* QAR data
* NVM from GCU and BPCU
AAIB4 * Witness photographs and 
videos
AAIB5 * CVR data
ATSB1 * DFDR data
* CVR data
ATSB2 * No recorders fitted * Requirements for recorders
ATSB3 * No statement
ATSB4 * QAR data
* FDR data
* CVR data
ATSB5 * FADEC/ECU data * Witness video
NTSB1 * No recorders fitted * Requirements for recorders
NTSB2 * No recorders fitted * Requirements for recorders
NTSB3 * CVR data
* FDR data
NTSB4 * CVR data
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* Fuel ‘dipstick’ readings
* Cargo inspection
* Weight and balance calculation
* CCTV
AAIB2 * Floating debris location
* Sonar scans of underwater
* Structure recovery location 
plotting
* Recovery of wreckage from 
seabed
* Engine inspection
* Main and tail rotor inspection
* Flight control inspection
* Instrument inspection





* Insulation blanket inspection
* Systems inspections
* Part number records
* Tests on specimen parts
AAIB4 * Site investigation













ATSB1 * Structures investigation








Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
ATSB3 * Site investigation






ATSB4 * Structures investigation
ATSB5 * Site investigation
* Structures investigation
* Engine examination




















NTSB5 * Structures investigation
* Engine investigation
1.13 Medical and 
pathological 
information
AAIB1 * No injuries to consider
AAIB2 * SAR records
* Post-mortem examination
AAIB3 * Not applicable
AAIB4 * Post-mortem examination
AAIB5 * Post-mortem examination
* Injury records
ATSB1 * No statement
ATSB2 * Impact not survivable
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ATSB3 * Impact not survivable
ATSB4 * No statement
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * Post-mortem examination




NTSB3 * Post-mortem examination
NTSB4 * Post-mortem examination
NTSB5 * Breathalyzer tests
* Injury records
* Passenger interviews
1.14 Fire AAIB1 * Foam blanket laid around 
aircraft
* ARFFS statement
AAIB2 * There was no fire
AAIB3 * Thermal camera images * ARFFS statements
AAIB4 * Site inspection - severe post-
impact fire
AAIB5 * No evidence of fire
ATSB1 * No statement
ATSB2 * Site inspection - grass fire * SAR statements
ATSB3 * No statement
ATSB4 * No statement
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * Site inspection - no evidence 
of fire
NTSB2 * No fire occurred
NTSB3 * Site inspection - no evidence 
of in-flight fire, ground fire 
occurred




Report Section Sample 
Report
On Site Evidence Off Site Evidence
NTSB5 * No fire occurred
1.15 Survival 
Aspects
AAIB1 * None to consider
AAIB2 * PLB search * SAR response incident log
* SAR statements
* PLB search
* Immersion suit survivability 
conditions
AAIB3 * Not applicable
AAIB4 * Accident was not survivable
AAIB5 * Cabin inspection * Passenger statements
* SAR statements






ATSB2 * Impact not survivable
ATSB3 * Impact not survivable
ATSB4 * No statement




NTSB1 * Impact not survivable





NTSB3 * Emergency responder 
statements
* Natural gas emergency 
responder statements
NTSB4 * Cabin inspection
* Exit door inspections
* Passenger statements
NTSB5 * Certification regulations




* Emergency response log
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1.16 Tests and 
Research
AAIB1 * Aircraft navaid checks for 
serviceability
* Instruments checked for 
serviceability and accuracy
* Records of navigation aid 
calibrations
AAIB2 * Flight tests
AAIB3 * Components removed for 
examination
* Removal of comparison parts 
from other aircraft
* Flammability tests
* Review of past accidents
* Endurance tests
* Maintenance records
AAIB4 * Not applicable
AAIB5 * Not applicable
ATSB1 * Passenger survey
ATSB2 * No statement
ATSB3 * Fuel sample * Testing of sample components
ATSB4 * No statement
ATSB5 * Passenger survey
* Review of past accidents
* Engine manufacturer research
NTSB1 * Aircraft simulation and 
performance tests




* Aircraft performance studies
* TAWS simulations
NTSB3 * Aircraft performance 
simulation
NTSB4 * CVR data * Sound spectrum study
* Aircraft performance 
simulation with map overlay
NTSB5 * Biological material collection 
(bird matter)
* Aircraft performance study






AAIB1 * Operator AOC
* Operations manual
* SOPs




Report Section Sample 
Report




AAIB2 * Operator records
* Operator training and recency 
records
* Operations manual
* Operators safety management 
system
AAIB3 * Organisational structure
* Management structure
AAIB4 * Organisational control manual
* Training records
* Safety review
AAIB5 * Operator information
* Review of Regulations
* Emergency response 
procedures
ATSB1 * AOC inspection
* Review of operator emergency 
response plan
* Crew statements
ATSB2 * Flight and duty times 
management procedures
* Mustering procedures
ATSB3 * No statement
ATSB4 * Review of regulation
* Training review
ATSB5 * No statement
NTSB1 * Operational oversight review
* Witness statements
* Organisation history
NTSB2 * Organisation overview
* Training procedures
* SOPs
* Review of previous accidents
* Post accident actions
* Regulatory oversight








* Safety management 
programmes
* Post accident actions
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NTSB4 * Organisation overview
* Maintenance records
* Pilots training procedures
* SOP
* Regulatory oversight









AAIB1 * Crew statements
AAIB2 * Automatic Voice Alert Device





* Previous accident analysis
AAIB3 * Crew checklists
* Failure condition simulations
* Review of previous safety 
recommendations
AAIB4 * Legal requirements
* Manoeuvre simulation
* Previous display accidents
* Historic aircraft operation 
guidelines
AAIB5 * Review of regulations
* Human factors research
* Witness statements
ATSB1 * No statement
ATSB2 * Mustering procedures
ATSB3 * Review of regulations
ATSB4 * Training oversight
* Advisory material
* Operators route manual
ATSB5 * Review of previous events
NTSB1 * CRM review
* Review of safety 
recommendations
NTSB2 * Safety of EMS operations
* SOPs
* Review of previous safety 
recommendations
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NTSB3 * Previous safety 
recommendations
* Review of previous accidents
* Witness statements
NTSB4 * Training safety studies
* Post accident action reviews
* Review of changes to flight 
manual from manufacturer
* Review of previous safety 
recommendations
* Tyre requirements
NTSB5 * Wildlife safety studies
* Review of previous accidents
* Review of safety 
recommendations
* Survivability testing




AAIB1 * Not included
AAIB2 * Not included
AAIB3 * Not included
AAIB4 * Not included
AAIB5 * Not included
ATSB1 * Not included
ATSB2 * Not included
ATSB3 * Not included
ATSB4 * Not included
ATSB5 * Not included
NTSB1 * Not included
NTSB2 * Not included
NTSB3 * Not included
NTSB4 * Not included




Evidence Types and Collection Methodologies Recommended 
in ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
















* “Global Positioning Satellite 
(GPS) receiver and 
aeronautical charts or aerial 
photographs”
* “Plotting the bearing and 
distances from known 
positions on a large-scale 
map or by using aerial 
photography”
2.1 Determination of the aircraft 
location is the first stage of 







* “Careful examination of 
ground marks, or scars upon 
trees, shrubs, rocks, poles, 
power lines, buildings etc.”
* “Measurement and 
documentation of ground 
scars, as well as impact 




* “It is usually possible to form a 
preliminary mental picture of:
a. the direction, angle and speed 
of descent;
b. whether it was a controlled or 
uncontrolled descent;
c. whether the engines were 
under power at the time of 
impact;
d. whether the aircraft was 

















* Staking the wreckage
* Use a GPS receiver to 
identify individual 
components on the accident 
site
* Build a wreckage 





* “As each stake is placed, it 
should be identified with a 
unique number and significance 
noted in a log. A master log can 
be assembled by the 
investigator-in-charge so that 
return to specific locations or 
identification of distribution 
can be made”
* Combine the initial wreckage 
debris identification and staking 
effort with an associated 
position entered into a GPS 
systems database”
* The chart should record the 
locations of all major 
components, parts and 
accessories, freight and 
locations at which the accident 
victims were found, or 
survivors located, and if 
available, their identities. The 
initial contact markings and 
other ground markings should 
also be indicated on the chart 
with suitable reference to 
identify the part of the aircraft 
or component responsible for 
the marking. When terrain 
features appear to have bearing 
on the accident or on the type 
of damage they too should be 
noted on the wreckage 
distribution chart. Pertinent 
dimensions, descriptive notes 
and also the locations from 
which photographs were taken 



















* “Aerial view of the site
* The site ground view from 
each cardinal compass 
position
* The site from the direction 
the aircraft was travelling in 
at impact
* Ground scars
* Damage to trees and foliage
* Skid marks
* Photo inventory of major 
wreckage components
* Flight control surfaces and 
actuators
* Landing gear and other 
hydraulic components
* Cockpit switch positions
* Fire/heat damage and 
discolouration
* Human remains, injuries, 
blood/tissue smears on 
wreckage
* Extra items or items adjacent 
to items not accounted for
* Close ups from fracture 
surfaces
* Close ups of any other items 
you suspect may have 
contributed to the mishap
* Private property damage
* Steps in removing, opening 
or cutting apart components
* Any other photos deemed 
necessary”
2.2 * “Clear will composed 
photographs allow the 
investigator to preserve 
perishable evidence, 
substantiate the information in 
the report, and illustrate the 
investigator’s conclusions”
* “The general rule in accident 
site photography is to start with 
the most perishable evidence 













* Visual inspection and 
photography
* Close examination of all 
components




* Investigators should identify 
any damage to the airframe 






* Wreckage inspection to 
identify fatigue in 
components
9.4 * Fatigue may manifest in many 
ways. including as bending 
fatigue, tension fatigue failures 





* Inspection of smears 
(deposits of one material on 
another, eg. paint, oil etc.) or 
score marks (from one 
surface or object scraping on 
another)
9.3.1 * This investigation should be 
done before any components 
















* Visual inspection to identify 
static failures - “this failure 
is characterised by 
permanent distortion or 
rupture of the member”
9.5 * Fractures in metals differ in 
look depending on whether they 
are the result of tensile, 
compression, bending, shear, 
torsion or tearing failures. 
* Fabrics may fail through 
tensile, tearing, or teasing 
stresses. 
* Polymers may deform through 
tensile, bending or tearing 
forces. 




Corrosion * Visual inspection of 
corrosion  in metals or 
composites
9.11 * Corrosion may occur either 
chemically or electrochemically. 







* Inspection of failed 
composite materials - these 
behave differently to metals
9.8 * Macroscopic analysis of 
composites will not provide 
sufficient evidence on site, and 
selected composite panels will 
need to be recovered for 
laboratory review. Care should 
be taken as composite panels 





on of broken 
or damaged 
parts
* “Parts are collected, 
identified, and arranged on 
the ground in their relative 
positions”
8.4 * After the site is photographed 
and wreckage plot diagrams 
made, it may be beneficial or 
identify components of the 
aircraft to determine whether all 
parts are contained within the 
wreckage. Further, more 
complicated reconstructions, 











* The fire investigator must 
gain an overall assessment of 
the fire damage caused by 
the post impact fire. This 
will assist in knowing if the 
ground fire may have 
damaged the parts from the 
aircraft zone suspected to 
cause the in-flight fire”
* Identify ignition sources: 
either chemical, thermal or 
electrical
* Identification of 
discolouration of paint
* Photograph the evidence
11.1 - 
11.10
* “Supporting fire evidence for 
the scenario will be masked by 
the post impact fire and 
subsequent fire fighting 
response before the investigator 
arrives on site”
* “This is where knowledge of 
fluid flammability enters into 
the investigation. The 
commercial phosphate ester 
base fluids, such as Skydrol, are 
not readily flammable. Mineral 
oil base fluids are, however, 
quite flammable in the atomised 
spray release mode”
* Different materials will burn at 

















* Inspect for pieces of shrapnel
* Testing for chemical residue
* Inspection of metallurgical 
surface characteristics
19.2 * Use evidence collected on site 



























* Retrieval of all available 
recorded media from the 
aircraft wreckage for 
analysis away from the site
* Special retrieval processes 
may be required depending 
on the location of the 
recorders, and the extent of 
damage sustained in the 
impact/fire.
* If a recorder is found 
submerged in water they 
“should be rinsed in fresh 
(distilled or de-ionized) 
water and placed in the 
watertight container. They 
should be transported fully 
submerged in fresh water (or 
water from the site if clean 
water is not available”
* “It is important to note the 
location of the flight 
recorders and to document 
the conditions to which they 




* “Irrespective of the type of 
recording system no attempt 
should be made to conduct a 
read-out at the accident site; 
instead the recorder should be 
hand carried in a timely manner 
to an adequate playback and 
analysis facility where suitable 
processing by qualified 
















* “If used, did the equipment 
function as designed, or were 
there factors which 
prevented them from 
providing the protection 
necessary”
* “The ability of a crew 
member to have access to the 
required controls”
* “The crew members ability 
to see objects if their 
presence is part of the 
accident scenario”
* “The ability of a crew 
member to see instruments, 
warning lights or switch 
positions across the cockpit”
4.6 * This is an investigation into 
how the crew were operating 
within the flight deck 
environment, and whether they 
were limited in their operational 






* Review a copy of the flight 
plan to identify the 
“particular circumstances of 
the intended flight”
* The flight plan may be 
logged with an external 
agency, or may be carried on 
the aircraft.
4.7 * “It will often be useful, 
especially in the case of light 
aircraft flights operated on 
demand and training flights to 
ascertain what the crew’s 
intentions regarding the flight 


















“The investigator should 
check:
* Plotting charts
* Radio navigation charts
* Terminal area charts
* Instrument approaches
* Aeronautical charts 
(topographical)
* Visual approach charts
* Landing charts
* Aerodrome charts
* Aeronautical navigation 
charts
* Charts from the internet
* Electronic flight bags
* RAMS and navigation aid 
availability
* GPS databases”
4.9 * Investigators should confirm 
the accuracy of materials being 








in the flight 
circumstanc
es
* The planned weight and 
balance charts (possibly 
carried amongst pilot 
paperwork) should be 
checked against the set of up 
the aircraft: “The setting in 
the cockpit and the position 
of the variable tailplane, or 
the trim tabs, if appropriate, 
should be checked”
4.8 * The purpose of this 
investigation is to consider the 
variation between the planned 
weight and balance of the 
aircraft and the actual weight 






* “All instruments should be 
recovered, their readings and 
conditions documented and 
their connections examined”
13.6 * Readings on instruments may 
be determined through either:
1. visual examination
2. microscopic examination of 
dial and pointer for evidence 
of impact marks
3. internal examination of 
operating gears and 
mechanisms for evidence of 
impact marks or capture





* “All switches should be 
documented as to position 
when found”
13.3.2 * “When switch position 
becomes a factor in the 
investigation, the position of 
nearby switches should also be 
considered. Crew members 
reaching for a particular switch 
without correctly identifying 
the switch may inadvertently 














y of the 
engine
* “Assess potential issues such 
as in-flight fire, uncontained 
rotor parts and the visible 
condition of the entrance and 
exit stages of the engine”
* Conduct an inventory of the 
components (eg. “inlet, 
nacelle, fan, compressors, 
burner, turbines, exhaust, 
externals”)
12.2 * If evidence is not obvious 
through a visual inspection, the 
a complete engine teardown in 
a laboratory may be required.
* Investigators are looking for 
answers to:
a. “what thrust power was being 
commanded
b. what thrust power was being 
produced
c. what malfunctions occurred






* “The first step in propeller 
examination is to account for 
all the blades, particularly 
the integrity of the tips. If 
any portion of the blade is 
missing, the fractures on the 
recovered portion should be 
examined with a magnifying 
glass to determine whether 
the break occurred in flight 
or at impact. Evidence of 
fatigue or tension breaks 
should be carefully noted”
12.4 * “When properly correlated with 
evidence obtained from the 
engine, examination of the 
propeller can produce valuable 
evidence such as:
a. revealing whether power was 
being produced at the time of 
impact
b. rpm of the engine (in some 
cases)
c. propeller blade angle







* Collection of oil and fuel 
samples
* Samples of smoke or soot 
smears




* “At least 2 litres should be 
obtained if proper assessment 
of fuel is to be made”
* “Fuel samples should be in 
suitably sealed times. (Glass or 
plastic containers let in light 
which may spoil the sample; 
fuel may also absorb some of 






* Samples of hydraulic fluids
* Examination of the hydraulic 
pumps
* Establish system pressure
* Inspect operation of the 
pressure release valves
13.2 * “Most large aircraft have at 
least two independent hydraulic 
systems”
* “Investigators should obtain 
hydraulic fluid samples from as 
many sources as possible, eg. 







* Inspection of components in 
the system to identify any 
failures
* Check quality and charge of 
the battery
* Light bulb analysis
13.3 * “The external evidence, crew 
statements, on-board 
recordings, witness reports, air 
traffic control communications 
recording etc, will generally 
provide the initial direction for 


















* Visual inspection of the 
wiring
* “A magnifying glass and 
multimeter will be about the 
best tools for this work. The 
purpose of this examination 
is to identify any wiring that 




* “Considering the more than 
200km of wiring that snakes 
through the typical wide-body 
transport, it is apparent that 






n and air 
conditioning 
systems
* Physical inspection of 
superchargers and 
compressors, turbine bleed 
air systems, air conditioning 
systems, valves in the system 
and ducting
* Inspect function of crew 
oxygen masks
* Account for all portable 
oxygen cylinders carried
* Check for activation of the 
passenger oxygen system




* The integrity and functionality 
of all components in the 
systems should be investigated. 
Certain signs, such as soot in 
the turbine engine bleed air 
system, suggest certain causes 
(in this example, possible 
carbon dioxide contamination)
* Check the system as a whole to 
ensure valves in the system are 
set as necessary, gases 





Ice and rain 
protection 
systems
* Inspection of “pneumatics 
and thermal de-icing 
equipment, windshield 
wipers and rain repellant”
13.5 * Check control settings in 







* Examine selected settings on 
equipment
* Examine antennas and cables
* Examine on-board self-
contained systems
13.7 * Different equipment may be 
fitted to different aircraft. 
Confirm with maintenance 
records etc. the equipment 







* Identify, recover and inspect 
all flight control components
13.8 * “Identify, tag, and photograph, 
as is, as much of the system as 
possible. During this part of the 
investigation, be sure to 
document, both in your notes 
and with photographs, any 
observations which appear to be 
unusual
* If you must disconnect portions 
of the system, index by marking 
each side of the connection so 
that you can reconstruct. 
Document such disconnects.
* Mark the position of any 
component that might be free to 




















* Physical inspection of the 
systems
* “Fire extinguisher bottles 
should be recovered and 
examined for their state of 
charge”
13.9 * “Fire detection and extinguisher 
systems are becoming 
increasingly complex, therefore 
consideration may need to be 
given to using specialised 







* Inspect the extension and 
retraction functions, and 
switch positions and 
indicator lights in the cockpit
* Check for correct installation 
of bolts in landing gear
* Check that the two wheel 
halves match
* Check pressure in the brake 
systems
* Check the fuseable plugs
* Check tire quality and 
inflation
13.11 * This is a general investigation 
of all the components in the 
system, and how they fit 
together
* Consideration should be given 
to how the system functioned 
for a take-off or landing 
accident, if hydroplaning 
occurred, or whether the anti-
skid or spin-up protection 




Fuel system * Inspect quality and quantity 
of the fuel
* Inspect fuel tank selectors 
and valves
* Inspect feed tank fuel gauges
* Analysis of low-level and 
low-pressure indicators
* Physical inspection of the 
components and connection 
in the systems
13.11 * “Fuel system problems may 
occur very early in some 
mishap sequences although 
under different circumstances 
the even would barely be an 
incident. This is the aspect of 
mishap investigations which 
frequently requires a complete 
evaluation of the fuel system to 
disclose problems which 
provoked a set of events which 





* Label and photograph bodies 
in situ before movement
* Collection of body fluids on 
site




* Recovery of bodies is not 
carried out by accident 
investigators, but they should 
be aware of the pathology 
procedures, and know the 
practices of collecting evidence 





* Inspect the condition of the 
cockpit
* Inspect the condition of the 
passenger cabin
* Inspect the use of exits
* Identify the positions and 
condition of slides or rafts 
used
* Identify the location and 
condition of fitted cabin 
crew emergency equipment
* Record locations of cabin 
baggage inside aircraft
* Identify cargo locations
* Test functionality of 
emergency communication 
systems
17.2 * Within the process of the site 
and aircraft examination, 
consideration should be given 
to factors which may influence 



















* Inspect the point of impact 
and surrounding evidence, 
plus collect remains
5.6 “Investigators should attempt to 
collect the following:
* all feather material from aircraft
* all feathers found on the ground
* non-fleshy remains (beaks, 






* Investigate local weather 
conditions for possible 
presence of ground icing, in-
flight icing, or engine icing.
5.4 * Physical inspection of icing on 
an accident site is difficult if the 
investigator, or an emergency 
responder, can not immediately 
record its presence at the site, 








* Interviews: “Statements 
should be taken as soon as 
possible after the accident; 
they can always be amplified 
later if necessary, but first 
statements are usually the 
most accurate”
* Interviews with eye 
witnesses may have to be 
conducted on the site when 
witnesses come forward 
rather than be arranged for a 
later time
4.11 “The following information 
should be recorded where 
relevant:
* Personal data regarding witness
* Time of observation
* Location of witness at time of 
observation
* Anything heard or observed 
concerning the aircraft itself, 
and, if relevant, other nearby 
aircraft according to the stage 
of flight, such as: position of 
flaps, trim, taxiing, run-up, 
brakes on start, initiation of 
rotation, climb angle, estimated 
speed, estimated altitude, points 
overflown by the aircraft, 
headings, manoeuvres, position 
of flight controls, landing gear, 
falling objects, flames from 
exhaust, fire or smoke, light 
signals, anti-collision and cabin 
lights, landing lights, 
touchdown point, use of brakes, 
reverse thrust, any seemingly 
abnormal noise, phenomena or 
movement etc.
* Position of the main and and 
any scattered wreckage
* Position of bodies
* Any sketches that the witnesses 
may be able to provide to 
illustrate his statement
* Any photographs or videos 
taken
* Rescue operations reports
* If witness knows of other 
witnesses, their names and 
addresses
* Signature on one copy of the 




Rater Assigned Categories Per Card in Novice Investigator 
Perception Survey
The following list shows the hazard category or categories assigned to each card in the 
novice investigator perception survey.
Key:
Number  Hazard Category
1.   Aircraft location
2.   Fatigue
3.   Insects/wildlife
4.   Climate
5.   Security
6.   Fire and flammable substances
7.   Stored energy components
8.   Pressurised gases
9.   Military and ex-military aircraft
10.   Recent safety equipment
11.   Pyrotechnics and explosives
12.   Damaged and unstable structures
13.   General biological hazards
14.   Local state of hygiene
15.   Metals and oxides
16.   Composite materials
17.   Chemicals and other substances
18.   Radioactive materials
19.   Cargo
20.   Psychological hazards
21.   All environmental hazards (categories 1-5)
22.   All physical hazards (categories 6-12)
23.   All biological hazards (categories 13-14)
24.   All material hazards (categories 15-19)
25.   Impede gathering of evidence (rater assigned category)
26.   Not relevant to research (rater assigned category)
27.   Personal safety hazard (rater assigned category)
28.   Investigation management (rater assigned category)
29.   Working conditions (rater assigned category)
30.   More than five categories relevant (rater assigned category)
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)













































Fuel (ignition) 6 6
Safety 25 26
Other toxic aircraft materials 15 16 17 15 16 17
Sharp objects (glass / fuselage) 12 12
Biohazards 13 13
Fire 6 6
Aircraft fluids (hydraulic fluid / fuel) 6 17
Aviation fuel 6 6
Body parts / fluids 13 13
Metals / possible injury 12 15
Biohazards 13 13
Ash 13 16 6 15
Fuel and other fluids (fire!!!) 6 6
Sharp debris 12 12





Various fluids - fuel / hydraulic / 
extinguishants
6 7 6 17
Fire 6 6
Hazardous materials 30 24
Hazards materials on the aircraft 8 11 13 17 19 24
Sharp objects, cuts 12 13 12
Post-accident fire 6 6
Media 20 28
Ash 15 6 15
Mechanical (items dropping or falling 
apart)
25 12




Pressure left in systems / firing squibs 11 7 8 11
Mechanical (sharp edges, falling objects) 12 12
Personal injury from wreckage 12 13 12
Chemical hazard 17 17
Fire 6 6
Biological substances 13 13
Radiation (radioactive materials) 18 18
Sharp matters 12 12
Fume 6 6
Chemical substances 17 17
Biological hazards 13 13
Object falls in case of large aircraft 12 12
Disturbance of evidence 25 28
Media intrusion 20 28
Hazardous substances 30 24
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)












































Hazardous ashes 15 15 16 17
Hazards due to lubricants 6 11 17 17
Fire hazards 6 6
Hazardous fuels 6 6
Hazardous fumes 6 15 16 17
Fatigue 2 2
Personal trauma (psychological) 20 20
Losing objectivity 25 28
Destroying evidence 25 28
Fire 6 6
Fumes / vapours 6 6 15 16 17
Sharp objects 12 12
Pressurised vessels 8 8
Chemicals 17 17
Fire 6 6
Personal psychological trauma from 
witnessing post accident events
20 20
Uncoordinated investigation activities 25 28
Fire 6 6
Blood related diseases 13 13
Tripping 12 1 12
Cuts from metal parts 12 13 12
Mental distress 20 20
Sharps 12 12
Fire / explosions 6 11 22
Dangerous air cargo 19 19




Fuel pooling and fire 6 6
Loose debris - broken seats, loose 
baggage, etc.
12 13 12
Sharp edges - broken airframe 12 12
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Chemicals 17 17
Fumes / invisible poisonous gas 6 17
Fire / ash 6 6 15
Terrain condition / environment 21 1 4
Loose surrounding and aircraft structure 12 12
Airborne particles 13 16 13 15 16 17
Weather 4 4
Dangerous goods if the aircraft has 19 19
Fuel, hydraulic fluids, batteries on the 
site
6 17 6 7 17
Wreckage itself 12 12
Public 20 28
325
Appendix E: Hazards Identified in Novice Investigator Perception Study
Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)














































Terrain and weather 1 4 1 4
COSHH and material hazards 6 11 13 16 17 24
Fire 6 6
Myself and my team 26 28
Fuel fire 6 6




Terrain (geographical) 1 1
Trauma 20 20
Explosive risk (fuel / weapons?) 6 11 22
Chemical hazards (bio etc.), mechanical 
hazards
12 13 17 12 13 17
Environment of the crash site 1 3 4 5 1 3 4
Biohazards 13 13
Moving / lifting operations 12 29





Inadvertent damage of evidence 25 28
Unknown chemical, radioactive or 
biohazard cargo
13 17 18 19 19
Sharp objects 12 12
Fire 6 6
Hazardous material on board aircraft 8 11 13 17 19 24
Body fragments 13 13




COSHH hazards 6 11 13 16 17 28
Weather 4 4
Biohazards 13 13
Unintentional movement of evidence 25 28
Slips / trips / falls 1 12 1 12
Chemicals / toxic goods 17 17
Carbon fibre 16 16
Sharp objects 12 12
Protecting evidence 25 28
Blood borne pathogens (biohazards) 13 13
Communicable disease Hepatitis B 13 13
Organic (plant vegetation) 1 1
Accident debris 12 12
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)









































Animal / insect (Weils disease, bites) 3 3
Fire 6 6
Sharp objects (torn metal etc.) 12 12
Environment (cold, rough terrain, steep 
climbs, rolling rocks, snow ravines)
1 4 1 4
Explosive materials / systems (from 
cargo, from aircraft systems, pressurised 
containers, etc.)
7 8 11 19 30
Toxic material (both from cargo and 
aircraft systems)
13 16 19 24
Reptiles and or insects 3 3
Being cut on pieces of wreckage 12 13 12
Blood borne health contamination 13 13
Explosions 11 11
Sharp objects 12 12
Sharp objects 12 12
Bodies / pathogens 13 13
Weather - hot / cold / wet - exposure 4 4
Rough ground / damaged buildings - 
slips / trips / falls
1 12 1 12
Chemicals 17 17
Fumes / vapours from fuel 6 6 17
Sharp edges 12 12
Unstable parts of the wreckage 12 12
Equipments under pressure or 
mechanically pre-charged
7 8 7 8
Fire (if very early on site) / hot surfaces 6 6 15
Fatalities - trauma 20 20
Fuel 6 6
Fire out break 6 6
Radioactive radiation 18 18
Explosion from pressurised containers 8 8
Cuts from sharp (wreckage) objects 12 13 12
Snake and other bites 3 3
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Injury on the body caused by high 
temperature of some material
6 15
Wound with a cutting part 12 13 12
Injury caused by some explosions 11 11
Inhale some toxic gas 6 17
Ability to gain the most of any debrief, 
before and after going on site
25 28
Exposition by radiation 18 18
Immediate and subsequent personal 
stress
20 20
Remaining focused during time on site 25 28
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)













































Accumulating tiredness and fatigue 2 2
The smell / stench of the accident site 20 13 15 16 17 20
Hazardous materials 30 24
Burn 6 6 17
Snake or harmful animal 3 3
Cut from sharp tool 12 13 29
Infection 13 13
Blood 13 13
Influenza (fever) 27 13
Cuts as a result of sharp aluminium 12 12






Snake, reptiles, wild animals, etc. 3 3
Fire 6 6
Chemicals 17 17
Self injuries 27 26
Terrain 1 1
Shrapnel injury 12 13 12
Contact with pathogenic materials 13 13
Inhalation of poisonous gases 6 17
Fire, explosion 6 11 22
Hazard material (including smoke) 30 24
Environmental (eg. steep slope, forest, 
etc.)
1 1
Cut by sharp edges of debris 12 13 12
Inclement weather 4 4
Toxic substances (gas, solid, liquid) 6 15 17 15 16 17
Fire hazards 6 6
Sharp objects 12 12
Overhead hazards 1 1
Trip hazards 1 12 1 12
Slips and trips - hydraulic and other 
fluids
1 12 17 1 12 17
Chemical hazards 17 17
Flammable materials and sources of 
ignition
6 6
Sharp objects and biohazards 12 13 12 13
Rotating or reciprocating equipment 12 12
Bio 13 13




Detonation of gas or oxygen bottles 8 8
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)












































Sharp objects 12 12
Fire 6 6
Unsafe supports 12 12
Sharp objects (metal / non metals) 12 12
Pyrotechnics and pressurised bottles 8 11 8 11
Radioactive materials / fumes and smoke 18 6 18
Bites (insects), etc. in accident site 3 3




Metal pieces from the aircraft 12 15
Biological material and snakes 3 13 3 13
Blood 13 13
Hazardous materials 30 24
Body fluids 13 13
Sharp edges 12 12
Tripping hazards 1 12 1 12
Underfoot conditions 1 12 1
Explosive materials / bottles 8 8
Dangerous reptiles and flies 3 3
Toxic gases / fumes / smoke 6 6 17
Difficult terrain path clearance 1 1
Biohazards 13 13




Dust / fibres from damaged wreckage 
made from man made mineral fibres
16 16
Radiological (beta lights etc.) 18 18
Contamination from leaking fuel, oils 
and greases, as well as from bio 
contamination from bodily fluids
6 13 6 13 17
Injury whilst lifting or moving wreckage 12 12
Sharp edges (sheared metal / glass) 12 12
Biohazard (blood borne, tetanus etc.) 13 13




Chemical / dangerous goods 17 19 17 19
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Sharp objects 12 12
Fire 6 6
Pathogens from body fluids 13 13
Items under pressure (oxygen bottles, 
fire extinguishers, tyres)
8 11 7 8
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)











































Hydraulic oil and fuel (liquid and gas) 6 8 17 6 17
Human remains (blood etc.) 13 13
Sharp edges from wreckage 12 12
Availability of wreckage (terrain, 
climate, etc.)
1 3 4 5 1 4
Smoke 6 6
Chemicals (fuel, hydraulic fluids, etc.) 6 17 6 17
Sharp objects 12 12
Bio-hazards 13 13
Biohazards 13 13
Injuries from jagged metals 12 12
Possible explosions from on board 
materials
11 11
Possibilities of falling over / hazardous 
materials on board the craft
12 13 17 19 1 12 24
Cut by sharp edges 12 13 12
Trip and fall 12 1 12
Contact with radioactive materials 18 18
Fire hazards 6 6
Sharp metal pieces 12 12
Wild life attack 3 3
Fall from height 1 12 29
Radioactive substance 18 18
Toxic 6 13 16 17 18 26
Explosion 11 11
Metal pieces from the aircraft 12 15
Chemical / solvents 17 17
Trip hazards 12 1 12
Sharp edges 12 12
Depends on the accident 26 28
Chemical from contamination gases 17 17
Hostile environment eg. terrain 5 1 4
Elements such as rain, heat, cold 4 4
Unaware of the location based hazards 
eg. live electrical equipment
1 1
Unaware of the safety rules at site and 
violates it
25 28
Unsecured objects eg. derailed train 12 12
Spilt chemical, toxic gas etc. 17 17
Hurt by unexpected rescue / recovery 
operation
25 29
MMMF - man made mineral fibres 16 16
Insecure site 5 5
Electrical discharge 7 7
Slip / trip hazards 1 12 1 12
Enemy fire (I'm military!) 5 5
Biological 13 13
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)













































Risk of injury, wounds 13 12
Nuclear contamination 18 18
Emotional impressed by the accident 20 20
Injury from debris - metallic 12 13 12
Fire explosion from fuel and electrical 
short circuits
6 7 6 7
Driving to the accident site 1 29
Working at height / on / through the 
wreckage
1 12 29
Falling objects / unstable wreckage 12 12
Ignorance of the total environment 25 14 21
Lack of adequate risk assessment 25 28
Inadequate safety brief 25 28
Lack of co-ordination / liaison / 
command / planning
25 28
Failure to follow procedures / human 
error
25 28
Chemical fumes / ingestion 17 17
Explosive cartridges 11 11
Fire (from fuel) 6 6
Fumes (from fuel) 6 6
Terrain 1 1
Sharp bits 12 12
Munitions (if military aircraft) 11 9 11
Train movements 12 1
Emergency service vehicle movements 25 29
Overhead lines 1 1
Lone working 25 29
Slips, trips, falls 1 12 1 12
Hazardous gases 8 15 16 17
Fire 6 6
Injury from debris 12 13 12
Mineral oil 6 17
Terrain 1 1
Explosions 11 22
Toxic substances 6 13 16 17
Bio hazards 13 13
Physical hazards in accident area 1 3 4 5 12 12
Slip, fall etc. when getting to the place 1 1 12
Working at height 25 29
Electrical hazard 1 7
Falling objects 12 12
Insufficient illumination 25 29
Confined space 1 29
Blood born pathogens 13 13
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)











































Hazardous materials (cargo, materials, 
effects of fire)
24 24




Stability of accident vehicle and site 12 12
Sharp objects 12 12
Blood / disease 13 13
Glass / shrapnel 12 12
Toxic waste 6 13 16 17 13
Moving parts 12 12
Physical (slips, trips, cuts, etc.) 1 12 1 12
Chemical and fuel (contact and 
inhalation)
6 17 17
Body fluids (contact and skin exposure) 13 13
Mechanical (if machinery is to be 
operated)
12 29
Elements (sun, wind, dehydration, etc) 4 4
Physical injury 27 22
Electricity 1 1
Chemical 17 17
Falls 1 12 1 12
Press 20 28
Hours of work - fatigue 2 20 2
Ground conditions - uneven and 
cluttered
1 1
Overhead power 1 1
Crainage (sic) - lifting equipment 12 29
Light conditions - night? 25 29
Fire / highly volatile materials 6 6
Compressed cylinders 8 7 8
Sharp objects 12 12
Pathogens / toxic chemicals 13 17 13 17
Airborne fibres 16 15 16 17 23
Sharp objects 12 12
Chemicals 17 17
Loose objects / unstable 12 12
Overhead power lines 1 1
Gas supplies or cylinders 8 8
Fire 6 6
Volatile / highly flammable fluids 6 6
Sharp broken metal parts 12 12
Very steep slopey terrain 1 1
Explosives / dangerous goods on board 11 18 19 9 10 11 19
Fire (spontaneous combustion) 6 6
Hazardous materials (chemicals, etc.) 17 17
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)







































Terrain (eg steep slopes / mountains, 
ravines)
1 1
Complacency (eg. over-confidence, 
carelessness of others)
25 28
Environmental (hot, cold, wind, etc.) 4 4
Physical - structures / wreckage / fire / 
smoke
12 13 6 12
Psychological - mental trauma / stress 20 20
Biological - disease, chemical hazards 13 17 13 17
Environmental - hot and high, cold, 
(military - desert, jungle, arctic)
1 3 4 5 1 4
Hostile action: if it’s in military conflict / 
dangerous air cargo / weapons
5 19 5 11 19
The incident aircraft, parts and debris 
(carbon fibres)
16 15 16 17 19 22
Chemical and biological + toxic agents 
(carbon fibres)
13 17 13 16 17
Weapons, explosives, dangerous cargo 11 17 18 19 11 19
Environmental (weather, terrain) 1 4 1 4
Personnel (yourself, your team, 
responders, media)
25 28
Dead / injured people lying about 13 20 13 20
Local climatic conditions prevailing 4 4
Infection whilst conducting investigation 13 13
Getting injured whilst conducting 
investigation
25 29




Toxic chemical 17 17
Harmful radiation 18 18
Moving mechanics 12 12
Terrorist 5 5
Cuts from jagged wreckage / sharps 12 13 12
Trip hazards - uneven surfaces, wreckage 1 12 1 12
Chemical - dangerous goods / substances 17 19 17 19
Disease - blood / effluent, etc. 13 13
Risk of explosion or fire 6 11 22
Pathogens / carcinogens 13 16 13 15 16 17
Hazardous materials 30 24
Waste materials 13 13
Sharp objects 12 12
Live electrical currents 1 1
Biohazards / blood borne pathogens 13 13
Fire (fuel) 6 6
Sharps 12 12
Burnt carbon fibre 16 16
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)









































Trip hazards 12 1 12
Sharp wreckage 12 12
Unsteady ground / surfaces 1 1
Chemicals and other substances 
exposure
17 17
Inhalation of fibres 16 15 16
Dehydration and illness from exposure 
to weather
4 4
To act when I see the scene 20 28
Fires / fumes (chemicals) 6 6 17
Fit for the job (physically) 2 28
Torn up parts can hurt you 12 12
The scene can be not easy to be in, not 
easy to reach
1 1 3 4 5
Sharp edges - cut 12 13 12
Uneven walking surface - trip 1 1
Loose wreckage falling onto rescuers / 
investigators
12 12
Environmental - electric wires, other 
vehicles, weather
1 4 1 4 29
Contaminants - chemicals, fuel, waste 
containers, body decay
9 13 17 6 13 17
HAZMAT 17 24
Explosives (I'm with the air force) 11 9 11
Sharp objects and wreckage 12 12
Terrain 1 1
Bio hazards (blood borne pathogens) 13 13
Inhalation of particles or gas 6 16 15 16 17
Explosion 11 22
Sharp object 12 12
Falling down object (trees, avalanche, 
wreckage)
1 1 12
Contact with dangerous goods (hydraulic 
oil, liquid, blood)
13 17 13 17 19
Possible explosion / flammables 11 22
Fuel ignition 6 6
Toxic gas 6 17
Free fall of damaged spares 12 12
Sharp edges 12 12
Wreckage / debris 12 12
Effluent 13 13
Dangerous goods 11 19 19
Smoke / fire / environment 1 3 4 6 12 1 3 4 6 15
Body parts 13 13
Contamination 13 13
Sharp edges 12 12
Explosions - fuel - fire hazards 6 11 22
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)








































Falling objects (non stable objects), 
moving objects
12 12
Weather (snow, rain) 4 4
Biological factors 13 13
Chemical / radioactive agents 17 18 17 18
Debris 12 12
Natural environment 1 4 1 3 4
Other on scene people activities 25 28
The wreckage 12 12
Biological 13 13
Biochemical 13 13
Fluids (fuel / hydraulic / oil …) 6 6 17
The media! My self! 20 28
Inhalation hazard - including toxic fumes 
from combustion, released chemical 
vapours, composite fibre dust
16 17 15 16 17
Blood borne pathogens, hepatitis (long 
term), HIV (shorter term)
13 13
Fires and explosions (heat, concussion 
effects from over pressure effects, 
projectiles)
6 8 11 22
Crash generated debris 12 12
Natural environmental hazards - terrain, 
weather, wildlife, etc.
1 3 4 1 4
Unexploded ordnance 11 9 11
Unstable equipment - i. topple hazard 12 12
Uneven ground - often in the middle of 
nowhere
1 1
Sharp objects 12 12
Hazardous substances 30 19
Dangerous goods 19 19
Exploding things 11 6 15 17
Fire / smoke / gases 6 13
Human "fluids" - hepatitis A - Z, HIV 13 13
Weather / nature 3 4 1 3 4
Toxic air / carbons 6 16 15 16 17
Fire / explosion (eg.  rescue equipment) 6 12 6 9 10 11
Sharp edges 12 12
Biological hazards (eg.  HIV) 13 13
Psychological trauma 20 20
Injuries from damage parts etc. 12 13 12
Toxic material and gas 6 16 24
Biological material 13 13
Stress 20 20
Fatigue 2 2
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
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Fluids - fuel / oil / hydraulic 6 6 17
Gases - pressure / poisonous 6 8 8 17
Slips / trips 1 12 1 12
Sharp edges / impact hazards 12 12
Fire and wreckage 5 12 22
Chemical and fuel 6 17 6 17
Biological 13 13
Sabotage 25 5
Environment - terrain, weather, confined 
space
1 4 1 4
Unexploded munitions 11 9 11
On board explosives / rocket propellants 10 11 9 10 11
Liquid oxygen leaks 8 8
Poisonous substances from AIM-9 
seeker head (Indium Antimonide)
17 9 18
Carbon fibre ingestion 16 16
Terrain hazard 1 3 4 5 1
Fire hazard 6 6
Chemical hazards 17 17
Biological hazards (blood / fluids) 13 13
Composite material hazard 16 16
Parts pressure loaded 11 7 8
Blood borne 13 13
Terrain, environment 21 1 3 4
Sharp and jagged objects 12 12
Aircraft parts (tyres, hydraulic, etc.) 7 7
Airborne pathogens / vapours 13 15 16 17 23
Unknown substances COSHH 30 17
Blood pathogens 13 13
Manual handling / wreckage 12 12
Sharps' cuts PPE 12 12
Survivors / general public / security 
services
20 28
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Sharp hazards (metals) 12 12
Composites 16 16
Pressure vessels 8 8
Family, next of kin 20 20
Terrain 1 1
Weather 4 4
Radioactive materials 18 18
Explosive materials 11 11
Oxygen bottles 8 8
Hydraulic pressure 7 7 8
MMMF - dusts / fibres / puncture risks 16 16
Products of combustion 15 6 15
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
Rater A (category 
numbers assigned)












































Human remains - pathogens, etc. 13 13
Physical risk through stability of 
wreckage
12 12
Site risks 1 12 1 3 4 5
Blood borne pathogens / disease 13 13
MMF / materials 16 16
Psychological effects 20 20
Vehicle movements, etc. 12 29
Environmental hazards 21 21
Poisonous smoke 6 6 17
Explosives 11 11
Fire and heat 6 6
Corrosives 12 17
Environment / landscape 21 1 3 4
Wreckage 12 12
Weather 4 4
Co-ordination and communication 
between site attendees
25 28
Fluids, fuel, hydraulic, cargo 6 17 19 6 17 19
Terrain 1 1
Fire / combustibles / fuel 6 6
Weather conditions 4 4
Local conditions / awareness 5 14 5 14
Unknown cargo 19 19
Bio (Hep A, B, C) 13 13
Materials (fluids, carbons, etc.) 6 16 15 16 17
Weather 4 4
Physical (terrain) 1 1
Stress (pressure) 2 20 20
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Skin breaks (cuts, grazes) 13 12
Fire or re-ignition 6 6
Unknown hazards (what are we dealing 
with?)
27 28
Site terrain 1 1
Dangerous goods 19 19
Pyrotechnics 11 11
Bloods 13 13
Debris / wreckage 12 12
Site location / mountain / swamp 1 1
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Chemical hazards 17 17
Fire 6 6
Fire risk / fuel 6 6
Toxic aircraft fluids / hydraulics 6 17
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Card 
No.
Hazard identified (as written by 
survey responders)
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Airborne pathogens / burnt synthetics / 
fuel smoke
6 13 16 6 13 15 16 17
Bio hazards / passenger remains - HIV 
…
13 13
Terrain and weather (site location) (site 
environment)
1 3 4 5 1 4
Chemicals 17 17
Disease 13 13
Dangerous goods and cargo 13 18 19 19
Fire 6 6
Radio active materials 18 18
Disease from bodily fluid 13 13
Chemicals 17 17
Dangerous goods - cargo 19 19
Fire from kerosene 6 6
Hazards arising from parts used in 
construction of aircraft ie. gas canisters 
for slides, etc.
11 11
Environmental (hot / cold) 4 1 4
Psychological (loss of life) 20 20
Physical (sharp edges) 12 12
Blood borne pathogens 13 13
Fatigue (long hours / many time zones 
away)
2 2
Slip / trip / fall 1 12 1 12
Chemical 17 17
Pathogen / blood based 13 13
Burn 6 6 17
Psychological 20 20
Environment 21 21
Smoke / fibres / radioactive 6 16 18 6 15 16 17 18
HAZ MAT 17 24
Blood borne 13 13
Smoke, fumes, resin 6 6 15 16 17
Fibres (micro fibre) 16 16
Local weather conditions and terrain 1 4 1 4
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Novice Investigator Perception Survey: Cards Per Category 
with Complete Rater Agreement
1. Aircraft Location
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 87 Terrain and weather
2 96 Terrain (geographical)
3 100 Environment of the crash site
4 120 Slips / trips / falls
5 127 Organic (plant vegetation)
6 133 Environment (cold, rough terrain, steep climbs, rolling rocks, snow ravines)
7 144 Rough ground / damaged buildings - slips / trips / falls
8 185 Terrain 
9 191 Environmental (eg. steep slope, forest, etc.)
10 197 Overhead hazards
11 198 Trip hazards
12 199 Slips and trips - hydraulic and other fluids
13 225 Tripping hazards
14 226 Underfoot conditions
15 230 Difficult terrain path clearance
16 255 Availability of wreckage (terrain, climate, etc.)
17 282 Unaware of the location based hazards eg. live electrical equipment
18 290 Slip / trip hazards
19 311 Terrain 
20 316 Overhead lines
21 318 Slips, trips, falls
22 323 Terrain 




Number Name of Hazard
24 337 Terrain 
25 344 Physical slips, trips, cuts, etc.)
26 350 Electricity
27 352 Falls
28 355 Ground conditions - uneven and cluttered
29 356 Overhead power
30 367 Overhead power lines
31 372 Very steep slopey terrain
32 376 Terrain (eg. steep slopes / mountains, ravines)
33 382 Environmental - hot and high, cold, (military - desert, jungle, arctic)
34 387 Environmental (weather, terrain)
35 400 Trip hazards - uneven surfaces, wreckage
36 408 Live electrical currents
37 415 Unsteady ground / surfaces
38 423 The scene can be not easy to be in, not easy to reach
39 425 Uneven walking surface - trip
40 427 Environmental - electric wires, other vehicles, weather
41 432 Terrain
42 437 Falling down object (trees, avalanche, wreckage)
43 447 Smoke / fire / environment
44 457 Natural environment
45 468 Natural environmental hazards - terrain, weather, wildlife, etc.
46 471 Uneven ground - often in the middle of nowhere
47 492 Slips / trips 
48 498 Environment - terrain, weather, confined space
49 504 Terrain hazard
50 525 Terrain




Number Name of Hazard
52 550 Terrain
53 558 Physical (terrain)
54 564 Site terrain
55 569 Site location / mountain / swamp
56 577 Terrain and weather (site location) (site environment)
57 593 Slip / trip / fall






2 167 Accumulating tiredness and fatigue
3 354 Hours of work - fatigue
4 488 Fatigue






1 100 Environment of the crash site
2 130 Animal / insect (Weils disease, bites)
3 136 Reptiles and or insects
4 157 Snake and other bites
5 171 Snake or harmful animal
6 181 Snake, reptiles, wild animals, etc.
7 216 Bites (insects), etc. in accident site
8 220 Biological material and snakes
9 228 Dangerous reptiles and flies
10 269 Wild life attack
11 447 Smoke / fire / environment







2 87 Terrain and weather
3 100 Environment of the crash site
4 107 Weather
5 117 Weather
6 133 Environment (cold, rough terrain, steep climbs, rolling rocks, snow ravines)
7 143 Weather - hot / cold / wet - exposure
8 193 Inclement weather
9 255 Availability of wreckage (terrain, climate, etc)
10 281 Elements such as rain, heat, cold
11 348 Elements (sun, wind, dehydration, etc.)
12 378 Environmental (hot, cold, wind, etc.)
13 382 Environmental - hot and high, cold, (military - desert, jungle, arctic)
14 387 Environmental (weather, terrain)
15 390 Local climatic conditions prevailing
16 418 Dehydration and illness from exposure to weather
17 427 Environmental - electric wires, other vehicles, weather
18 447 Smoke / fire / environment
19 453 Weather (snow, rain)
20 457 Natural environment
21 468 Natural environmental hazards - terrain, weather, wildlife, etc.
22 478 Weather / nature
23 498 Environment - terrain, weather, confined space
24 526 Weather
25 547 Weather







28 577 Terrain and weather (site location) (site environment)
29 588 Environmental (hot / cold)





1 288 Insecure site
2 291 Enemy fire (I’m military!)
3 383 Hostile action: if it’s in military conflict / dangerous air cargo / weapons
4 398 Terrorist
5 553 Local conditions / awareness
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6. Fire and Flammable Substances
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 1 Fuel (ignition)
2 6 Fire
3 8 Aviation fuel
4 13 Fuel and other fluids (fire!!!)
5 18 Various fluids - fuel / hydraulic / extinguishants
6 19 Fire
7 23 Post-accident fire
8 27 Dangerous materials (fuel, hydraulic fluid, etc.)
9 33 Fire
10 37 Fume
11 46 Fire hazards
12 47 Hazardous fuels
13 53 Fire
14 54 Fumes / vapours
15 58 Fire
16 61 Fire
17 71 Fuel pooling and fire
18 77 Fire / ash
19 83 Fuel, hydraulic fluids, batteries on the site
20 89 Fire




25 146 Fumes / vapours from fuel
26 150 Fire (if very early on site) / hot surfaces
27 152 Fuel 
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6. Fire and Flammable Substances
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
28 153 Fire out break
29 170 Burn
30 182 Fire
31 195 Fire hazards
32 201 Flammable materials and sources of ignition
33 211 Fire
34 218 Fire
35 229 Toxic gases / fumes / smoke
36 233 Fuel 
37 238 Contamination from leaking fuel, oils and greases, as well as from bio contamination from bodily fluids
38 243 Fuel 
39 249 Fire
40 252 Hydraulic oil and fuel (liquid and gas)
41 256 Smoke
42 257 Chemicals (fuel, hydraulic fluids,  etc.)
43 267 Fire hazards
44 298 Fire explosion from fuel and electrical short circuits
45 309 Fire (from fuel)
46 310 Fumes (from fuel)
47 320 Fire
48 359 Fire / highly volatile materials
49 369 Fire
50 370 Volatile / highly flammable fluids
51 374 Fire (spontaneous combustion)
52 394 Fire
53 410 Fire (fuel)
54 420 Fires / fumes (chemicals)
55 440 Fuel ignition
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6. Fire and Flammable Substances
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
56 447 Smoke / fire / environment
57 462 Fluids (fuel / hydraulic / oil ...)
58 476 Fire / smoke / gases
59 480 Fire / explosion (eg.  rescue equipment
60 490 Fluids - fuel / oil / hydraulic
61 495 Chemical and fuel 
62 505 Fire hazard
63 541 Poisonous smoke
64 543 Fire and heat
65 549 Fluids, fuel, hydraulic, cargo
66 551 Fire / combustibles / fuel
67 562 Fire or re-ignition
68 572 Fire
69 573 Fire risk / fuel
70 575 Airborne pathogens / burnt synthetics / fuel smoke
71 581 Fire
72 586 Fire from kerosene
73 596 Burn
74 599 Smoke / fibres / radioactive
75 602 Smoke, fumes, resin
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1 149 Equipment  under pressure or mechanically pre-charged
2 244 Electrical
3 289 Electrical discharge
4 298 Fires explosion from fuel and electrical short circuits
5 513 Aircraft parts (tyres, hydraulics, etc.)





1 56 Pressurised vessels
2 149 Equipment under pressure or mechanically pre-charged
3 155 Explosion from pressurised containers
4 177 Explosion of oxygen bottles and cylinders
5 209 Detonation of gas or oxygen bottles
6 214 Pyrotechnics and pressurised bottles
7 227 Explosive materials /  bottles
8 251 Items under pressure (oxygen bottles, fire extinguishers, tyres)
9 360 Compressed cylinders
10 368 Gas supplies or cylinders
11 491 Gases - pressure / poisonous
12 501 Liquid oxygen leaks
13 523 Pressure vessels
14 529 Oxygen bottles
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9. Military and Ex-Military Aircraft - No agreement between raters
10. Recent Safety Equipment
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 500 On board explosives / rocket propellants
11. Pyrotechnics and Explosives
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 29 Pressure left in systems / firing squibs
2 93 Explosives
3 139 Explosions
4 161 Injury caused by some explosions
5 214 Pyrotechnics and pressurised bottles
6 262 Possible explosions from on board materials
7 308 Explosive cartridges
8 313 Munitions (if military aircraft)
9 373 Explosives / dangerous goods on board
10 386 Weapons, explosives, dangerous cargo
11 430 Explosives (I’m with the air force)
12 469 Unexploded ordnance
13 475 Exploding things
14 499 Unexploded munitions
15 500 On board explosives / rocket propellants
16 528 Explosive materials 
17 542 Explosives
18 566 Pyrotechnics
19 587 Hazards arising from parts used in construction of aircraft ie. gas canisters for slides, etc.
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12. Damaged and Unstable Structures
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 4 Sharp objects (glass / fuselage)
2 14 Sharp debris
3 22 Sharp objects cuts
4 30 Mechanical (sharp edges, falling objects)
5 31 Personal injury from wreckage
6 36 Sharp matters
7 40 Object falls in case of large aircraft
8 55 Sharp objects 
9 63 Tripping
10 64 Cuts from metal parts
11 66 Sharps
12 72 Loose debris - broken seats, loose baggage, etc.
13 73 Sharp edges - broken airframe
14 79 Loose surrounding and aircraft structure
15 84 Wreckage itself
16 99 Chemical hazards (bio etc.), mechanical hazards
17 110 Sharp objects 
18 123 Sharp objects 
19 128 Accident debris
20 132 Sharp objects (torn metal,  etc.)
21 140 Sharp objects 
22 141 Sharp objects 
23 147 Sharp edges
24 148 Unstable parts of the wreckage
25 156 Cuts from sharp (wreckage) objects
26 160 Wound with a cutting part
27 176 Cuts as a result of sharp aluminium
28 186 Shrapnel injury
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12. Damaged and Unstable Structures
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
29 192 Cut by sharp edges of debris
30 196 Sharp objects 
31 198 Trip hazards
32 199 Slips and trips - hydraulic and other fluids
33 202 Sharp objects and biohazards
34 203 Rotating or reciprocating equipment
35 206 Sharps
36 210 Sharp objects 
37 212 Unsafe supports
38 213 Sharp objects (metal / non metals)
39 224 Sharp edges
40 225 Tripping hazards
41 232 Sharp debris
42 239 Injury whilst lifting or moving wreckage
43 240 Sharp edges (sheared metal / glass)
44 248 Sharp objects 
45 254 Sharp edges from wreckage
46 258 Sharp objects 
47 261 Biohazards
48 263 Possibilities of falling over / hazardous materials on board the craft
49 264 Cut by sharp edges
50 265 Trip and fall
51 268 Sharp metal pieces
52 276 Trip hazards
53 277 Sharp edges
54 284 Unsecured objects eg. derailed train
55 290 Slip / trip hazards
56 297 Injury from debris - metallic
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12. Damaged and Unstable Structures
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
57 301 Falling objects / unstable wreckage
58 312 Sharp bits
59 318 Slips, trips, falls
60 321 Injury from debris 
61 327 Physical hazards in accident area
62 331 Falling objects 
63 336 Hazardous materials from vehicle’s damage - structure
64 338 Stability of accident vehicle and site
65 339 Sharp objects 
66 341 Glass / shrapnel
67 343 Moving parts
68 344 Physical (slips, trips, cuts, etc.)
69 352 Falls
70 361 Sharp objects 
71 364 Sharp objects 
72 366 Loose objects / unstable
73 371 Sharp broken metal parts
74 379 Physical - structures / wreckage / fire / smoke
75 397 Moving mechanics
76 399 Cuts from jagged wreckage / sharps
77 400 Trip hazards - uneven surfaces, wreckage
78 407 Sharp objects 
79 411 Sharps
80 413 Trip hazards
81 414 Sharp wreckage
82 422 Torn up parts can hurt you
83 424 Sharp edges - cut
84 426 Loose wreckage falling onto rescuers / investigators
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12. Damaged and Unstable Structures
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
85 431 Sharp objects and wreckage
86 436 Sharp object
87 442 Free fall of damaged spares
88 443 Sharp edges
89 444 Wreckage / debris
90 450 Sharp edges
91 452 Falling objects (non stable objects), moving objects
92 456 Debris
93 459 The wreckage
94 467 Crash generated debris
95 470 Unstable equipment - ie.  topple hazard
96 472 Sharp objects 
97 481 Sharp edges
98 484 Injuries from damage parts, etc.
99 492 Slips / trips 
100 493 Sharp edges / impact hazards
101 512 Sharp and jagged objects
102 517 Manual handling / wreckage
103 518 Sharps’ cuts PPE
104 521 Sharp hazards (metals)
105 534 Physical risk through stability of wreckage
106 546 Wreckage
107 568 Debris / wreckage
108 590 Physical (sharp edges)
109 593 Slip / trip / fall
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13. General Biological Hazards
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 5 Biohazards




6 34 Biological substances
7 39 Biological hazards
8 62 Blood related diseases
9 74 Blood borne pathogens
10 80 Airborne particles
11 86 Biohazards
12 94 Biological 
13 99 Chemical hazards (bio etc.), mechanical hazards
14 101 Biohazards
15 104 Contamination
16 113 Body fragments
17 118 Biohazards
18 125 Blood borne pathogens (biohazards)
19 126 Communicable disease Hepatitis B
20 138 Blood borne health contamination
21 142 Bodies / pathogens
22 158 Blood borne pathogens
23 173 Infection
24 174 Blood 
25 187 Contact with pathogenic materials
26 202 Sharp objects and biohazards
27 204 Bio
28 220 Biological material and snakes
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13. General Biological Hazards
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
29 221 Blood 
30 223 Body fluids
31 231 Biohazards
32 238 Contamination from leaking fuel, oils and greases, as well as from bio contamination from bodily fluids
33 241 Biohazard (blood borne, tetanus, etc.)
34 247 Blood borne pathogens
35 250 Pathogens from body fluid
36 253 Human remains (blood, etc.)
37 259 Biohazards
38 260 Biohazards
39 292 Biological 
40 326 Biohazards
41 334 Blood borne pathogens
42 340 Blood / disease
43 342 Toxic waste
44 346 Body fluids (contact and skin exposure)
45 362 Pathogens / toxic chemicals
46 381 Biological - disease, chemical hazards
47 385 Chemical and biological + toxic agents (carbon fibres)
48 389 Dead / injured people lying about
49 391 Infection whilst conducting investigation
50 402 Disease - blood / effluent, etc.
51 404 Pathogens / carcinogens
52 406 Waste materials
53 409 Biohazards / blood borne pathogens
54 428 Contaminants - chemicals, fuel, waste containers, body decay
55 433 Biohazards (blood borne pathogens
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13. General Biological Hazards
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
56 438 Contact with dangerous goods (hydraulic oil, liquid, blood)
57 445 Effluent
58 448 Body parts 
59 449 Contamination
60 454 Biological factors
61 460 Biological 
62 461 Biochemical
63 465 Blood borne pathogens, hepatitis (long term), HIV (shorter term)
64 477 Human “fluids” - hepatite A - Z, HIV
65 482 Biological hazards (eg. HIV)
66 486 Biological material
67 496 Biological 
68 507 Biological hazards (blood / fluids)
69 510 Blood borne
70 516 Blood pathogens
71 520 Blood borne pathogens
72 533 Human remains - pathogens,  etc.
73 536 Blood borne pathogens / disease
74 555 Bio (Hep. A, B, C)
75 560 Blood borne pathogens
76 567 Bloods
77 570 Blood borne pathogens
78 575 Airborne pathogens / burnt synthetics / fuel smoke
79 576 Biohazards / passenger remains - HIV ...
80 579 Disease 
81 583 Disease from bodily fluid
82 591 Blood borne pathogens
83 595 Pathogen / blood based
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13. General Biological Hazards
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
84 601 Blood borne 
14. Local State of Hygiene
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 553 Local conditions / awareness
15. Metals and Oxides
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 3 Other toxic aircraft materials
2 25 Ash
3 44 Hazardous ashes
4 194 Toxic substances (gas, solid, liquid)




Number Name of Hazards
1 3 Other toxic aircraft materials
2 80 Airborne particles 
3 122 Carbon fibre
4 236 Dust / fibres from damaged wreckage made from man made mineral fibres
5 287 MMMF - man made mineral fibres
6 363 Airborne fibres
7 384 The incident aircraft, parts and debris (carbon fibres)
8 404 Pathogens / carcinogens
9 412 Burnt carbon fibre
10 417 Inhalation of fibres
11 434 Inhalation of particles or gas
12 464 Inhalation hazard - including toxic fumes from combustion, released chemical vapours, composite fibre dust
13 479 Toxic air / carbons
14 489 Man made mineral fibres / composite material
15 503 Carbon fibre ingestion
16 508 Composite material hazard
17 522 Composites
18 531 MMMF - dusts / fibres / puncture risks
19 537 MMF / materials
20 556 Materials (fluids, carbons, etc.)
21 575 Airborne pathogens / burnt synthetics / fuel smoke
22 599 Smoke / fibres / radioactive
23 603 Fibres (micro fibre) 
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17. Chemicals and Other Substances
Card 
Number Name on Card
1 3 Other toxic aircraft material
2 32 Chemical hazard
3 38 Chemical substances
4 45 Hazards due to lubricants
5 57 Chemicals
6 69 Loose normally-contained materials eg. Hydrazine
7 75 Chemicals
8 83 Fuel, hydraulic fluids, batteries on the site
9 99 Chemical hazards (bio etc.), mechanical hazards
10 115 Chemicals





16 199 Slips and trips - hydraulic and other fluids
17 205 Toxin / chemical
18 217 Chemical from passenger luggage or aircraft
19 242 Chemical spill (cargo or fluids)
20 246 Chemical / dangerous goods
21 252 Hydraulic oil and fuel (liquid and gas)
22 257 Chemicals (fuel, hydraulic fluids, etc)
23 275 Chemicals / solvents
24 279 Chemical from contamination gases
25 285 Spilt chemical, toxic gas, etc.
26 293 Chemical
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17. Chemicals and Other Substances
Card 
Number Name on Card
27 307 Chemical fumes / ingestion
28 345 Chemical and fuel (contact and inhalation)
29 351 Chemical
30 362 Pathogens / toxic chemicals
31 365 Chemicals
32 375 Hazardous materials (chemicals, etc.)
33 381 Biological - disease, chemical hazards
34 385 Chemical and biological + toxic agents (carbon fibres)
35 395 Toxic chemical
36 401 Chemical - dangerous goods / substances
37 416 Chemicals and other substances exposure
38 428 Contaminants - chemicals, fuel, waste containers, body decay
39 438 Contact with dangerous goods (hydraulic oil, liquid, blood)
40 455 Chemical / radioactive agents
41 464 Inhalation hazard - including toxic fumes from combustion, released chemical vapours, composite fibre dust
42 495 Chemical and fuel 
43 506 Chemical hazards
44 549 Fluids, fuel, hydraulic, cargo







Number Name of Hazard
1 35 Radiation (radioactive materials)
2 154 Radioactive radiation
3 164 Exposition by radiation
4 180 Radiation 
5 215 Radioactive materials / fumes and smoke
6 237 Radiological (beta lights, etc.)
7 266 Contact with radioactive materials
8 271 Radioactive substance
9 295 Nuclear contamination
10 396 Harmful radiation
11 455 Chemical / radioactive agents
12 527 Radioactive materials 




Number Name of Hazard
1 68 Dangerous air cargo
2 82 Dangerous goods if the aircraft has
3 109 Unknown chemical, radioactive or biohazard cargo
4 246 Chemical / dangerous goods
5 263 Possibilities of falling over / hazardous materials on board the craft
6 383 Hostile action: if it’s in military conflict / dangerous air cargo / weapons
7 386 Weapons, explosives, dangerous cargo
8 401 Chemical - dangerous goods / substances
9 446 Dangerous goods 
10 474 Dangerous goods 
11 549 Fluids, fuel, hydraulic, cargo
12 554 Unknown cargo
13 565 Dangerous goods 
14 580 Dangerous goods and cargo




Number Name of Hazard
1 50 Personal trauma (psychological)
2 59 Personal psychological trauma from witnessing post accident events
3 65 Mental distress
4 97 Trauma
5 151 Fatalities - trauma
6 165 Immediate and subsequent personal stress
7 168 The smell / stench of the accident site
8 296 Emotional impressed by the accident
9 380 Psychological - mental trauma / stress
10 389 Dead / injured people lying about
11 483 Psychological trauma
12 487 Stress
13 524 Family, next of kin
14 538 Psychological effects
15 559 Stress (pressure)




Number Name of Hazard
1 105 Environmental
2 207 Environmental
3 540 Environmental hazards
4 598 Environmental
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22. Physical Hazards - No agreement between raters
23. Biological Hazards - No agreement between raters
24. Material Hazards
Card 
Number Name of Hazard
1 15 Dangerous goods / materials from aircraft
2 335 Hazardous materials (cargo, materials, effects of fire)
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Appendix G
Hazards Identified On Sites by Experienced Aircraft Accident 
Investigators
Hazards Identified by Engineering Investigators
Hazard Count
None 46
Airside / hangar operations / noise from other aircraft 25
Fuel 16
Slope of earth / steep terrain / difficult access due to slope 7
Biohazards / body parts / Human tissue / Human remains / Body fluids / Blood / 
Biohazard in toilet / Biological contamination / Bloodborne pathogens
36
Damaged composites / carbon fibre / glass reinforced plastic / carbon fibre shards 6
Burnt composites / burnt carbon fibre / 5
Wet and slippery ground / icy ground / slippery seaweed on ground 6
Unstable wreckage 2
Medical kit left remaining by ambulance services (may contain sharps) 4
Trip hazards 3
Hazards working on a ship / offshore 3
Working with cranes / lifting equipment 2
Sharp wreckage / debris / sharps / sharp metal 13
Oil 2
Dry powder extinguishant 2
Battery 2
Working on high platforms 3
Broken perspex 1
Field surface / uneven terrain 3
Lifting heavy wreckage 3
Cold weather / freezing windchill 5
Asbestos 1
Working in and around unstable buildings 3
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Hazards Identified by Engineering Investigators
Hazard Count
Marsh / waterlogged or swampy ground / mud 4
Hazardous cargo 1
Hydraulic fluid / Skydrol 2
Powering up aircraft 1
Hay fever 1
Dehydration 1
Access to the aircraft 1
Operation of flying controls 1
Mosquitos / Insects / Horse flies 3
Working at night 2
Wet weather 1
Livestock (both dead and alive) 1
Composite dust / Carbon fibre dust 3
Radioactive dust 1
Wreckage in trees 2
Gorse bushes 1
Broken branches and trees 3
Chemical weed killer 1




Personal safety / locals throwing stones 2
Pressurised cylinders 2
Fire residue / dust from charred wreckage 3
High voltage power supply 1
Flares 1
Poor access control 1
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Live cartridges in ejection seat / armed escape system / cartridge starter system 3
Protecting the safety of third parties on the site 1
Driving conditions to site 2
Fire extinguisher 1
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Hazards Identified by Operations Investigators
Hazard Count
None 114
Mountain / steep terrain 5
Slippery / wet / muddy ground 6
Biological hazards / pathogens 27
Aircraft debris / sharp metal / wreckage / sharps 12
Access to site 4
Rain / Snow 3
Cold weather 4
Fuel 8
Wooded areas / falling loose wood 2
Airside hazards 5
Ship hazards 2
Products of composite combustion 5
Damaged buildings 1
Uneven terrain 1
Composites / carbon fibre / fibreglass 8













Hazards Identified by Operations Investigators
Hazard Count
Lack of food / water supply 1
Weedkiller 1
Exploding nosewheel 1
Stress from conducting interviews 1
Manure 1
Ejector seat and canopy 1
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Hazards Identified by HS&E Responders
Hazard Count
None 1
Debris / Sharps / general wreckage 5
Blood / pathogens / tissue 10
Fire damaged or burnt materials 4
Wet, slippery ground 1
Lifting wreckage 1






















Recommended PPE for Investigators During Site 
Investigation
Recommended PPE for Investigators During Site Investigation
ICAO Circular 315 (2008a) Lewis and Burrell (2004) NTSB (2002a)
Half-face respirator complete with 
spare set of broad range chemical/
dust cartridges (the set should be 
effective for organic vapour, acid 
gas and P100). If space permits, a 
full-face piece respirator complete 
with spare set of cartridges should 
be included.
Several disposable dust/mist 
HEPA/P3 masks
Two or more disposable coveralls 
Several pairs of disposable nitrile 
gloves
Several pairs of disposable heavy 
duty gloves
One pair of Kevlar cut-resistant 
gloves with lined palm and fingers
Protective footwear with sole and 
toe protection
Hard hat
Eye protection: either safety 
glasses or safety goggles
Hearing protection: either ear 
muffs or ear plugs
Hand and equipment wipes
High visibility vest
Chemical or duct tape  
Appropriate severe weather 









Summer and winter weight 
uniforms (BDU)
Winter weight jacket with hood
Rain suit
Work boots with steel toes and 
shanks
Boots suitable for mountainous 
terrain
Head cover (baseball cap, winter 
hat or protective helmet)
Sunglasses
Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE)
Tyvek coveralls
Goggles
Leather gloves
Latex examination gloves
Boot covers
Particulate mask
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